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Supreme Court of the Federated States of Micronesia |
FSM SUPREME COURT APPELLATE DIVISION
APPEAL CASE NO. K1-2017
(Civil Action No. 72-14)
(Land Court No. 20-13)
HEIRS OF NEIME PRESTON, )
)
Appellants, )
)
vs. )
)
HEIRS OF SISUO ALOKOA, )
)
Appellees. )
___________________________________ )
OPINION
Argued: May 1, 2018
Decided: June 1, 2018
BEFORE:
Hon. Dennis K. Yamase, Chief Justice, FSM Supreme Court
Hon. Larry Wentworth, Associate Justice, FSM Supreme Court
Hon. Camillo Noket, Specially Assigned Justice, FSM Supreme Court*
*Chief Justice, Chuuk State Supreme Court, Weno, Chuuk
APPEARANCES:
For the Appellants: Stephen V. Finnen, Esq.
P.O. Box 1450
Kolonia, Pohnpei FM 96941
For the Appellees: Yoslyn G. Sigrah, Esq.
P.O. Box 3018
Kolonia, Pohnpei FM 96941
* * * *
HEADNOTES
Appellate Review Standard Civil Cases De Novo
Issues of law, including the Kosrae Land Court’s jurisdiction and the applicable statute of limitations (to the extent it does
not require factual findings) are reviewed de novo. Heirs of Preston v. Heirs of Alokoa, 21 FSM R. 572, 578 (App. 2018).
Appellate Review Standard Civil Cases De Novo; Civil Procedure Summary Judgment
When reviewing a summary judgment, an appellate court uses the same standard that the trial court initially used when it determined
the summary judgment motion the appellate court determines de novo whether genuine issues of material fact are absent and whether
the prevailing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Heirs of Preston v. Heirs of Alokoa, 21 FSM R. 572, 578 (App. 2018).
Courts; Property Land Court
The Kosrae Land Court’s statutory jurisdiction includes all matters concerning the title of land and any interest therein.
Heirs of Preston v. Heirs of Alokoa, 21 FSM R. 572, 578 (App. 2018).
Civil Procedure; Property Land Court
An action alleging fraud or negligence or due process violation and in which the plaintiffs seek to regain the registered title to
a land parcel their predecessor once held and in which the defendants seek to retain the registered title in their predecessor’s
name so that, in the future, they will become the parcel’s registered owners, is a dispute over the parcel’s title and
is thus a matter concerning the title of land and the interests therein, over which the Kosrae Land Court has original jurisdiction.
Heirs of Preston v. Heirs of Alokoa, 21 FSM R. 572, 578-79 (App. 2018).
Administrative Law Judicial Review; Appellate Review Parties; Civil Procedure Parties; Property Land Court
In past practice, it was common for the Kosrae Land Commission to be named a defendant when a party had occasion to complain about
one of its acts or omissions since administrative agencies were often named as defendants when a party sought judicial review of
the administrative agency’s act or omission. But there is no reason why the Land Court should be a party to such an action
because the Kosrae Land Court, unlike its predecessor, is not an administrative agency; it is a court. It is not proper to make
the lower court a defendant when seeking judicial review of its actions in a higher court. Heirs of Preston v. Heirs of Alokoa, 21 FSM R. 572, 579 (App. 2018).
Appellate Review; Appellate Review Parties; Mandamus and Prohibition
It is not proper to make the lower court a defendant when seeking judicial review of its actions in a higher court. Judicial review of a lower court’s acts or omissions is usually accomplished by an appeal to a higher court or, on rare occasion, by a petition for a prerogative writ, such as prohibition or mandamus. Heirs of Preston v. Heirs of Alokoa, 21 FSM R. 572, 579 (App. 2018).
Appellate Review Parties; Property Land Court
When the Land Court does not own, or claim to own, any interest in a land parcel, it is not a proper party to any dispute over title
to that parcel. Heirs of Preston v. Heirs of Alokoa, 21 FSM R. 572, 579 (App. 2018).
Jurisdiction Subject-Matter; Statutes of Limitation; Torts Governmental Liability
A statue of limitation generally is not jurisdictional unless it is a limitations period for claims against the government. Heirs of Preston v. Heirs of Alokoa, 21 FSM R. 572, 579 (App. 2018).
Jurisdiction Subject-Matter; Statutes of Limitation
Raising a statute of limitation as a bar to a remedy does not deprive a court of jurisdiction to hear the cause in the first instance;
the court could not adjudicate the question of proper application of the statute if it did not have subject matter jurisdiction.
Heirs of Preston v. Heirs of Alokoa, 21 FSM R. 572, 579 (App. 2018).
Statutes of Limitation Which Limitation Applies
To determine which statute of limitation to apply, a court must look to the nature of the case. There are three ways to determine
a case’s nature for statute of limitations purposes: 1) the type of interest allegedly harmed, or 2) the right sued upon,
or 3) the remedy sought, rather than the theory of recovery. What is significant for statute of limitations purposes is the primary
interest that was invaded by the defendant’s wrongful conduct. Heirs of Preston v. Heirs of Alokoa, 21 FSM R. 572, 580 (App. 2018).
Statutes of Limitation Which Limitation Applies
When, using any of the three ways to analyze an action’s nature for statute of limitations purposes, it could not be plainer
that the action is one to recover an interest in land, the twenty-year statute of limitations to recover land or an interest in land
applies. Heirs of Preston v. Heirs of Alokoa, 21 FSM R. 572, 580 (App. 2018).
Statutes of Limitation Which Limitation Applies
As a matter of policy, if there is a substantial question or reasonable dispute as to which of two or more statutes of limitation
within the jurisdiction should be applied, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the application of the statute containing the
longest limitation period. Heirs of Preston v. Heirs of Alokoa, 21 FSM R. 572, 580 n.2 (App. 2018).
Statutes of Limitation Which Limitation Applies; Property Registered Land
When the type of interest allegedly harmed is land ownership; when the right that the plaintiffs sue upon is their right to own a
certain land parcel; when the remedy sought is to recover registered title to that land parcel that the plaintiffs contend that was
lost through the defendants’ predecessor’s wrongful act; and when the primary interest that the alleged wrongdoer invaded
was the plaintiffs’ predecessor’s registered ownership of that parcel, the action is one for the recovery of title to
land. The theory of recovery might be fraud, or due process violation, or negligence, or some other theory such as reformation of
contract, but that theory does not change the action’s nature for statute of limitations purposes. Heirs of Preston v. Heirs of Alokoa, 21 FSM R. 572, 580 (App. 2018).
Equity Laches
The equitable doctrine of laches is usually invoked only when the applicable statutory limitations period has not yet run, and not only depends upon considerations of fairness, justice, and equity, but also cannot be invoked when the party raising it has failed to act properly or is said to have "unclean hands." Heirs of Preston v. Heirs of Alokoa, 21 FSM R. 572, 580-81 (App. 2018).
Civil Procedure Summary Judgment; Equity Laches
Laches is rarely subject to summary judgment, and can rarely be resolved without some preliminary evidentiary inquiry. Generally,
when a defendant asserts the laches defense, a full hearing of testimony on both sides of the issue is required. Heirs of Preston v. Heirs of Alokoa, 21 FSM R. 572, 581 (App. 2018).
Property Registered Land Transfer
Under Kosrae Court Rule 13, when registered land is transferred, the owner of the parcel must surrender the certificate of title to
the Registrar to transfer title. Heirs of Preston v. Heirs of Alokoa, 21 FSM R. 572, 581 (App. 2018).
Property Registered Land
For registered land, strict compliance with the Torrens land registration system’s procedures is a must in order to claim the
system’s benefits of title good against the world. Heirs of Preston v. Heirs of Alokoa, 21 FSM R. 572, 581 (App. 2018).
Property Registered Land Transfer
A landowner’s failure to surrender the his certificate of title may indicate that the landowner does not intend to transfer
title to the land. Heirs of Preston v. Heirs of Alokoa, 21 FSM R. 572, 581 (App. 2018).
Notaries; Property Registered Land Transfer
Kosrae Land Court Rules (and good practice) require that all documents concerning transfer of title must be notarized and submitted
to the Registrar for recordation. Signatures that are executed at different times or in different locations must be notarized separately.
The signature page of each document may consist of as many duplicate pages as necessary for proper notarization. Heirs of Preston v. Heirs of Alokoa, 21 FSM R. 572, 581 (App. 2018).
Notaries; Property Registered Land Transfer
When the purported transferor’s signature and that of his witnesses were not notarized on a duplicate page, but the notarization
was instead on a page separate from their signatures, and since the Registrar must not accept any document which is not properly
notarized, it is doubtful that the Land Court should have accepted for filing a deed of gift in this form, even if it had been accompanied
by the surrender of the old certificate of title, which it was not. Since the deed of gift was in a doubtful form and since the
transferor’s certificate of title was not surrendered with it, the Land Court should not have issued the transferee a certificate
of title for that parcel. Heirs of Preston v. Heirs of Alokoa, 21 FSM R. 572, 581 (App. 2018).
Property Registered Land Transfer
The hearing and notice procedure in Kosrae State Code § 11.612 is inappli to the trhe transfer of already registered land. It
only governs the registration of unregistered land. Heirs of Preston vrs of Alokoa, 21 FSM R. 572, 582 (App. 2018).
Constitutional Law Due Prue Process; Property Registered Land Transfer
When the owner of registered land sells or gifts registered land, all that is needed for a valid transfer is the delivery to the Land Court of a properly notarized deed (with each needed signature properly notarized) combined with the surrender of the grantor’s old duplicate certificate of title. Proper and strict compliance with these requirements is the due process that is sufficient (and required) for the issuance of a new certificate of title to the grantee. Heirs of Preston v. Heirs of Alokoa, 21 FSM R. 572, 582 (App. 2018).
Property Registered Land Transfer
On rare occasions, when the landowner’s old certificate has been lost, mislaid, or destroyed and the landowner wishes to transfer
title, the proper practice is for the Land Court, following its practices and procedures for replacing a lost, mislaid, or destroyed
certificate, to issue and deliver to the grantor a new duplicate certificate of title so that the grantor may turn around and surrender
that certificate to Land Court when the deed is presented for registration. Heirs of Preston v. Heirs of Alokoa, 21 FSM R. 572, 582 (App. 2018).
Property Registered Land Transfer
Whenever a landowner of registered land wishes to transfer an interest in the registered land (such as subjecting it to a lien such
as a mortgage) or to transfer title, it is the landowner’s duty in requesting any transfer to submit his or her owner’s
duplicate certificate for proper endorsement or cancellation. When the landowner has not done so, the landowner’s intent might
reasonably be questioned and the Land Court ought not to act. Heirs of Preston v. Heirs of Alokoa, 21 FSM R. 572, 582 (App. 2018).
* * * *
COURT’S OPINION
LARRY WENTWORTH, Associate Justice:
This appeal is from the Kosrae State Court’s reversal of a Kosrae Land Court summary judgment and its order of remand to that Court. We affirm the Kosrae State Court decision and supplement its reversal of the Kosrae Land Court decision to include further instructions to the Land Court. Our reasoning follows.
I. BACKGROUND
This appeal involves land in Lelu, Kosrae designated as Parcel No. 032-K-05. On April 19, 1983, the Kosrae Land Commission issued a certificate of title for Parcel No. 032-K-05, naming Sisuo Alokoa as the registered owner of that parcel. Alokoa had nine children. In 2005, his adopted daughter, Neime Preston, wanted to run a business, a store, on Parcel No. 032-K-05. She needed, and obtained, financing through the FSM Development Bank.
On August 16, 2005, Alokoa signed an English-language document entitled "deed of gift." His signature as grantor was witnessed by two of his children, Lillian B. Skilling and Iuver S. Alokoa. On a separate page, Ruth P. Timothy certified that she notarized those three signatures. Susan T. Anson notarized Preston’s August 24, 2005 signature as grantee. The deed, by its terms, granted "the premises, unto the Grantee, his/her heirs and assigns, forever." Whether Alokoa knew, when he signed it, the document’s nature and contents is now disputed. His heirs now contend that Alokoa and his witnesses understood only that the document he signed was to help Preston obtain the bank’s assistance for her business.
The deed of gift was filed at the Kosrae Land Court, the Kosrae Land Commission’s successor. On May 17, 2006, the Land Court issued a new certificate of title for Parcel No. 032-K-05 ("locally called Pukusrik Te") naming Neime Preston as the sole owner in fee simple. Alokoa did not surrender his certificate of title to the Land Court. It is still with one of his children.
Sometime in 2006, another of Alokoa’s daughters asked him, while he was visiting her in Saipan, what sort of document he signed for Preston. His reply was that it was so Preston could build her business. Preston died on April 28, 2009. Alokoa and some of his children continued using Parcel No. 032-K-05.
On February 14, 2013, Alokoa visited the Kosrae Land Court and discovered the certificate of title that had been issued to Preston for Parcel No. 032-K-05. On February 17, 2013, he filed a sworn statement at the Land Court, averring that he never intended to transfer title to Preston. Land Court staff apparently advised him that if he wanted to regain title to Parcel No. 032-K-05, he could either ask Preston’s heirs to convey Parcel No. 032-K-05 back to him or he could file a claim with the Kosrae Land Court. He and his attorney were unsuccessful in getting the Preston heirs to convey Parcel No. 032-K-05 back to Alokoa.
On December 16, 2013, Alokoa filed a Statement of Land Claim for Relief in the Kosrae Land Court, in which he sought a judgment declaring him the true owner of Parcel No. 032-K-05, upholding his 1983 certificate of title for Parcel No. 032-K-05, and invalidating Preston’s 2006 certificate of title for that parcel. Alokoa died February 18, 2014.
The Preston heirs moved for summary judgment. On June 26, 2014, the Land Court issued its ruling, granting the Preston heirs summary judgment. It held that in order to transfer title to Preston, "[a]ll that the Land Court had to do was determine [the] validity and authenticity of the Deed of Gift, register it and issue title based on the expressed terms of the deed." Ruling on Mots. for Summ. J. at 10 (Kos. L. Ct. No. 20-13, June 26, 2014). The Land Court noted that Alokoa did not surrender his certificate of title. Id. It then ruled that it did not commit fraud and was not negligent for relying on the deed to issue title to Preston. Id. at 12. The Land Court further concluded that, because the Alokoa heirs alleged that Alokoa lost his title through a due process violation and since only governmental entities can violate due process, the Land Court itself was an indispensable and necessary party, that should have been named as a party, but was not. Id. at 13.
Characterizing the Alokoa heirs’ action as a negligence or due process violation claim, the Land Court concluded that Alokoa’s cause of action accrued either when he signed the deed in 2005 or when Preston was issued her certificate of title in 2006 and that the six-year limitation period had therefore run out before Alokoa filed his 2013 claim, and that laches also barred Alokoa’s claim. Id. at 14-16. It then granted the Preston heirs summary judgment and dismissed the case. Id. at 16. The Land Court also questioned (but did not definitively answer) whether it had jurisdiction over the matter since it viewed itself as an indispensable party and since it ruled that the case was not a land case but an action for negligence and due process violations, causes of action generally not within the Land Court’s jurisdiction.
The Alokoa heirs appealed to the Kosrae State Court. The State Court vacated and set aside the Land Court judgment as void. It ruled that summary judgment was improper because there were genuine issues of material fact present and because, under Kosrae General Court Order 1998-6, summary judgment motions must be given an oral hearing, and the Land Court did not hold one. Memo. of Decision, J., & Order of Remand at 7-9 (Kos. S. Ct. Tr. Civ. No. 72-14 Jan. 13, 2017). It ruled that the Land Court should have held a hearing on the Preston heirs’ summary judgment motion because, in Kosrae courts, summary judgment is a hearing motion. Id. at 9. It remanded the matter to the Land Court for hearings and written findings and a decision "consistent with statutory and procedural requirements." Id. at 10.
The Neime Preston heirs timely appealed to the FSM Supreme Court appellate division.
II. ISSUES PRESENTED
The Heirs of Preston contend that the Kosrae State Court’s factual findings were clearly erroneous; that its conclusions of law were erroneous; that it abused its discretion and erred as a matter of law in remanding the matter instead of upholding the Land Court judgment; that it was an error of law to determine that summary judgment was inappropriate to determine the case’s outcome; and that it was an error of fact and law and an abuse of discretion not to rule on the statute of limitations issue and on whether the Land Court had jurisdiction over the subject matter.
III. STANDARDS OF REVIEW
We review de novo issues of law, including the Kosrae Land Court’s jurisdiction over this matter and the applicable statute of limitations (to the extent it does not require factual findings). Tilfas v. Kosrae, 21 FSM R. 81, 86 (App. 2016) (questions of when a statute of limitations starts to run and whether the statute of limitations bars a claim are questions of law to be reviewed de novo); Andrew v. Heirs of Seymour, 19 FSM R. 331, 337 (App. 2014) (jurisdictional issues are mainly questions of law reviewed de novo); Kosrae v. Skilling, 11 FSM R. 311, 315 (App. 2003) (questions of when a statute of limitations begins to run, and whether the limitations statute bars a claim, are questions of law to be reviewed de novo).
And, when reviewing a summary judgment, we use the same standard that the trial court initially used when it determined the summary judgment motion we determine de novo whether genuine issues of material fact are absent and whether the prevailing party is entitled to judgment as a matter of law. Sam v. FSM Dev. Bank, 20 FSM R. 409, 415 (App. 2016); Andrew, 19 FSM R. at 337.
IV. ANALYSIS
A. Land Court Jurisdiction
We will first address the Preston heirs’ claim that the Land Court lacks jurisdiction over this action since, if they prevail on this point, we would not need to proceed further.
The Preston heirs state that the Kosrae State Court failed to rule on their lack of Land Court jurisdiction arguments, and that if the State Court had ruled in their favor, there then would have been no case for it to remand to the Land Court. We think that the State Court implicitly held that the Land Court had jurisdiction over this case or it would not have remanded it. Be that as it may, we now explicitly hold that the Land Court not only has jurisdiction over this case, but is the court with original jurisdiction over the matter.
The Preston heirs’ contention that the Land Court lacks jurisdiction is based on two arguments 1) that this case is an action for fraud or negligence or due process violation and the Land Court does not have jurisdiction over those types of lawsuits, and 2) that the Land Court is a necessary and indispensable party to the action and the Land Court does not have jurisdiction over cases in which it is a defendant.
The Kosrae Land Court and its jurisdiction are created by a Kosrae state statute, which provides that "[t]he jurisdiction of the Land Court shall . . . inclul matcons concerningrning the title of land and any interest therein." Kos. S.C. § 11.604. Thrthis action, thn, the Alokoa heirs seek to regain the registered title to Parcel No. 005 thokoa once held. ld. The PThe Preston heirs, by defending, seek to retain the registered title in Neime Preston’s name so that, in the future, they will become the registered owners of Parcel No. 032-K-05. This is a dispute over title to Parcel No. 032-K-05. This is a matter concerning the title of land and the interests therein. The Land Court has original jurisdiction over all matters concerning land titles. The Land Court thus has original jurisdiction over this case.
The Preston heirs also contend that the Land Court should have been made a party to the action since in other suits against the Land Court’s predecessor, the Kosrae Land Commission, the Land Commission had been made a party when the plaintiff alleged that the Land Commission had been negligent and the six-year statute of limitations had been applied. They assert that, if the court were to follow that line of reasoning in this case, the Land Court would not have jurisdiction since the six-year statute of limitations has run out and since it would be improper for the Land Court to make undue corrections to certificates of title it had already issued.
We see no reason why the Land Court should be a party to this action. Admittedly, in past practice, it was common for the Kosrae Land Commission to be named a defendant when a party had occasion to complain about one of its acts or omissions. Administrative agencies were often named as defendants when a party sought judicial review of the administrative agency’s act or omission. But the Kosrae Land Court, unlike its predecessor, the Kosrae Land Commission, is not an administrative agency. It is a court. It is not proper to make the lower court a defendant when seeking judicial review of its actions in a higher court. Judicial review of a lower court’s acts or omissions is usually accomplished by an appeal to a higher court or, on rare occasion, by a petition for a prerogative writ, such as prohibition or mandamus.
In the present case, it is obvious that making the Land Court a party would serve no purpose. It would be pointless. No judgment against the Land Court, no matter how favorable to the Alokoa heirs, could give them the relief they seek ownership of Parcel No. 032-K-05. That can only be accomplished by an action against the Preston heirs. The Land Court does not own, or claim to own, any interest in Parcel 032-K-05. It is not a proper party to any dispute over title to that parcel.
Nor can the statute of limitations affect the Land Court’s jurisdiction. "[A] statue of limitation generally is not jurisdictional unless it is a limitations period for claims against the government." 51 AM. JUR. 2D Limitation of Actions § 20 (rev. ed. 2000) (ote omie omitted). "Raising a statute of limitation as a bar to a remedy does not deprive a court of jurisdiction to hear the cin the first instance; the court could not adjudicate the question of proper application ofon of the statute if it did not have subject matter jurisdiction." Id. § 21. That bringto the propeproper application of the statutes of limitation to this matter.
B. Statutes of Limitation and Laches
The Preston heirs also assert that the Kosrae Court failed to rule on thon their statute of limitations arguments, and that if it had ruled in their favor on that, then there would have been no case for it to remand to the Land Court. For that reason, we think the State Court implicitly ruled that Alokoa’s case fell within the limitations period. Otherwise, the State Court would not have remanded it. We now explicitly hold, for the following reasons, that the limitation statutes do not bar this action.
1. Applicable Statute of Limitation
The Preston heirs contend that, since the Alokoa heirs allege that Alokoa was wrongfully deprived of title to Parcel No. 032-K-05
through fraud, or through a violation of his due process rights, or through negligence, the applicable statute of limitations is
that for a fraud cause of action or a due process violation cause of action. That would be the six-year catchall limitations period[1] in Kosrae Code § 6.2506. We cannot agree. To determine which statute of limitation to apply, we must look to the nature of the case. There are three ways tormine a case’s
nature for statute of limitations purposes. The nature of e of an action for the purposes of a statute of limitations is determined by [1] the type of interest allegedly harmed,
[or 2] the right sued upon, or [3] the remedy sought, rather than the theory of recovery. What is significant for statute of limitations
purposes is the primary interest that was invaded by the defendant’s wrongful conduct. 51 AM. JUR. 2D Limitation of Actions § 91, at rev. ed. 2000) (foot(footnotes omitted) (numbering alterations added). This is an action to recover an interest in
land. That ue under any of the three ways to analyze an action’s nature for statute of limitatiotations purposes. It could
not be plainer.[2] The type of interest allegedly harmed here is land ownership. The right that the Alokoa heirs sue upon is their right to own Parcel
No. 032-K-05. And looking to the remedy sought the remedy that Alokoa sought and that the Alokoa heirs now seek is to recover
registered title to Parcel No. 032-K-05. The Alokoa heirs seek to recover land that they contend that Alokoa lost through Preston’s
wrongful act. And, the primary interest that Preston invaded, by her alleged wrongful conduct, was Alokoa’s registered ownership,
good against the world, of Parcel No. 032-K-05. The Alokoa heirs’ theory of recovery might be fraud, or due process violation,
or negligence, or some other theory such as reformation of contract, but that theory does not change the action’s nature. The statute of limitations to recover land or an interest in land is twenty years. Kos. S.C. § 6.2503(1)(b). dless of whef
when Alokoa’s cause of action accrued, his 2013 Land Court filing is clearly within the twenty-year limitations period. Thus,
we need not cer arguments over when the cause of action accrued. 2. Laches We make no ruling on the Preston heirs’ laches defense. The equitable doctrine of laches is usually invoked only when the applicable
statutory limitations period has not yet run, and not only depends upon considerations of fairness, justice, and equity, Andon v. Shrew, 15 FSM R. 315, 322 (Kos. S. Ct. Tr. 2007), but also cannot be invoked when the party raising it has failed to act properly or is
said to have "unclean hands," Kosrae v. Skilling, 11 FSM R. 311, 318 (App. 2003). The State Court did not err when it voided the Land Court decision and did not otherwise address the laches defense. We decline to
rule on it as well. The Land Court summary judgment relied on laches without any hearing, let alone an evidentiary hearing. "Laches
is rarely subject to summary judgment, and can rarely be resolved without some preliminary evidentiary inquiry." Waddell v. Small Tube Prods., Inc., [1986] USCA3 1066; 799 F.2d 69, 74 n.2 (3d Cir. 1986) (citation omitted). Generally, "[w]here a defendant asserts the laches defense, a full hearing of testimony
on both sides of the issue is required." 27A AM. JUR. 2D Equity § 201 (1996). Since thas no s no evidentiary inquiry in the Land Court, the State Court could remand it for one. This case
would seem to require one. C. Summary Judgment and Due Process The Preston heirs contend tend that the State Court erred when it ruled that this matter was unsuitable for summary judgment. They
contend that summary judgment in their favor was proper on Land Court jurisdictional grounds, on the statute of limitations, on laches,
and because the documentary record, as evidenced by the deed of gift and Preston’s certificate of tile, is conclusive. As
discussed above, we reverse the Land Court’s ruling on subject matter jurisdiction (including whether the Land Court should
be a party) and on the statute of limitations, and we affirm the State Court’s decision to void the Land Court’s decision
on laches. The documentary record, however, is not as conclusive as the Preston heirs wish. More than one aspect of that transaction should
have given the Land Court pause when the deed of gift was filed. Under Land Court Rule 13, when registered land is transferred,
"[t]he owner of the parcel must surrender the Certificate of Title to the Registrar for title transfer." Kos. L. Ct. R. 13.A. For
registered land, strict compliance with the Torrens land registration system’s procedures is a must in order to claim the system’s
benefits of title good against the world. See In re Engichy, 11 FSM R. 520, 531 (Chk. 2003). But Alokoa never surrendered his certificate of title. Despite this, the Land Court transferred
title and issued the grantee (Preston) a certificate. A landowner’s failure to surrender the old certificate of title may
indicate that the landowner does not intend to transfer title to the land. Another aspect that should have worried the Land Court is that the notarization of Alokoa’s signature and that of his witnesses
was not on the same page as their signatures. The Land Court Rules (and good practice) require that "[a]ll documents . . . concerning
transfer of stle shall be notarized and submitted to the Registrar for recordation. . . . Signatures ware executed uted at different
times or in different locations must be notarized separ. Thnature page of eaof each doch document may consist of as many duplicate
pages as necessary for proper notarization." Kos. L. Ct. R. 13.B. Alokoa’s signature and that of his witnesses were not notarized
on a duplicate page. The notarization was instead on a page separate from Alokoa’s and his witnesses’ signatures. Since
"[t]he Registrar shall not accept any document which is not properly notarized," Kos. L. Ct. R. 13.C, it is doubtful that the Land
Court should have accepted for filing the deed of gift in this form, even if it had been accompanied by the surrender of Alokoa’s
certificate of title. But it was not accompanied by the surrender of Alokoa’s certificate of title. Since the deed of gift
was in a doubtful form and since Alokoa’s certificate of title was not surrendered with it, the Land Court should not have
issued Preston a certificate of title for Parcel No. 032-K-05. The Alokoa heirs contend that Alokoa’s due process rights were violated because the Land Court did not follow the hearing and
notice procedures in Kosrae State Code § 11.612re issuing the certifertificate of title to Preston. That statutory provision
is inapplicable to this case. It only governs the registration of unregistered l Parcel No. 032-K-05 is land that had already been
registeristered. When the owner of registered land sells or gifts registered land, all that is needed for a valid transfer is the delivery to the Land
Court of a properly notarized deed (with each needed signature properly notarized) combined with the surrender of the grantor’s
old duplicate certificate of title. Proper and strict compliance with those requirements is the due process that is sufficient (and
required) for the issuance of a new certificate of title to the grantee. On rare occasions, the landowner’s old certificate
may have been lost, mislaid, or destroyed. The proper practice, then, would be for the Land Court, following its practices and procedures
for replacing a lost, mislaid, or destroyed certificate, to issue and deliver to the grantor a new duplicate certificate of title
so that the grantor may turn around and surrender the certificate to Land Court when the deed is presented for registration. See In re Engichy, 12 FSM R. 58, 70 (Chk. 2003) (if the owner is unable to physically submit the certificate because it has been lost or destroyed,
there is a method whereby he may obtain a new duplicate certificate for submission). Whenever a landowner of registered land wishes
to transfer an interest in the registered land (such as subjecting it to a lien such as a mortgage) or to transfer title, it is the
landowner’s duty in requesting any transfer to submit his or her owner’s duplicate certificate for proper endorsement
or cancellation. Id. When the landowner has not done so, the landowner’s intent might reasonably be questioned and the Land Court ought not to
act. Accordingly, we affirm the State Court’s decision that summary judgment was inappropriate, that genuine issues were in dispute,
that there were problems with the documents that the summary judgment was based upon, and that the matter should be remanded to the
Land Court for evidentiary hearings and resolution of whether Sisuo Alokoa transferred Parcel No. 032-K-05 to Neime Preston. V. CONCLUSION Accordingly, we affirm the Kosrae State Court decision and remand this case to the Kosrae State Court for it to implement its order
of remand to the Kosrae Land Court, subject to our further instructions to the Kosrae Land Court concerning its jurisdiction, the
twenty-year statute of limitations, laches, and the defects in its issuance of a certificate of title to Neime Preston without all
the required procedures. * * * * [1] The Preston heirs also contend that Alokoa’s action accrued and the statute should start to run in 2006 when, in their view,
Alokoa was put on notice in Saipan by his daughter’s query, that what he signed may have transferred his ownership to Preston. [2] If it were not so plain, policy considerations would come into play. The result, however, would not differ. "As a matter of policy,
if there is a substantial question or reasonable dispute as to which of two or more statutes of limitation within the jurisdiction
should be applied, the doubt should be resolved in favor of the application of the statute containing the longest limitation period."
51 AM. JUR. 2D Limitation of Actions § 92 (rev. ed. ; see also
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