Faga v Reginam [1977] FJSC 11; Criminal Appeal 102 of 1976 (11 March 1977)

Fiji Islands - Faga v Reginam - Pacific Law Materials

SUPREME COURT OF FIJI

APPELLATE JURISDICTION

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. 102 OF 1976

BETWEEN:

GABRIEL FAGA

AND:

REGINAM

JUDGMENT

To succeed on this submission it is necessary for the appellant to show that there was no evidence on which the trial Magistrate could reach the conclusion which he did if he properly directed himself. In a gallant effort so to do, counsel for the appellant subjected the evidence and the judgment of the trial Magistrate to a critical analysis and submitted that the decision was inconsistent with the physical factors, such as the position of the vehicles after the collision, the damage sustained and the point at which broken glass was found on the road.

After a careful consideration of the evidence I hove come to the conclusion that this is not a case in which an appellate court could or should interfere. It is quite clear from the detailed judgment of the trial Magistrate that he took into account the physical factors when arriving at his conclusion. He was faced with two irreconcilable versions of the event; namely the contention of the complainant (P.W.2) that the appellant drove his landrover into the rear of the complainant's taxi, and the appellant's contention that the complainant reversed his taxi into the appellant's landrover; and it was for him, not for this Court, to decide on the credibility of the witnesses in the light of all the circumstances.

In his judgment, after analysing the evidence, the trial Magistrate concluded that -

"The evidence before me is such as to convince me beyond a reasonable doubt that the facts of this case are as set out on oath by P.W.2. I believe that it being 1.15 a.m., or thereabout, the accused was approaching this pedestrian crossing behind two other motor vehicles. Because he did not anticipate the use of the pedestrian crossing at that hour of the morning he was not being as attentive as he might otherwise have been, he did not realise that the motor vehicles ahead were stopped and that because of the short distance in which all three motor vehicles were grouped he could not take avoiding action in time sufficient to prevent the collision. Whatever the reason, the accused was not exercising that care which a prudent driver would in approaching a pedestrian crossing. I believe both the accused and his defence witness to be mistaken in their account to the court.

I believe P.W.2 to be a witness of truth upon whom reliance could be placed without reserve. Such being the case I find the accused guilty as charged and I convict him accordingly."

The evidence on which the trial Magistrate relied was sufficient to justify the conclusion which he reached, and the appeal is accordingly dismissed.

Clifford H. Grant
CHIEF JUSTICE

Suva,
11th March, 1977.