Hadley v FSM Social Security Administration [2018] FMSC 2; 21 FSM R. 420 (App. 2018) (31 January 2018)

FSM SUPREME COURT APPELLATE DIVISION

APPEAL CASE NO. P10-2015
(Civil Action No. 2015-021)

GLORY I. HADLEY, )
)
Appellant, )
)

0. )

)
FEDERATED STATES OF MICRONESIA )
SOCIAL SECURITY ADMINISTRATION, )
)
Appellee. )

__________________________________________ )

OPINION

Argued: August 9, 2017
Decided: January 31, 2018

BEFORE:

Hon. Dennis K. Yamase, Chief Justice, FSM Supreme Court
Hon. Larry Wentworth, Associate Justice, FSM Supreme Court
Hon. Camillo Noket, Specially Assigned Justice, FSM Supreme Court*

*Chief Justice, Chuuk State Supreme Court, Weno, Chuuk

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant: Salomon M. Saimon, Esq.
Directing Attorney
Micronesian Legal Services Corporation
P.O. Box 129
Kolonia, Pohnpei FM 96941

For the Appellees: Stephen V. Finnen, Esq.
P.O. Box 1450
Kolonia, Pohnpei FM 96941

* * * *

HEADNOTES

Appellate Review Standard Civil Cases Abuse of Discretion
An abuse of discretion occurs when: 1) the court’s decision is clearly unreasonable, arbitrary, or fanciful; 2) the decision is based on an erroneous conclusion of law; 3) the court’s findings are clearly erroneous; or 4) the record contains no evidence on which the court rationally could have based its decision. Such abuses must be unusual and exceptional; an appeals court will not merely substitute its judgment for that of the trial judge. Hadley v. FSM Social Sec. Admin., 21 FSM R. 420, 423 (App. 2018).

Administrative Law Judicial Review
Generally, there are three standards of review for administrative decisions: 1) arbitrary and capricious, or abuse of discretion; 2) reasonableness, or substantial evidence; and 3) de novo, or agreement review. The Social Security statute’s unambiguous language indicates a clear congressional intent for judicial review of all social security administration disputes upon the intermediate substantial evidence standard. Hadley v. FSM Social Sec. Admin., 21 FSM R. 420, 424 (App. 2018).

Administrative Law Judicial Review
The standards of review in any given administrative scheme are generally established by statute. Hadley v. FSM Social Sec. Admin., 21 FSM R. 420, 424 n.1 (App. 2018).

Administrative Law Judicial Review; Social Security Claims and Benefits
The standard of review for social security cases is highly deferential. The appellate court must presume the trial court’s finding that the Board’s action was valid and affirm the decision if a reasonable basis, or substantial evidence, exists for it. The appellate court’s role is to determine whether the trial court was correct in upholding the Board’s decision. In doing so, it reviews the Board’s decision to make sure that it applied the correct legal standards and reviews the entire administrative record to ascertain whether its findings are supported by substantial evidence. Hadley v. FSM Social Sec. Admin., 21 FSM R. 420, 424 (App. 2018).

Administrative Law Judicial Review; Appellate Review Standard Civil Cases De Novo
An appellate court has plenary authority over a lower court’s review of an agency decision, and applies the same legal standards that pertain in the trial court and accords no deference to the lower court’s decision. Hadley v. FSM Social Sec. Admin., 21 FSM R. 420, 424 n.2 (App. 2018).

Administrative Law Judicial Review; Social Security Claims and Benefits
A court will consider additional evidence at the aggrieved party’s motion only when supported by reasonable grounds for failure to adduce the evidence in the hearing before the Social Security Board, and when the claimant made no such showing of a reasonable failure to elicit evidence, the remaining question is whether the Board’s final order rests on findings of fact that are supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence, and if the court so concludes, then the Board’s findings of fact are conclusive. Hadley v. FSM Social Sec. Admin., 21 FSM R. 420, 424-25 (App. 2018).

Appellate Review Briefs, Record, and Oral Argument
Clear identification of parts of the record containing the matter that forms the basis for the appellant’s argument is the brief writer’s responsibility, and when the record provided by the appellant does not provide the court with the basis for the trial court findings, the appellate court must presume the findings are correct because, by not providing an adequate record, the appellant cannot successfully challenge those findings. Hadley v. FSM Social Sec. Admin., 21 FSM R. 420, 425 (App. 2018).

Appellate Review Briefs, Record, and Oral Argument; Appellate Review Standard Civil Cases Abuse of Discretion
When an appellant filed an appendix, but failed to include the relevant filings concerning the issue of whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion for enlargement of time, the record does not demonstrate error and the appellate court must presume the trial court acted within its discretion. Hadley v. FSM Social Sec. Admin., 21 FSM R. 420, 425 (App. 2018).

Domestic Relations Marriage
Under Pohnpei law, marriage contracts between parties, both of whom are FSM citizens, that are solemnized in accordance with recognized customs, are valid. Hadley v. FSM Social Sec. Admin., 21 FSM R. 420, 427 (App. 2018).

Domestic Relations Marriage
To find that there was a Pohnpeian customary marriage, the court need not find that the coconut oil and head lei ritual was performed, only that there is substantial evidence in the record to make a finding that the families of both parties to the marriage contract consented to the marriage, expressly or impliedly. Hadley v. FSM Social Sec. Admin., 21 FSM R. 420, 427 (App. 2018).

Administrative Law Judicial Review; Domestic Relations Marriage; Social Security Claims and Benefits
When the applicant testified at the administrative level that the marriage was accepted by members of her community; that she and her partner had been living together for three years; that she has a sacred Pohnpeian title exclusively given to the wife of the second in chief, which is her partner’s title; that her title is derived from being her partner’s customary wife; and that she serves as her partner’s wife at traditional feasts, Social Security’s determination that she had remarried was valid since there was a reasonable basis, or substantial evidence, for its decision. Hadley v. FSM Social Sec. Admin., 21 FSM R. 420, 427-28 (App. 2018).

Administrative Law Judicial Review; Evidence Burden of Proof; Social Security Claims and Benefits
In reviewing the evidence in the record below, the court must recognize that it is primarily Social Security’s task to assess the witnesses’ credibility, the admissibility of evidence, and to resolve factual disputes since substantial evidence is a deferential standard, which is more than a scintilla or some evidence, but less than a preponderance of evidence. The court does not assume the fact-finder’s role, since the issue is purely one of law. Hadley v. FSM Social Sec. Admin., 21 FSM R. 420, 428 (App. 2018).

Administrative Law Judicial Review; Social Security Claims and Benefits
When the court finds substantial evidence in the record supporting Social Security Board’s findings, it must affirm the Board’s decision that the applicant remarried and is thus not entitled to further social security survivor benefits as a result thereof. Hadley v. FSM Social Sec. Admin., 21 FSM R. 420, 428 (App. 2018).

* * * *

COURT’S OPINION

DENNIS K. YAMASE, Chief Justice:

This appeal arises from the trial division’s purported order denying Appellant’s motion for enlargement of time not before us and October 5, 2015 Order Granting Summary Judgment.

I. BACKGROUND

Glory I. Hadley was receiving social security survivor benefits as the surviving spouse of Weiner Hadley. By letter dated January 17, 2013, the FSM Social Security Administration (hereinafter "FSMSSA") informed Hadley that she had forfeited these benefits due to remarriage. Hadley appealed the decision to cease payment of survivor’s benefits to the FSMSSA’s Board of Trustees (hereinafter "the Board") and a hearing was held on April 2, 2015. The Board upheld the denial of benefits based on its finding that Hadley had remarried. Its decision was issued by letter dated April 6, 2015.

Hadley appealed the Board’s decision to the FSM Supreme Court trial division on May 14, 2015. The FSMSSA answered on May 25, 2015 and subsequently filed a Motion for Summary Judgment on July 6, 2015.

On October 5, 2015, the trial court entered summary judgment in favor of the FSMSSA and against Hadley. [Hadley v. FSM Social Sec. Admin., 20 FSM R. 197 (Pon. 2015).] The trial court found "that the evidence submitted on record, taken in its entirety, is competent, material, and substantial to support the findings of the Board in denying benefits to Hadley based on remarriage pursuant to 53 F.S.M.C. 802(2)" and upheld the Board’s decision. This appeal followed.

II. ISSUES PRESENTED

Hadley contends that the trial court erred:

1) because it was an abuse of discretion to deny an unopposed and thus consented to motion for enlargement of time made after expiration of the period permitted under the FSM Civil Rules; and

2) by granting summary judgment in favor of the appellee because there were triable issues of material fact on whether a remarriage took place because the record was absent of evidence that one had taken place and that controlling law on the existence of any remarriage as reflected in Pohnpei law does not recognize the union that the appellant was engaged in as a valid marriage.

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

First, Hadley claims that the trial court abused its discretion in denying her motion for enlargement of time. An abuse of discretion occurs when: (1) the court’s decision is clearly unreasonable, arbitrary, or fanciful; (2) the decision is based on an erroneous conclusion of law; (3) the court’s findings are clearly erroneous; or (4) the record contains no evidence on which the court rationally could have based its decision. Arthur v. FSM Dev. Bank, 16 FSM R. 653, 657-58 (App. 2009) (citing Panuelo v. Amayo, 12 FSM R. 365, 372 (App. 2004)). "Such abuses must be unusual and exceptional; an appeals court will not merely substitute its judgment for that of the trial judge." Id.

Second, Hadley claims that the trial court erred in law and fact in granting summary judgment in favor of the FSMSSA.

The Federated States of Micronesia Social Security Act (hereinafter "FSM Social Security Act") provides for judicial review of a decision by the FSMSSA’s Board as follows:

Any person aggrieved by a final order of the Board may obtain a review of the order in the Trial Division of the Supreme Court of the Federated States of Micronesia by filing in Court, within 60 days after the entry of the order, a written petition praying that the order be modified or set aside in whole or in part. . . . The findings of the Board as to the facts, if supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence, shall be conclusive. If either party es toCourtleave to adduce additional material evidence and shows to the satisfactsfaction oion of thef the Court there were reasonable grounds for failure to adduce the evidence in the hearing before the Board or its authorized representatives, and that such evidence is competent, material, and substantial, the Court may order the additional evidence to be taken by the Board and to be adduced upon the hearing in such manner and upon such conditions as the Court considers proper. The Board may modify its findings and order after receipt of further evidence together with any modified or new findings or order. The judgment of the Court upon the record shall be final, subject to review by the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court upon petition of any aggrieved party, including the Board, within 60 days from judgment.

53 F.S.M.C. 708.

Because Congress did not include a standard for judicial review in the FSM Social Security Act, we must look to the Administrative Procedures Act (hereinafter "APA"). Under the APA,

[a]n aggrieved party may obtain a review of any final judgment of the Trial Division of the Supreme Court under this chapter by appeal to the Appellate Division of the Supreme Court. The appeal shall be taken as in other civil cases, and the judgment be reviewed by considering the finding of the Trial Division in light of whether it was justified by substantial evidence of record.

17 F.S.M.C. 112.

Generally, there are three standards of review for administrative decisions: (1) arbitrary and capricious, or abuse of discretion; (2) reasonableness, or substantial evidence; and (3) de novo, or agreement review.^[1] 33 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 8331, at 2006). As the Trie Trial Division has noted, the statute’s unambiguous language indicates a clear congressional intent for judicial review of all social security administration disputes upon the intermediate substantial evidence standard. GMP Hawaii, Inc. v. Ikosia, 19 FSM R. 551, 554 n.4 (Pon. 2014) ("[T]itle 53, which codifies social security law cases, expressly uses the words ‘reasonableness’ and ‘substantial’ thus triggering the intermediate standard."). The standard is highly deferential and thus, we must presume the trial court’s findings that the Board’s action was valid and affirm the decision if a reasonable basis, or substantial evidence, exists for it. Thus, our role is to determine whether the trial court was correct in upholding the Board’s decision.^[2] In doing so, we review the Board’s decision to make sure that it applied the correct legal standards and review the entire administrative record to ascertain whether its findings are supported by substantial evidence.

Last, the court will consider additional evidence at the aggrieved party’s motion only when supported by "reasonable grounds for failure to adduce the evidence in the hearing before the Board . . . ." 53 F.S.M.C. 708.l Hadade made no such showing in the lower court or the appellate court. "Where no showing is made of a reasonable failure to elicit evidence, the qun thaains etherfinal order of the Board rest rests on s on findifindings ongs of fact that are ‘supported by competent, material, and substantial evidence.’" Id. If the court so concludes, then the Board’s findings of fact are conclusive. Id.

IV. ANALYSIS

Hadley contends that the trial court (1) abused its discretion in denying an unopposed motion for enlargement of time sought after the deadline, and (2) erred in law and fact in granting summary judgment in favor of the Administration and against her because there were triable issues of fact concerning whether she remarried, the record is absent of evidence of a remarriage, and that the controlling law used to determine whether a remarriage took place does not recognize a common law marriage as valid. We address these assignments of error in turn.

A. Order Denying Motion for Enlargement of Time

Hadley contends that the trial court abused its discretion when it denied an unopposed, but untimely motion for enlargement of time within which to file an opposition to the Administration’s motion for summary judgment. Notwithstanding Hadley’s contention, neither the relevant filing nor the trial court’s dispositive order are made part of the record.

Rule 30(a) of the FSM Rules of Appellate Procedure reads, inter alia:

The appellant shall prepare and file with appellant’s brief an appendix to the brief which shall contain relevant and essential portions of the record, including those particular parts to which the parties wish to direct the attention of the court. It is anticipated that the appendix shall normally include copies of the following: . .&.

(4) >(4) the jude judgment or interlocutory order sought to be reviewed from which the appeal is taken or sought to be reviewed.

Clear idenationarts of the record containing the matter that fort forms thms the basis for the appellant’s argument is the responsibility of the brief writer. Damarlane v. United States, 7 FSM R. 510, 512-13 (App. 1996); Nakamura v. Bank of Guam (I), 6 FSM R. 224, 228 (App. 1993). When the record provided by the appellant on appeal does not provide the court with the basis for the trial court findings, the appellate court must therefore presume the findings are correct because by not providing an adequate record, the appellant cannot successfully challenge those findings. Akinaga v. Heirs of Mike, 15 FSM R. 391, 397 (App. 2007). If the record does not demonstrate error, the appellant cannot prevail. Cheida v. FSM, 9 FSM R. 183, 189 (App. 1999).

Therefore, whereas Hadley filed an appendix in this matter, but failed to include the relevant filings concerning the issue of whether the trial court abused its discretion in denying the motion for enlargement of time, the record does not demonstrate error and we must presume the trial court acted within its discretion. Accordingly, Hadley cannot prevail on her first assignment of error.

B. Order Granting Motion for Summary Judgment

Hadley contends that the trial court erred in law and fact when it granted summary judgment in favor of the Administration. She contends that there remained a triable issue of material fact, i.e., whether she remarried as defined by Pohnpei law, and that therefore, it was error for the trial court to grant summary judgment in favor of the Administration.

Hadley contends that the Board determined that she had remarried by common law marriage and that, according to Pohnpei law, common law marriage is not a legally recognizable type of marriage. At oral argument, Hadley maintained that position, but also argued that a customary marriage had not been formed either because certain customary rituals to legitimize such a marriage were not performed.

Hadley’s argument that the Board’s decision was based solely upon a finding of common law marriage is misguided. First, the administrator’s comment at the conclusion of the administrative proceedings concluded that common law marriage and customary marriage are interrelated in that evidence of one can also be evidence of the existence of the other. Appellant’s App. at 10. Second, the Board’s final decision stated that "[t]he evidence presented without dispute showed that the applicant has been customarily married/engaged in a common law marriage for a period of three years." Id. at 11 (emphasis added). Thus, it is clear the Board concluded that both a customary and common law marriage existed based on the evidence presented.

A significant part of Hadley’s argument is that the FSM Social Security Regulations wrongfully expand Pohnpei’s definitions of marriage by adding common law marriage and that therefore the Board’s finding that she remarried was an error.

The FSMSSA defines "spouse" as "an applicant that the court of the State in which an individual was domiciled at the time of his death has or would find to be the individual’s . 0;. s in determetermining ting the devolution of intestate personal property." 53 F.S.M.C. 603(4) (emphasis added). Thus, the Administration, in determining wr onearried or not, must reference the law of the stat state in e in which the applicant spouse is domiciled at the time of the alleged marriage. Furthermore, Part 100.2 of the FSMSSA Regulations defines remarriage, which reads:

Remarriage is reviewed by FSMSSA under the same standards used to determine if a marriage has taken place, including if the remarriage was statutory (ceremonial), customary, common law, or a deemed valid marriage. FSMSSA may discontinue benefits based on remarriage in certain situations, though such decision may be appealed by the beneficiary.

Hadley takes issue with the Administration’s inclusion of common law marriage in its definition of remarriage, which is defined by the Regulations as

one based not upon ceremony and compliance with legal formalities, but upon the agreement of two persons, legally competent to marry, to cohabit with each other in the same household, or as is sometimes referred to as "under one roof", who in fact cohabited in the same household for a period of no less than a year, with the intention of being husband and wife.

FSMSSA Regs. § 100.18(b).

In supporupport of her position, she relies on In re Estate of Tokutake, 3A Pon. L.R. 444 (Pon. S. Ct. Tr. 1989), which reads:

[t]here are three recognized lawful forms of marriage by which the status of husband and wife may be acquired in Pohnpei, namely (1) statutory civil marriage under [51 Pon. C. §§ 2-101 et seq.], (2) statutory ‘religious marriage’ commonly known in Pohnpei as ‘inou saraw’ meaning (a sacrosanct vow) and (3) statutory customary marriage known in Pohnpei as ‘pwopwoud en tiahk en sahpw.’

Id. at 445. She claims that the FSMSSA’s recognition of common law marriage per se does not comport with the law of Pohnpei as defined by the Tokutake court and that therefore the Board’s reliance on the same to terminate spousal survivor benefits was improper.

Hadley, however, fails to acknowledge that the Board also found evidence sufficient to establish a customary marriage under the law of Pohnpei and thus we need not make a determination whether the FSMSSA Regulation’s definition of remarriage is per se ultra vires.

The FSMSSA Regulation’s definition of customary marriage reads:

Customary Marriage. A marriage between two citizens or habitual residents of the same jurisdiction or State solemnized in accordance with the recognized custom of that jurisdiction or State. State court decisions on this subject may be consulted in cases of doubt, but such Court decisions shall not be given conclusive effect unless they are supported by written findings of fact.

FSMSSA Regs. § 100.18(a). Thus, the Regulations’ definition of customary marriage must necessarily comply with Pohnpei law. Indeed, according to the law of Pohnpei, "[m]arriage contracts between es, both of whom are citizens of the FSM, solemnized in accn accordance with recognized customs, shall be valid." 51 Pon. C. § 2-105.

Here, Hadley contends there was no customary act performed to solemnize a customary marriage under Pohnpei law. The written findings of the Pohnpei Supreme Court trial division in Tokutake aids in clarifying what is considered "recognized custom," at least at the time of its decision in 1989. That court stated the following regarding customary marriage:

Under ‘pwopwoud en tiahk en sahpw’ (customary marriage) both parties to the marriage must be citizens of Pohnpei. 39 TTC 55; In re: Speetjen, (PCA No. 243-88). The families of both parties to the marriage contract must consent to the marriage, expressly or impliedly. Solemnization of a customary marriage takes many forms. According to the common forms the man takes the woman and introduces her to his family, and a sister or a close female relative of the man puts special coconut oil on the bride (keiedhi) and places a lei (kamwaramwarehdi) over the bride’s head. The application of oil and the placing of head lei on the bride, in many instances lately, are not practiced much. However, there must be some kind of gesture exhibited by the family of the bridegroom to indicate that they accept the marriage to take effect. . . . Any of these acts completes a valid customary marriage under Pohnpei custom.

In re Estate of Tokutake, 3A Pon. L.R. at 457-58 (Pon. S. Ct. Tr. 1989). We need not find that such a ritual was performed, only that there is substantial evidence in the record for the Board to make a finding that "families of both parties to the marriage contract [] consent[ed] to the marriage, expressly or impliedly."

There is testimony at the administrative level given by Hadley herself that the marriage was accepted by members of her community. As the trial court correctly found based on the testimony taken at the administrative level, Hadley admitted that she and her partner had been living together for three years and that she has the title of Kedmadaw, a sacred Pohnpeian title exclusively given to the wife of the second in chief, i.e. Peliendal, the title given to her partner. She further admitted that her title is derived from being her partner’s customary wife. During questioning, the Administrator came to a similar conclusion when he asked Hadley whether her title was given to her as the cultural wife of her partner, the peliendal, and whether she serves as the wife of her partner at traditional feasts, both of which she answered affirmatively. Last, the Board made an identical conclusion in its final determination to uphold the Administration’s finding of remarriage, concluding the following:

The Board listened to the testimony provided. Testimony showed the applicant had been living together with a partner for three years and taking part in customarial obligations as husband and wife. The evidence presented without dispute showed that the applicant has been customarily married/engaged in a common law marriage for a period of three years.

Appellant’s App. at 4.

We must presume the Administration’s action to be valid and affirm the Administration’s action if a reasonable basis, or substantial evidence, exists for its decision. In reviewing the evidence in the record below, we must recognize that it is primarily the Administration’s task to assess the witnesses’ credibility, the admissibility of evidence, and to resolve factual disputes. Substantial evidence is a deferential standard. It is more than a scintilla or some evidence, but less than a preponderance of evidence. We do not assume the role of fact-finder, the issue is purely one of law. Heirs of Benjamin v. Heirs of Benjamin, 17 FSM R. 650, 656 (App. 2011). Because we find there to be substantial evidence in the record supporting its findings, we must affirm the Board’s decision that Hadley remarried and is thus not entitled to further social security survivor benefits as a result thereof.

V. CONCLUSION

ACCORDINGLY, in consideration of the evidence on the record, the written and oral arguments presented by the parties, we HEREBY AFFIRM the trial court’s October 5, 2015 Order Granting Summary Judgment.

* * * *

---

^[1] "The standard of review system relies on several long established word formulas that communicate the proper role of the court in a given administrative scheme. The word formulas communicate the level and kind of judicial review intended by Congress. These standards of review are generally established by statute." 33 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE § 8331, at 153 (2006).

^[2] Generally, an appellate court has plenary authority over a lower court’s revf an agency decision." 33 CHARLES A. WRIGHT ET AL., FEDERAL PRACTICE AND PROCEDURE §&167; 8331, at 153 (2006). See, e.g., Associated Fisheries of Maine, Inc. v. Daley, [1997] USCA1 270; 127 F.3d 104, 109 (1st Cir. 1997) (when reviewing agency action, appellatet applies same legal standards that pertain in the trial court and affords no special deferdeference to that court’s decision); Aquarius Marine Co. v. Pena, [1995] USCA2 941; 64 F.3d 82, 87 (2d Cir. 1995) (on appeal from lower court’s review of claim of violation of Administrative Procedures Act, no deference is given to the lower court; whether agency action satisfies standards of APA is reviewed de novo); Ward v. Brown, [1994] USCA2 511; 22 F.3d 516, 521 (2d Cir. 1994) (on appeal from lower court’s review of administrative action, appellate court accords no deference to the lower court’s decision, conducts de novo review of administrative record, and renders its own independent judgment); Mount Evans Co. v. Madigan, [1994] USCA10 38; 14 F.3d 1444, 1455 (10th Cir. 1994) (giving no deference to district court’s determination and conducting independent review based on the same administrative record before the court below); Gas Appliance Mfrs. Ass’n, Inc. v. Department of Energy, [1993] USCADC 310; 998 F.2d 1041, 1045 (D.C. Cir. 1993) (where no additional testimony taken in district court, no deference given to that court’s decision); Washington v. Garret, [1994] USCA9 279; 10 F.3d 1421, 1428 (9th Cir. 1993) (court of appeals’ role is to determine whether district court decision was correct).