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Magistrates Court of Fiji |
IN THE MAGISTRATES COURT OF FIJI
AT SUVA
Criminal Case No: 1744/2008
STATE
V
GANESWAR Raj
Counsel: Mr. Paka for the State
: Mr .I. Khan for the Accused
Date of Hearing : 29th December 2014
Date of Ruling:29th December 2014
RULING
"I do not think that [the use of the word 'shall'] means that once the procedure is set in motion, the court has ineluctably to allow the wheels to revolve without any power to stop them if the accused wants to change his mind...I can find nothing...which would deprive a magistrate...of the ordinary right which they must have in the interests of justice of allowing n accused who has given his consent ill-advised to abandoning his right to trial by jury, to be given the opportunity of reconsidering it."
It would seem that the accused can in theory be allowed to re-elect even after his trial on a not guilty plea has begun. However, it is submitted that, once a significant portion of the prosecution evidence has been given, a change of election should be allowed only in very exceptional circumstances, since otherwise the defence might be tempted to ask to re-elect as a tactical ploy simply because the trial seems to be going badly.
(b) In exercising their discretion whether or not to accede to an application to re-elect, magistrates must have regard to the 'broadjustice' of the situation (per Lord Widgery CJ in Southampton Justice, ex parte Briggs [1972] 1 WLR 277 at p. 280). They are entitled to take into account: (i) that the defendant had his rights as to mode of trial fully explained to him; (ii) that he understood those rights; (iii) that he voluntarily consented to be tried summarily; and (iv) that there were no unusual, difficult or grave features in the case (Lambeth Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Wright [1974] Crim LR 444, as explained by McCullough J in Ex parte Hodgson [1985] QB 1131 at p. 1140A-C).
(c) Since one of the most important factors in the mind of an accused deciding which court he would like to deal with his case is whether or not he believes he has any defence, an election for summary trial made when unrepresented and intending to plead guilty through a misunderstanding of the law is invalid because, even if the accused understands the nature of the choice put to him in the sense of knowing the difference between trial on indictment and summary trial, he does not truly appreciate the significance of the choice for him (Ex parte Hodgson, see especially p. 1146D-H).
(d) It is implicit in the judgment of McCullough J that the fact that the accused was unrepresented when he elected summary trial is not sufficient by itself to compel the court to allow a withdrawal of election, even if e is subsequently advised that trial on indictment would be preferable. Conversely, although having had legal advice before electing would obviously be a very powerful argument against an application to re-elect, there is no reason to suppose that it must inevitably be decisive. In Highbury Corner Metropolitan Stipendiary Magistrate, ex parte Weekes [1985] QB 1147, McCullough J (at app. 1152F-1153A) held that there is no rule of law that a magistrates' court must adjourn before putting an unrepresented accused to his election so as to allow him to apply for legal aid.
(e) Most important, where the material before the magistrates shows that the accused, when he elected summary trial, did not properly understand the 'nature and significance' of the choice put to him, the broad justice of the situation demands that he be allowed to re-elect (Ex parte Hodgson [1985] QB 1131 at p. 1144-5).
H.S.P.Somaratne
Resident Magistrate, Suva
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URL: http://www.paclii.org/fj/cases/FJMC/2014/171.html