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Supreme Court of Fiji |
IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FIJI
[APPELLATE JURISDICTION]
CIVIL PETITION NO: CBV0003 OF 2021
Court of Appeal No. ABU 134 of 2017
BETWEEN:
ITAUKEI LAND TRUST BOARD
Petitioner
AND:
SAROJNI aka SAROJNI LAL
1st Respondent
APISAI BAUSI & SUSU
2nd Respondent
Coram : Hon. Mr. Justice Anthony Gates, Judge of the Supreme Court
Hon. Mr. Justice Brian Keith, Judge of the Supreme Court
Hon. Mr. Justice Filimone Jitoko, Judge of the Supreme Court
Counsel: Mr. J. Cati for the Petitioner
: Mr. R. K. Naidu and Mr. S. Ratoto for the Respondent
Date of Hearing : 11 April 2023
Date of Judgment : 28 April 2023
JUDGMENT
Gates J
[1] I have read in draft the judgment of Jitoko J. I am in agreement with it, its reasons and orders.
Keith J
[2] I have read a draft of the judgment of Jitoko J in this case. I entirely agree with him that leave to appeal should be refused for the reasons which he gives. I add a few words of my own only to address an alternative argument which Mr Cati for the Board advanced when he saw the lie of the land.
[3] The Board’s first ground of appeal is that the Court of Appeal was wrong to approve the master’s reliance on the report of Ms Cavalevu when that report was hearsay because her opinion was not based on a physical inspection of the land, but on the basis of photographs, documents and what she was told by the plaintiff. I agree with what Jitoko J has said. Her report was not hearsay. The fact that she did not physically inspect the land and relied on what she was told went only to the weight to be attached to her report, not its admissibility.
[4] From the questions we asked Mr Cati, he was astute enough to see the way the wind was blowing. He therefore advanced an alternative submission. He contended that the master placed undue weight on the report, when it should really have been ignored altogether. I agree with Mr Cati to this extent: if the weight which was placed on the report was greater than could reasonably have been placed on it – admittedly a very big “if” – that could amount to an error of law. But it would not involve such a far-reaching question of law as to engage the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court.
[5] The second ground of appeal relates to the length of time for which interest was awarded. The issue turned on which of the parties was responsible, or primarily responsible, for the delay. That was an issue of fact. As Jitoko J has said, even if the Court of Appeal erred in law in reaching its conclusion about which of the parties was responsible, or primarily responsible, for the delay, that does not mean that the issue involves a far-reaching question of law.
[6] Neither of the other two circumstances for justifying the intervention by the Supreme Court exist in this case. That, in short, is why I agree with Jitoko J that leave to appeal should be refused.
Jitoko J
[7] In my view, the Petitioner’s application under Section 98(4) of the Constitution for special leave to appeal the decision of the Court below falls short of the threshold requirements under Section 7 (3) of the Supreme Court Act 1998.
[8] For the reasons I have set out below, leave to appeal the judgment of the Court of Appeal of 30 April, 2021 is refused.
Factual Background
[9] On 6 January, 1977, the iTaukei Land Trust Board (iTLTB) issued a Tenancy – At – Will (TAW) to one Shubhaga Devi over three (3) acres of land described as Solovi CN: 2286 situated at Nawaka, Nadi. The conditions of occupancy were inter alia, that the land to be used solely for agricultural purpose, no buildings whatsoever to be erected on the land and, the right to occupancy was not transferrable. On 17 September 1982, the TAW was extended for a further 20 years from 1 January 1981. The covenants, conditions and restrictions in the earlier TAW remained in force. On 2 April 1986, Shubhaga Devi successfully applied to the iTLTB for its consent to assign the TAW to Shanti Lal for a consideration of $47,000. In the process of assignment, the area under the TAW had somehow increased to 13 acres from the original 3 acres. The consent of the iTLTB was nevertheless sought and obtained on 30 April 1986, followed by the issuance of the Certificate of Assignment on 6 August 1986.
[10] Shanti Lal’s tenancy for the remainder of the 20 years period was frequently disturbed, by the landowners trespassing, trying to take possession of the land. There were accusations as to what exactly was Shanti Lal’s entitlement. Allegations of threats and illegal entries by Respondents, the representatives of the landowners were made, and verified by the Board reports.
[11] The iTLTB finally, in 2000 terminated the tenancy, giving notice on 30 June 2000, 6 months from the expiry of the tenancy. On 14 July 2000, Shanti Lal issued court proceedings against the Petitioner and the 2nd Respondents claiming damages for breaches of contractual and statutory obligations alleging that he had been denied entitlement as a tenant over 13 acres of assigned tenancy.
[12] In his prayer for damages for breaches of entitlements to completion of the TAW, Shanti Lal claimed $35,000 compensation; for improvements including extension of the four bedroom house, $111,194.00: for losses to crops including sugarcane and fruit trees, $69,000.00, for farm equipment and machinery $7,361.00.
[13] This was to be the beginning of long and tortuous journey of over 20 years in the making, through the courts of the country.
Judgment At First Instance
[14] The Writ of 2000 came before the High Court in Lautoka. The High Court, per Phillips J, after hearing the evidence from all the parties and critically analyzing the credibility of the evidence adduced, decided on 11 July 2008 that the Plaintiff was only entitled to 3 acres of farmland, and concluded at paragraph [46].
“The Claim against the NLTB is dismissed. The Plaintiff partially succeeds in his claim against the 2nd defendants. The manner in which the second defendants trespassed and took over the plaintiff’s property was high-handed and completely unjustified. It calls for an award of aggravated damages which I assess in the sum of $15,000.00. For the unlawful conversion of the plaintiff’s chattels including farm implements, household furniture, stock and carpentry tools. I have awarded the plaintiff the sum of $15,000. The amounts awarded are reduced by $10,000.00 for breaches by the plaintiff of the terms of the contract of tenancy.
Orders:
(i) The plaintiff’s action against the NLTB is dismissed with costs in the sum of $2,000.00 to be paid to NLTB
(ii) The 2nd defendants are to pay the plaintiff the sum of $20,000.00 inclusive of interest plus costs in the sum of $2000.00.”
Judgment At the Court of Appeal
[15] The tenant Shanti Lal appealed the High Court decision to the Court of Appeal on 1 June 2011. In his submission, he argued that he was entitled to 13 acres and that the High Court failed to award him due compensation under Section 40 of the Agricultural Landlord and Tenant Act (ALTA) and had erred in the quantum of damages against the 2nd Respondents.
[16] The appeal was allowed setting aside the Orders of the High Court and the Court of Appeal ordered;
“(2) The First Respondent to pay the Appellant damages for breach of
His entitlement to quiet enjoyment as determined by the Master.
(3) The Second Respondent to pay damages to the Appellant for trespass to land and conversion of goods as determined by the Master.
(4) With regard to costs of Appellant before Madam Justice Phillips, each Respondent pay to the Appellant costs assessed at $1,000 (total $2,000).
(5) With regard to the costs of the Appellant in the Court of Appeal, each Respondent to pay to the Appellant costs assessed at $2,000 (total $4000).”
Judgment of the Supreme Court
[17] The Petitioner sought special leave to appeal against the Court of Appeal Judgment, pursuant to Section 8 (2) (b) of the Administration of Justice Decree 2009 that provides;
“(2) An appeal may not be brought from a final judgment of the Court of Appeal unless:
(a).....
(b) the Supreme Court gives special leave to appeal.”
[18] In its judgment of 7 May 2012, the Supreme Court in addition to this provision, also referred to its jurisdiction spelt out under
Section 7 (3) of the Supreme Court Act 1998 which provides that –
“(3) In relation to a civil matter (including a constitutional question) the Supreme Court must not grant special leave to appeal unless the case raises:
(a) a far-reaching question of law;
(b) a matter of great general or public importance;
(c) a matter that is otherwise of substantial general interest to the administration of civil justice.”
[19] The Supreme Court, having weighed all the possible issues of law be raised by the Appellant against the threshold requirement that it must involve “a far-reaching question of law” concluded that they did not. Special leave to appeal the judgment of the Court of Appeal was dismissed on 7 May, 2012.
Ruling By The Master
[20] The Master, Mr. Anare Tuilevuka (as he then was) held the assessment of damages hearing as ordered by the Court of Appeal, on 23rd and 24th May 2012.
[21] The judgment was delivered on 2 January 2015 and the Court awarded damages to Shanti Lal as follows;
Total: $360,240.00
[22] The Master delivered his Ruling on 2 January, 2015 after he had succeeded as a Judge and the Ruling was delivered from the Bench of the High Court.
Ruling at the Court of Appeal
[23] The Petitioner filed an application before the Court of Appeal on 17 February 2015 for an extension of time to file an appeal against the Ruling of the Master of 2 January, 2015.
[24] The Court of Appeal per W. D. Calanchini P, ruled on 14 May 2015, quite correctly, that since the matter was heard before the Master, the leave for extension of time to appeal, should properly be made before the High Court.
Decision of the High Court
[25] The Petitioner thereafter filed its application for extension of time to file an appeal against the Ruling of the Master of 2 January 2015. It was opposed by the 1st Respondent.
[26] Ajmeer J on 10 September, 2015, allowed extension of time. The Petitioner’s application of reinstatement, after it had not complied with O59 r.17 (2) of The High Court Rules, was also allowed.
Judgment At The High Court
[27] The Petitioner’s appeal was heard on 20 June 2017 and the Judgment per Ajmeer J, was delivered on 4 October, 2017 with the following Orders:
“1. Appeal allowed in part
2. Master’s assessment varied
3. Master’s assessment of damages reduced to $103,000.00.
4. The Respondent is entitled to interest on the total amount of damages at the rate of 4% to be calculated from the date of the issue of the Writ of Summons to the date of the Master’s Ruling (2 January, 2015) but limited to 10 years with costs of $2,000.00 as assessed by the Master.
5. Master’s Orders set aside to that extent.
Judgment At The Court of Appeal
[28] The Respondent then appealed the decision of Ajmeer J. and on 30 April 2021. The Court of Appeal ordered as follows:
“1. The appeal is allowed.
2. The Judgment of the High Court dated 4 October 2017 is set aside.
3. The Ruling of the Master dated 2 January, 2015 is affirmed.
4. The Appellant is entitled to tax costs in the High Court.
5. Costs in the sum of $5,000.00 to be paid in the Court of Appeal to the
Appellant by the 1st Respondent.”
Present Hearing Before the Supreme Court
[29] On 11 June, 2021 the Petitioner filed, in accordance with Section 98 (4) of the Constitution and Section 7 (3) of the Supreme Court Act 1998, a petition for:
(i) leave to appeal the judgment of the Court of Appeal dated 30th April, 2021,
(ii) the Supreme Court to set aside the Orders of the Court of Appeal as set out
at paragraph [20] above.
[30] The Petitioner’s grounds of appeal filed into court on 11 June, 2021 are:
1. The Court of Appeal erred in law and fact when it found that the High Court Judge was wrong in exercising his discretion in assessing the improvement for $55,000 and setting aside the assessment on loss of income as the Judge had used his discretion to exclude the Valuation based on hearsay evidence.
2. The Court of Appeal erred in law and fact in accepting the Master’s assessment based on a Valuation Report that is considered hearsay evidence as it was taken from a distance.
3. The Court of Appeal erred in law and fact in stating that the Petitioner did not object to the Valuation even though the Petitioner has made statement of facts in its written submission in the Master’s Court that the Valuation was taken from a distance effectively confirming that it is hearsay evidence.
4. The Court of Appeal erred in law and fact in stating that the Petitioner did not object to the Valuation Report at the Master’s assessment when the Valuation Report was admitted as evidence during the substantive trial in 2006 and was already part of the evidence.
5. The Court of Appeal erred in law and fact in finding that the Petitioner did not object to production of the Valuation during the Master’s assessment in 2012 as there was no transcript or judge’s notes available to confirm the same, except that the Valuation was admitted during the trial in 2006 and where Judge Philips had treated the Valuation with caution as it was taken from a distance.
6. The Court of Appeal erred in law and fact when it allowed the Master’s assessment for interest at 4% for fifteen years when the 1st Respondent equally contributed to the delay in which the High Court Judge used his discretion and reduced the interest period to 10 years. Whilst the 1st Respondent filed the claim in 2000, there is no evidence of any progress until when it filed its Amended Claim in 2006 right before the trial.
[31] For the Petitioner to find favour from this Court to a grant of leave for the case to be heard, the petition must, as set out under Section 7 (3) of the Act, raise:
“(a) a far-reaching question of law;
(b) a matter of great general or public importance;
(c) a matter that is otherwise of substantial general interest to the administration of civil justice.”
The Requirements of Section 7(3) of the Supreme Court Act 1998
[32] Counsel for both parties have referred to numerous cases, both local and elsewhere, where the courts have gone into great lengths to interpret and explain the meaning and intent of sub-section (3).
[33] In Prince Vyas Muni Lakshman v Estate Management Services Ltd, Court of Appeal,
Civil Appeal No: ABU0014 of 2012, the Court had given some useful guidelines, using the examples in Collettes v Bank of Ceylon (1982) (2) Sri Lanka Law Reports 514, on what constitutes questions of law as follows: (at paragraph 37)
“(i) The proper legal effect of a proved fact is necessarily a question of law.
(ii) Inference from the primary facts found are matters of law.
(iii) The question whether the tribunal has misdirected itself on the law or the facts or misunderstood them or has taken into account irrelevant considerations or has
reached conclusion which no reasonable tribunal directing itself properly on law could have reached a conclusion which no reasonable tribunal directing itself properly on law could have reached or that it has gone fundamentally wrong in certain other respects, is a question of law.
(iv) Whether the evidence is in the legal sense sufficient to support a determination of fact is a question of law.
(v) In order to arrive at a conclusion on facts, it is necessary to construe a document or title or correspondence, then the question of construction of the document or correspondence becomes a question of law.
(vi) Every question of legal interpretation which arises after the primary facts have been established is a question of law.
(vii) Whether there is or is not evidence to support a finding, is a question of law.
(viii) Whether the provisions of a statute apply to the facts; what is the proper interpretation of a statutory provision; what is the scope and effect of such provision are all questions of law.
(ix) Whether the evidence has been properly admitted or excluded or there is a misdirection as to the burden of proof are all questions of law.”
The distinction between questions of fact and law depends on the context that is on the circumstances in which the question arise: Da Costa v The Queen [1968] HCA51; [1968] HCA 51; 118 CLR 186.
[34] In this case, the High Court, after considering the nature and specifically how the Valuation Report was prepared, concluded, given that the Valuer did not physically inspect the property including the structures and contents of buildings within it, that the Master, in assessing the damages, should have disregarded the Report as it was based on hearsay evidence and that the action of the Valuer was not in accordance with the profession’s code of ethics.
Petitioner’s Submission on Question of Law
[35] There are two (2) arguments in support on the question of law made by Counsel for the Petitioner namely;
“(a) ....whether the High Court Judge has the discretion to exclude hearsay evidence in its appellate jurisdiction in reviewing the Master’s decision to admit and place so much reliance on a valuation that is assessed through what was communicated to the Valuer from the 1st Respondent.
(b) How can the Court confirm if the Board did not object to the production of the valuation for assessment before the Master when there is a missing transcript of the assessment made by the Master and the only confirmation on the admission of the valuation report was when the Valuation was already admitted as part of the evidence in the substantive trial in 2006 when the High Court Judge Philips treated the valuation with caution as it was taken from a distance.”
[36] The central issue common to both the submissions by Counsel for the Petitioner, is the Valuation report that was submitted to the High Court in its 2006 hearing. Counsel argued that the valuation report of the land made by Akesa Cavalevu, Valuer, in 2006, after six years from the time the Respondent had vacated the land, and compiled with information given by the Respondent, was hearsay, and should not have been permitted as evidence before the Court. This finds support in the High Court decision of M. H. Mohamed Ajmeer J who was of the opinion that Ms. Cavalevu’s valuation report “is based on hearsay evidence,” and as a result concluded:
“I accept the appellant’s submission that Ms Cavalevu’s conduct of valuation for the subject property was unethical according to property valuers’ code of ethics or at least governing principles and is, in fact, an unreliable valuation relied upon by the Master.”
[37] The Court of Appeal alluded to the learned Judge’s analysis of the Valuation and concluded that the “valuation report as hearsay and unethical” although the High Court only offered the view that the report was based on hearsay evidence, and not the report itself.
[38] Be that as it may, the critical issue remains whether the admission of Ms Cavalevu’s Valuation Report as evidence, given the nature of how it was prepared, was hearsay and whether the discretionary power of the High Court not to allow it, was a serious issue raising a far-reaching question of law. In support on this contention, Counsel referred to a similar landlord and tenant case in the English Court of the Chancery Division, where the expert opinion of the Valuer was an opinion on values based on hearsay. In English Exporters (London) Ltd v. Eldonwall Ltd [1973]1 Ch. 415 the Court, leaving aside the provisions of its Civil Evidence Act 1968 which is similar to Section 15 of Fiji’s Civil Evidence Act 2002, per Megarry J at p.423 stated:
“Putting matters shortly and leaving on one side, the matters that I have mentioned, such as the Civil Evidence Act 1968 and anything made admissible by questions in cross-examination, in my judgment, a Valuer giving expert evidence in chief (or in re-examination): (a) may express the opinions that he has formed as to values even though substantial contribution to the formation of those opinions have been made by matters of which he has no first-hand knowledge; (b) may give evidence as to the details of any transactions within his personal knowledge in order to establish them as a matter of facts; and (c) may express his opinion as to the significance of any transactions which are or will be proved by the admissible evidence (whether or not given by him) in relation to the Valuation with which he is concerned; but (d) may not give hearsay evidence stating the details of any transactions not within his personal knowledge in order to establish them as matters of fact.”
Was the Valuation Report Admissable?
[39] Statute laws in civil matters is a useful starting point. Section 3 (1) of the Civil Evidence Act 2002 states:
“3 (1) In civil proceedings, evidence must not be excluded on the ground that it is hearsay.”
[40] Furthermore, also relevant particularly in this instance where the witness is qualified or expert in her/his field, is Section 15 (1) of the Civil Evidence Act that provides:
“15(1) Subject to any rules of court under this Act, if a person is called as a witness in any civil proceedings, the person’s opinion on any relevant matter on which he or she is qualified to give expert evidence is admissible in evidence.”
[41] There are many decisions of the Courts that have accepted the exception to the hearsay rule in civil proceedings and especially involving expert witnesses. In Murdesk Investments Pty Ltd v Roads Corporation [2006] VSC 363, Osborn J stated, at p.367:
“A valuer may express an opinion of value which is founded in part upon hearsay but he cannot give hearsay evidence of disputed facts which are outside his own personal knowledge.”
[42] While Ms. Cavalevu had prepared her Report with information gathered in her interview of the Respondent, it is also accepted that she had visited the property on 27 September 2006, and while prevented from entering the property, she was able to view all the structures, less the contents, from close by. The assessment figures she arrived at in the end were not only based on information given to her by the Respondent, Shanti Lal, but from her own inspection and viewing, as an experienced Valuer, from the outside of the property.
[43] A similar facts of a case which counsel for Respondent referred to, came before Court of Appeal, Saint Vincent & the Grenadines East Caribbean in Bertille Da Silva v Silvia Da Silva CA 10 of 1991 in which the Court was wrong to rely on the evidence of an experienced building contractor, because the valuation was based on hearsay. The High Court referred to the English Exporters (London) Ltd (supra) propositions by Megarry J in accepting the evidence by the building contractor who was “an experienced builder of some thirty years............” after he had inspected the calculations and the information given to him by his son.
[44] The Court of Appeal in dismissing the appeal per Redhead J.A (Ag.) said, at p.19:
“It is quite obvious that the learned trial Judge did not depend on the evidence of what Michael Gibson told his father, but arrived at the value of the property by what Gibson told her in evidence as an experienced builder, that it would cost $200,000 to build a house similar to the Indian Bay Property.”
[45] The Court held the view that the valuation was based on the estimate of construction price which was well within the building contractors personal knowledge and experience.
[46] It would seem that the Petitioner’s argument that the exercise by Ajmeer J. of discretionary powers to exclude the Valuation Report on the ground that it is based on hearsay, is misconceived. At the very least, the report is an opinion of an expert in her field of valuation, and is admissible under law.
[47] As is plain from the Court’s examination of the facts in evidence and the applicable law in this case, the Valuation Report submitted into court by Ms. Akesa Cavalevu, was permissible and the Master was entitled to rely on it in assessing the quantum of compensation and damages due to the Respondent. Her report therefore was not hearsay. The fact that part of the report was composed with information obtained from the Respondent goes to the weight of the evidence, not its admissibility.
[48] The High Court had erroneously excluded the Valuation Report not only because it was not hearsay, but also because it had properly been admitted by consent of both parties and accepted by the High Court in its hearing of 2016.
[49] In my view, therefore the issue whether the decision by the High Court to exclude the Valuation Report does not raise a far-reading question of law. The issue is relevant or important only to the parties to the proceedings and not a matter of great nor general public interest.
[50] Equally, I fail to see, based on the grounds of appeal, that the case raises matters of great public importance or substantial general interest to the administration of civil justice.
[51] There are also other important and relevant considerations to the question of the admissibility of the Report. The Report had been tendered and accepted by the High Court in the 2006 hearing, without objection from the Petitioner. The author of the Report, Akesa Cavalevu, had been called then as the Respondent’s witness, and the Petitioner had every opportunity to object to the Report or at the very least, test the evidence in cross examination. This it failed to do, or at least there is no evidence on the court’s record to show.
[52] It could very well be, that the High Court in 2006 had made its own assessment of compensation independent of Ms. Cavalevu’s Valuation Report. The fact remains that the Court had accepted the Report, without objection from the Petitioner, and it stands to reason that it would have formed the basis from which it had arrived at its own assessment.
[53] The Master’s assessment of damages, was made with the assistance of all the evidence that were already filed and were part of the court’s record. It seemed inconceivable, in my view, that the Petitioner now finds it the appropriate time to question the validity and/or legality of the evidence that have already been accepted into the records of the Court.
[54] The Master for his part the court notes, did not adopt in total the figures in the Valuation Report and had arrived at different figures in his assessment of compensation for the buildings on the property.
[55] All in all the submission by the Petitioner that the Valuation Report was hearsay and that the Ajmeer J was correct in rejecting it, is erroneous for reasons I have explained.
Whether the Exercise by the High Court of its Discretion to Reduce the Applicable Years from 15 to 10 years for Assessment of Interest Raised a Far-Reaching Question of Law
[56] This issue turns on which of the parties was responsible for the delay. It is clear from the evidence before the Court that both the parties were partially to blame. Each contributed to, and were responsible, for the proceedings being held up although the courts too had played a role in its delays of delivering its Rulings.
[57] The issue of who was responsible for the delay is one of fact. The Court of Appeal agrees with the conclusion by the Master, as to the appropriate length of time for which interest on the award was to apply.
[58] In any case, it is the view of this Court that even if the Court of Appeal had erred in law in reaching its conclusion as to which of the parties was to be blamed for the delay, it does not of itself raise a far-reaching question of law.
Conclusion
[59] As a general observation, this case highlights the need for the Petitioner as the trustee of native lands under the iTaukei Land Trust Act, to make certain that its statutory obligations are observed and are carefully carried out.
[60] In this instance, what began in January 1971 as a 3 acre tenancy-at-will (TAW), somehow through lack of due care and attention in the follow up to an Inspection Report, was renewed for a term and when the new TAW was assigned, the acreage had increased to 13 acres. No proper inquiry as to the increase in the acreage was made but the assignment was duly approved by the Board.
[61] A TAW at common law, is a tenancy without a pre-determined term or duration of occupancy. It may be terminated by the landlord or tenant at any time. When the TAW was renewed for a 20 year term on 17 September 1982, it brought the tenancy within the ambit of the Agricultural Landlord and Tenant (Amendment) Act, 1976.
[62] The application of 2 April, 1986 to the Board for the assignment of the tenancy from Subhaga Devi to Shanti Lal described the TAW holding as “13 acres.” Even though there were questions raised as to the exact land portion under the TAW, the Petitioner did not pursue the matter further. Surely, it was incumbent on the Board to, for example, seek the intervention of the Tribunal for a formal declaration on the acreage under the TAW. Instead it proceeded to consent to the Assignment of the TAW of 13 acres, to Shanti Lal on 30 April 1986.
[63] Furthermore, the TAW was issued for exclusive use for agriculture and it specifically prohibited construction of buildings on the land. Yet despite the Inspection reports referring to the existence of buildings, including residence on the property, no notice of the breach of the tenancy conditions were ever made, or served on the tenants.
[64] The Petitioner has a statutory duty and responsibility to ensure that the management of the native lands are carried out in a proper manner, in accordance with the law and in keeping with the trust placed upon it by the native land owners. Sadly, it does appear that it failed, in this instance.
Orders of the Court
Hon. Mr. Justice Anthony Gates
Judge of the Supreme Court
Hon. Mr. Justice Brian Keith
Judge of the Supreme Court
Hon. Mr. Justice Filimone Jitoko
Judge of the Supreme Court
Solicitors:
iTLTB Legal for the Petitioner
Naidu Lawyers for the Respondent
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