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SOUTH PACIFIC AQUATIC INC v INFORMATION TECHNOLOGY SERVICES (FIJI) LIMITED AND APOLOSI KALOUMAIRA
High Court Civil Jurisdiction
27 November, 5 December, 2001
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HBC 0411/01S
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Dissolution of stay order - dispute over rental for lease of vessel – non disclosure- court's duty to examine the entire matter afresh on application to extend, dissolve or discharge injunction – counterclaim equitable set off – serious triable issues - damages an adequate remedy – sufficiency of Plaintiff's undertaking – Plaintiff unagble to deposit Defendant's counter-claim into Court – preservation of status quo
Following a dispute as to charter rental for a vessel, and an unsuccessful effort at re-taking possession, the Plaintiff applied ex parte 4 days later and obtained an order requiring the Defendant to deliver the vessel John G to the Plaintiff immediately. The indorsed Writ of Summons sought damages for trespass and conversion of the vessel by the Defendants. The Defendants sought and obtained an ex parte stay order 3 days later on the grounds of material non-disclosure. The Defendant company's Statement of Defence claimed it had overpaid rent for 7½ months and counterclaimed for liquidated damages for various alleged breaches of the lease agreement by the Plaintiff, and to an Arceneaux debt indemnity of the Plaintiff. Upon the Plaintiff's ex parte application to dissolve the stay order, the Court ordered the matter to be heard inter-partes. The Court found the Plaintiff had not disclosed Arceneaux debt indemnity, or that the vessel was seized by the Admiralty Marshal for 5 weeks resulting in the consent order, after it had been chartered to the Defendant company. The Court pointed out that Plaintiff's counsel's submissions of a reduced debt diminished the nature of the legal debt the Defendant had taken on, forced the Court to determine the issues in dispute between the parties and failed to take into account the Defendant company's much larger set-off and counter-claim. The Court set about determining the matter afresh and decided there were serious triable issues. The Court found the Plaintiff's inability to meet an undertaking or to pay the Defendant's counterclaim into Court, that damages are an adequate remedy in all the circumstances, the balance of convenience in preserving the status quo by allowing the Defendant company to operate the vessel for fishing purposes favoured the dissolution of the earlier ex parte injunction.
Held–(1) Upon an inter-partes application to extend, dissolve, or discharge an ex-parte injunction the Court has a duty to examine the entire matter afresh upon all of the affidavits and submissions placed before it and may, in exercising its discretion afresh, dissolve, vary, suspend or extend the ex-parte injunction and may even grant a fresh injunction as in its discretion appears just. An application for injunction inter-partes, on which serious issues arise, which forces a Court to determine the heart of the dispute between parties will be refused.
(2) A claim to an equitable set-off should not be hemmed-in by common law rules requiring notice before the set-off may be properly asserted, but must arise and be interdependent under the claim itself.
Application to dissolve stay order refused. Earlier ex parte injunction to deliver up the 'John G' dissolved. Plaintiff to file and serve a proper Statement of Claim within 7 days.
[Note: subsequently, a Statement of Claim was filed on 11 December 2001. A motion to set aside judgment in default filed on 29 February 2002 has never been heard. On 17 January, 2006 Plaintiff counsel advised the Court the matter has been settled. On 29 March 2006, the action was struck out.]
Cases referred to in Judgment
Bank of Mellat v Nikpour [1985] FSR 87
Brinks –Mat Ltd v Elcombe [1983]
3 All ER 188
British Anzani (Felixstowe) Ltd v International Marine
Management (UK) Ltd [979] 2 All ER 1063
Compagnia Sud Americana v Ship Mair
BV ('The Teno') [1977] 2 Lloyd's Rep. 297
Dormeil Freres v Nicolian Ltd
[1988] 3 All ER 197
Federal Commerce and Navigation Ltd v Molena Alpha Inc
[1978] 3 All ER 1066
Grant v NZMC Ltd [1989] 1 NZLR 8
R v Kensington
Income Tax Commissioners [1917] 1 KB 486
'The Nanfri' [1978] 3 All ER 1066
Feizal Haniff for the Plaintiff
Kitione Vuataki for the
Defendants
5 December, 2001
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JUDGMENT
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Fatiaki, J
This is an application to dissolve a stay order granted by the Court on the
Defendant company's ex-parte application dated 16th October
2001.
The case concerns a vessel the JOHN 'G' which had been
chartered to the Defendant company by the Plaintiff company in August 2000
on a
monthly rental of $6000.
Over time a dispute arose between the
parties over rental payments and other matters culminating in a letter dated
October 7, 2001
from the Plaintiff company purported to terminate the lease
agreement because inter alia '... as of today, you are $60,000 (US$30,000)
in
arrears.'
The letter was followed the very next day 8th October
2001, by an unsuccessful attempt by the managing director of the Plaintiff
company
to take possession of the vessel pursuant to Clause 6 of the lease
agreement which reads:
'If the rent reserved by this lease is unpaid for a period of more than
twenty-eight (28) days the lessor or his agent shall take
possession of the
vessel whereupon the term shall absolutely cease and determine.'
It
is noteworthy that the Plaintiff company's termination letter does not clearly
identify any component of the accumulated arrears
as being 'unpaid for a period
of more than twenty eight (28) days' nor does the letter give the Defendant
company any time or warning
within which to make payment of the arrears claimed
failing which repossession of the vessel would take place.
Be that
as it may on 12th October 2001 the Plaintiff company applied ex-parte and
obtained an order requiring the Defendant company
to 'deliver the vessel John
'G' to the Plaintiff forthwith'. The indorsed Writ of Summons which founded the
application sought damages
for trespass and conversion of the vessel by the
Defendants. All papers were ordered to be served within 24
hours.
Three (3) days later on 15th October the Defendant company
entered an appearance by counsel and the very next day sought a stay of
the
above mandatory order which was granted ex-parte on the court's preliminary
acceptance that material non-disclosure(s) had occurred
on the part of the
Plaintiff company in obtaining the original ex-parte order for the return of the
vessel. The ex-parte stay order
was served on the Plaintiff's solicitor on 18th
October.
The Defendant company in its Statement of Defence had
denied being in arrears of rental payments and averred that 'it had overpaid
rent for 7½ (seven and half) months'. It further counterclaimed for
liquidated damages for various alleged breaches of the lease
agreement by the
Plaintiff company and also, in respect of a separate agreement relating to what
might be conveniently described,
in short-form, as the 'Arceneaux debt', wherein
the Plaintiff company's managing director agreed to:
'(1) ... indemnify (the Defendant company) for making payments on behalf of my debt to Steven Arceneaux (High Court Case HBG 3 of 2001) and;
(2) ITS (Fiji) Ltd. is authorised to deduct from the amount owing to me from
the charter of the vessel John G to compensate ITS (Fiji)
Ltd. for payments made
on my behalf.'
On the face of it this latter agreement which was
subsequently reduced into a consent order of the Court in Admiralty Action No.
HBG
3 OF 2001, rendered the Defendant company solely liable for the whole of the
'Arceneaux debt' and granted it the right to 'set-off'
against the rental
payments under the lease, any payments made by the Plaintiff company in
discharging the debt.
Such an agreement if I may say so, has the
potential to considerably and materially affect or impact on the question of
rental arrears
under the original lease of the 'John G' yet was never disclosed
by the Plaintiff company which later claimed, through its managing
director,
that '...(it) was anyway insignificant'.
In this latter regard it
is also not disclosed by the Plaintiff company that, as a direct result of the
Court proceedings to recover
the 'Arceneaux debt', the vessel was seized by the
Admiralty Marshall in March 2001 i.e. after it had been leased to the Defendant
company, and was detained for approximately five (5) weeks until after the
above-mentioned consent order was filed in Court, and
pursuant to which the
Defendant company:
'... undertakes to pay (Steven Arceneaux's) debt of US$10,500 (US Ten
Thousand and Five Hundred Dollars) plus costs of $4,000 (Four
Thousand Dollars)
with an initial payment of $5,000 (Five Thousand Dollars) and monthly payments
of $1,500 (One Thousand and Five
Hundred Dollars) thereafter';
The
principle requiring full and frank disclosure in ex-parte applications has
recently been enunciated and reaffirmed in
Bank of Mellat v
Nikpour (1985) FSR 87 where Donaldson, L.J. said:
"This principle that no injunction obtained ex parte shall
stand if it has been obtained in circumstances in which there was a breach
of
the duty to make the fullest and frankest disclosure is of great antiquity.
Indeed, it is so well enshrined in the law that it
is difficult to find
authority for the proposition; we all know it; it is trite law. But happily we
have been referred to a dictum
of Lord Justice Warrington in the case of
R. v Kensington Income Tax Commissioners, ex p. Princess Edmond de Polignac
[1917] 1 KB 486
at p.509. He said: 'It is perfectly well settled that a person who makes an ex
parte application to the court - that is to say, in
the absence of the person
who will be affected by that which the court is asked to do - is under an
obligation to the court to make
the fullest possible disclosure of all material
facts within his knowledge, and if he does not make that fullest possible
disclosure,
then he cannot obtain any advantage from the proceedings, and he
will be deprived of any advantage he may have already obtained by
means of the
order which has thus wrongly been obtained by him'."
Furthermore,
Lord Cozens-Hardy M.R. in dealing with the consequences of non-disclosure in
ex-parte applications aptly summed it up when he said in R. v
Kensington Income Tax Commissioners (op.cit) at p.505:
"... the court ought not to go into the merits of the case, but simply say,
'we will not listen to your application because of what
you have
done'."
In my view however, upon an application inter-partes
to extend, dissolve, or discharge an ex-parte injunction the Court has
the opportunity and the duty to examine the entire matter afresh upon the basis
of all of the affidavits
and submissions placed before it at the inter-
partes hearing and may, in exercising its discretion afresh in the matter,
dissolve, vary, suspend or extend the ex-parte injunction and may even
grant a fresh injunction as in its discretion appears just.
In this
regard I am fortified by the observations of Browne-Wilkinson V.C. in
Dormeil Freres v
Nicolian Ltd. [1988] 3 All ER 197 where the learned Vice Chancellor said
at p.199:
'... if, in the circumstances existing when the matter comes before the Court
inter partes justice requires an order continuing the
ex parte injunction or the
grant of a fresh injunction, such an order can be made notwithstanding the
earlier failure to make such
disclosure. Moreover, there is authority that,
contrary to the law as it was originally laid down, there is no absolute right
to
have an ex parte order obtained without due disclosure set aside: There is a
discretion in the Court whether to do so or not.'
In
considering this aspect of the present case I am also guided by the head-note to
Brinks-MAT Ltd v
Elcombe [1983] 3 All ER 188 which contains the following relevant
passage dealing with non-disclosure in ex- parte applications:
'Whether a fact not disclosed is of sufficient materiality to justify
or require immediate discharge of the order without examination
of the merits
depends on the importance of the fact to the issue to be decided by the judge on
the application. The fact that the
non-disclosure was innocent, in the sense
that it was not known to the Applicant or that its relevance was not perceived,
is an important,
but not decisive, consideration in deciding whether to order an
immediate discharge. However the Court has a discretion notwithstanding
proof of
material non-disclosure which justifies the immediate discharge of an ex parte
order to continue the order or to make a
new order on
terms.'
Ralph Gibson LJ in his judgment at pp.192/193
(ibid) enumerated no less than seven (7) relevant 'principles' of
which it is only necessary for present purposes to refer to the second which
reads:
'(ii) the material facts are those which it is material for the judge to know
in dealing with the application as made; materiality
is to be decided by the
Court and not by the assessment of the Applicant or his legal
advisors.'
In light of the above I reject in
limine the claim by the managing director of the Plaintiff company that the
agreement and/or the subsequent Court order were either 'insignificant'
or
immaterial for this court to know. Indeed, it is impossible to calculate the
arrears of rental (if any) owing to the Plaintiff
company under the lease of the
vessel without fully accounting for any 'payments made ... to Steven Arceneaux'
which the Defendant
company was specifically 'authorised to deduct from the
amount owing ... from the charter of the vessel John G.'
Be that as
it may on 1st November the Plaintiff company responded with an ex-parte
application for the dissolution of the stay order. By then it had become
abundantly clear to the Court that no further ex-parte applications ought
to be entertained in the matter and the Plaintiff's summons was ordered
inter-partes.
At the inter-partes hearing Plaintiff's
counsel while reluctantly conceding that there had been a non-disclosure on the
Plaintiff company's part, nevertheless,
valiantly sought to support the managing
director's 'insignificant' description by way of a detailed analysis of the
various payments
that had been deposed in the affidavits and producing a
substantially reduced arrears figure of $46,000 at the end of October 2001
after
taking into account all individual payments made by the Defendant company
towards the 'Arceneaux debt'.
Three (3) observations may be made
regarding this submission which is also rejected. Firstly, the calculation
diminishes the nature
of the legal liability that the Defendant company has
taken on in relation to the 'Arceneaux debt' by only allowing deductions
for individual payments made therefor as opposed to the entire debt; Secondly,
the submission requires
the Court on an interlocutory application with opposing
affidavits, to finally determine the very question which is in dispute between
the parties namely, the lawfulness of the purported exercise by the Plaintiff
company of its powers to repossess the vessel under
Clause 6 of the lease
agreement; and Thirdly, the submission ignores the counterclaim or equitable
set-off pleaded in the Statement
of Defence which is more specifically evidenced
in the affidavit of the 2nd Defendant who is principal shareholder and director
of
the Defendant company and which exceeds, in amount, the rental arrears
calculated by counsel.
In support of this latter claim to set-off
against the rental claimed the repair expenses incurred by the Defendant
company, defence
counsel referred to para. 417 of Vol.42 of Halsbury's Laws
of England (4th ed) which reads:
'In answer to a claim for rent, a tenant has an ancient common law right to
set up by way of defence any sum of money actually expended
by him on repairs
which the landlord, in breach of covenant, has failed to carry out
....'
Counsel for the Plaintiff company forcefully
submits however, that even assuming that the lessor was liable to carry out such
repairs,
nevertheless equitable set-off is not available to the Defendant as
lessee of the vessel, insofar as no notice requesting or requiring
the alleged
repairs was ever given to the Plaintiff company as lessor.
I cannot
agree that a claim to an equitable set-off which by its nature attracts the
court's conscience, should be hemmed-in by common
law rules requiring notice
before the set-off may be properly asserted.
The distinction
between the 'ancient common law right' of a tenant to set-off repairs against
rental, and, an equitable set-off of
a cross-claim as recognised by the courts
of equity is clarified and made plain in the scholarly judgment of Forbes J in
British Anzani
(Felixstowe) Ltd. v International Marine Management (UK) Ltd.
[1979] 2 All ER 1063 where the learned judge said at p.1074:
'I am satisfied that it is proper in principle to allow that a cross-claim
could be effective as an equitable set off against a claim
for rent .... The
important qualification is that the equity must impeach the title to the legal
demand, or in other words go to
the very foundation of the landlord's claim.
This seems to me to involve consideration of the proposition that the tenant's
cross-claim
must at least arise under the lease itself, or directly from the
relationship of landlord and tenant created by the lease.'
His
lordship then considered (ibid at p.1075/76) the difficult question of how
'closely connected' or related ought the claim and
cross-claim to be before an
equitable set-off would be permitted and in concluding that the guiding
principle is: 'What is obviously
fair or manifestly unjust' his lordship firmly
rejected 'the insidious promptings of generations of common lawyers that there
is
something special about rent.'
I respectfully adopt as an
accurate formulation of the principle of equitable set-off, the observations of
Somers J in Grant v
NZ MC Ltd. [1989] 1 NZLR 8 where his lordship in delivering the
judgment of the Court of Appeal said, at pp.12/13:
'The principle is we think, clear. The Defendant may set-off a cross-claim
which so affects the Plaintiff's claim that it would be
unjust to allow the
Plaintiff to have judgment without bringing the cross-claim to account. The link
must be such that the two are
in effect interdependent: judgment on one cannot
fairly be given without regard to the other; the Defendant's claim calls into
question
or impeaches the Plaintiff's demand. It is neither necessary, nor
decisive, that claim and cross-claim arise out of the same contract.'
The right to an equitable set-off in a time charter of a
vessel was firmly recognised in
Federal Commerce
and Navigation Ltd v Molena Alpha Inc
'The
Nanfri' [1978] 3 All ER 1066 where Lord Denning M.R. said at p.1080:
'In my opinion therefore in a time charter, if the shipowner wrongly and in
breach of contract deprives the charterer for a time of
the use of the vessel,
the charterer can deduct a sum equivalent to the hire for the time so
lost.'
(See also: per Parker LJ in
Compagnia Sud
Americana v Ship Mair BV ('The Teno') [1977] 2
Lloyds Rep 297.) So much then for the question of set-off.
I am
satisfied that the Plaintiff company's non-disclosure of the 'Arceneaux debt'
agreement and subsequent consent order was not
'innocent in the sense that it
was not known to the Applicant', nor do I accept that either non-disclosed fact
was 'insignificant'
or immaterial in the Court's assessment. This alone would
justify the summary dismissal of the Plaintiff's ex-parte injunction under
the
'law as it was originally laid down', however, in deference to counsel's
submissions and the later authorities referred to above,
I turn to consider
afresh whether or not to extend the injunction or grant a new
order.
In this latter regard there is not the slightest doubt in my
mind that the competing affidavits of the parties and the submissions
of
counsels raises serious triable issues in the case, including, whether or not
the Plaintiff company is entitled to invoke Clause
6 of the lease agreement? and
whether or not the Defendant company is entitled to set-off against the rental,
the cost of the repairs
carried out to the vessel and, if so, by how
much?
Plaintiff's counsel then submits that damages are not an
adequate remedy because the Defendant company is in arrears of rental and
the
vessel which represents the Plaintiff's only asset is being used for fishing
purposes in the high seas and is uninsured. To a
suggestion that the Plaintiff
company pay into court the amount of the Defendant's counterclaim counsel was
unable to accede.
For its part the 2nd Defendant deposes that the
vessel ought to remain in the Defendant company's custody and possession because
that
was a term of the consent order voluntarily entered into by the managing
director and owner of the vessel and in terms of which the
Defendant company
undertook to repay a substantial debt which in turn was 'to be
sourced and financed from the operation and utilisation of the John G for
fishing purposes' and there is a balance of $17,000
owing on the
undertaking.
Furthermore, the right of the Plaintiff company to
determine the lease for rental arrears is the very matter in dispute between the
parties and finally, any undertaking by the Plaintiff company to compensate the
Defendant company in the event that the vessel ought
not to have been returned
to the Plaintiff company, must be viewed as suspect given its earlier inability
to meet the 'Arceneaux
debt'.
I have carefully considered the
affidavit materials and competing submissions and am firmly of the view that
damages are an adequate
remedy for the Plaintiff company in all the
circumstances. Needless to say the Plaintiff company was content to charter the
vessel
in the first place to the Defendant company 'to be used for the purposes
of fishing' and unlike the Defendant company, rental is
due and payable to the
Plaintiff company whether or not the vessel is in its possession and
custody.
If I should be wrong however in concluding that damages
are an adequate remedy for the Plaintiff company, then there is no doubt in
my
mind that the balance of convenience strongly favours the Defendant company in
the maintenance of the existing status quo.
It cannot be
ignored that the 'locus contractus' of the 'Arceneaux debt' was
Hawaii and proceedings to recover it was taken in Fiji because presumably the
vessel was taken out of the jurisdiction by the
Plaintiff company without
payment of the debt.
In the result the Plaintiff company's
inter-partes summons to dissolve the stay order and to recover
the vessel is dismissed. Furthermore and for the sake of completeness the
ex-parte injunction granted to the Plaintiff company on 12th October is
dissolved forthwith with costs of $800 summarily fixed.
By way of
further directions the Plaintiff company is ordered within seven (7) days to
file and serve a proper Statement of Claim,
failing which, the action stands
dismissed.
Application dismissed.
Marie Chan
PacLII:
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