FSM Development Bank v Ehsa [2017] FMSC 6; 21 FSM R. 148 (Pon. 2017) (14 February 2017)

FSM SUPREME COURT TRIAL DIVISION

CIVIL ACTION NO. 2007-035

FSM DEVELOPMENT BANK, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. )
)
PERDUS I. EHSA and TIMAKYO I. )
EHSA a/k/a TIMAKIO I. EHSA, )
)
Defendants. )
___________________________________ )

ORDER DENYING MOTION TO VACATE

Ready E. Johnny
Associate Justice

Decided: February 14, 2017

APPEARANCES:

For the Plaintiff: Nora E. Sigrah, Esq.
P.O. Box M
Kolonia, Pohnpei FM 96941

For the Defendants: Joseph S. Phillip, Esq.
P.O. Box 464
Kolonia, Pohnpei FM 96941

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HEADNOTES

Courts Judges; Signatures
In the absence of any provision in the FSM Code, Civil Procedure Rules, or General Court Order, mandating a handwritten signature on an order issued by a justice, arguments that a judge’s signature is deficient because it is "rubber-stamped," are devoid of merit. FSM Dev. Bank v. Ehsa, 21 FSM R. 148, 149 (Pon. 2017).

Signatures
A signature is a person’s name or mark written by that person or at the person’s direction, or any name, mark, or writing used with the intent of authenticating a document also termed legal signature. FSM Dev. Bank v. Ehsa, 21 FSM R. 148, 149 (Pon. 2017).

Courts Judges; Signatures
A judge’s rubber-stamped signatures are marks used to authenticate the judge’s written orders, and are thus valid, original signatures. Contentions that they are fake, or invalid, or not legal signatures, are without merit. FSM Dev. Bank v. Ehsa, 21 FSM R. 148, 150 (Pon. 2017).

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COURT’S OPINION

READY E. JOHNNY, Associate Justice:

This comes before the court on the defendants’ Motion to Vacate and Set Aside as Null and Void Order Denying Relief from Judgment; Order Transferring Title to Land; Order to Compel Discovery; Order Freezing Funds and Any and All Orders Issued and Entered in this Matter by Associate Justice Ready Johnny, filed January 31, 2017 (with counsel’s affidavit), and on Plaintiff’s Opposition to Motion to Vacate, filed February 8, 2017. The motion is denied. The reasons follow.

Defendants Perdus I. Ehsa and Timakyo I. Ehsa (a/k/a Timakio I. Ehsa) contend that all orders in this matter signed by the current presiding justice (Justice Ready Johnny) since some time in 2014 or 2015 must be set aside as null and void because the signatures are "faked signatures imposed with rubber stamp signatures without hearings." Motion at 2 (Jan. 31, 2017). The Ehsas further contend that "[a]lthough it is not explicitly provided by rule that a judge must sign and affixed [sic] his signature to judgments and order, the acts of faking the signature of Justice Johnny on those judgments and orders are inconsistent with due process, and so they are null and void." Id. at 3. The Ehsas further assert that the judge’s "signatures were faked signatures because they are rubber stamp signatures" and that there is "no rule or authority for FSM justices to apply stamp signatures on judgments and orders." Aff. of Joseph Phillip at 1 (Jan. 31, 2017).

All of the Ehsas’ argument rely on the presumption that in order to be valid a judge’s signature (or any signature apparently) must be hand-written by the signatory. The Ehsas also imply that any other form of signature is "fake" and raises concerns over authenticity. Lastly, the Ehsas opine that due process requires that their case be presided over by a judge without physical disability.

These contentions must be rejected as without any valid legal or factual basis. First, there is case authority that signatures other than hand-written are permissible. In the absence of any provision in the FSM Code, Civil Procedure Rules, or General Court Order, mandating a handwritten signature on an order issued by a justice, arguments that a judge’s signature is deficient because it is "rubber-stamped," are devoid of merit. FSM Dev. Bank v. Christopher Corp., 20 FSM R. 225, 228 (Chk. 2015).

Second, the issue of my physical limitations and use of a rubber stamped signature has been raised earlier in another case and rejected. I cannot say it any better now than I said it then:

Counsel notes that my signature on court orders is by rubber stamp and "challenges the validity of a rubber stamped signature." Besides this, counsel further speculates that others have signed documents on my behalf "through rubber-stamped signature." Not only is this pure speculation, but it is also a falsehood. I have been signing, without any objection, documents by use of a rubber stamp for the last three years. The rubber stamp is kept in my personal possession and I am the only person who uses it. I personally affix my rubber-stamped signature to each and every document that I sign. No one but me personally, affixes my rubber-stamped signature on documents. Just because I rubber stamp my signature, it does not mean that it is not my own signature or that it is not a valid signature. A signature is defined as "[a] person’s name or mark written by that person or at the person’s direction," or "[a]ny name, mark, or writing used with the intent of authenticating a document [a]lso termed legal signature." BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY 1507 (9th ed. 2009) (emphasis in original) (citations omitted); see also Iriarte v. Individual Assurance Co., 18 FSM R. 340, 352 (App. 2012).

George v. Palsis, 20 FSM R. 157, 159 (Kos. 2015). My rubber-stamped signatures are marks used to authenticate my written orders. They are thus valid, original signatures. The Ehsas’ contentions that they are fake, or invalid, or not legal signatures, are without merit.

Likewise, the Ehsas’ contention that their due process rights are violated if the judge making the rulings on the case has a physical disability, is also without merit. The Ehsas took their opportunity to, and were heard on the papers they filed, before any rulings were made.

Accordingly, the Ehsas’ motion to vacate and set aside earlier orders in this matter is denied.

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