Hafiz v Reginam [1977] FJSC 27; Criminal Appeal 020 of 1977 (27 May 1977)

Fiji Islands - Hafiz v Reginam - Pacific Law Materials

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FIJI

APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL No. 20 of 1977

BETW/p>:

MOHAMMED HAFIZ
s/o MOHAMMEDRASUL

AND:

REGINAM

On the 8th December 1976 at Suvt Suva Magistrates Court the appellant was convicted after trial of makinglse declaration for the purpose of procuring a passport contrary to section 346 of the Pena Penal Code and was sentenced to a fine of $150.

Section 346 of the Penal Code under which the appellant was charged provides that "Any person who makes a statement which is to his knowledge untrue for the purpose of procuring a passport, whether for himself or for any other person, is guilty of a misdemeanour."

The appellant has appealed on the ground that the trial Magistrate erred in law in holding that in signing a blank form the appellant accepted the responsibility for any untrue statement contained in that form.

This appeal raised on that point of law and arises from the fact that the trial Magistrate was faced with the evidence of two prosecution witnesses (the second and third prosecution witnesses), who the trial Magistrate considered to be particeps criminis and whose evidence was in conflict. The second prosecution witness testified that he filled in a passport application form (Exhibit P.1) incorporating an untrue statement on information given to him by the appellant before the appellant signed the form; but the third prosecution witness claimed that the appellant merely signed the form in blank and then left it with the second prosecution witness, which was consistent with a statement made by the appellant when interviewed by the police and his assertion that the second prosecution witness thereafter filled in the form (including the untrue statement) on his own initiative. In his judgement the trial Magistrate dealt with this aspect of the matter as follows:

"If Exhibit P.1 was completed when Accused signed it then there is no doubt that a false declaration, or statement, was made to obtain a passport. There is equally no doubt that if the Exhibit P.1 was signed in blank the Accused has made a false declaration or statement, to obtain a passport. He cannot sign a blank form and then escape the consequences by saying, "I have made no declaration or statement I have only signed my name, therefore I cannot he caught by the section". That would be a foolhardy view. The mere placing of a signature on a blank form is an act accepting responsibility for any false declaration or statement contained in that form. It is as if the person signing his name had written it himself ... I am satisfied that Exhibit P.1 contained the accused’s signature placed there quite freely and voluntarily. He knew what he was doing when he put it there. He wanted a passport. He obtained a passport as the result of a false declaration. I have no hesitation in finding this Accused guilty as charged and I convict him for this offence."

Thus the trial Magistrate did not decide. which, if either, of the second or third prosecution witnesses he believed but held that on either version the appellant was guilty. By so holding the trial Magistrate, on the version of events of the third prosecution witness and the appellant's statement to the police, found the appellant liable for the act of the second prosecution witness of entering on the application form an untrue statement even though the appellant was not aware of its existence.

As a general rule there is no vicarious responsibility in crime, although there are statutory exceptions such as licensee cases, corporate criminal responsibility, and some offences involving a master and servant relationship. None of those exceptions apply to the circumstances of this case. Before the appellant can be convicted of this offence it must be proved beyond reasonable doubt that for the purpose of procuring a passport the appellant, knowing that a statement was untrue, incorporated some in the application form or had it incorporated by another acting with the knowledge of the appellant.

It is quite clear from the trial Magistrate's judgement that on the evidence he was not satisfied that it had been proved beyond reasonable doubt that when the untrue statement was incorporated in the application form by the second prosecution witness he was acting with the knowledge of the appellant. On the findings of the trial Magistrate the form could simply have been signed in blank by the appellant and thereafter the untrue statement could have been incorporated therein by the second prosecution witness without the knowledge of the appellant.

Although it would appear from the trial record that there is an active "racket" in passports in Fiji, the Crown concedes that for the reasons given the conviction cannot be sustained. It is accordingly quashed and the sentences set aside.

Clifford H. Grant
Chief Justice

Suva,
27th May 1977