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Magistrates Court of Fiji |
IN THE RESIDENT MAGISTRATE'S COURT
AT LAUTOKA
IN THE WESTERN DIVISION
CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL CASE NO.: 579/11
STATE
v
REGINAL AUTAR
For Prosecution: Sgt Paul Taito
For Accused: In Person
SENTENCE
"Reginal" you appear for sentence in this Court, after pleading guilty to the offence of "Assault Causing Actual Bodily Harm" Contrary to Section 275 of the Crimes Decree No. 44 of 2009.
I am satisfied that your plea is "unequivocal" and that you understand the consequences of your plea.
"Reginal" You are aged 30 and a father of three tender aged children. You are a resident of "Kauata" Street, Simla, Lautoka. The Complainant "Anina Eva" is your wife.
On the 03rd day of September 2011, around 9.30a.m. your wife started quarrelling and swearing at your father since he sought your permission to take one child to town for shopping. Being annoyed over your wife's swearing at your father, you punched her several times on her head and hand. As a result, she received bruises on her face and right hand.
The above mentioned summary of facts was read over to you by the Prosecution in open court. You admitted the summary of facts.
I see no aggravating factors in this case.
Mitigating Factors
1) You reconciled with the complainant.
2) The presence of the element of provocation.
3) You are remorseful for your actions and deeds.
4) You tendered an apology to Court.
The complainant in this case is your wife. She informed Court that she has forgiven you and has reconciled with you. This is a "domestic violence" offence. The Court cannot accept the reconciliation and dismiss the proceedings since there is a statutory prohibition contained in section 154 (6) of the Criminal Procedure Decree, 2009. But there is nothing to prevent Court from taking into account the reconciliation as a mitigating factor at the stage of sentencing.
According to section 275 of "Crimes Decree No. 44 of 2009", the offence of "Assault Causing Actual Bodily Harm" carries a maximum sentence of five (05) years imprisonment.
The tariff for "Assault Occasioning Actual Bodily Harm" varies from suspended sentence to 9 months imprisonment. (Per Gounder J in "Jonetani Sereka vs State 2008 HAA 027/08S, 25 April 2008).
In "State vs Anjula Devi" Criminal Case No. 4 of 1998 Lab, it was held that the tariff for "Assault Occasioninci Actual Bodily Harm" ranges from a suspended sentence where there is a degree of provocation and no weapon used, to 9 months imprisonment for the more serious cases of assault.
In "Elizabeth Joseph vs State" Criminal Appeal HAA 030 of 2004S, the accused stabbed her partner's wife with a pen knife. The victim received a cut on the finger. A sentence of 4 months imprisonment was upheld on Appeal.
In the case of "State vs Tevita Alafi" 2004 HAA 073/04S, it was held that it is the extent of the injury which determines the sentence.
In the case of "Amasai Korovata vs The State" F20061 HAA 115/06S it is in domestic violence cases, sentences of 18 months imprisonment have been upheld.
Section 4[1] of the Sentencing and Penalties Decree limits the purpose of sentencing an offender to the following grounds:
(a) to punish offenders to an extent and in a manner which is just in all the circumstances;
(b) to protect the community from offenders;
(c) to deter offenders or other persons from committing offences of the same or similar natures;
(d) to establish conditions so that rehabilitation of offenders may be promoted or facilitated;
(e) to signify that the court and the community denounce the commission of such offences; or
(f) any combination of these purposes.
Section 4[2] of the decree outlines what a sentencing Court must consider when sentencing an offender:
(a) the maximum penalty prescribed for the offence;
(b) current sentencing practice and the terms of any applicable guideline judgment;
(c) the nature and gravity of the particular offence;
(d) the offender's culpability and degree of responsibility for the offence; (e) the impact of the offence on any victim of the offence and the injury, loss or damage resulting from the offence;
(f) whether the offender pleaded guilty to the offence, and if so, the stage in the proceeding at which the offender did so or indicated an intention to do so;
(g) the conduct of the offender during the trial as an indication of remorse or the lack of remorse;
(h) any action taken by the offender to make restitution for the injury, loss or damage arising from the offence, including his or her willingness to comply with any order for restitution that a court may consider under this Decree;
(l) the offender's previous character;
(j) the presence of any aggravating or mitigating factor concerning the offender or other circumstance relevant to the commission of the offence; and
(k) any matter stated in this Decree as being grounds for applying a particular sentencing option.
At this stage, I address my mind to the legal principles enunciated in the case of "Divendra Bila vs State" 43 FIR 144. In this case it was held "each case must be assessed and evaluated in its true merits and that the best guidance as always is for the courts to grasp the essence of established general principles of sentencing and apply them based on the fundamental premise that a sentence should not be harsh and excessive or wrong in principle".
"Reginal" you pleaded guilty to the charge at the earliest opportunity. I note that your guilty plea has saved substantial time and money that could have been thrown away if you denied your involvement. To that extent, I note that your guilty plea operates in your favour.
It has been well recognized practice in common law to take into account a plea of guilty in the sentence. Most common Law Jurisdictions have codified this practice in sentencing statutes. In Fiji, the practice is a part of the common law.
In "Navuniani Koroi v. The State" Criminal Appeal No. AAU0037 of 2002S the court said:
"It has been the practice of the courts to reduce a sentence where the accused person has pleaded guilty. In most cases that is a recognition of his contribution as expressed by an early admission and the fact that it will save the witnesses and the court a great deal of time and expense. In offences of a sexual nature, the amount of reduction is generally more because the plea saves the victim from having to attend the trial and relieve her experience in the witness box".
The weight to be given to a guilty plea depends on a number of factors. Some of these factors were identified by Hunt CJ at CL in R v. Winchester (1992) 58 A Crim R 345 at 350:
"A plea of guilty is always a matter which must be taken into account when imposing sentence. The degree of leniency to be afforded will depend upon many different factors. The plea may in some cases be an indication of contribution, or of some other quality or attribute, which is regarded as relevant for sentencing purposes independently of the mere fact that the prisoner has pleaded guilty. The extent to which leniency will be afforded upon this ground will depend to a large degree upon whether or not the plea resulted from the recognition of the inevitable: Shannon (1979) 21 SASR 442 AT 452; Ellis (1986) 6 NSWLR 603 at 604. The plea of guilty may also be taken into account as a factor in its own right independently of such contribution, as mitigation for the co-operation in saving the time and cost involved in a trial. Obviously enough, the extent to which leniency will be afforded upon this ground will depend to a large degree upon just when the plea of guilty was entered or indicated (and thus savings affected):Beavan (unreported, Court of Criminal Appeal, NSW, Hunt, Badgery –Parker and Abadee JJ, 22 August 1991), at p.12.
In the "Principle of sentencing second edition, by D. A. Thomas, at P. 46 wrote
"The Final Step in the process of calculation the length of tariff sentence is to make allowance for mitigation, reducing the sentence from the level indication by the facts of the offence by an amount appropriate to reflect such mitigating factors as may be present. Mitigating factors exist in great variety, but some are more common and more effective than others.
They include such matters as the youth and previous of the offender....."
I select Nine (09) months imprisonment as my "starting point". I reduce three (03) months for the "Mitigating Factors" and another three (03) months for the "early guilty plea".
"Reginal" you are a first offender. Hence I reduce one (01) month from your sentence, to mark your previous good behaviour.
Now, your sentence stands at two (02) months imprisonment.
"Reginal" you pleaded for forgiveness and applied for leniency in sentencing as you have now learnt a lesson and you will not re-offend. You urged Court to consider your age, family commitments and your desire to get into the main stream of the society. You were forceful and potent in you Plea for a 'Non Custodial Sentence'.
In this context, I direct myself to consider the appropriate sentence on your conviction pursuant to your plea of guilty. In doing so, I am guided by the "General Principles of Sentencing".
Under Section 26 (2) (B) of Sentencing and Penalties Decree 2009, a sentence below two (02) years could be suspended.
A discussion of the process which should be undertaken when a judicial officer is considering a suspended sentence is found in the decision of the New Zealand Court of Appeal in R v. Peterson [1994] 2 NZLR 533. There may be differences of details between the Fijian and New Zealand statutes. However, the principles stated in Petersen are helpful. These principles are summarized in the head note thus:
"The principal purpose of [the relevant section] was to encourage rehabilitation and to provide the Courts with an effective means of achieving that end by holding a prison sentence over an offender's head. It was available in cases of moderately serous offending but where it was thought there was a sufficient opportunity for reform, and the need to deter others was not paramount. The legislature has given it teeth by providing that the length of sentence of imprisonment was fixed at the time the suspended sentence was imposed, that it was to correspond in length to the term that would have been imposed in the absence of power to suspend, and that the Court before whom the offender appeared on further conviction was to order the suspended sentence to take effect, unless of the opinion it would be unjust to do so. So, there was a presumption that upon further offending punishable by imprisonment the term previously fixed would have to be served (seep. 537 line 4).
The Court's first duty was to consider what would be the appropriate immediate custodial sentence, pass that and then consider whether there were grounds for suspending it. The Court must not pass a longer custodial sentence that it would otherwise do because it was suspended. Equally, it would be wrong for the Court to decide on the shorter sentence than appropriate in order to take advantage of the suspended sentence regime (seep. 538 line 47, p. 539 line 5). R V. Mah-Wingh (1986) 5 Cr App R (S) 347 followed.
The final question to be determined was whether immediate imprisonment was required or whether a suspended sentence could be given. If, at the previous stages of the inquiry, the Court had applied the correct approach, all factors relevant to the sentence were likely to have been taken into account already; the sentencer must either give double weight to some factors, or search for new ones which would justify suspension although irrelevant to the other issues already considered. Like most sentencing, what was required here was an application of commonsense judgment, in which the sentencer must stand off and decide whether the imposition of a suspended sentence would be consonant with the objectives of the new legislation (see p.539 line 8, p. 539 line 37).
Petersen's case was a prosecution appeal against leniency of sentence. Petersen had pleaded guilty at early opportunity, to reasonably serious drug offences: he was sentenced in the High Court to 18 months' imprisonment suspended for 2 years plus 9 months' periodic detention. He had no previous drug convictions and was aged 42 with family commitments. The New Zealand Court of Appeal considered Peterson's offending so serious that it quashed the suspended sentence and imposed one of 18 months' imprisonment concurrent on the several charges. The Court discussed at p. 539 the factors needing to be weighed in choosing immediate imprisonment or suspended sentence in these words:
"Thomas at pp.245-247 lists certain categories of cases with which suspended sentences have become associated, although not limited to them. We do not propose to repeat those in detail since broadly all can be analysed as relating either to the circumstances of the offender or alternatively the offending. In the former category may be the youth of the offender, although this does not mean the sentence is necessarily unsuitable for an older person. Another indicator may be a previous good record, or (notwithstanding the existence of a previous record, even one of some substance) a long period of free of criminal activity. The need for rehabilitation and the offender's likely response to the sentence must be considered. It is clear that the sentence is intended to have a strong deterrent effect upon the offender; if the latter is regarded as incapable of responding to a deterrent the sentence should not be imposed. As to the circumstances of the particular case, notwithstanding the gravity of the offence, as such there may be a diminished culpability, arising through lack of premeditation, the presence of provocation, or coercion by a co-offender. Cooperation with the authorities can be another relevant consideration. All the factors mentioned are by way of example only and are not intended as an exhaustive or even comprehensive list. The factors may overlap and more than one may be required to justify the suspension of the sentence in any particular case. Finally, any countervailing circumstances have to be considered. For example, in a particular case the sentence may be regarded as failing to protect the public adequately.
In concluding our consideration of the principles, we wish to add this. Understandably, the form of the legislation requires the sentencer to pass through a series of statutory gates, before reaching the point of availability of a suspended sentence. Subject to that however, like most sentencing what is required in the end is an application of commonsense judgment, in which the sentencer must stand off and decide whether the imposition of a suspended sentence would be consonant with the objectives of the new legislation. In many instances an initial broad look of this kind will eliminate the possibility of a suspended sentence as an appropriate response".
D. A Thomas in "Current Developments in Sentencing" (1969) Crim. L.R. 237 said.
"The court has refused to order suspension of a sentence passed for what amounted to a series of offences rather that an isolated one; in cases where the offence exhibits a degree of careful premeditation, or where the offence amounts to a serious breach of trust. The court is also reluctant to order suspension where the length of the term imprisonment already makes substantial allowance for the factors which are urged as a basis for suspension.
In O' Keefe (1969 1 ALL ER 426, the English Court of Appeal noted that
"The court must go through the process of eliminating other possible courses such as absolute discharge, conditional discharge, probation order, fines and then say to itself: this is a case for imprisonment required, or can I give a suspended sentence?"
In Fiji, concern has repeatedly been expressed by the courts about the over-use of the suspended sentence. Byrne J in Nand Kumar –v- The State Crim App. No. HAA0115.2002L said -
"In line with other judges I have frequently expressed the view that suspended sentences generally are a snare and a delusion in that they tend to give a person convicted a false sense of security and leave him under the mistaken belief that he has not done any wrong because he has not been sent to prison.
Grant C.J. said in DPP –v- Jolame Pita 20 FLR 5:
"Once a court has reached the decision that a sentence of imprisonment is warranted there must be special circumstances to justify a suspension, such as an offender of comparatively good character who is not considered suitable for, or in need of, probation, and who commits a relatively isolated offence of a moderately serious nature, but not involving violence. Or there may be other cogent reasons such as the extreme youth or age of the offender, or the circumstances of the offence"
The Court ought to bend backwards to avoid immediate custodial sentence for first offenders. "The first offenders should not be sentenced to immediate imprisonment" (Moses Nariva –v- State, Criminal App, HAA 148/2005).
"Reginal" since you are clearly remorseful, you must be given an opportunity to prove your remorse by embarking on a period of good behaviour.
In the circumstances, I decided to suspend your sentence.
"Reginal" I sentence you for two (02) months imprisonment. The operation of the term of imprisonment is suspended for two (02) years. [The purpose and the effect of the suspended term is explained to the accused along with the consequences of the breach under section 26 (3) of Sentencing and Penalties Decree 2009].
If an offence punishable with a term of imprisonment is committed within the operational period of the suspended term, the suspended term shall begin to run in addition to the sentence that you may get for the subsequent offence.
The accused is also informed that the commission of an offence punishable with imprisonment during the operation of the suspended sentence is an offence itself against section 28 of the Sentencing Decree for which he could be arraigned and punished by the Court.
Assault causing actual bodily harm is listed as a domestic violence offence in Schedule 1A of the Decree.
Section 24 (a) (b) (i) of the Decree provides:
(a) Subject to subsection (3) but not withstanding any other provision in this Decree -
(b) where a person –
(i) pleads guilty to, or is found guilty of, an offence which is a domestic violence offence;
(ii) the Court must make a domestic violence restraining order under this Decree for the safety and well being of the person against whom the offence or alleged offence was committed;
(iii) where subsection (1) applies the Court need not make an order under this section if satisfied that, having regard to the safety and wellbeing of the person for whose protection the order would be made, the order is not required.
Section 24 (1)(b)(i) is a mandatory provision. The only discretion given to the Court is when the safety and wellbeing of the victim is a non-issue. In this case, since the accused is convicted of a domestic violence offence and the safety and wellbeing of the victims are an issue, the Court has no discretion but to issue a restraining order against the accused in addition to the sentence.
I issue a restraining order for the safety and wellbeing of the victims;
➢ NON MOLESTATION
In accordance with section 27 of the Decree, the following standard non-molestation conditions apply to this Order: The terms of the order are that the accused must not:
28 days to Appeal.
Dated at Lautoka on the 22nd day of November 2011
Jude Nanayakkara
Resident Magistrate
Magistrate Court-03
LAUTOKA
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