Singh v Regina [1979] FJSC 45; Criminal Appeal No. 34 of 1979 (27 July 1979)

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FIJI
(WESTERN DIVISION)
AT LAUTOKA

Appellate Jurisdiction
Criminal Appeal No. 34 of 1979

BETWEEN

PHALAD SINGH
s/o Mukut Singh
(Appellant)

AND

REGINA
(Respondent)

Mr. Shankar for Messrs. Tulsi R. Sharma,
Counsel for the Appellant
Mr. D. Williams, Counsel for the Respondent

JUDGMENT

The appellant was convicted of a number of offences under the Road traffic Act and sentenced.

His appeal is concerned with one count only, that of driving whilst under the influence of drink to such as extent as to be incapable of having proper control of the vehicle. The appellant pleaded not guilty, but after hearing evidence the magistrate convicted and sentenced him to a fine of $100 and disqualified from holding or obtaining a driving licence for 12 months.

The ground of appeal was basically that the evidence of the doctor called by the prosecution did not support the finding of guilt. In fact the evidence of the doctor shows a rather confused outlook.

A blood sample from the appellant showed 190 m.g. of alcohol to 100 m.l. of blood and the doctor quite rightly said that any person with over 150 m.g. of alcohol in 100 m.l. of blood would be adversely affected- his reflexes would be adversely affected. That would ipso facto mean that the person’s ability to drive properly and safely would naturally be adversely affected.

The doctor could well have put the figure much lower of course since 80 m.g. of alcohol in 100 m.l. of blood is considered to be the safe maximum in many countries, but certainly so far the doctor’s conclusion are quite clear.

But the doctor went on “clinical examination did not disclose any signs which would enable me to say (the accused) could not drive a motor vehicle properly”. He also said “The accused was completely capable of driving a motor vehicle”. Although perhaps significantly, the doctor did not direct his mind specifically to the real issue ie. Whether by reason of drink the appellant was capable of having proper control of the vehicle.

The two findings of the doctor are really rather contradictory. How can a person whose reflexes are adversely affected by drink be said to be completely normal and not have his driving ability impaired?

This is one of those irritating inconsistencies of which even experienced doctors are capable, quite often because of an innate reluctance to declare a person to be drunk so as to render him criminally liable. Probably the only satisfactory solution is to have a statutory provision prescribing the maximum amount of alcohol in the blood beyond which a person is deemed to be unfit to have proper control of a vehicle.

It is to be noted that the doctor in the present case did not even follow the guide lines suggested by the Chief Justice in a previous appeal heard by the Supreme Court.

It is the court’s responsibility finally to decide whether a person is unfit to have proper control of a vehicle (although of course an opinion by a medical officer will have considerable weight) and the best way in which a doctor can help the court is to carry out certain specific tests to determine the suspects reactions, and to report the results to the court. An opinion on the specific issue based on such evidence would of course carry very much more weight. The doctor in this case did not carry out any such tests, or at least did not give evidence of any such tests, merely referring to clinical examination, so that his opinion as to the accused’s ability to have proper control of a vehicle is of very doubtful value, and of no more assistance to the court than the evidence of the other witnesses who saw the accused driving the vehicle and afterwards. The only parts of his evidence which are clearly supportable and relevant are that the accused smelt of liquor (and it was admitted that the accused had been drinking) and that a person with the amount of alcohol in his blood that the accused has would be adversely affected by it, his reflexes- which after all are some of the most important factors in determining whether a person is able to be in proper control of a vehicle- would be adversely affected.

It may well be that the doctor was looking for signs of drunkenness rather than ability to have proper control of a vehicle.

In the circumstances I think the magistrate was quite entitled to look beyond the evidence of the doctor, at other evidence which would help him to determine whether the accused was capable of having proper control of the vehicle. Both the case of Langford v R. Criminal Appeal No. 162 of 1973 and Davis v Edinburgh Magistrate (1953) S.C. 34 support the view that the court is not bound by the opinions of expert witnesses and must not disregard the evidence of other witnesses.

This case differs from the case of Bharat Pal Chauhary v R. Cr. App. No. 95 of 1978 since in that case the doctor carried out specific tests and reported his findings based on those tests, and so the court was obliged to give the most serious consideration to what he said in evidence. Since there was doubt whether the magistrate had properly appraised the doctor’s evidence in that case it was considered on appeal that it was not safe to allow the conviction to stand.

In the present case the magistrate had before him evidence that the accused had been drinking, that he smelt of liquor, that he was talkative and the amount of alcohol in his blood was such that he would have been – presumably must have been – adversely affected by it so that his reflexes were not what they should have been. He also had before him evidence as to the appellant’s driving, his zigzagging along the road and stopping in the middle of the road. On that evidence I consider that he was entitled to disregard the doctor’s equivocal opinion that the appellant was normal, and to find that the appellant was incapable through drinking from having proper control of the vehicle. The sentence passed on the appellant for this offence, namely a fine of $100 and in default 3 months imprisonment and disqualification from driving or holding or obtaining a driving licence for 12 months is by no means excessive.

The appeal is therefore dismissed.

Sgd. (G.O.L. Dyke)
JUDGE

LAUTOKA
27 July, 1979