Chuuk v Nowell [2018] FMCSC 5; 22 FSM R. 130a (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 2018) (7 August 2018)

CHUUK STATE SUPREME COURT TRIAL DIVISION
CSSC-CRIMINAL CASE NO. 039-2017

CHUUK STATE,
Plaintiff,

vs.

VINCENT M. NOWELL,
Defendant.
___________________________________

ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFF’S MOTION TO RE-OPEN ITS CASE IN CHIEF FOR PURPOSE OF ADMITTING CONFESSION

Kerio D. Walliby
Associate Justice

Hearing: June 15, 2018
Decided: August 7, 2018

APPEARANCES:

For the Plaintiff: Redeemer Nelson
State Prosecutor
Office of the Chuuk Attorney General
P.O. Box 1050
Weno, Chuuk FM 96942

For the Defendant: Kachie Sana
Office of the Public Defender
P.O. Box 754
Weno, Chuuk FM 96942

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HEADNOTES

Criminal Law and Procedure
Within common law jurisdictions, courts have always had an inherit power to administer their proceedings as well as the order of proof in the interest of efficiency and justice. Derived from the court’s common law power to administer its proceedings, is the implied power to decide whether to allow a party to re-open its case in chief after closing, even though, as a general rule, parties are expected to produce all evidence available to them at the time scheduled for hearing. Chuuk v. Nowell, 22 FSM R. 130a, 130c (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 2018).

Criminal Law and Procedure
Chuuk courts have referred to certain practices and decisions in other common law jurisdictions, mostly notably the U.S., as persuasive authority when a doctrine was applicable and supported by good policy to incorporate into FSM jurisprudence based on the realities present within the jurisdiction, and the vast number of decisions in common law jurisdictions provide a mechanism, under common law, for the court to use its discretion so as to consider allowing a state to reopen its case in chief after having closed that case. Chuuk v. Nowell, 22 FSM R. 130a, 130c-0d (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 2018).

Criminal Law and Procedure; Criminal Law and Procedure - Speedy Trial; Evidence
As a general rule, the state is expected to produce all evidence available to it at the time of trial. This rule exists for the purposes of judicial economy, an efficient disposition of cases, and to not delay the defendant’s rights to a speedy trial. Some instances merit exception to this general rule. Chuuk v. Nowell, 22 FSM R. 130a, 130d (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 2018).

Criminal Law and Procedure; Evidence
Under the court’s inherent common law authority to administer the order of proof before it, the court may entertain a party’s motion to reopen its case in the interest of justice, such as when the state had inadvertently forgotten to introduce a piece of evidence, the other party had notice through discovery that such evidence will be introduced, and the other party was not unduly prejudiced by the evidence’s introduction. Chuuk v. Nowell, 22 FSM R. 130a, 130e (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 2018).

Criminal Law and Procedure - Motions; Evidence
The factors that are relevant for deciding whether to grant the state’s motion to reopen its case in chief are: 1) the seriousness of the crime alleged; 2) whether motion to re-open case resulted from lack of preparation for trial; 3) timeliness of motion to reopen case in chief; 4) good cause; 5) whether motion to reopen case in chief resulted from a decision of the court after the case in chief, which was contrary to the state’s understanding of the applicable law; 6) whether the other party would be unfairly prejudiced by reopening such case; and 7) whether re-opening the case will unduly delay the disposition of the case. Chuuk v. Nowell, 22 FSM R. 130a, 130d-0e (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 2018).

Criminal Law and Procedure - Motions; Evidence
A motion to reopen a case should be denied when unfair prejudice towards the defendant results, such as when the state wants to introduce a document or evidence not disclosed in discovery, of which defendant lacked any notice, and against which defendant could not adequately defend due to the lack of time to prepare a defense. But when the defendant had notice of the confession statement; and when a preliminary hearing determined that the confession statement was admissible at trial, and so that the defendant was put on notice that the confession would be introduced at trial, no unfair prejudice would result from allowing the state to introduce the defendant’s confession statement upon re-opening its case. Chuuk v. Nowell, 22 FSM R. 130a, 130e-0f (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 2018).

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COURT’S OPINION

KERIO D. WALLIBY, Associate Justice:

I. INTRODUCTION

Trial commenced on the above-matter on June 14, 2018. The State attempted to introduce Defendant’s confession statement into evidence through a witness, but upon Defendant’s motion, witness was considered cumulative and not permitted to testify. The State then rested its case after having inadvertently failed to introduce the confession statement. Defendant was aware that the State intended to introduce the Confession Statement into Evidence. Defendant moved for a Rule 29 Motion to Dismiss. On June 15, 2018, the State Motioned for this Court to re-open its case in chief for the purposes of introducing the Confession Statement as evidence.
II. ISSUES

1. 1. Whether the purposes of justice are served by allowing this trial court to grant the State’s Motion to re-open its case in chief.
   

III. LAW AND APPLICABLE STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. FSM Authorities on re-opening Plaintiff’s Case

It is a case of first impression in the FSM where the Court must consider whether to allow a State to reopen its case in chief based on its negligence in failing to admit a certain piece of evidence at trial that both parties had expected to be introduced into evidence. Within Common Law jurisdictions, Courts have always had an inherit power to administer their proceedings as well as the order of proof in the interest of efficiency and justice. Derived from the Court’s common law power to administer its proceedings, is the implied power to decide as to whether to allow a party to re-open its case in chief after closing.

As a result of this power, in a past instance, this Court had provided the State with an option to reopen its case after a defendant had sought to introduce witnesses never previously disclosed within the State’s requested discovery. See generally Chuuk v. Rotenis, [2009] FMCSC 20; 16 FSM Intrm. 565, 567 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 2009) (The order provided that the State may also proffer additional evidence to avoid prejudice and reopen its case as well).

Likewise, the FSM Supreme Court used the same power to deny such motion when the State proffered to re-open its case after the State decided against including certain evidence into the record and upon receiving an adverse ruling, motioned to introduce such additional evidence. See generally FSM v. Tipen, 1 FSM Intrm. 79 (Pon. 1982). "To reopen a hearing would unnecessarily delay and extend . . . proceedings [and] as a alneral rule parties are expected to produce all evidence available to them at the time of scheduled for hearing." Id. at 94. In another matter, SM Su Court considered whether to grant a mistrial or l or to alto allow the State to re-open its case after the State failed to provide transcripts of a confession statement in its original language at the hearing, such transcript later surfaced, and appeared notably different from the transcript relied upon by the State’s and Defense witnesses. See generally FSM v. Walter, [2005] FMSC 26; 13 FSM Intrm. 264, 269 (Chk. 2005) (citing United States v. Pope, [1978] USCA6 401; 574 F.2d 320 (6th Cir. 1978) (prior witness statement revealed after witness had finished testifying and next prosecution witness had taken the stand; trial judge's offer to have witness recalled and allow his cross-examination to continue was proper remedy). The Walter Court decided in favor of a mistrial, but notably considered the practice in other jurisdiction as to similar matters.

B. Practices within Other Common Law Jurisdictions as Persuasive Authority

Chuuk’s Courts have referred to certain practices and decisions within other Common Law Jurisdictions, mostly notably the U.S., as persuasive authority where a doctrine was applicable and supported by good policy to incorporate into FSM jurisprudence based on the realities present within the jurisdiction. See generally Trust Territory v. Edgar, 11 FSM R. 303 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 2002); see also Chuuk v. William, 15 FSM R. 483 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 2008).

C. Persuasive Authority from U.S. Courts

U.S. Courts have firmly established a common law precedent where a Court has discretion to allow the State to re-open its case in chief so long as undue prejudice is not shown to the Defendant. "[T]he common-law power of the trial court to alter the order of proof ‘in its discretion and in furtherance of justice’ remains at least up to the time the case is submitted to the jury." People v. Olsen, 313 N.E.2d 782, 784 (N.Y. 1974) (noting that if the order of evidence unduly influences the jury, then it should not be admitted); see also People v. Whipple, 760 N.E.2d 337, 734 (N.Y. 2001). Reopening is permissible (for the State) where the missing element is simple to prove and not seriously contested, and reopening the case does not unduly prejudice the defense. Whipple, 760 N.E.2d at 734 (granting motion to reopen case in order to prove the size of the parking lot, a necessary component of proving an element of a drunk driving offense).

Similarly, (in Virginia), "whether the [State] should be permitted to introduce evidence in chief after it has rested is [also] a matter for the sound discretion of the trial court, and in the absence of abuse, its judgment will not be disturbed on appeal." Chrisman v. Commonwealth, 349 S.E.2d 899, 902 (Va. Ct. App. 1986) (cited by Harden v. Commonwealth, 2001 Va. App. LEXIS 429, *6, 2001 WL 802414 at *2 (Va. Ct. App. 2001)). Likewise an Indiana Court reasoned that because order of proof is within trial court's discretion, trial court did not err in allowing State to reopen case-in-chief to establish (an element of a crime) by independent evidence beyond defendant's confession. Pawloski v. State, 380 N.E.2d 1230, 1235 (Ind. 1978).

This principle is also reflected within common law by California Courts: limiting the introduction of evidence and allowing a party to reopen his case in chief are matters peculiarly within the discretion of the trial court and do not constitute grounds for reversal unless a manifest abuse of discretion is shown. Brocke v. Naseath, 285 P.2d 291, 294 (Cal. Ct. App.1955) (citing People v. Berryman, 57 P.2d 136, 139 (Cal. 1936) (After both sides had rested, but before the argument to the jury had commenced, the prosecution asked that the case be reopened for the purpose of permitting the introduction in evidence of a bottle, which had been previously marked exhibit 5 for identification, but which had not been offered in evidence, and the Court granted such motion over objection from Defense).

The vast number of decisions throughout various common law jurisdictions provide a mechanism under common law, for the Court to use its discretion so as to consider allowing a State to reopen its case in chief after having closed that case.

IV. LEGAL ANALYSIS

As a general rule, the State is expected to produce all evidence available to it at the time of trial. This rule exists for the purposes of judicial economy, an efficient disposition of cases, and to not delay Defendant’s rights to a speedy trial. There are however, instances akin to the present matter before this Court, that merit exception to this general rule.

Pursuant to this Court’s inherent authority under Common Law to administer the order of proof before it, this Court may entertain a motion from a party to reopen its case in the interest of justice. As there is no jury in the present case, common law abrogation in some jurisdictions to the court’s discretion in the order of proof as relating to a jury bear no relevance as to this matter. The cases mentioned from other common law jurisdictions have entertained such motions generally when, the State had inadvertently forgotten to introduce a piece of evidence, the other party had notice through discovery that such evidence will be introduced, and the other party was not unduly prejudiced by the introduction of this evidence.

The interests of justice are served by granting a State to reopen its case in chief if the matter at hand is a serious crime, the motion is timely, for good cause, and does not unfairly prejudice the defendant nor cause undue delay. In this matter, this Court feels the need to adopt the following factors in deciding on whether to grant a motion for the State to reopen its case in chief:
1. The Seriousness of the Crime alleged

2. 2. Whether motion to re-open case resulted from lack of preparation for trial
   
3. 3. Timeliness of motion to reopen case in chief
   
4. 4. Good Cause
   
5. 5. Whether motion to reopen case in chief resulted from a decision of the court after the case in chief, which was contrary to the State’s understanding of the applicable law.
   
6. 6. Whether the Other party would be unfairly prejudiced by reopening such case
   
7. 7. Whether re-opening the case will unduly delay the disposition of the case
   

The factor of seriousness of a crime is an important consideration. A crime not only victimizes a particular person, but also victimizes our entire society and the rule of law. Some crimes are more serious than others - and there is a greater public interest in determining their truth. A minor misdemeanor might not warrant a re-opening of a case in lieu of the general rule against reopening cases, as the harm to society is limited by the alleged offense and possibly outweighed by the importance of finality within a hearing. For a serious felony, such the allegation of murder within this case, the public interest in ensuring that the truth of the matter is revealed outweighs the public interest in having an expedient resolution matters before the court. This factor weighs in favor of reopening State’s case in chief.

Courts in the FSM have been reluctant to open cases that resulted from a lack of preparation for trial by a State, especially where the State had failed to move for a continuance at the beginning of the trial. This is not the case in the underlying matter.

Likewise, the Court should only consider granting a motion for the state to reopen the case if the motion is made in a timely manner. A motion to reopen a case made several days after the end of trial might not be timely and thus cause excessive delay in the hearing. In the underlying matter, the State submitted its motion to reopen the case the day after it had closed its case in chief and prior to the defense commencing its case in chief. The motion was filed timely.

Additionally the motion should have a good cause reason for reopening the case. In this instance, the State attempted to introduce its case in chief through a witness. Upon Motion from the Defendant, the Court inadvertently denied the introduction of the witness. Although this matter may be not raised on appeal because of failure by the State to object, the Court is aware that the confusion which resulted from the denial of introducing this witness may have resulted in the failure by the State to introduce the confession statement into evidence. This factor seems to constitute good cause for requesting to re-open the case in chief.

Courts in the FSM have also been reluctant to open cases because the outcome of the trial went contrary to the State’s expectations due to failure of the State to correctly interpret the law. The matter at hand contains no such issue.

Most importantly, a motion to reopen a case should be denied in instances where unfair prejudice towards the defendant results. One such example of unfair prejudice would result if the State had desired to introduce a particular document or evidence not disclosed in discovery, of which Defendant lacked any notice, and against which Defendant could not adequately defend due to the lack of time to prepare a defense. In this case, the Defendant had notice of the confession statement. A preliminary hearing determined that the confession statement is admissible at trial, and so Defendant was put on notice that the confession would be introduced at trial. No unfair prejudice would result from an order allowing the State to introduce Defendant’s confession statement upon re-opening its case.

Finally, re-opening the State’s case in the aforementioned matter for the sole purpose of introducing Defendant’s confession statement into evidence would not unduly delay the proceeding. The introduction of a confession statement should not exceed an hour - a period of time which is insignificant as compared to testimonies of numerous witnesses. Thus, the applicable factors appear to weigh in favor of allowing the State to reopen its case for the introduction of the Confession Statement into Evidence.

V. CONCLUSION

The Court now finds that the purposes of justice are served by allowing this trial court to grant the State’s Motion to re-open its case in chief. This Court now GRANTS State’s Motion. The State will be able to re-open its case in chief for the sole purpose of admitting the Defendant’s confession into evidence. The trial is now continued to August 21, 2018 at 10:00 a.m.

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