Lautabui v State [2009] FJSC 7; CAV0024.2008 (6 February 2009)

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE FIJI ISLANDS
AT SUVA

CRIMINAL APPEAL CAV0024, CAV0011, AND CAV0025 OF 2008
(Fiji Court of Appeal No AAU00)

BETWEEN:

LEONE LAUTABUI
JONASA TONAWAI
SEMESA ROKO
Petitioners

AND:

THE STATE
Respondent

Coram: The Hon Justice Kenneth Handley, Judge of the Supreme Court
The Hon Justice David Ipp, Judge of the Supreme Court
The Hon Justice Ronald Sackville, Judge of the Supreme Court

Hearing: Monday, 9th February, Suva

Counsel: First Petitioner in Person
Mr. F. Vosarogo for second and third Petitioners
Mr. N. Nand for the Respondent

Date of Judgment: 6th February 2009, Suva

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

[1] Three petitioners seek leave to appeal to this Court against a judgment of the Court of Appeal dismissing each of their appeals against convictions for murder and attempted murder.

[2] The petitioners were unrepresented when they prepared written submissions for this Court. However two of the petitioners, Jonasa Tonawai and Semesa Roko, subsequently were represented by counsel and filed further written submissions. The third petitioner, Leone Lautabui, appeared without representation but adopted the submissions advanced by counsel for the two represented petitioners. We shall refer to the petitioners’ submissions as though they were made on behalf of all three petitioners.

THE ISSUE

[3] The convictions of the petitioners arose out of events which occurred on the night of 7–8 August 2000, shortly after the coup that took place in Fiji that year. Each of the three petitioners was charged with two counts of murder, contrary to s.199 of the Penal Code, Cap.17, and two counts of attempted murder, contrary to s.214 of the Penal Code. The two deceased victims were Corporal Raj Kumar of the Fiji Police Force and Private Joela Waeilakeba of the Fiji Military Forces. Both of the wounded officers were members of the Fiji Military Forces.

[4] The trial of the three petitioners was held in the High Court, before a judge and three assessors, over some 17 hearing days in January and February 2002. At the conclusion of the evidence, the trial Judge delivered her summing up. No complaint is made in this Court about the directions given by her Ladyship to the assessors in the course of the summing up.

[5] Following the summing up, the assessors retired to consider their opinions. Two assessors returned opinions that all three petitioners were not guilty on all counts. One assessor gave his opinion that two of the petitioners (Lautabui and Roko) were guilty on the two counts of attempted murder, but not guilty on the two counts of murder.

[6] The only substantial issue in this Court is whether the Court of Appeal erred in holding that the trial Judge’s reasons complied with the requirements of s.299 of the Criminal Procedure Code, Cap.17 ("CPC"). Section 299 provides as follows:

"(1) When the case on both sides is closed, the judge shall sum up and shall then require each of the assessors to state his opinion orally, and shall record such opinion.

(2) The judge shall then give judgment, but in doing so shall not be bound to conform to the opinions of the assessors.

Provided that ... when the judge does not agree with the majority opinion of the assessors, he shall give his reasons, which shall be written down and be pronounced in open court, for differing with such majority opinion and in every such case the judge’s summing up and the decision of the court together with, where appropriate, the judge’s reasons for differing with the majority opinion of the assessors, shall collectively be deemed to be the judgment of the court for the purposes of this subsection ...

(3) If the accused person is convicted, the judge shall pass sentence on him according to law."

PENAL CODE

[7] Two provisions of the Penal Code, Cap.17, are of particular significance for these petitions since they were critical to the case for the prosecution and defence, respectively.

[8] Section 22 of the Penal Code deals with offences committed by joint offenders in prosecution of an unlawful purpose:

"When two or more persons form a common intention to prosecute an unlawful purpose in conjunction with one another, and in the prosecution of such purpose an offence is committed of such a nature that its commission was a probable consequence of the prosecution of such purpose, each of them is deemed to have committed the offence."

[9] Section 16 of the Penal Code deals with the defence of compulsion:

"A person is not criminally responsible for an offence if it is committed by two or more offenders, and if the act is done or omitted only because during the whole of the time in which it is being done or omitted the person is compelled to do or omit to do the act by threats on the part of the other offender or offenders instantly to kill him or do him grievous bodily harm if he refused; but threats of future injury do not excuse any offence."

THE TRIAL

[10] The chief witness for the State was Taito Navualaba, who was said to be a co-conspirator with the three petitioners. He had been given a conditional indemnity from prosecution. The prosecution’s case generally reflected Navualaba’s evidence, although there were significant differences between his account and the evidence given by the police and military witnesses who had come under gunfire, including the two wounded persons.

[11] Each of the petitioners gave sworn evidence at the trial and was cross-examined. Some of their evidence was consistent with Navualaba’s account of events. However, each petitioner claimed in his evidence that he had been forced by Alifereti Nimacere, the initiator of a plan to take over a police/army checkpoint at Sawani, to participate in the venture. Nimacere died before the trial.

[12] It is convenient first to give an outline of Navualaba’s evidence. He said that five men – the three petitioners, Nimacere and Navualaba himself – hatched a plot to take over the checkpoint at Sawani while they were together in an otherwise unoccupied house near Nadovu village. At the time the plan was discussed, all five had weapons – M16s and a K2 automatic rifle. The motive for the plan was said to be to avenge actions taken earlier by the police or military.

[13] According to Navualaba, the five set off at about 7.30 p.m. on 7 August 2000 on the road to Sawani, although Navualaba claimed that he had previously told Nimacere that he did not want to take part in carrying out the plan. As they walked along the road, Nimacere verbally abused the others.

[14] After the group had been walking for some time, a carrier truck appeared. Nimacere stopped the truck and told the driver that they wanted his truck. A second vehicle, a red four-wheel drive, then arrived. Nimacere also stopped it, ordered the passengers out at gunpoint and forced the driver to drive the group towards Sawani. Along the way, Nimacere stopped a white twin cab on the road and forced its occupants to transfer to the red four-wheel drive vehicle. The five men then proceeded in the white twin cab.

[15] According to Navualaba, Nimacere forced him to take the wheel of the twin cab, but as he could not drive, Lautabui took over. After a short stop, the group was joined by a young man and they drove to a house in Qiolevu Road, near Navuso village.

[16] The group got out of the twin cab and Lautabui parked it close to a chicken shed near the house. A friend of the young man, who lived in the house, gave Nimacere information about the location of the soldiers.

[17] While the group was standing on the road, an army vehicle and a two tonne carrier police vehicle arrived from the direction of Navuso. Nimacere told the others to run away and they did so, towards the back of the house. Navualaba said that he then heard a gunshot from the road and non-stop firing from beside the house. The firing continued for about ten minutes.

[18] According to Navualaba, he found himself near Nimacere, behind the chicken shed. He saw Nimacere firing. Nimacere then put his pistol to Navualaba’s head and forced the latter to fire his weapon. Navualaba did so, but fired towards some bushes, rather than at the police or military personnel.

[19] Later, Navualaba saw the three petitioners on a hill near the chicken shed. Nimacere followed them in that direction. Navualaba then heard Lautabui calling out from the road that there was someone in the police vehicle. Nimacere told Lautabui to pull the man out, but Lautabui refused. Nimacere then went to the vehicle, pulled the man out, hit the man on the head and shot him in the head with his (Nimacere’s) pistol.

[20] Shortly afterwards all five drove away from the scene in the twin cab. They all retained their weapons.

THE SUMMING UP

[21] The trial Judge, in her summing up, summarised the prosecution case as follows:

"The prosecution says that this was a joint unlawful enterprise in which all the accused took part voluntarily and not under compulsion. The prosecution says that all accused persons took part in a plan to take over the Sawani police post and checkpoint, with violence, and that the shooting of soldiers and policemen at Qiolevu Road was a probable, indeed, an inevitable consequence of that plan. To support their case of a joint plan, they point of Livai’s evidence that all 5 people were involved in the hijack of his father’s vehicle, the evidence of clear firing at the scene, the numbers called, the fact that all were armed and that two people conversed when Raj Kumar was shot.

Also in support of this submission, they refer to the fact that each accused was armed either with an M16 or a K2, that they had plenty of opportunity to get away from Nimacere and the others during the journey through the bush on foot and by car, and that Livai, Ratu Sakiusa’s son, said that it was not Nimacere but Lautabui who led the attack on his vehicle and that the others surrounded his father. The prosecution says that each accused was able because of his personal characteristics and previous employment [in the case of Lautabui] in the Police Force, and [in the case of Tonawai] in the Army Peacekeeping Forces, as well as the fact that they were armed and well-built to resist Nimacere and to escape from the joint plan that the prosecution said they were all a party to. The prosecution says that the defence evidence that they were coerced by Nimacere is an incredible story, cooked up because Nimacere is conveniently dead and easy to blame". (Emphasis added.)

We shall refer later to the evidence relating to the "numbers called".

[22] Her Ladyship directed the assessors that they were required to give the accused’s evidence careful consideration and that it was a matter for them as to whether they accepted or rejected that evidence. She summarised the defence case as follows:

"They each admitted on oath being part of the group with Nimacere which travelled from Nadovu to Qiolevu Road. Their evidence in most material aspects corroborated the evidence of Taito Navualaba up to the arrival of the group at Qiolevu Road. Their defence is that they were not part of a joint unlawful plan to take over the checkpoint in Sawani, because they were being forced to follow Nimacere, who was implementing his own plan and using the three accused and Navualaba. The defence is that they were not willingly aiding and abetting in the murders and attempted murders because they were forced, before, at and after the shooting to stay with Nimacere. And finally, the defence is that none of them fired a single shot from the arms they were holding, at the time of the shooting. Leone Lautabui said in his evidence that he was hiding under the steering wheel of the twin cab during the shooting. He denied what Navualaba said he did, and that is refuse to open the door of the police van to pull Cp. Raj Kumar out. Tonawai said in his evidence that he ran up the slope with Nimacere and Navualaba, but that he did not fire his gun at all and only remained there because Nimacere was within his sight all the time. ... Semesa Roko said in his evidence that he too ran up the hill behind Nimacere and that he did not use his gun at all because the gun was not working. He said he hid on the slope next to the chicken shed until the firing stopped and that the gun he showed the police had been hidden there by Nimacere. Further, Roko said that he was forced by Nimacere at gunpoint to go with him to Monasavu from Raiwaqa on the 17th of July 2000, and he could not escape thereafter. He called a witness Josateki Cama who gave evidence that he saw Nimacere forcing Toko to go with him at Raiwaqa at gunpoint.

Each of them said that at all material times they were forced by Nimacere to be present but that they were not part of the plan or the shooting. They are therefore each relying on the defence of compulsion or duress which I defined to you at the beginning of this summing up. They rely on evidence of Nimacere’s possession of two guns, his abusive language, his height, and his general reputation to show that they were so frightened of him that if they did not obey him, they thought that Nimacere would kill them. You must give the defence case full and careful consideration, and must consider all the evidence to decide whether the three accused were willing partners to a joint unlawful plan to take over the checkpoint, or whether they were forced to take part in the journey towards the Sawani checkpoint by threats of instant death or serious injury, and whether they were willing partners in the shooting incident at Qiolevu Road". (Emphasis added.)

THE TRIAL JUDGE’S JUDGMENT

[23] In her judgment convicting the petitioners, the trial Judge first pointed out that the third assessor’s opinion faced the difficulty that the facts relevant to the counts of attempted murder were the same as those relevant to the counts of murder. Her Ladyship noted that if the petitioners were guilty on the basis of their participation in a joint enterprise in respect of the attempted murder counts (as the prosecution had argued), the same joint enterprise existed in respect of the murder counts.

[24] The trial Judge continued as follows:

"Taking all the evidence into account and after directing myself in accordance with my summing up, I regret that I cannot concur with the assessors’ opinions.

I disagree with them for the following reasons. There is compelling evidence that all 5 persons, including the 3 accused were part of a joint unlawful plan to take over the Sawani Police Post and checkpoint. The plan may have been Nimacere’s plan, but I am of the opinion that the evidence of the long walk together, the evidence of a joint hijack of Ratu Sakiusa’s vehicle, the evidence of numbers being called at the time of the shooting and the evidence that all 5 left together after the shooting gives rise to a compelling case of a joint unlawful enterprise. I am satisfied of that beyond reasonable doubt.

I am further of the view that the shooting at Qiolevu Road was a probable consequence of the unlawful joint plan and that each accused by their reactions when the vehicles arrived, knew that. I am satisfied of that beyond reasonable doubt.

I am further of the opinion that each accused participated in this unlawful enterprise voluntarily and not under duress. I am satisfied beyond reasonable doubt that Leone Lautabui, Jonasa Tonawai and Semesa Roko, had many opportunities to remove themselves from the plan prior to the Qiolevu shooting, and that Nimacere’s threats, if they existed, were not of a continuing nature to instantly kill or injure the accused. I am satisfied of that beyond reasonable doubt.

The judgment of the Court is therefore as follows:

	Accused 1	Accused 2	Accused 3
Count 1	Guilty	Guilty	Guilty
Count 2	Guilty	Guilty	Guilty
Count 3	Guilty	Guilty	Guilty
Count 4	Guilty	Guilty	Guilty

All 3 are convicted on each count accordingly".

THE COURT OF APPEAL JUDGMENT

[25] The Court of Appeal considered and rejected the petitioners’ challenges to the adequacy of the trial Judge’s summing up. As we have noted, the petitioners do not pursue those challenges in this Court. Their Lordships also addressed the petitioners’ submission that her Ladyship had failed to provide sufficient reasons for differing from the majority opinion of the assessors.

[26] Their Lordships pointed out that all counsel agreed that the trial Judge was obliged by s.299 of the CPC to provide "cogent reasons" for deciding not to accept the assessors’ opinion. They considered, however, that her succinct reasons, coupled with the directions in the summing up, constituted an adequate compliance with the requirements of s.299.

[27] Nevertheless, the Court of Appeal added some significant observations concerning the trial Judge’s reasons:

"The authorities to which we have referred make it clear that the reasons for the Judge not agreeing with the majority opinion of the assessors must be cogent and in sufficient detail to enable this court critically to examine them in the light of the whole of the evidence and reach a conclusion on whether the decision to reject the majority opinion of the assessors is justified.

In the present case the reasons set out in the judgment were sparse. It would have been preferable for the Judge to have set out in more detail the reasons for finding ‘a compelling case of a joint unlawful enterprise’, and, perhaps more importantly, the reasons for concluding that the appellants participated in the enterprise voluntarily and not under duress. It would have been helpful if she had given more detailed reasons for her conclusion that the three appellants had opportunities to remove themselves from the plan and that the threats to them, if they existed, were not of a continuing nature instantly to kill or injure the accused. We do not mean to suggest that the judgment should review the evidence in the detail that we have done in this judgment, but findings of credibility of important witnesses and inferences properly drawn from the evidence should be clearly but concisely stated.

If the requirements of the section to give clearly stated cogent reasons for departing from the opinions of the assessor are not adequately complied with, this Court may conclude that the convictions should be quashed and a new trial directed".

REASONING

Principles

[28] Section 299 of the CPC recognizes that a judge has the power and authority to disagree with the majority opinion of the assessors. When the judge disagrees with the assessors his or her reasons are deemed to be the judgment of the Court. However, the judge’s power and authority in this regard is subject to three important qualifications.

[29] First, the case law makes it clear that the judge must pay careful attention to the opinion of the assessors and must have "cogent reasons" for differing from their opinion. The reasons must be founded on the weight of the evidence and must reflect the judge’s views as to the credibility of witnesses: Ram Bali v Regina [1960] 7 FLR 80 at 83 (Fiji CA), affirmed Ram Bali v The Queen (Privy Council Appeal No. 18 of 1961, 6 June 1962); Shiu Prasad v Reginam [1972] 18 FLR 70, at 73 (Fiji CA). As stated by the Court of Appeal in Setevano v The State [1991] FJA 3 at 5, the reasons of a trial judge:

"must be cogent and they should be clearly stated. In our view they must also be capable of withstanding critical examination in the light of the whole of the evidence presented in the trial".

[30] Secondly, although a judge is entitled to differ from even the unanimous opinion of the assessors, he or she must comply with the requirement of s.299 of the CPC to pronounce his or her reasons in open court. It was not disputed by the State that a failure to comply with the statutory requirement, whether because the reasons are inadequate or because they are not pronounced in open court, is sufficient, of itself, to warrant setting aside a conviction in a case where the judge overrides the opinion of the assessors.

[31] The third point is related to the other two. A person convicted of a criminal offence in the High Court has a right of appeal on any ground which involves a question of law alone: Court of Appeal Act, Cap.12, s.21(a)(a). The convicted person may appeal to the Court of Appeal on any question of fact, provided he or she obtains the leave of the Court of Appeal or a certificate from the trial judge: s.21(1)(b). An appeal to the Court of Appeal (whether as of right or after a grant of leave or of a certificate) is by way of rehearing: Setevano v State at 14. Thus, a decision by a trial Judge to disagree with the assessors’ opinion that the accused should be acquitted is subject to an appeal (albeit by leave) in the nature of a rehearing.

[32] It follows that the reasons of the trial Judge in such a case will be scrutinised closely on appeal. It is important to appreciate that one of the principal rationales for requiring trial courts sitting without juries to give reasons for their decisions is "to enable the case properly and sufficiently to be laid before the ... appellate court": Pettit v Dunkley [1971] 1 NSWLR 376 at 388. The reasons must be sufficient to fulfil that purpose.

[33] The qualifications to the power and authority of a trial judge to override the opinion of assessors are closely related because an appeal by way of rehearing on a question of fact presupposes that the judge’s reasons expose the reasoning process by which he or she has concluded that the case against the accused has been proved beyond reasonable doubt. Unless this is done, the Court of Appeal may not be able to determine whether the judge erred in reaching that conclusion, much less whether he or she had "cogent reasons" for depriving the accused on the benefit of the assessors’ opinion. Further, in the absence of a cogent reasoning process in the judgment, the accused will not know precisely why the assessors’ opinion in his or her favour was not allowed to stand.

[34] In order to give a judgment containing cogent reasons for disagreeing with the assessors, the judge must therefore do more than state his or her conclusions. At the least, in a case where the accused have given evidence, the reasons must explain why the judge has rejected their evidence on the critical factual issues. The explanation must record findings on the critical factual issues and analyse the evidence supporting those findings and justifying rejection of the accused’s account of the relevant events. As the Court of Appeal observed in the present case, the analysis need not be elaborate. Indeed, depending on the nature of the case, it may be short. But the reasons must disclose the key elements in the evidence that led the judge to conclude that the prosecution had established beyond reasonable doubt all the elements of the offence.

Adequacy of Reasons in the Case

[35] The Court of Appeal identified serious omissions in the trial Judge’s reasons, although their Lordships thought that the "sparse" reasons ultimately complied with s.299 of the CPC. In our view, the omissions identified by the Court of Appeal demonstrate that the reasons given by the trial Judge did not satisfy the requirements of s.299.

[36] As the Court of Appeal noted, the trial Judge’s reasons record no findings about the credibility of the important witnesses, including the petitioners. Each of the petitioners gave evidence that, as the trial Judge herself acknowledged in the summing up, was capable, if accepted, of making out the defence of compulsion provided for in s.16 of the Penal Code. Lautabui, for example, said that from the outset, when the group first met, he feared for his life because Nimacere had his finger resting on his gun and was "forcing us" to participate. Lautabui claimed that he did not attempt to escape from the group because he was frightened of what Nimacere would do.

[37] No doubt it is implicit that her Ladyship rejected the petitioners’ evidence. Moreover, it may well be, as counsel for the State argued, that the trial Judge could have given cogent reasons for rejecting the evidence of the petitioners on the issue of duress. But that is not the question posed by s.299 of the CPC. It is necessary to ask whether the reasons given by the trial Judge were sufficiently cogent to satisfy the statutory requirement. In answering this question it is important to recall that her Ladyship gave no clear reasons for rejecting the petitioners’ account, beyond her assertion that there was "compelling evidence" of the joint unlawful plan and that the petitioners "had many opportunities to remove themselves from the plan".

[38] The difficulty with the reasons is well illustrated by the absence of any finding as to whether any of the petitioners fired their weapons at or around the time of the shootings. The trial Judge regarded the issue as irrelevant, apparently because each petitioner, in her view, participated voluntarily in the unlawful enterprise and the shootings were a probable consequence of the unlawful plan. That no doubt would be a correct assessment once one concluded that, on the evidence, the claims of compulsion were disproved beyond reasonable doubt and that the voluntary participation of each petitioner in an unlawful plan to attack the checkpoint was also established beyond reasonable doubt.

[39] The disputed factual question whether the petitioners (or any of them) fired their weapons at the police or military was important to resolve. If the petitioners did fire their weapons at the police or miliary, considerable doubt (to say the least) would be cast on their claims to have acted under compulsion. But if they did not fire their weapons, notwithstanding the apparent opportunity do so, that finding would tend to support their claims. While a finding that one or more did not fire weapons would not necessarily be conclusive on the question of compulsion, such a finding would be material in determining whether the State had disproved the defence of duress. As matters stand, neither the petitioners nor any appellate court can know what view the trial Judge took as to whether or not the petitioners fired their weapons.

[40] The Court of Appeal also pointed out that the trial Judge had not given reasons for concluding that each petitioner had "many opportunities to remove themselves from the plan prior to the Qiolevu shooting". In the absence of findings as to when each of the petitioners could have removed himself, it is difficult to determine precisely what her Ladyship had in mind. The doubt cannot be resolved by reference to the summing up since, quite properly, the trial Judge did not purport to make any findings on disputed factual issues in the course of directing the assessors.

[41] A reading of the trial Judge’s reasons does not make clear the precise basis on which the compulsion defence was rejected. Was it because, as the prosecution urged, the trial Judge found that the petitioners had "cooked up the whole story to pin the blame on the conveniently dead Nimacere? Or was it because the trial Judge, while accepting that the petitioners (or one or two of them) were in fear of their lives at various times, were not in fear for the "whole of the time in which [the act was] being done", as required by s.16 of the Penal Code? (The summing up appears to assume that the relevant period was from the beginning of the plan to attack the checkpoint until the end of the shooting, rather than the short period during which the shooting actually took place. The assumption was not challenged in argument.)

[42] The trial Judge identified a number of matters that, in her view, gave rise to a compelling case of joint unlawful enterprise. Because these matters are stated in general terms, without findings of primary fact, it is again difficult to evaluate the cogency of her Ladyship’s reasoning.

[43] This point, too, may be illustrated by an example. The reasons refer to "the evidence of numbers being called at the time of the shooting". The reasons do not include any findings as to who called out the numbers or for what purpose. In the course of argument, we were taken to the relevant evidence. A witness gave evidence that one person called out numbers but the witness could not identify the person who did so. The evidence therefore did not establish whether any of the petitioners called out numbers, let alone whether numbers were called out for the quasi-military purpose of ensuring that all the members of the group were safe and accounted for (as her Ladyship seems to have assumed).

[44] Many of the other matters relied on by the trial Judge were the subject of disputed evidence, for example whether the petitioners were subject to deadly threats during the "long walk" or whether the hijack of the vehicle was truly a joint enterprise. She made no specific factual findings on these matters to support her conclusion. Again, it may well be that there was a sound basis for rejecting the petitioners’ accounts relating to these events. But, as we have already remarked, this is not the critical question for the purposes of determining these petitions.

[45] The reasons given by the trial Judge did not comply with the requirements of s.299 of the CPC. The convictions of the petitioners were therefore affected by a significant error of law.

DELAY

[46] Counsel for the State pointed out that there had been a considerable delay in filing the petitions for special leave to appeal. The Court of Appeal judgment was given on 15 March 2004.The first of the petitions was not filed until November 2007, over three and a half years later.

[47] It appears that the petitioners prepared and filed their petitions without legal assistance. Taking that into account and also taking into account their success in establishing an important error of law affecting their convictions for murder and attempted murder, we do not regard the delay as justifying withholding otherwise appropriate relief. In that connection, it is relevant that counsel for the State could not point to any specific prejudice caused to the State by reason of the petitioners’ delay in filing the petitions.

CONCLUSION

[48] The petitioners have established that their convictions were affected by a serious error of law. The case is an appropriate one for the grant of special leave. A substantial question of principle affecting the administration of justice is involved and, in addition, if we do not grant leave substantial and grave injustice may occur: Supreme Court Act 1998, s.7(2)(b),(c).

[49] As we have noted, it was common ground that if the petitioners established a contravention of s.299 of the CPC, their convictions should be quashed and the matters remitted to the High Court for a new trial. It will be for the Director of Public Prosecutions to determine whether a new trial takes place.

[50] The Court therefore makes the following orders:

1. Each petition for special leave to appeal from the judgment of the Court of Appeal given on 15 March 2004 be granted.
   
2. Each appeal be allowed.
   

3. Each matter be remitted to the High Court for a new trial.

Hon Justice Kenneth Handley
Judge of the Supreme Court

Hon Justice David Ipp
Judge of the Supreme Court

Hon Justice Ronald Sackville
Judge of the Supreme Court

Solicitors:
First Petitioner in Person
Office of the Legal Aid Commission, Suva for the Second and Third Petitioners
Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions, Suva for the Respondent.