Ham v Chuuk [1998] FMCSC 12; 8 FSM Intrm. 300i (Chk. S. Ct. App. 1998) (20 April 1998)

CHUUK STATE SUPREME COURT
APPELLATE DIVISION
Cite as Ham v Chuuk, [1998] FMCSC 6; 8 FSM Intrm. 300i (Chk. S. Ct. App. 1998)

NEIPUN HAM et al.,
Appellants,

vs.

CHUUK STATE et al.,
Appellees.

CSSC CIVIL APPEAL NO. 46

OPINION

Argued: December 1, 1997
Decided: April 20, 1998

BEFORE:

Hon. Soukichi Fritz, Chief Justice, Chuuk State Supreme Court, presiding
Hon. Lyndon Cornelius, Temporary Justice, Chuuk State Supreme Court*
Hon. Ready Johnny, Temporary Justice, Chuuk State Supreme Court**

*Chief Justice, Kosrae State Court, Lelu, Kosrae
** FSM Public Defender, Weno, Chuuk

APPEARANCES:

For the Appellants:
Midasy O. Aisek, Esq.
Directing Attorney
Micronesian Legal Services Corporation
P.O. Box D
Weno, Chuuk FM 96942

For the Appellees:
Maketo Robert, Esq.
Attorney General
Office of the Chuuk Attorney General
P.O. Box 189
Weno, Chuuk FM 96942

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HEADNOTES

Public Officers and Employees - Chuuk; Settlement
It is settled doctrine that the power vested in the office of the Attorney General empowers settlement of litigation in which the Attorney General has supervision and control. Ham v. Chuuk, [1998] FMCSC 6; 8 FSM Intrm. 300i, 300k (Chk. S. Ct. App. 1998).

Judgments; Statutes - Construction
An obligation of the state to pay a litigant a sum in exchange for dismissal of claims sought that arises from the judgment of dismissal of that case is not contrary to the legislative intent expressed in any provision of the Financial Management Act. Otherwise, no settlement of litigation requiring payment by the state could ever be made. Ham v. Chuuk, [1998] FMCSC 6; 8 FSM Intrm. 300i, 300k (Chk. S. Ct. App. 1998).

Judgments; Statutes - Construction
It is the purpose of the Financial Management Act to ensure that public funds are only used or promised in a manner provided by law and a judgment of the Chuuk State Supreme Court trial division is a manner provided by law. Ham v. Chuuk, [1998] FMCSC 6; 8 FSM Intrm. 300i, 300k (Chk. S. Ct. App. 1998).

* * * *

COURT'S OPINION

SOUKICHI FRITZ, Chief Justice:

This is an appeal from a judgment of the Trial Division which must be reversed. This decision renders moot the constitutional and procedural issues raised by the Appellant.

The undisputed facts indicate that without prior consent or permission, the State entered upon the Appellant's land located in the vicinity of the airport for the purpose of constructing a road, drainage ditches and utility lines. In response, the Appellant filed suit, CSSC CA No, 108-89, on August 30, 1989. On December 19, 1991, that case was dismissed in the Trial Division with the following statement: "Upon a stipulation agreed by both parties, an order of dismissal is hereby entered, accordingly. So ordered this 19th day of December, 1991."

The basis for the stipulation for dismissal was an agreement entered into by the parties on January 12, 1990, entitled: "Settlement Agreement for Government Use of Private Property." The Appellant has been paid $10,000.00 of the $55,000.00 agreed to by the State under the terms of the Settlement Agreement. Paragraph 5(b) of this agreement provides that the Appellant "shall dismiss any and all claims, damages, liabilities against the Government arising out of this lease agreement prior to effective date of this agreement."

Based on the foregoing facts and the court records, of which this Court takes judicial knowledge, the only issue necessary for the decision in this case is whether the Trial Court erred in its conclusion that the Settlement Agreement referred to above is void as being in violation of the Financial Management Act, Truk S.L. No. 5-44.

From the outset, it must be understood that the document in question can not be characterized as merely a land use agreement, when, in fact, it is a stipulation which has been incorporated in the Judgment of Dismissal of a pending law suit. The issue then evolves into whether the Attorney General has the authority to bind the State to an obligation arising under the terms of a negotiated settlement of pending litigation.

In Truk v. Robi, [1988] FMCSC 1; 3 FSM Intrm. 556, 560 (Truk S. Ct. App. 1988) under similar facts, this Court held:

It is settled doctrine that the power vested in the office of the Attorney General empowers settlement of litigation in which the Attorney General has supervision and control. Leonard v. United States Postal Service, [1974] USCA1 13; 489 F.2d 814, 817 (1st Cir. 1974), citing cases establishing an Attorney General's power to settle.

It is clear, that the obligation of the State to pay the Appellant the sum of $55,000.00 in exchange for her dismissal of all claims sought in case No. 108-89, arises from the Judgment of Dismissal of that case and is not contrary to the Legislative intent expressed in any provision of the Financial Management Act. Otherwise, no settlement of litigation requiring payment by the State could ever be made. There is nothing to indicate that the Legislature intended to strip the Attorney General of this power by the enactment of Truk S.L. No. 5-44.

Section 2 of Truk S.L. No. 5-44, states that "It is the purpose of this Act to ensue that public funds are only used or promised in a manner provided by law. . . ." There is no douat thjudg judgment of the Trial Division of the Chuuk State Supreme Court is a "manner provided by law," and that Appellant is entitled to judgment in the amount of $45,000.00 which is the balance due from the State.

The Judgment of the Trial Division is reversed and Judgment is entered for the Appellant in the amount of $45,000.00.