Chuuk v Jose [2018] FMCSC 2; 21 FSM R. 566 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 2018) (28 May 2018)

CHUUK STATE SUPREME COURT TRIAL DIVISION

CSSC-CRIMINAL CASE NO. 091-2017

CHUUK STATE, )
)
Plaintiff, )
)
vs. )
)
ANDER JOSE, )
)
Defendant. )
___________________________ )

ORDER REGARDING THE LEGALITY OF SENTENCING RECOMMENDATIONS WITHIN DEFENDANT’S PLEA

Camillo Noket
Chief Justice

Hearing: March 28, May 23, 2018
Decided: May 28, 2018

APPEARANCES:

For the Plaintiff: Sherry Jane Edmond
State Prosecutor
Office of the Chuuk Attorney General
P.O. Box 1050
Weno, Chuuk FM 96942

For the Defendant: Charleston L. Bravo
Office of the Public Defender
P.O. Box 754
Weno, Chuuk FM 96942

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HEADNOTES

Statutes Construction
A statutory provision’s plain meaning must be given effect whenever possible. Because issues of statutory construction are issues of law, courts have final authority over them and the court will construe and give effect to the provisions’ plain meaning. Chuuk v. Jose, 21 FSM R. 566, 569 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 2018).

Statutes Construction
A court should construe a statute as the legislature intended. Legislative intent is determined by the statute’s wording what a legislature says in a statute’s text is considered the best evidence of the legislative intent or will. Chuuk v. Jose, 21 FSM R. 566, 569 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 2018).

Statutes Construction
A court must give effect to a statutory provision’s plain meaning whenever possible. Chuuk v. Jose, 21 FSM R. 566, 569 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 2018).

Criminal Law and Procedure Sentence
Chuuk State Law No. 13-16-12 amended the sentencing provisions for some of the most violent felonies listed within Chuuk State Law No. 6-66 in order to help courts impose stiffer sentences on the convicted violators so as to help deter future criminal tendencies and involvement. Chuuk v. Jose, 21 FSM R. 566, 569 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 2018).

Criminal Law and Procedure Sentence
The commonly understood meaning of the term "imprisonment,” and its definition in both legal and regular dictionaries, is confining someone in prison or jail, and these definitions consistently allude to detention or captivity within a structure, as opposed to "suspended sentences," but the scope of imprisonment possibly includes house arrest, since it is a type of lawful restraint upon movement. Chuuk v. Jose, 21 FSM R. 566, 569 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 2018).

Criminal Law and Procedure Sentence
Chuuk courts have consistently relied on the discretionary authority vested upon them under Section 1110, to suspend the execution of sentences that the court imposed. Chuuk v. Jose, 21 FSM R. 566, 570 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 2018).

Criminal Law and Procedure Sentence
A Chuuk court may direct that the execution of the whole or any part of a sentence of imprisonment it imposes be suspended on such terms as to good behavior and on such conditions as the court may think proper. Chuuk v. Jose, 21 FSM R. 566, 570 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 2018).

Criminal Law and Procedure Sentence; Statutes Construction
When the statute never defines imprisonment, the plain meaning of the term governs, which could leave the possibility of defining imprisonment to include house arrest, but the statute’s context narrows the definition of imprisonment to refer only to confinement in jail. Chuuk v. Jose, 21 FSM R. 566, 570 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 2018).

Criminal Law and Procedure Homicide; Criminal Law and Procedure Sentence; Criminal Law and Procedure Parole
When the statute requires that a defendant convicted of murder be sentenced to a minimum of term of not less than 40 year(s), and eligible for parole after 20, the term imprisonment, as used within the statute, means a punishment of not less than 40 years in prison. Otherwise, the term parole is left meaningless, since it can only refer to release from prison, as opposed to house arrest, or the lifting of a suspended sentence. Chuuk v. Jose, 21 FSM R. 566, 571 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 2018).

Criminal Law and Procedure Parole
Parole is the conditional release of prisoners before they complete their sentence. Paroled prisoners are supervised by a parole officer. If paroled prisoners violate their release conditions, they may be returned to prison. Chuuk v. Jose, 21 FSM R. 566, 571 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 2018).

Criminal Law and Procedure Parole
The commonly understood meaning of parole is the conditional release from prison. Chuuk v. Jose, 21 FSM R. 566, 571 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 2018).

Criminal Law and Procedure Sentence; Criminal Law and Procedure Sexual Offenses
When a statute states that "a person convicted under this Section shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than five years," has consistently been interpreted to refer to the imposition of sentences, leaving the court the opportunity to suspend the execution of its imposed jail terms for sexual abuse, but when the punishment provision was amended to "not less than five years" instead of "not more than five years" imprisonment and the punishment section’s wording otherwise remains the same, therefore, although imprisonment means jail term, the mandated punishment refers to the imposition of such jail term as opposed to its execution. Therefore, courts may still suspend such sentences. Chuuk v. Jose, 21 FSM R. 566, 571 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 2018).

Criminal Law and Procedure Sentence
When the amended statute added some additional subsections requiring that the defendant serve a minimum five-year sentence, the "shall serve" within this provision refers to the execution of a sentence. But when the notable term missing within the paragraph is "jail" sentence, the court must impose a five-year imprisonment term, which it may then suspend in whole or in part, although the defendant is required to serve a five-year sentence. Since the provision lacks the term "jail" before "sentence," it only requires the court to impose at least a five-year jail sentence which the court may then suspend by virtue of its discretionary power. Chuuk v. Jose, 21 FSM R. 566, 571-72 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 2018).

Criminal Law and Procedure Sentence; Statutes Construction
Only those sections that contain a provision which mandates that defendant shall serve a mandatory x year jail sentence supersede § 1110 aereby actually removeemove the court’s equitable power to suspend such jail sentence. Chuuk v. Jose, 21 FSM R. 566, 572 (Chk. S. Ct. Tr. 2018).

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COURT’S OPINION

CAMILLO NOKET, Chief Justice:

I. INTRODUCTION

After Defendant Ander Jose pleaded guilty of one count of "Sexual Abuse," the State and Defense counsel presented their sentencing recommendations to the Court. Defense recommended a five year suspended sentence while the State recommended a three year jail term followed by a two year suspended sentence.

II. ISSUES

The Sentencing Recommendations within the Plea Agreement present this Court with two issues:

1. 1. Whether the term "imprisonment," as defined within the context of CSL 13-16-12; includes within its scope suspended sentences and house-arrests, as opposed to merely incarceration in a jail?
   

2. 2. Whether Section 1110 of CSL 6-66 continues to vest the Court with the authority to suspend the execution of sentences for a first offense under Section 404 as amended by CSL 13-16-12?
   

III. STANDARD OF REVIEW

A. Statutory Construction

The plain meaning of a statutory provision must be given effect whenever possible. Setik v. FSM, 5 FSM R. 407, 410 (App. 1992). "Because issues of statutory construction . . . are issues w, courts have have final authority over them . . . and the courl construe anue and give effect to the provisions’ plain meaning." Chuuk State Bd. of Educ. v. Sony, 17 . 56,Chk. . Tr. 2010) 010) (Tasked with defining vacancy, the Court explained that the wohe word vard vacancy within a statute shall be given its plain meaning unless the statute defined the word otherwise which it did).

Further, a court should construe a statute as the legislature intended. FSM v. Wainit, 12 FSM R. 105, 111 (Chk. 2003). Legislative intent is determined by the statute’s wording. Id. What a legislature says in a statute’s text is considered the best evidence of the legislative intent or will. Id. (citing Rodriguez v. Bank of the FSM, [2003] FMSC 12; 11 FSM Intrm. 367, 379 (App. 2003)); see also FSM Social Sec. Admin. v. Kingtex (FSM) Inc., [1997] FMSC 27; 8 FSM Intrm. 129, 131 (App. 1997). Thus a court must give effect to the plain meaning of a statutory provision whenever possible. Id.

B. CSL 13-16-12 and Section 404 of CSL 6-66

On November 1, 2016, Governor Elimo signed Chuuk State Law (CSL) 13-16-12 into effect after the legislature responded to an apparent increase in violent crime throughout Chuuk. CSL 13-16-12 amended the sentencing provisions for some of the most violent felonies listed within CSL 6-66 to "help Courts impose stiffer sentences on the convicted violators . . . [so as] to help fterre cure criminal tendencies and involvement." Chk. S.L. No. 13-16-12, pmbl. Neither CSL 13-16-12 amendments nor CSL 6-66 define the term imprisonment.

The applicable sentencing provision of Section 404 (for sexual abuse), within CSL 6-66 prior to the amendment read: A person convicted under this Section shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than five years, or a fine of not more than $5,000.00, or both. As amended, a person convicted under this section (for sexual abuse) shall be punished by imprisonment of not less than 5 years or a fine of not less than $5,000, or both.

C. "Imprisonment as Commonly Understood"

Generally, both legal and regular dictionaries define imprisonment as "confining someone in prison/jail." See WEST'S ENCYCLOPEDIA OF AMERICAN LAW (2 ed. 2008); BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY, available at: https://thelawdictionary.org/imprison/; Dictionary.com, available at: http://www.dictionary.com/browse/imprisonment; MERRIAM-WEBSTER’S DICTIONARY, available at: https://www.merriam-webster.com/thesaurus/imprisonment; ENGLISH-COLLINS DICTIONARY, available at: https://www.collinsdictionary.com/dictionary/english/imprisonment; OXFORD DICTIONARY. available at: https://en.oxforddictionaries.com/definition/imprisonment. Most variances within the definition, including footnoted passages such as "restriction on freedom," generally reference the concept of "false imprisonment" a situation where a private party wrongfully restrains another against that other’s will. However, these dictionaries consistently allude to detention or captivity, within a structure as opposed to "suspended sentences." These dictionaries therefore may define the scope of imprisonment to possibly include house arrest, since it is a type of lawful restraint upon movement.

Notably, the Court’s exhaustive search has revealed no dictionary that includes within its definitions of imprisonment, terms such as: suspended sentences or threats of being placed in jail at a later time. Instead, the definitions all clearly allude to confinement.

D. Section 1110 of CSL 6-66

During their sentencing process, Courts in Chuuk have consistently relied on the discretionary authority vested upon them under Section 1110, to suspend the execution of sentences that the Court imposed. "The court which imposes a sentence upon a person convicted of a criminal offense may direct that the execution of the whole or any part of a sentence of imprisonment imposed by it shall be suspended on such terms as to good behavior and on such conditions as the court may think proper to impose." Chk. S.L. No. 6-66, § 1110.

IVCTS &aTS & PROCEDURAL HISTORY

On December 15, 2017, the State charged Defendant Ander Jose with one Count of Sexual Assault in violation of CSL 6-66, § 403 as amended b CSL 13-L 13-16-12 and one Count of Sexual Abuse in violation of CSL 6-66, § 404 as ameny CSL 13-L 13-16-12. Defendant pleaded "not guilty" to counts. The matter proceeded to trial on March 8, 2018, w18, where the parties concurred to a plea agreement where Defendant change plea to guilty as to one cone count of "Sexual Abuse" in exchange for the State dismissing one count of "Sexual Assault." On March 23, 2018, the State submitted its sentencing recommendation: a three year jail term followed by a two year suspended sentence. On March 28, 2018 the Court held a hearing where Defense submitted its sentencing recommendation: a five year suspended sentence. At the hearing, the Court questioned the parties as to the definition of the term imprisonment, as used in the sentencing guidelines with CSL 6-66 as amended by CSL 13-16-12. The Court then instructed the parties to submit briefs on the subject by April 13, 2018 and response briefs by May 1, 2018. The Court continued the hearing to May 23, 2018 at 9:30 a.m., where the parties made oral arguments.

V. LEGAL ANALYSIS

A. Chuuk State Law No. 13-16-12

As CSL 13-16-12 never defined imprisonment, the plain meaning of the term governs. Although dictionary definitions have clearly rejected the notion of "suspended sentences," they have left the possibility of defining imprisonment to include house arrest. The context of CSL 13-16-12, however, narrows the definition of imprisonment to refer only to confinement in jail.

Throughout the entire statute, the words "imprisonment" and "jail sentence" are used interchangeably. Examples include: CSL 13-16-12, § 407 "Assault with a Daus Weus Weapon": Subsection 2: imprisonment for not less than 5 years . . . (followesubsection 3) ) defendant will serve a mandatory five year sentence in addition to any other jail terms the court may impo>. W § 407, the third subsectiotioection clarifies that imprisonment refersefers to j to jail terms. "Any other jail terms" directly refers to "sentence," which in turn refers to "imprisonment."

Section 416 on "Manslaughter" parallels § 407, where ction 2 follows lows the same structure on the provision of imprisonment and 3 elaborates on jail terms based on the number of victims. "Manslaughter for one victim is punishable by a minimum jail sentence of 5 years."

Section 417 on "Aggravated Assault" again parallels § 407’s language. Section 418 on "Sexual Assault" again parallels this language: imprisonment for not less than 3 years, defendant must serve a mandatory 3 year jail term for the firstim, and a minimum 5 years jail term for a second convictionction.

The language within § 404 "Sexual Abuse" lackaralparallel jail sentence and sentencing clause provision compared to the other sections. Subsection 2 provides that "the Defe be sentenced to no less than 5 years imprisonment or not less than a $5,000 fine or both."oth." It further stipulates that if this is Defendant’s "second conviction under the statute, he shall be sentenced to an additional 2 years, in addition to whichever jail term the court imposes." The fact that a jail term is not required for the first offense but instead can be replaced with a fine over $5,000, generally explains the legislature’s decision not to include a repetitive jail sentencing provision within this section a first offense of sexual abuse.

The remaining section, § 415 "Murder" clearly refera to a jail sentence within the context of imprisonment when it uses "parole" within the same section. Section 415 mandates thaendant be sentenced upon conviction to a minimum of term of not less than 40 year(s), an), and eligible for parole after 20.

The Cornell Legal Institute defines parole as: conditional release of prisoners before they complete their sentence. Paroled prisoners are supervised by a . . . parolecer. arf paroled pred prisoners violate the conditions of their release, they may be returned to prison. Parole, THE WEXLER LEGAL DICTIONARY, available at: https://www.law.cornellwex/p.

By p>By virtuvirtue of the commonly understood meaning of parole which is, in short defined as a "conditional release from prison," the term imprisonment has been used within § 415 to mean a punishment of not less than 40 years in prison. Otherwise, the term parole is left meaningless, since it can only refer to release from prison, as opposed to house arrest, e lifting of a suspended sentence.

All the sect sections amended by CSL 13-16-12 interchange jail term and imprisonment. The statute never alludes to any other meaning for imprisonment other than incarceration in a jail.

B. The Court’s Authority to Suspend Imposed Sentences under CSL 6-66, § 1110

jail sentence.

The first subsection of the originally phrased § 404, invant part, states thes that "a person convicted under this Section shall be punished by imprisonment for not more than fiars." Chuuk State Courts have consistently interpreted this phrase to refer to the impositposition of sentences. Hence, CSL 6-66, § 1110 applied to this sion aion and provided the Court’s with the opportunity to suspend the execution of its imposed jail terms for § 404. 13-16-12 merely amendemended the punishment provision to not less than five years instead of not more than five years imprisonment. Otherwise, the wording of the punishment section remains the same. It would defy the basic canons of statutory interpretation to interpret the now amended § 404 to reo the execution ason as opposed to the imposition of a sentence when the phrase in question remains unchanged by the amendments. Therefore, although imprisonmeans jail term, the mandated punishment refers to the imposimposition of such jail term as opposed to its execution. Therefore, the Courts may still use § 1110 to suspend such sentences.

CSL 13-16-12 had added some additional subsections to § 404, requiring that thendanendant serve a minimum 5 year sentence. "Shall serve" within this provision refo the execution of a of a sentence. The notable term missing within this paragraph is "jail" sentence. Therefore, the Court must impose a 5 year imprisonment term, which it may then suspend in whole or in part . .;. but the Defendant is reis required to serve a 5 year sentence. Since the provision lacks the term jail before sentence, it only requires the Cto impose at least a five year jail sentence which the Coue Court may then suspend by virtue of its discretionary power under § 1110. Only those sections that contain a provision which mandates that defendant shall serve a mandatory x year jail sentence supersede § 111 therefore actually remo remove the Court’s equitable power to suspend such mandatory jail sentence in the applicable section.

VI. CONCLUSION

The Court now finds that the term "imprisonment," as defined within the context of CSL 13-16-12, does not include within its scope suspended sentences and house-arrests, as opposed to merely incarceration in a jail. However, this Court finds that Section 1110 of CSL 6-66 continues to vest the Court with the authority to suspend the execution of sentences for a first offense under Section 404 as amended by CSL 13-16-12. Therefore, both the State and Defense have presented this Court with sentencing recommendations in compliance with the law. This Court will now hold a hearing as to whether to accept Defendant’s guilty plea on May 31, 2018 at 9:30 a.m. with consideration as to the sentencing recommendations as they now stand.

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