In re Parmanandam - ruling [1972] FJSC 1; No 90 of 1972 (9 May 1972)

IN THE SUPREME COURT OF FIJI
Civil Jurisdiction

Action No. 90 of 1972

IN THE MATTER of an application by the Attorney-General for Fiji for leave to apply for an order of committal pursuant to Order 52 Rule 2 of the Supreme Court Rules

AND IN THE MATTER of one VIJAYA PARMANANDAM

RULING

I am in no doubt that a contempt of Court consisting of scandalising the Court is a criminal contempt as distinct from a civil contempt and that the Order of the Full Court amounts to a conviction of the Applicant (R. v. Gray [1900] UKLawRpKQB 63; (1900) 2 Q. B. 36: Izuora v. Reg. (1953) A. C. 327).

The procedure for moving the Court to deal with that offence was indeed a civil one, namely O. 52 R. 1 of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Fiji; and to the extent that the procedure adopted was civil in nature but the contempt committed criminal in nature the matter may be described as hybrid.

This raises the question of the correct procedure to be adopted on an application to relieve the Applicant of the effect of the sentence imposed by the Court pending appeal.

The Applicant has chosen to proceed under the provisions relating to appeals in civil cases, namely Section 12(1) of the Court of Appeal Ordinance and the Court of Appeal Rules applicable thereto.

In view of the urgency of this application I propose to make no finding as to whether or not the procedure adopted by the applicant is technically correct but shall deal with the three grounds raised by the Applicant entirely on their merits.

As to ground (a), as it is intended that the Court of Appeal will sit on the 12^th June no question of undue delay arises.

As to ground (c), the fact that a case is of public interest does not affect, and in my view should not be permitted to affect, the position.

As to ground (b), I am in no doubt that it was never the intention of the Full Court that the sentence imposed should result in the parliamentary sear of the Applicant being imperilled and I have given anxious consideration to the position. I have come to the conclusion that an application base on this ground is at this stage premature. Section 34(1)(c) of the Constitution provides that a member of the House of Constitution provides that a member of the House of Representatives shall vacate his seat if he is absent from three consecutive meetings of the House without having obtained from the Speaker (or when appropriate his deputy) before the termination of any of those meetings permission to be or to remain absent from that meeting.

Thus, at this juncture, the Applicant’s seat is not at risk; and indeed may never be.

Should the stage ever be reached when a real likelihood arises of the vacation of the Applicant’s seat, the Applicant is at liberty to renew his application to this Court, or of course, to apply to the Court of Appeal. Attention is also drawn to O.52 R. 8(1) of the Rules of the Supreme Court of Fiji.

For these reasons the application is denied.

(Clifford H. Grant)

JUDGE

SUVA
9^th May, 1972