Lal v R [1983] FJSC 3; Criminal Appeal 091 of 1983 (7 October 1983)

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FIJI
Appellate Jurisdiction

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 91 OF 1983.
Between:

BRIJ LAL

s/o Sada Nand
Appellant
And:

REGINAM

Respondent

Mr. V. Maharaj for the Appellant
Mr. A.H.C. Gates for the Respondent

JUDGMENT

On the 29th September, 1983, on the hearing of this appeal, the purported sentence of 7 days imprisonment inflicted on the appellant by the Suva Magistrate, Mr Tevita Fa, was quashed and counsel were informed that written reasons would be given for allowing the appeal.

The Record is not complete because of the urgency of bringing this appeal before the Court. There is sufficient in the Record, however, to ascertain what led up to the imposition of the purported sentence of seven days imprisonment on the appellant.

The Record discloses several irregularities and apparent misunderstanding by the Magistrate of his proper functions and the limits of his powers.

It appears that the wife of the appellant had applied for maintenance under the provisions of the Maintenance and Affiliation Act. The first call was apparently on the 8^th August, 1983.

On that date the appellant, who was the defendant in the court below informed the Magistrate that the child of the marriage, who was 4 months old, was at the matrimonial home at Tavua. He informed the Court, also that his wife had left home leaving the child at home.

The wife said the appellant and his family had assaulted her and he had taken her to her parent’s home and left her there and said she wanted her child.

Mr. I. Khan, who happened to be in Court, and who knew the appellant, offered to speak him. Mr. Khan did so but there was no agreement reached between the parties.

The Record discloses what happened next:-

“Court: The parties haven’t agreed. I order the defendant to return the child to the mother within 7 days. I’ll have him treated for contempt of Court if this is not done. I will order that the police and Social Welfare Department assist in the return of child.”

Hearing on the application had not even commenced. No evidence had been heard yet the Magistrate purported to judge without any inquiry what was in the best interests of the child and made an order which he was not at that stage of the proceedings empowered to make.

Under section 4 of the Act, the Magistrate hearing the application is empowered to order that legal custody of a child of the marriage be given to the applicant. Not having even started to hear the application in the instant case, the Magistrate should not have made the order he did.

The threat to treat the appellant as being in contempt of Court was not called for and was, in my view an unseemly display of purported judicial which the Magistrate did not possess.

On the 5^th September, 1983, the Record indicates that both parties were before the Court although it would appear from what the Magistrate recorded that the appellant may not have been present.

The Record shows:-

“Court: This man was ordered by this Court to return the child within 7 days. This he has failed to do.

I order that he be arrested and brought before this Court.”

On the 13^th September, 1983, the Record shows:-

“Complainant: My child hasn’t been returned yet.

Court: I ordered on 5.9.83 the arrest of the defendant for contempt of Court. I don’t know why this has not been done.”

On the 21^st September, 1983, the Record shows:-

“Defendant: The child is with me.

Court: Against my order you detained the child. This is contempt of Court. You go to prison for 7 days. On your return I’ll give you 2 days to return the child. Failing that you will go to prison for 14 days. This should be a lesson to you that Court orders are there to be obeyed.”

The appellant in an urgent application to this Court for bail which was granted, filed an affidavit in support in which he disclosed the attempts he had made to comply with the Court’s order.

The appellant lives in Tavua and his wife was at the time at her parent’s house in Tailevu. On 13^th August, 1983, well within the 7 days, he had taken the child to Tailevu where he reported to the police station that he was taking the child to the child’s mother. A police officer agreed to accompany him but the wife was not at the parent’s home. He reported back to the police at the police station that he had been unable to hand over the child to his wife because she was away from her parent’s home.

Mrs. Hoffman, who appears for the appellant on the bail application, stated that the appellant had informed her that he endeavoured to explain to the Magistrate why he had not complied with the order but the Magistrate would not listen to him. There is no record of this in the Record nor is there any record that the Magistrate asked the appellant for any explanation for his apparent failure to comply with the Court order.

Mr. Gates for the respondent could not support the Magistrate’s actions and conceded the appeal should be allowed.

I am entirely at a loss to understand or appreciate how the Magistrate came to act as he did nor am I able to determine what authority he purported to act under. If he was purporting to act under section 136 of the Penal Code then it would appear he had not properly considered that section. I will refer to this later in this judgment.

One of the fundamental freedoms guaranteed to an individual under the Constitution of Fiji is the protection of his right to personal freedom.

Section 5(1) (b) of the Constitution provides that:-

“No person shall be deprived of his personal liberty save as may authorized by law (underlining is mine) in any of the following cases, that is to say-

1. .................
   
2. in execution of the order of a Court punishing him for contempt of that Court or of another Court or Tribunal.
   

100. .....................
     

There are 8 other instances listed where a person may be arrested or detained.

Under the Magistrates’ Courts Act, it is the Supreme Court which has jurisdiction to deal with cases of Contempt of Court. The Magistrate has no power to punish for Contempt of Court under that Act.

Section 6 of the Act provides:-

“6. The Supreme court shall have the same power to deal with cases of contempt of its authority as the High Court of Justice in England, and such power shall extend to the upholding of the authority of Magistrates Courts.”

There is only one instance when a Magistrate (other than a third class one) is empowered to punish for an offence akin to Contempt of Court and that is where an offence is committed under section 136 of the Penal Code.

Where certain offences listed in subsection (1) are committed in view of the count, the Magistrate under subsection (2) may cause the offender to be detained in custody and at any time before the rising of the Court on the same day, may take cognizance of the offence and sentence the offender to a fine not exceeding forty dollars or in default of payment to imprisonment for a term not exceeding one month.

Section (3) provides:-

(3) The provisions of this section shall be deemed to be in addition to and not in derogation from the Power of the Supreme Court to punish for Contempt of Court”.

Section 136(1) specifies a number of offences relating to judicial proceedings. If it is decided to proceed under that section proceedings must be taken against the offender in the normal way as for the commission of any other offence unless subsection (2) applies and the Magistrate in whose view the offence the offence has been committed deals with the offender. Nothing in section 136 empowers any court to commit any person to prison for seven days without a charge being first preferred against him and a proper trial.

The appellant’s failure to deliver the child to his wife does not appear to be an offence under section 136 of the Penal Code. No charge was laid against the appellant and in my view the Magistrate could not have recourse to section 136(2) if that is what he in fact did.

In any event imprisonment for 7 days was well beyond any powers he had to deal with an alleged contempt (if it was within section 136) had it been committed in his presence.

Recourse should have been had to the Supreme Court, not by the Magistrate himself but by the complainant. The Magistrate’s function is to hear and decide on the evidence before him all applications or cases properly brought before him. It is no part of his function to descend into the arena and take over the functions of counsel or a party and without application on behalf of a party to order the arrest of any person.

Order 52 Rules of the Supreme Court provides rules for committal for Contempt of Court. Under the Rules no application to the Court for committal can be made without prior leave of the Court to make such application. Order 52 also applies to Contempt of Court committed in connection with proceedings in an inferior court.

As the complainant, the wife, was not represented, on the appellant’s failure to comply with the order, she should have been advised by the Magistrate that she should consult a solicitor if she wished to enforce the order by means of contempt proceedings.

The Magistrate went astray when the parties first appeared before him. He had no authority at the time he made the order about returning the child to make the order. Thereafter there was a succession of irregularities leading me to the conclusion that the Magistrate did not appreciate what was his proper function or the limits of his powers.

The right to personal liberty is zealously guarded in a democratic society.

Section 5(6) of the Constitution provides:-

“(6) Any person who is unlawfully arrested or detained by any other person shall be entitled to compensation therefore from that other person, or from any other person or authority on whose behalf that other person was acting.”

I believe the appellant spent two nights and one day in custody. On the evidence before me the appellant’s arrest and detention in custody on the orders of the Magistrate were unlawful.

It is rare indeed for a Magistrate in Fiji to have to exercise what little powers he has to punish for contempt committed in his view. By and large the general public has respect for the Courts and where someone fails to comply with a lawful order of the Court a warning by the Court that he is laying himself open to contempt proceedings being bought against him is usually all that is required to have him comply with the order.

I confirm the quashing of the purported order committing the appellant to prison for 7 days. The appellant is to have his costs of this appeal.

(R. G. KERMODE)

JUDGE

SUVA,
7th OCTOBER, 1983.