King v State [2019] FJSC 11; CAV0002.2016 (21 May 2019)

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FIJI
AT SUVA
CRIMINAL APPELLATE JURISDICTION

Criminal Petition No. CAV0002 of 2016
[On Appeal from Court of Appeal No: AAU0103 of 2011]

BETWEEN:
JOE KING
Petitioner

AND:
THE STATE
Respondent

Criminal Petition No. CAV0007 of 2016
[On Appeal from Court of Appeal No: AAU0117 of 2011]

BETWEEN:
SANJEEV MOHAN
Petitioner

AND:
THE STATE
Respondent

Coram: The Hon. Mr. Justice Anthony Gates, Judge of the Supreme Court
The Hon. Madam Justice Chandra Ekanayake, Judge of the Supreme Court
The Hon. Madam Justice Anjala Wati, Judge of the Supreme Court

Counsel: Petitioners in person
Ms P.K. Madanavosa for State

Date of Hearing: 11^th August 2016
Date of Judgment: 21^st May 2019

___________________________________________________________________________

JUDGMENT

___________________________________________________________________________

Gates P

[1] Both petitioners seek leave to appeal against their convictions and sentences.

[2] On 5^th October 2011 they had been convicted by the High Court at Lautoka of a joint and single count of aggravated robbery contrary to section 311(1) (a) and (b) of the Crimes Act 2009. The circumstances of aggravation were that they were armed with an offensive weapon and that the crime was committed in company, that is there was more than one person involved.

[3] Sanjeev Mohan was sentenced to 10 years 8 months imprisonment. Joe King was sentenced to 11 years 9 months. The non-parole period fixed by the Judge was:

Mohan 9 years

King 10 years

[4] The High Court Trial

The information alleged that the incident occurred on 29^th April 2010 at Lautoka. The two petitioners, with another named Accused and “with others”, whilst being armed with an offensive weapon stole $4,000 cash, half a bag of beche-de-mer valued at $3,000 and three mobile phones valued at $484, a total value of $7,484 from the complainant. It was also alleged that “immediately before such robbery” the petitioners had used personal violence on the complainant. The trial proceeded against the 2 petitioners alone. There was no evidence of “others” being involved.

[5] In his summing up the judge said the case was rather unusual. It was so because the prosecution case rested largely on the “Agreed Facts.” He said the 2 Accused were not disputing most of the evidence. Colloquially, the litigation dispute was that whilst the defence accepted there had been a robbery, both denied that either of them were involved. They were not the perpetrators. Both petitioners gave evidence of this denial. It was for the prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt, and through its admissible and credible evidence to convince the assessors and the judge that the prosecution version was to be preferred to the sworn evidence of the 2 Accused.

[6] The complainant gave evidence and said that at around 8.30pm on the evening in question she was sweeping her verandah. She heard footsteps and saw 3 Fijian men. One of them put a large knife to her neck. She was taken inside. She and her father were told to go and get money and gold to fill a till box that was on a table. Her husband on his way to take a bath was also apprehended.

[7] He was told to sit and a mobile phone taken from him. One of the robbers went into the room where the bech-de-mer was stored, and took a bag worth $3,000 from the storeroom. She was threatened saying if she did anything she would be cut. The knife was still being displayed. The robbers were all wearing black clothes. All were Fijian she said. There was no conversation. The occupants were all very scared. Not very particular descriptions were given of the perpetrators. She did not identify either of the Petitioners as being involved. A light was shone by a vehicle into the house, and with that they ran away. The police then arrived. This witness’ evidence was not subjected to any defence cross-examination.

[8] In the agreed facts the essential facts of the case were agreed. They were read out to the assessors and the judge.

[9] The arrests of both Accused was admitted. The recovery of cash from Joe King after a search was also admitted, though this was stated to be fishing money.

[10] The confessions to the crime of both Accused were also agreed facts, and the caution interviews of both were admitted into evidence by consent. A large number of police officer statements were also allowed in by consent. In it, Joe King admitted attending the scene of the robbery and pointed out where he had thrown the weapon, and showed the money after the robbery.

[11] Various items were recovered by the police including a cane knife shown to them by Joe King, a heart shaped money box from which they had shared the money whilst in the bushes near the house, and 2 knives. In cross-examination the police witness DC Silio said proper fingerprints could not be obtained from the wood handle of the cane knife. He said the powder would not stick (on wood). The handle was given to the fingerprints man, but it was smudged he said. There was no evidence from the knife or the box linking either of the Petitioners to these items. Neither of the Petitioners had been identified by a witness as being at the scene. The case rested on their contested confessions alone.

[12] The prosecution closed its case. Counsel for Mohan said the case was “not safe” since his client was an Indian whereas the complainant stated the intruders were Fijian. The prosecution answered by saying it was agreed “that she said they were all Fijians, however caution interview tendered as an agreed fact.” The judge ruled there was some evidence and therefore by virtue of section 231(c) of the Criminal Procedure Act, it was necessary for the matter to go before the assessors at the end of the evidence.

[13] Both Accused testified on oath. Joe King gave evidence of being at a friend’s birthday party. He was arrested by police, manhandled and hassled he said. The next day he was questioned. Force was used on him. He could not take the pain. An officer wrote on paper then asked him to sign. He was not given the paper to read.

[14] Sanjeev Mohan also said he was forced to sign a statement. He was in fact tortured with chillies put on his private parts and in his eyes. The contents of the statements he said were not true. He had not invaded the complainant’s house. He had not made any complaint about his ill-treatment. Neither petitioner called any witnesses in support.

[15] Agreed facts had been prepared and signed by both Petitioners and their respective counsel, and the trial judge. In it the Petitioners agreed to the fact of a robbery at the complainant’s house by 3 men with 2 cane knives.

[16] They accepted the items stolen. They also accepted the arrest of Joe King and a search in which the police recovered $263 cash from him. Later on 6^th May 2010 Sanjeev Mohan, Petitioner 2 was arrested and was taken to Lautoka Police Station.

[17] The Agreed facts also stated that both Petitioners confessed on different interview dates and they agreed to the caution interview statements being tendered by counsel in the trial.

[18] The Interviews

Joe King was interviewed by the police at Lautoka Police Station on 1^st May 2010. He asked to be interviewed in English and said he had been educated up to Class 8. The interviewing officer asked him to sign to acknowledge he wished to be interviewed in English, and asked him if he wished to consult a lawyer of his own choice or relatives or friends. He is recorded as saying “No, we can continue.”

[19] He was asked where he was on the Thursday afternoon 29.4.2010. He said he was at his farm at the back of his house. After concluding the gardening he went and had a bath and a change. He said he went to meet Josateki Labalaba, a person originally jointly charged with the Petitioners but in whose case the Director had entered a nolle prosequi. He went because he was asked to meet him “to go and get something.” He also met one Bob. He was told that they had to go and get some money from a house at Wairabetia. The 3 of them went there in a 7 seater van and were dropped nearby.

[20] He went on to describe how they took 2 cane knives as weapons. They climbed the fence of a green house. They came through an open door and met an Indian lady coming from a kitchen passage, “I took the till and give it to Bob” he said. They came out. He said he threw his knife at the place where they shared the money in nearby bush. He described what they were wearing. He did not know who took the mobile and who the beche de mer. Afterwards they split up. He had to cross two rivers and he got wet including the money. He then went home. He had $263 on him. The rest of the money went on the drinking. He said he had used the short knife which he identified. All met up again at another house, and they went drinking near Fiji Gas. He showed the police the house and the bushes where they shared the money and threw away the weapon. He was asked if he had any complaints and is recorded as saying ‘No.’

[21] Mohan was interviewed on 6^th May 2010. He said he wanted to be interviewed in English. He had reached Form 5 in his education at Tilak High School. He is recorded as not requiring a lawyer at this stage or to have a visit from a family member or next of kin. He was asked about his health and said he suffered from asthma and used to carry around a pump.

[22] He said he was known as Bob. His wife and son then visited. Just before he was asked where he was on 29^th April 2010 and he said “I’ll answer in court.” Afterwards he said he had come to Lautoka that day to meet Labalaba. He said Labalaba told him “he got one job.” This was to steal beche de mer from Wairabetia. They went off in a 7 seater and picked up Joe King. He was a friend of his. They eventually went to the back of a house and entered. He said as they came out that there were 2 plastic bags of beche de mer on the porch, so he picked them up. When a van came he threw the bags away. They ran off towards Lautoka, and split up. He was out all night in the jungle.

[23] Later Labalaba gave him his share, only $300. He used it for food and drinking beer. He said he knew nothing about putting a knife to the complainant’s neck. He did not know who picked the phone. He is recorded as having said he had given his answers voluntarily.

[24] At the end of the voire dire, the judge ruled the confessions voluntary. In a brief Judgment the judge accepted the unanimous decision of the 3 Assessors that both Accused were guilty of the charge.

[25] King’s application for leave before the single judge came on before Mohan’s. It was decided on 29.11.13 and leave was refused. The single judge exercised care in examining 7 grounds against conviction and 2 against sentence.

[26] Mohan’s appeal to the single judge was decided on 24 July 2014. His lordship found the grounds broad and vague. He went on to state “The voir dire findings of the trial judge were available on the evidence and no arguable error arises from the admissibility of the appellant’s confession.”

[27] On the issue of whether all of the perpetrators were identified as Fijian, as given in evidence by the complainant his lordship said (para 8):

“The trial judge at paragraph 12 of his summing up directed the assessors to consider the description that the complainant gave of the alleged perpetrators was that they were all Fijians. The trial judge further directed the assessors to consider that the complainant also told the court that she was petrified and did not look clearly at the alleged perpetrators. In my judgment, the complainant’s description of the alleged perpetrators was made in a state of shock and the assessors were entitled not to rely on that piece of evidence. No arguable error arises under this ground.”

[28] In refusing leave to appeal against sentence Goundar J said:

“The appellant was sentenced to 10 years and 8 months imprisonment. The tariff for robbery with violence is 10 to 16 years’ imprisonment (Samuela Donald Singh v State unreported Cr. App. No. AAU15 and 16 of 2011). The appellant’s sentence is clearly on the lower side of the tariff and there is nothing in the sentencing remarks of the trial judge to indicate he used impermissible aggravating factors to enhance the sentence. The sentence appeal is not arguable.”

[29] Court of Appeal: Full Court

The Court of Appeal heard the appeal of the two appellants, one of whom was represented by counsel (not counsel at the trial). The Full Court rejected the appeals and upheld the High Court’s decision.

[30] Grounds to the Supreme Court

Joe King included the following grounds in his petition:

“Appeal against conviction

1. That the learned Court of Appeal erred when it did not adequately contemplate that the trial judge in the High Court had erred in law and in fact when he did not inform the appellant in person nor direct the defence counsel the provisions stipulated under section 125 subsection (6) in relation to the provision under subsection (1), when the lower court failed to apply.
   
2. That the learned trial judge of the High Court erred in law and in fact when he completely took wrong assessment of the evidence nor the correct principles have been applied.
   
3. That the learned trial judge erred in law and in fact when he erroneously without adequate assessment of other independent evidence admitted the only evidence relied entirely by the prosecution was the caution interview.
   
4. That the learned trial judge erred in law and in fact when he did not give any direction to all the parties concerned in this case that circumstantial evidence does not play a vital role in this case.
   
5. That the learned penal of judges and the trial judge had all erred and failed to adequately peruse the whole lot of discrepancies of evidence and inconsistencies of the witnesses evidence and their earlier statements.
   
6. That the learned trial judge erred in law and in fact when he failed to address in his summing up that the identity of the appellant of a “bad character” should not be allowed as evidence.
   
7. That the learned trial judge erred in law and in fact when he failed to disregard the evidence of bad character in his judgment, thus this caused a miscarriage of justice.
   

Appeal against sentence

1. That the learned trial judge has erred in fixing the non-parole period pursuant to section 18(1) of the Sentence and Penalties Decree.
   
2. That the learned trial judge erred in law and facts when he erroneously mistook the facts of this case, thus sentence being harsh and excessive in all circumstances of the case.”
   

[31] Sanjeev Mohan filed the following grounds in his petition:

“1. Inadvertent admission of prejudicial evidence (i.e. unsigned record of caution interview).

2. Breach of Constitutional Rights (failure of the prosecution to their duty to disclosure).
   
3. That the honourable justice of appeal erred when his lordship failed to analyse the evidence of the record interview as to its reliability.
   
4. That the honourable justice of appeal erred when his lordship stated at para 18 of the Judgment that “... the incriminatory statements are not only found on the unsigned pages but on the other pages as well ...”, when in fact there were no such statements on those pages to prove the element of identification in identifying him as the robber on the charge aggravated robbery.
   
5. That the honourable justice of appeal erred when he failed to make an independent assessment of the unsigned pages of the record in dealing with the question, as whether the petitioner had adopted those unsigned pages during the trial.
   
6. That the honourable justice of appeal erred when his lordship failed to analyse the evidence of the police witnesses who stated, that the record was signed by all parties which is inconsistent and contradicting to the record tendered in court as it had no signatures on pages 3, 5 and 6 from any party to attest their presence.
   
7. That the honorable justice of appeal erred when he failed to analyse the evidence of the petitioner at trial that he signed his record on the day in question.
   
8. That the honourable justice of appeal erred when his lordship failed to quash the petitioner’s conviction, when he accepted that a miscarriage of justice has occurred as there were no other evidence apart from the uncorroborated unsigned record which led to his conviction.
   
9. The Court of Appeal was in error and should have concluded that the verdict was unreasonable or could not be supported having regard to the evidence at trial.
   

Sentence Ground

1. That the sentence is harsh and excessive in all circumstance of the case.”
   

[32] Ground 1 - Alibi

Joe King was represented at his trial. His counsel informed the judge that her client would give evidence. This was after the judge allowed a break in order for both Accused to be advised of their options in defence. They could have called further evidence, a witness or witnesses to testify that at the relevant time King was not at the crime scene, but at the birthday party of which he had spoken in his interview and later in his evidence. Counsel would have taken instructions on this. It was a defence choice whether to call such evidence if available.

[33] The Court of Appeal considered the learned trial judge could have dealt with alibi evidence in a less perfunctory or cursory manner, but found that no miscarriage of justice had occurred thereby. If witnesses were available defence counsel could have called those witnesses as part of the defence case. There is nothing in the record to suggest an application had been made to the judge for leave to call an alibi witness. The judge in summing up had reminded the assessors (para 15):

“At the end of the prosecution case you heard me explain to each accused his rights in defence. Both of them elected to give evidence. Now as I told you at the beginning, an accused person does not have to give evidence. He does not have to prove anything to you. His giving of evidence does not relieve the burden on the prosecution to prove its case beyond reasonable doubt.

The first accused says that on the evening of the 29 April, he was drinking grog at a birthday party all evening. He was arrested by the Police the next day and they dragged him to the Natakowaqa Police Post where he was “hassled” and dragged about. He was then taken to Lautoka Police Station and locked in a cell. He was interviewed the next day. He told the Police about the birthday party but they didn’t believe him.”

[34] As it was defence counsel rested their case by calling Joe King as a witness as to his whereabouts on the night without more. The prosecution could prove the defence was incorrect if they satisfied the court that his confession was voluntary and true.

[35] Grounds 2 & 3 - Wrongful Admission of Confession

The case as the trial judge said in his summing up was unusual in that the Agreed Facts appeared to accept the caution interview documents. It was headed:

“The following facts are agreed between the prosecution and the defence counsels under the provisions of section 135 of the Criminal Procedure Decree 2009.

8. That on the 1^st May 2010, Joe King (Accused 1) confessed in his caution interview.
   
9. That on the 6^th May 2010, Sanjeev Mohan (Accused 2) confessed in his caution interview.”
   

[36] However a trial within a trial was conducted by the judge to determine whether the prosecution could prove that the confessions had been obtained by the police voluntarily, without oppression or by any form of impropriety. After that procedure only could the judge rule the evidence admissible. It is incorrect therefore for the Petitioner King to suggest the assessors no longer had to make their own minds up about the issue of voluntariness. His lordship directed them as follows:

“18. I now come to the law on confession statements. Each accused says that his confession is not true. In deciding for each accused whether you can safely rely on the admissions you must decide whether they were or may have been obtained by force or assaults as both accused allege. If you think they were or may have been, you are to disregard them entirely and not rely on them. So in our case if you believe the first accused was assaulted on the floor while he was making his interview and if you think the second accused indecently assaulted with chillies immediately before he made his; or you think that that may have been true then you must ignore that confession.

19. If however you are sure that the accused whose case you are considering made the confession and it was not obtained by physical abuse, you must nevertheless decide whether you are sure that the admissions are true. If, for whatever reason, you are not sure that the admissions are true you must disregard them. If on the other hand you are sure that they are true, you may rely on them.
    
20. Another important direction I must give you on cautioned interviews is this. Whatever one accused says in his interview is evidence against him alone and nobody else. If for example the second accused says he did the robbery with Jo King, then in law that is not admissible evidence against Jo King.”
    

[37] Of course, as the judge told the assessors, ultimately the decision in the case was for himself, unlike in an English jury trial.

[38] Ground 4 - Circumstantial evidence

If the confessions were accepted, the assessors could place those along with the prosecution witnesses’ sworn evidence, that of the complainant in particular, whose evidence was not challenged. This is not strictly circumstantial evidence and therefore no direction was required on what was the direct evidence of a witness observing events at the scene. Ground 4 fails.

[39] Ground 5 - Inconsistencies of Prosecution Witnesses

This ground is repeated after being rejected by the Court of Appeal. No details were put to the court below. The ground was dismissed as lacking merit. Now the ground is renewed. In a written submission King suggests variations in the colour of the till box given by the two prosecution witnesses were of consequence. This ground fails.

[40] Grounds 6 & 7 – Wrongful admission of evidence of Bad Character

This ground was not raised by King before the Court of Appeal. It was raised by Mohan. Inadvertently prejudicial evidence went in from the interviews of both Petitioners. Lecamwasam J dealt with the matter in this way:

“19. This ground has some merit when the second accused was questioned by police, in questions 21 and 22 and answers thereto are relevant in this issue. Questions 21 and 22 and the answers are as follows:

Q21: Who is this Labalaba?

A: Friend of mine.

Q22: How do you know him?

A: We did Namada Robbery case together so from there we know each other.

20. Not only in Sanjeev Mohan’s caution interview but in Joe King’s caution interview also I have noticed a similar situation in relation to questions number 98 and 99 and the answers thereto in the caution interview:
    

Q98: Are you sure that this two Labalaba and Bob went with you?

A: Yes.

Q99. How did you know them?

A: Because we have four cases together.

21. This is evidence of bad character. It is undoubtedly not competent for the prosecution to adduce evidence tending to show that the accused has been involved of criminal acts other than those covered by the indictment.
    
22. It is important to stress that since the prosecution relied entirely on the caution interview statement to establish the identity of the appellants it was imperative that no prejudicial material showing a previous bad character of the appellants should have been allowed as evidence. The learned High Court Judge not only failed to address this issue in his summing up but also, failed to disregard this evidence in his judgment. Due to this prejudicial inadmissible evidence of bad character pertaining to both the appellants was included. This has caused a miscarriage of justice in this case.
    
23. However there was ample evidence in this case on all elements of the offence which could have led reasonable assessors to convict the Appellants.
    
24. I hold that although there was a miscarriage of justice by the inclusion of bad character evidence, when considering the totality of the evidence in the case it cannot be considered as a substantial miscarriage of justice. Therefore I hold that this falls within the proviso to Section 23(1)(a) of the Court of Appeal Act. Hence I uphold the conviction.”
    

[41] The prosecution should have agreed with the defence before the trial commenced the deletion of the offending (and unnecessary) material from the interview record. The prosecution by agreement could have tendered copy documents with the prejudicial remarks edited out. Then the embarrassment would not have occurred.

[42] The judge could have stopped the trial when they reached that point in the evidence, and allowed time to have the documents prepared without this material.

[43] With the material remaining in the document and before the assessors many a judge would direct the assessors that the evidence was irrelevant to their task of deciding on the voluntariness and truthfulness of the confessions, and on whether the Accused were indeed the perpetrators on that night in committing the aggravated robbery.

[44] Other judges might have considered more harm would be done by raising the matter with the assessors. Appellate courts have tended to rely on a judge’s personal assessment as to what is appropriate in an individual case as to how to handle the error. In the circumstances this court should not disturb the decision of the Court of Appeal to apply the proviso. Grounds 6 and 7 fail.

[45] Appeal against Sentence - King

Grounds 1 and 2

The submissions have misunderstood the law on section 18(1) of the Sentencing and Penalties Act. The section states:

“18(1) Subject to sub-section (2), when a court sentences an offender to be imprisoned for life or for a term of 2 years or more the court must fix a period during which the offender is not eligible to be released on parole.”

[46] King argues that because the prosecution had “failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt any element of the offence or actus reus” the fixing of the non-parole period should not stand. The conviction was entered and has been upheld by the Court of Appeal. The position has not changed on that in the Supreme Court either. There was no mistaking of the facts by the judge.

[47] On the question of harshness of sentence and the reason for disparity, these matters were explained in the single Judge’s decision in Joe King’s application. Goundar J set out the position:

King

Starting point - 12 years

Add aggravating factors - 2 years

Deduct good character - 2 years

Deduct remand period - 3 months

Final Sentence - 11 years and 9 months

Non parole period - 10 years

Mohan (the co-offender)

Starting point - 12 years

Add aggravating factors - 2 years

Deduct good character - 2 years

Deduct remand period - 16 months

Final Sentence - 10 years and 8 months

Non parole period - 9 years

Clearly, the disparity in sentences was due to the different remand periods. But when the remand periods are added to the non-parole periods, King’s length of incarceration comes to 10 years and 3 months before he will be eligible for parole, while Mohan’s length of incarceration comes to 10 years and 4 months before he will be eligible for parole. In other words, Mohan’s length of incarceration is more than King. This ground is not arguable.

[48] Both sentences therefore – King and Mohan – came within the established tariff for robbery with violence of 10 – 16 years imprisonment: Samuel Donald Singh Crim. App. No. AAU15 and 16 of 2011. The sentences were not harsh or excessive. This was a home invasion at night, a robbery aggravated by both having weapons (2 cane knives) and by being committed by 3 persons. The knife was put to the throat of the female complainant and the occupants of the house were put into considerable fear and apprehension as to what might happen to them. The sentences and the non-parole periods reflected the necessary gravity of the 2 cases.

[49] Ground 2 - Failure of the prosecution to serve disclosure documents

This ground I will examine before Ground 1 which is allied to Grounds 3, 4, 5, 6, 7 and 8.

[50] The difficulty for Mohan is in laying the foundations of the complaint that his counsel was not served with the disclosures. At the commencement of the trial his counsel Mr. Shah makes no such claim. It is inconceivable that defence counsel would be agreeable to conduct a High Court trial for the defence without the forewarning of the prosecution case, and thus without full disclosures of witness statements and documents. How would the agreed facts be drafted and agreed without such? It may be that the disclosures were originally served on other counsel. The issue is whether his counsel at the trial, and in sufficient time for preparation purposes, was armed with the disclosures. This ground must fail.

[51] Mohan raises several grounds which are intertwined, alleging the caution interview was wrongly admitted when there were pages of the document unsigned. He alleges therefore that the appeal court had not analysed the record of interview as to its reliability, and takes issue with the judge’s statement that there were incriminating statements made on pages that were signed as well as on pages that were not signed.

[52] His lordship reached the following conclusion on this point at para [18]:

“Appellants took up the position that there are few unsigned pages in their caution interviews and when I perused the case record I found that their version is true and their position is that all incriminating evidence lies on those unsigned pages. On a careful perusal of all these pages it is evident that incriminatory evidence is found not only on unsigned pages but on other pages as well. Hence this ground of appeal also fails.”

[53] Leave to appeal was refused by Goundar J. These grounds did not feature in the leave to appeal application, only before the Full Court. The Court of Appeal dealt with this point, which is not a point of law. The finding of the appeal court is unremarkable and sound. All of these grounds must fail.

[54] The final ground 10 is not arguable in the sense, the conviction could not be said on the evidence presented and accepted as incapable of supporting a conviction. If the confessions were found to be voluntary and true, the verdict was not unreasonable. Ground 10 fails.

[55] In the result,

(i) Leave to appeal in both cases is refused.
(ii) The petitions are dismissed.
(iii) The decision of the Court of Appeal is upheld.
(iv) The convictions entered and sentences passed in the High Court are upheld.

Ekanayake J

[56] I have read the draft judgment of His Lordship Gates J and I concur with His Lordship’s reasoning and conclusions.

Wati J

[57] I have read the draft judgment of His Lordship Gates J and I agree with His Lordship’s conclusions.

............................................
Hon. Mr. Justice Anthony Gates
Judge of the Supreme Court

............................................
Hon. Madam Justice Chandra Ekanayake
Judge of the Supreme Court

.............................................
Hon. Madam Justice Anjala Wati
Judge of the Supreme Court

Solicitors
For the Petitioners: In person
For the State: Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions

uln

www.judiciary.gov.fj