Chuuk State Land Management v Jesse [2020] FMCSC 3; 22 FSM R. 573 (Chk. S. Ct. App. 2020) (12 June 2020)

CHUUK STATE SUPREME COURT APPELLATE DIVISION
CSSC APPEAL CASE NO. 001-2015

CHUUK STATE LAND MANAGEMENT,
Appellant,

vs.

YUSER JESSE,
Appellee.
__________________________________________

ORDER ON THE FINAL ISSUE ON APPEAL

Argued: October 10, 2019
Decided: June 12, 2020

BEFORE:

Hon. Jayson Robert, Associate Justice, Presiding
Hon. Daniel Rescue Jr., Temporary Justice*
Hon. Bethwell O’Sonis, Temporary Justice**

*Attorney at Law, Micronesian Legal Services Corporation, Weno, Chuuk
** Attorney at Law, FSM Public Defender, Weno, Chuuk

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellant: Sabino S. Asor, Esq.
Attorney General
Office of the Chuuk Attorney General
P.O. Box 1050
Weno, Chuuk FM 96942

For the Appellee: Jack Fritz, Esq.
P.O. Box 788
Weno, Chuuk FM 96942

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HEADNOTES

Appellate Review - Standard - Civil Cases - De Novo
Whether a particular dispute falls within the scope of a court’s subject matter jurisdiction is an issue of law. Issues of law are reviewed de novo. Chuuk State Land Mgt. v. Jesse, 22 FSM R. 573, 576 (Chk. S. Ct. App. 2020).

Constitutional Law - Chuuk; Statutes; Transition of Authority
Chuuk State Constitution’s transition clause provides that statutes in force at the time the Constitution took effect remain in effect to the extent they comply with the Constitution, or until amended or repealed. Chuuk State Land Mgt. v. Jesse, 22 FSM R. 573, 576 (Chk. S. Ct. App. 2020).

Constitutional Law - Chuuk; Property
While the Chuuk Constitution provides the Chuuk State Supreme Court with concurrent jurisdiction over land disputes, Article VII, § 3(d) of the Chuuk Constitution allows the specific court to be prescribed by statute. Chuuk State Land Mgt. v. Jesse, 22 FSM R. 573, 576 (Chk. S. Ct. App. 2020).

Courts; Property - Land Commission
Upon the filing of a registration area with the court, courts cannot entertain any action with regard to interests in land within that registration area without a showing of special cause why action by a court is desirable before it is likely that the land commission can determine the matter. Chuuk State Land Mgt. v. Jesse, 22 FSM R. 573, 576 (Chk. S. Ct. App. 2020).

Property - Land Commission
Land registration teams are to adjudicate claims to as much land within a registration area as practical within a year of the designation. If the registration team deems that a disputed claim’s consideration will seriously interfere with accomplishing this or the land commission deems that one of its teams is spending an undesirable amount of time on a claim, the land commission may withdraw the claim from that team’s consideration, and may then proceed to hear the claim itself or to refer the claim to the Chuuk State Supreme Court trial division for adjudication. Chuuk State Land Mgt. v. Jesse, 22 FSM R. 573, 576 (Chk. S. Ct. App. 2020).

Property - Land Commission; Property - Registered Land
Upon receipt of a land registration team’s adjudication, the Land Commission may issue a determination of ownership if satisfied, but, if not satisfied with the adjudication, the Land Commission may either hold hearings on the matter or remand the issue back to the registration team, but the Land Commission has no authority to refer the matter to the Chuuk State Supreme Court. Chuuk State Land Mgt. v. Jesse, 22 FSM R. 573, 576 (Chk. S. Ct. App. 2020).

Property - Land Commission
When a land commission consists of more than a senior commissioner, the concurrence of at least two members is necessary to constitute action by the commission. Chuuk State Land Mgt. v. Jesse, 22 FSM R. 573, 576-77 (Chk. S. Ct. App. 2020).

Appellate Review - Decisions Reviewable
When the appellant never timely appealed the trial division’s denial of its motion for relief from judgment that asked the trial division to admit new evidence, res judicata bars that new evidence from being admitted within a different appeal. Chuuk State Land Mgt. v. Jesse, 22 FSM R. 573, 578 (Chk. S. Ct. App. 2020).

Property - Land Commission; Property - Registered Land
When the Senior Land Commissioner’s letter of referral states that the land registration team would take an undesirable amount of time over the matter as the dispute had numerous issues of law which the land registration team was incapable of resolving, and when it states that the Land Commission decided against adjudicating since the parties and commissioners exhibited ill-will towards each other and therefore, the commissioners felt conflicted and prejudiced, that written explanation satisfies the statutory requirements for removal of an adjudication from a registration team in order to refer it to the Chuuk State Supreme Court trial division. Chuuk State Land Mgt. v. Jesse, 22 FSM R. 573, 578 (Chk. S. Ct. App. 2020).

Property - Land Commission; Property - Registered Land
When the entire commission body suffered from a conflict of interest in the matter as a result of ill feeling towards one of the parties, and the Senior Land Commissioner appeared to have the only valid signature for a decision, the statutory two-commissioner requirement does not apply to a decision as in that matter, because the Senior Land Commissioner’s one signature referral to the court does not violate 67 TTC 116, since the two-signature requirement is for a valid Land Commission action or decision on substantive matters concerning property rights, not for a decision on procedural matters such as referral of a dispute to the Chuuk State Supreme Court. Chuuk State Land Mgt. v. Jesse, 22 FSM R. 573, 579 (Chk. S. Ct. App. 2020).

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COURT’S OPINION

JAYSON ROBERT, Associate Justice, Presiding:

I. INTRODUCTION

The Chuuk State Land Management appealed the Trial Court decision where the judge found that Yuser Jesse is the rightful owner of Lot No. 012-A-21 and Lot No. 012-A-28 in Iras, Weno. Of the three issues on appeal, most of which stemmed from decisions on post-judgment motions, this Court previously held that Chuuk State Land Management made a timely appeal on only one issue. This sole issue before the appellate panel is whether the Chuuk State Trial Division had subject matter jurisdiction to determine the rightful owner of the lots in question.

The record reflects, and the parties agree, that the Lots 012-A-21 and 28 lie within a registration area. Further, the Chuuk State Land Commission never issued a determination of ownership after the parties filed their claims over these lots. Instead, the Chuuk Land Commission referred this matter to the Chuuk State Supreme Court Trial Division in January 1993.

As Chapter 3 of the Trust Territory Code Title 67 remains the applicable body of law for this particular case, the Trial Division of the Chuuk State Supreme Court only had jurisdiction over this matter if the referral by the Land Commission complied with the law. The legality of the referral rests on the following issues:

II. ISSUES

1. 1. Whether the record reflects that the Moen Registration team issued a finding of facts in 1992, and thus renders the guidelines of 67 TTC 109 applicable to a 1993 referral to the Chuuk State Supreme Court Trial Division.
   
2. 2. Whether the 1993 referral complied with 67 TTC 108.
   
3. 3. Whether the two person signature provision found within 67 TTC 116 applies to letters of referral written by a non-conflicted Senior Land Commissioner.
   
4. 4. Whether the referral of the case over the ownership of the Lots 012-A-21 and 28 by the Senior Land Commissioner in 1993 complies with TTC Title 67 and thus vested the Trial Division of the Chuuk State Supreme Court with subject matter jurisdiction to hear that case.
   

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

Whether a particular dispute falls within the scope of a court’s subject matter jurisdiction is an issue of law. Issues of law are reviewed de novo. Phillip v. Moses, 10 FSM R. 540, 543 (Chk. S. Ct. App. 2002).

IV. LAW

A. Chapter 3 of Title 67 of the Trust Territory Code governs this dispute.

Chuuk State Constitution’s transition clause provides that statutes in force at the time the Constitution took effect remain in effect to the extent they comply with the Constitution, or until amended or repealed. Chk. Const. art. XV, § 9apter 3 of TTC 67 governederned the 1993 referral as this Court finds that this specific section complied with the Constitution. Further, no amendments had occ up to the time of the referral (the section was only laterlater superseded by the Chuuk State Land Commission Act of 2004). Likewise, while the Chuuk State Constitution provides the Chuuk State Supreme Court with concurrent jurisdiction over land disputes, Article VII, § 3(d) of the Chuuk State Constitution allows the specific court to be prescribed by statute. The Trust Territory Code provided specific instances where the Chuuk State Supreme Court may exercise jurisdiction over a land registration area.

B. 67 TTC 105

Section 105 provides that the upon the filing of a registration area with the Court, Courts shall not entertain any action with regard to interests in land within that registration area without a showing of special cause why action by a court is desirable before it is likely a determination can be made on the matter by the land commission. 67 TTC 105. In the underlying appeal, the Court never had a showing of special cause. Instead, it asserted its jurisdiction over this land registration area upon a referral from the Senior Land Commissioner.

C. 67 TTC 108 Referrals

Section 108 mandates land registration teams to adjudicate claims to as much land within a registration area as practical within a year of the designation. 67 TTC 108(1). If the registration team deems that consideration of a disputed claim will seriously interfere with accomplishment of the purpose of this chapter or land commission deems that one of its teams is spending an undesirable amount of time on a claim, the land commission may withdraw the claim from consideration by the team. 67 TTC 108 (2) and (3). "[T]he commission may then proceed to hear [the claim] . . . or refer the claim to the trial division of the [Chuuk State Supreme] Court for adjudication." 67 TTC 108(4).

D. 67 TTC 109 No Authority to Refer to Court if adjudication made by team

This particular section provides that upon receipt of the adjudication from a land registration team, the Land Commission may issue a determination of ownership if satisfied. 67 TTC 109. However, if not satisfied with the adjudication, the Land Commission may either hold hearings on the matter or remand the issue back to the registration team. Id. Section 109 however, vests the Land Commission no authority to refer the matter to the Chuuk State Supreme Court.

E. 67 TTC 116 Concurrence of Majority Present required for Decision

In case of land commissions consisting of more than a senior commissioner, the concurrence of at least two members shall be necessary to constitute action by the commission. 67 TTC 116.

V. PROCEDURAL HISTORY WITHIN THE LAND COMMISSION

A. The Referral from the Land Commission

On January 1993, then Senior Land Commissioner Kachuo Mefy referred the adjudication matter concerning Lot No. 012-A-21 and Lot No. 012-A-28 to the Chuuk State Supreme Court. He provided the following reasons:

1. The Land Registration team is tasked to register as much land as practical within a year, but a major dispute existed over this land - which concerns technical issues of law and was beyond the capabilities of the Land Registration team.

2. One of the parties openly accused the Land Commission members of favoritism and created an atmosphere of "suspicion, un-trust, and ill feeling on part of the members of the commission."

Stated differently, Senior Land Commissioner Mefy claimed, amongst other things, that the land registration team would take an undesirable amount of time to adjudicate ownership claims over Lot No. 012-A-21 and Lot No. 012-A-28 as there were numerous issues of law involved and they lacked the competence to resolve the matter within a desirable amount of time.

Mefy then refers the dispute to the Trial Division of the Chuuk State Supreme Court because of the ill feeling that exists between the parties and the land commissioners. Mefy’s letter in essence discloses that a conflict of interest existed between the Land Commissioners and the parties after accusations of favoritism - and the land commissioners seemingly could not put aside their "ill feeling" against one of the parties so as to overcome the conflict. Hence, the referral.

Curiously, the record reflects that neither the State, nor any other party objected to the referral of this matter to the Trial Division of the Chuuk State Supreme Court for the next two decades. It appears that the State agreed that the undue delay of registration as much land areas as practicable in Moen was sufficient for matter to be removed from the hands of the registration team. Further, it appears that the State agreed that the conflict of interest that existed between the Commissioners and one of the parties would only resolve with the referral of this matter to the Chuuk State Supreme Court.

On November 6, 2013, the Chuuk State Supreme Court Trial Division entered a judgment which declared Yuser Jesse, the appellee, as the rightful owner of Lot No. 012-A-21 and Lot No. 012-A-28.

On May 30, 2014, the State filed a Motion of Relief from Judgment based on allegations of newly discovered evidence - a document allegedly purported as a "finding of facts signed by members of the Moen Registration Team concerning Lot No. 012-A-21 and Lot No. 012-A-28". The alleged document was dated February 1992 - "issued" eleven months prior to the Mefy’s referral. The trial-level judge ultimately heard an evidentiary hearing and denied the motion. Whether for failure of authentication or the suspicious circumstances surrounding the alleged document’s appearance - the Court refused to admit the alleged 1992 Findings of Fact into evidence. The State never filed a timely appeal as to that ruling.

VI. LEGAL ANALYSIS

A. The 1992 Adjudication and Findings by Registration Team

The State never filed a timely appeal as to the Trial Division’s refusal to admit the alleged 1992 Findings by the Moen Land Registration Team into evidence. Had the State filed a timely appeal as to the trial court’s refusal to admit the document into evidence, perhaps it may have alleged an abuse of discretion or an alleged rule of evidence violation. As the State never appealed the Court’s refusal, res judicata bars this document from being admitted within this matter. The record reflects no February 1992 adjudication or any other finding by the land registration team as to Lot No. 012-A-21 and Lot No. 012-A-28.

Section 109 of the Trust Territory Code only applies if a Land Commission received an adjudication from the Land Registration Team. The record reflects that no such adjudication occurred. Thus, this matter is not subject to the restrictions on referrals to the Trial Division as found within Section 109.

B. Referral Complies with 67 TTC 108

Then-Senior Land Commissioner Mefy submitted a referral of adjudication over Lot No. 012-A-21 and Lot No. 012-A-28. He essentially stated that the land registration team would take an undesirable amount of time over this matter as the dispute had numerous issues of law which the land registration team was incapable of resolving. Further, Mefy stated that the Land Commission decided against adjudicating since the parties and commissioners exhibited ill-will towards each other - therefore, the commissioners felt conflicted and prejudiced. Mefy’s explanation written within the referral letter satisfies the requirements of Section 108 for removal of an adjudication from a registration team for the purposes for referral to the Trial Division of the Chuuk State Supreme Court.

C. 67 TTC 116 Two Signatures not required for Referral Letter

Senior Land Commissioner Mefy’s 1993 referral letter to the Chuuk State Supreme Court Trial Division contained one signature - his own. The State argues that since the Land Commission was composed of more than just Senior Land Commissioner Mefy, Section 116 required the referral letter to contain two signatures so as to constitute a valid action by the Chuuk Land Commission. This Court disagrees.

We will not engage in speculation on whether Mefy made a unilateral decision to refer the matter. If Mefy had, however, such decision has no bearing on the validity of the referral.

The record reveals that the entire commission body suffered from a conflict of interest in this matter (as a result of ill feeling towards one of the parties). 67 TTC 103 suggests that the commissioners are to be their own judge for a conflict of interest. The record appears to show that the entire commission felt conflicted out of this case. This Court has consistently struck signatures on "decisions" such as determinations of ownership when a commissioner admitted to a conflict of interest which could not be waived. The Senior Land Commissioner therefore appeared to have the only valid signature for a decision - thus the two commissioner requirement under Section 116 bears no applicability to a decision as to those lots. This is the first reason for why the one signature referral is not in violation of Section 116.

Section 116 notes that two signatures are required for a valid "action" by the Land Commission if more than one (non-conflicted) commissioner existed. Section 116’s title captions "majority concurrence for decision by land commission." Thus, the "action" by the Land Commission must necessarily refer to a "decision" on substantive matters concerning property rights. This Court has previously held that Section 116 applied to various substantive decisions that concerned property rights over land - such as decisions on boundaries, ownership, conflicting claims, findings, the issuance of determinations of ownership, and certificates of title. Section 116 is situated amongst provisions which establish notice requirements, procedure for appeal, and other due process safeguards into the proceedings. Decisions as to findings or whether to issue these documents immediately impact the parties’ substantial rights towards the land. The spirit of this law aimed to protect those rights against arbitrariness that may arise when one person makes decisions as to these matters.

No existing case law in this jurisdiction suggests that Section 116 was ever meant to apply to procedural issues, such as issuing a notice as to the date of a hearing, decision to remove or refer, or for replacing a registration team member when a conflict of interest arises. Procedural decisions have a limited impact on the rights of the parties towards the land. This Court questions whether Section 116 applies to procedural matters, such as decisions on referrals, but resolves this appeal on other grounds.

Instead, the Court holds that a letter of referral is not a section 116 "decision" of the commission; it is mere evidence that the Commission decided to refer a matter to the Chuuk State Supreme Court. We further hold that Section 116 does not apply to referral letters.

First, it bears observing that letters from one government entity to another were not sent with multiple signatures during Trust Territory era. Standard protocol dictated that a department head communicate on behalf of his department to another department head without the inclusion of his subordinates as signatories. This practice remains unchanged today. Although section 108 directs the Chuuk Land Commission to refer matters to the Chuuk State Supreme Court Trial Division; as head of the department, the senior land commissioner has certain implied powers of representation. Like any department head, the senior land commissioner is the "face" of the Chuuk Land Commission. Senior Land Commissioner Mefy represented the Land Commission when he wrote the letter to Chief Justice Soukichi Fritz. Mefy’s letter is not the "decision" of the Land Commission to make a referral - it is merely evidence that the Land Commission made that decision.

While the Chuuk Land Commission documents other than the referral never appear in this court’s record, circumstantial evidence persuasively suggests that the Land Commission made a decision to take the following action: remove the matter from the registration team and refer the matter to the Chuuk State Supreme Court.

Within this contested case, none of the commissioners nor parties raised the Section 116 issue for more than two decades after the referral. This suggests that the Chuuk Land Commission had a concurrence of the majority when they reached the decision to refer the matter.

Sometimes in 2012, almost all of the Chuuk State Land Commission Office including its records was burned during a fire. Years later, one of the parties alleges that the referral failed to comply. As a result of these circumstances, as well as a general presumption that entities of the State comply with applicable law, the burden of persuasion rests with the moving party. The Chuuk State Supreme Court Trial Division record reflects that the State failed to meet this burden as it failed to present any evidence in support of its case.

The Land Commission made a decision which authorized Mefy to write this referral letter. The referral letter itself is not a "decision" subject to Section 116.

VII. CONCLUSION

This Appellate Panel resolves the issues before it as follows:

1. 1. The record fails to reflect that the Moen Registration team issued a finding of facts in 1992, and thus render the guidelines of 67 TTC 109 un-applicable to a 1993 referral to the Chuuk State Supreme Court Trial Division.
   
2. 2. The 1993 referral complied with 67 TTC 108.
   
3. 3. The two person signature provision found within 67 TTC 116 does not apply to letters of referral written by the only none-conflicted commissioner, the Senior Land Commissioner.
   
4. 4. The referral of the case over the ownership of Lots 012-A-21 and 28 by the Senior Land Commissioner in 1993 complies with TTC Title 67 and thus vested the Trial Division of the Chuuk State Supreme Court with subject matter jurisdiction to hear that case.
   

As the Trial Division of the Chuuk State Supreme Court had subject matter jurisdiction to adjudicate questions of ownership over Lots 012-A-21 and 28, this appeal fails. This Panel upholds the trial-level decision. Appellant shall bear the costs of appeal.

Appeal Denied.

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