Setik v Mendiola [2018] FMSC 30; 21 FSM R. 624 (App. 2018) (5 July 2018)

FSM SUPREME COURT APPELLATE DIVISION

APPEAL CASE NO. P12-2015
APPEAL CASE NO. P7-2016
APPEAL CASE NO. P9-2016
(Civil Action No. 2015-031)

MARIANNE B. SETIK, individually and as )
Administratrix of the ESTATE OF RAYMOND )
SETIK, and HEIRS OF RAYMOND SETIK, )
)
Appellants, )
)
vs. )
)
ANA MENDIOLA, individually and in her official )
capacity as President and Chief Executive Officer )
of FSM Development Bank; BRANDON TARA, )
Chief Financial Officer of FSM Development )
Bank; JOHN SOHL, in his official capacity as )
Chairman of the FSM Development Bank Board )
of Directors and as the Board Director )
representing Pohnpei State; NORA SIGRAH, )
individually and in her official capacity as Legal )
Counsel for FSM Development Bank; and FSM )
DEVELOPMENT BANK, )
)
Appellees. )
_____________________________________________ )

ORDER DENYING PETITION FOR REHEARING

Decided: July 5, 2018

BEFORE:

Hon. Larry Wentworth, Associate Justice, FSM Supreme Court
Hon. Cyprian J. Manmaw, Specially Assigned Justice, FSM Supreme Court*
Hon. Mayceleen J.D. Anson, Specially Assigned Justice, FSM Supreme Court**

*Chief Justice, State Court of Yap, Colonia, Yap
**Associate Justice, Pohnpei Supreme Court, Kolonia, Pohnpei

APPEARANCE:

For the Appellants: Yoslyn G. Sigrah, Esq.
P.O. Box 3018
Kolonia, Pohnpei FM 96941

* * * *

HEADNOTES

Appellate Review Ä Rehearing
An appellate court may grant a petition for a rehearing if it overlooked or misapprehended points of law or fact. Setik v. Mendiola, 21 FSM R. 624, 625 (App. 2018).

Appellate Review Ä Rehearing
Ordinarily, an appellate court summarily denies petitions for rehearing, but, when clarification may be helpful, some reasons may be given. Setik v. Mendiola, 21 FSM R. 624, 625 (App. 2018).

Domestic Relations Ä Probate; Jurisdiction
A Chuuk probate court cannot have jurisdiction over real property on Pohnpei even though the property’s registered owner was a Chuukese decedent for whom probate cases were filed in a Chuuk state court. Setik v. Mendiola, 21 FSM R. 624, 626 (App. 2018).

Courts; Jurisdiction Ä Territorial
It is a well established principle of law that a court’s jurisdiction does not extend beyond the boundaries of the state of its creation. This is because the authority of every tribunal is necessarily restricted by the territorial limits of the state in which it is established, and any attempt to exercise authority beyond those limits would be deemed in every other forum an illegitimate assumption of power. Setik v. Mendiola, 21 FSM R. 624, 626 (App. 2018).

Domestic Relations Ä Probate; Jurisdiction
Even if there had not been an heirship proceeding for the Pohnpei property in the Pohnpei Court of Land Tenure, the Chuuk State Supreme Court would still lack jurisdiction to probate the property since the land and real estate are outside of Chuuk. Setik v. Mendiola, 21 FSM R. 624, 626 (App. 2018).

Constitutional Law Ä Case or Dispute Ä Standing
When the estate’s ownership of the property ended in 2001 when the Pohnpei Court of Land Tenure issued its decision in the heirship proceeding for that property, the estate could not state a claim against the bank or its agents for events that occurred after the estate’s ownership ended. It lacked standing. Setik v. Mendiola, 21 FSM R. 624, 626 (App. 2018).

Judgments Ä Relief from Judgment Ä Independent Action
Neither the presence of other defendants, who were in privity with the defendant and who were nominal parties, nor the plaintiffs’ request for an injunction to prevent the enforcement of the earlier judgment, change the nature of the action from one seeking independent relief from that earlier judgment. Setik v. Mendiola, 21 FSM R. 624, 626 (App. 2018).

* * * *

COURT’S OPINION

LARRY WENTWORTH, Associate Justice:

Our opinion and the judgment in this matter were issued on June 1, 2018. [Setik v. Mendiola, 21 FSM R. 537 (App. 2018).] On June 13, 2018, the appellants filed their Petition for Re-Hearing.

We may grant a petition for a rehearing if we have overlooked or misapprehended points of law or fact. Nena v. Kosrae (II), 6 FSM R. 437, 438 (App. 1994). Ordinarily, we summarily deny petitions for rehearing, but, when clarification may be helpful, some reasons may be given, Iriarte v. Individual Assurance Co., 18 FSM R. 406, 408 (App. 2012); Goya v. Ramp, 14 FSM R. 305, 307 (App. 2006); Ting Hong Oceanic Enterprises v. FSM, 7 FSM R. 481, 482 (App. 1996), although in this case, it may be a matter more of re-emphasis of certain points than of clarification.

The appellants contend that court jurisdiction over the C-Star real estate was not an issue in the trial court case and that we erred in even considering the Chuuk probate court’s jurisdiction over the C-Star property and in ruling that the C-Star property is not tied up in a Chuuk probate proceeding. The appellants, however, raised that issue themselves by contending that the C-Star property was tied up in the Chuuk state court probate case handling the Raymond Setik estate. It was, in fact, the underlying basis for their trial court action and the claims they raised therein. They assert that the C-Star property became tied up in the Chuuk probate case when it was listed as an asset of Raymond Setik’s estate in that proceeding and the Chuuk court froze the estate’s assets.

The appellants’ basic misconception is that the Chuuk probate court could, or did, have jurisdiction over the C-Star property on Pohnpei because its registered owner, Raymond Setik, was a Chuukese decedent for whom probate cases were filed in a Chuuk state court. That the Chuuk probate court has not yet distributed the assets of Raymond Setik’s estate is irrelevant since the C-Star property is an asset of that estate over which the Chuuk probate court had no jurisdiction. "It is a well established principle of law that the jurisdiction of a court does not extend beyond the boundaries of the state of its creation." Wisconsin ex rel. Walling v. Sullivan, 13 N.W.2d 550, 553, 154 A.L.R. 841, 846 (Wis. 1944). This is because "[t]he authority of every tribunal is necessarily restricted by the territorial limits of the State in which it is established. Any attempt to exercise authority beyond those limits would be deemed in every other forum . . . an illegitimate assumption of power." Stewart v. Eaton, 283 N.W. 651, 654, 120 A.L.R. 1354, 1358-59 (Mich. 1939). As noted by the Chuuk probate court, ancillary proceedings were needed for Raymond Setik’s properties in other jurisdictions. In re Estate of Setik, 12 FSM R. 423, 431 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 2004) (ancillary probate proceedings needed in Pohnpei, Guam, and Hawaii for Raymond Setik’s properties in those places). And, as we noted, an ancillary proceeding was held in Pohnpei through an heirship proceeding in the Pohnpei Court of Land Tenure in 2001.

Even if there had not been an heirship proceeding in the Pohnpei Court of Land Tenure, the Chuuk State Supreme Court would still lack jurisdiction to probate land and real estate outside of the state of Chuuk. But there was an heirship proceeding in the Pohnpei court. The Pohnpei Court of Land Tenure, the court of first instance for such a heirship proceeding since C-Star was registered land, determined certain persons to be Raymond Setik’s heirs, and those persons, after being determined heirs, mortgaged the C-Star property to the FSM Development Bank to secure Manny Setik’s loan to run the C-Star business. We thus neither overlooked the estate of Raymond Setik’s ownership of the C-Star property nor overlooked that the estate was a plaintiff in the trial court. We noted that the estate’s ownership of C-Star ended in 2001 when the Pohnpei Court of Land Tenure issued its decision in the heirship proceeding for that property, and that the estate could not state a claim against the Bank or its agents for events that occurred after the estate’s ownership ended. It lacked standing.

We did not overlook that the plaintiffs had named defendants besides the FSM Development Bank. Those other defendants were the bank’s employees Ä its agents, and in privity with the bank. They were nominal parties whose presence did not change the nature of the action from one seeking independent relief from an earlier judgment. See, e.g., Butler v. Ungerleider, [1951] USCA2 28; 187 F.2d 238, 239 (2d Cir. 1951) (new defendant was in privity with plaintiff of judgment from which relief sought). Nor did the plaintiffs’ request for an injunction to prevent the enforcement of the earlier judgment change the nature of the action from one seeking independent relief from that earlier judgment.

We have carefully considered the rest of the petition for rehearing and have determined that we have neither overlooked nor misapprehended any points of law or fact, and therefore deny the petition. Berman v. Pohnpei Legislature, 17 FSM R. 452, 452 (App. 2011); Damarlane v. Pohnpei Legislature, 15 FSM R. 529, 529 (App. 2008); Panuelo v. Amayo, 12 FSM R. 475, 476 (App. 2004).