Suzuki v Chuuk [2020] FMSC 6; 22 FSM R. 491 (Chk. 2020) (24 February 2020)

FSM SUPREME COURT TRIAL DIVISION
CIVIL ACTION NO. 2019-1014

PANDINUS SUZUKI,
Plaintiff,

vs.

CHUUK STATE,
Defendant.
___________________________

ORDER OF DISMISSAL FOR LACK OF JURISDICTION

Larry Wentworth
Associate Justice

Decided: February 24, 2020

APPEARANCES:

For the Plaintiff: Johnny Meippen, Esq.
P.O. Box 1169
Weno, Chuuk FM 96942

For the Defendant: Sabino S. Asor, Esq.
Chuuk Attorney General, Office of the Attorney General
P.O. Box 1050
Weno, Chuuk FM 96942

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HEADNOTES

Judgments - Stipulated; Jurisdiction - Subject-Matter
Although parties may stipulate to factual matters, they may not stipulate to interpretations of law. Thus, even though parties may stipulate to a judgment, they cannot stipulate to a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction to enter that judgment. Suzuki v. Chuuk, 22 FSM R. 491, 493 (Chk. 2020).

Jurisdiction - Subject-Matter
Parties cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction upon the FSM Supreme Court by stipulation, and therefore their agreement to do so is irrelevant. Suzuki v. Chuuk, 22 FSM R. 491, 493 (Chk. 2020).

Jurisdiction - Subject-Matter
Because parties may not agree between themselves and stipulate to subject matter jurisdiction, the court has an obligation to independently determine whether it has subject matter jurisdiction. Suzuki v. Chuuk, 22 FSM R. 491, 493-94 (Chk. 2020).

Civil Procedure - Motions - Sua Sponte; Jurisdiction - Subject-Matter
A court, whether trial or appellate, is obliged to notice want of jurisdiction, on its own motion. Suzuki v. Chuuk, 22 FSM R. 491, 494 (Chk. 2020).

Civil Rights - Acts Violating; Constitutional Law - Due Process; Judgments; Property
A litigant’s judgments against Chuuk are not vested property rights, and Chuuk’s failure to pay those judgments is not a due process or civil rights violation. Suzuki v. Chuuk, 22 FSM R. 491, 494 (Chk. 2020).

Civil Rights - Acts Violating; Judgments; Jurisdiction - Subject-Matter; Property
When the only basis the plaintiff asserts for subject-matter jurisdiction is that his state court judgments are property and the state’s failure to pay is a taking of his property without due process, the plaintiff’s suit does not involve subject matter over which the FSM Supreme Court has jurisdiction because the plaintiff’s state court judgments are not property, and the state’s failure to pay his judgments against it does not violate his due process or civil rights. Suzuki v. Chuuk, 22 FSM R. 491, 494 (Chk. 2020).

Judgments - Void
A judgment rendered by a court without subject-matter jurisdiction is void from the start. A void judgment is a legal nullity. Suzuki v. Chuuk, 22 FSM R. 491, 494 (Chk. 2020).

Judgments - Void
A court should never enter a judgment it knows would be void. Suzuki v. Chuuk, 22 FSM R. 491, 494 (Chk. 2020).

Civil Procedure - Dismissal - Lack of Jurisdiction; Judgments - Stipulated; Judgments - Void; Jurisdiction - Subject-Matter
When the parties’ stipulation to enter a judgment would result in a void judgment, the court must reject the stipulation for judgment and dismiss the case for the lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because whenever it appears that the court lacks jurisdiction of the subject matter, the court must dismiss the action. Suzuki v. Chuuk, 22 FSM R. 491, 494 (Chk. 2020).

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COURT’S OPINION

LARRY WENTWORTH, Associate Justice:

The court has independently determined that it must dismiss this case for the lack of subject matter jurisdiction. The reasons follow.

I. PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On December 10, 2019, the plaintiff, Pandinus Suzuki, filed his verified complaint against the State of Chuuk. Suzuki avers that he holds two Chuuk State Supreme Court judgments, both rendered in 1993, against the State of Chuuk and he alleges that $460,000 (out of a total of $475,000, not including interest) of those judgments remains unpaid. Suzuki asserts that the state’s failure to pay these judgments constitutes, under both the FSM and Chuuk Constitutions, a deprivation, or a taking, of his property without due process of law and that the failure to pay for over twenty years is thus a civil rights violation. He asks the court to grant him judgment on both of his causes of action and award him the $460,000 principal plus accrued interest, and further order Chuuk to pay this new judgment at the rate of $150,000 a year until satisfied in full.

Chuuk filed its answer on January 22, 2020, denying Suzuki’s legal conclusions. The court then issued a scheduling order, which also asked the parties to brief the effect of certain other court decisions and of the statute of limitations on the court’s ability to entertain this action on state court judgments. No briefs were ever filed.

On February 3, 2020, Suzuki and Chuuk filed a Stipulation for Judgment. In it, Suzuki and Chuuk stipulate to the entry of a judgment for $460,000 and to a payment schedule. They ask the court to enter that stipulated judgment and to approve their agreed payment schedule. The court concludes that, by stipulating to a court judgment, Suzuki and Chuuk are also stipulating that the court has the subject matter jurisdiction to enter the stipulated judgment.

II. STIPULATING TO SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

Although parties may stipulate to factual matters, they may not stipulate to interpretations of law. Berman v. Lambert, 17 FSM R. 442, 446, 450-51 (App. 2011). Thus, even though parties may stipulate to a judgment, they cannot stipulate to a court’s subject-matter jurisdiction. E.g., California v. La Rue, [1973] USSC 27; 409 U.S. 109, 112 n.3[1973] USSC 27; , 93 S. Ct. 390, 394 n.3[1973] USSC 27; , 34 L. Ed. 2d 342, 348 n.3 (1972) ("parties may not confer jurisdiction" upon courts by stipulation); Laughlin v. Kmart Corp., [1995] USCA10 283; 50 F.3d 871, 873 (10th Cir. 1995) ("Subject matter jurisdiction cannot be conferred or waived by consent, estoppel, or failure to challenge jurisdiction . . . ."); [1993] USCA9 1603; , 994 F.2d 666, 668 n.1 (9th Cir. 1993) ("The parties cannot, however, create federal court subject matter jurisdiction by stipulation. Their agreement is irrelevant."); Beale Int’l, Inc. v. Federal Rep. Of Nigeria, [1981] USCA2 310; 647 F.2d 330, 331 (2d Cir. 1981) ("Graven in stone is the maxim that parties cannot confer jurisdiction on a federal court by consent or stipulation."); LLP Mortgage Ltd. v. Vasicek, 227 F. Supp. 2d 1108, 1111 (D.N.D. 2002) ("subject matter jurisdiction may never be waived; parties may not stipulate to subject-matter jurisdiction; and subject-matter jurisdiction may not arise by way of estoppel"); Mehlenbacher v. Akzo Nobel Salt, Inc., 207 F. Supp. 2d 71, 75 (W.D.N.Y. 2002) ("it is axiomatic that the parties cannot agree between themselves and stipulate to jurisdiction in federal court"); see also CHARLES ALAN WRIGHT, LAW OF FEDERAL COURTS § 7, at 28 (5th ed. 1994). Parties cannot confer subject matter jurisdiction upon the FSM Supreme Court by stipulation. Their agreement to do so is irrelevant.

Because parties mayagree between themselves and stipulate to subject matter juer jurisdiction, the court has an obligation to independently determine whether it has subject matter jurisdiction. See Kosrae v. George, 17 FSM R. 5, 7 (App. 2010); Kosrae v. Benjamin, 17 FSM R. 1, 3 (App. 2010); Alanso v. Pridgen, 15 FSM R. 597, 598 n.1 (App. 2008); Bualuay v. Rano, 11 FSM R. 139, 145 (App. 2002). "The court, whether trial or appellate, is obliged to notice want of jurisdiction, on its own motion." WRIGHT, supra, § 7, at 28.

III. WHETHER JUDGMENTS ARE "PROPERTY"

The court will thus independently determine whether it has subject matter jurisdiction and thus the effect of the cases that the cour asked the parties to briefbrief.

In Narruhn v. Chuuk, 16 FSM R. 558 (Chk. 2009), the plaintiff brought an action in this court, alleging a civil rights violation - that the state had taken his property without due process of law - because state had not paid a judgment he had against it in the Chuuk State Supreme Court. The FSM Supreme Court abstained because whether the Chuuk State Supreme Court judgment against the state was property was a matter of Chuuk state law that no court had ruled upon and because the Chuuk State Supreme Court should have the initial opportunity to decide that unsettled issue of state law. Id. at 564. The plaintiff appealed. The appellate division affirmed this abstention and ruled that no precedent held that a state court judgment against a state (or any other judgment) was a property right. Narruhn v. Chuuk, 17 FSM R. 289, 398-99 (App. 2010).

Subsequently, the Chuuk State Supreme Court decided, in Kama v. Chuuk, 18 FSM R. 326, 331-334 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 2012), that a court judgment did not constitute property and that the non-payment of a judgment against the state did not constitute a civil rights violation. That decision was appealed. The Chuuk State Supreme Court appellate division affirmed. Kama v. Chuuk, 20 FSM R. 522 (Chk. S. Ct. App. 2016). It held that a judgment is not a vested property right. Id. at 528-30. It concluded that Chuuk’s "failure to timely satisfy a judgment does not constitute a taking in violation of due process or equal protection." Id. at 534.

Thus, Suzuki’s judgments are not vested property rights, and Chuuk’s failure to pay those judgments is not a due process or civil rights violation.

IV. LACK OF SUBJECT MATTER JURISDICTION

The only basis Suzuki asserts for subject-matter jurisdiction is that his state court judgments are property and the state’s failure to pay is a taking of his property without due process. Since Suzuki’s state court judgments are not property, the state’s failure to pay his judgments against it has not violated his due process or civil rights. Suzuki’s suit thus does not involve subject matter over which the FSM Supreme Court has jurisdiction.

A judgment rendered by a court without subject-matter jurisdiction is void from the start. Ehsa v. FSM Dev. Bank, 20 FSM R. 498, 507 (App. 2016). A void judgment is a legal nullity. Id. at 509. A court should never enter a judgment it knows would be void. Since the parties’ stipulation to enter a judgment would result in a void judgment, the court must reject the stipulation for judgment and dismiss this case for the lack of subject-matter jurisdiction because "[w]henever it appears . . . that turt ljuks jurisdictsdiction of the subject matter, the court shall dismiss the action." FSM Civ. R. 12(h)(3).

V. CONCLUSION

Accordingly, this matter isissedout prejudice.

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