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Fiji Independent Legal Services Commission |
IN THE INDEPENDENT
LEGAL SERVICES COMMISSION
ILSC Action No: 001 of 2009
BETWEEN:
CHIEF REGISTRAR
Applicant
AND
ABHAY SINGH
Respondent
APPLICATION IN PERSON | |
RESPONDENT IN PERSON | |
DATE OF HEARING: | 4th November 2009, 7th December 2009, 7th December 2009,11th December 2009 |
DATE OF JUDGMENT | 25th January 2010 |
JUDGMENT
COMPLAINT NUMBER 1
"On the 24th July 2003 the trial was due to start in the Magistrates Court at Suva of one Sahadat Attai Khan. He was charged with corruptly seeking, as a Land Transport Authority Officer, $200 for the registration of a second-hand vehicle. The owner of the car and the person from whom it was alleged he had sought the money was Rajendra Narayan. The Accused was Mr. Khan's defense counsel. Subsequently in February 2005 Mr. Khan was acquitted of that charge.
Prior to the Khan hearing, on 22nd July 2003, Mr. Narayan informed the investigating officer that he had been approached by the accused. The police took advice from the Director of Public Prosecutions Officer. It was then agreed to give Mr. Narayan a digital recording device to record any further conversation with the Accused on the topic. Mr. Narayan agreed to this course.
On the next day, 23rd July 2003, a conversation took place between the Accused and Mr. Narayan. It started when they were in a vehicle traveling to the scene of an accident in which the Accused's son had been one of the drivers. In the course of the conversation the Accused mentioned the court case the next day. He advised Mr. Narayan to change his evidence to some extent, and the Accused told him what to say in its place.
The original evidence from Mr. Narayan was that Mr. Khan had taken the $200 from him and placed it under a book Mr. Khan then pulled out a file pretending to read it in order to hide his actions from a woman who had come to the door of his office.
The accused told Mr. Narayan to keep to his original story which he need not lie about. But that when he came to describe handing over the money to Mr. Khan he should say that he hid it under a book or register because a woman came into the room. He was to say that he never actually handed the money over to Mr. Khan. He should add that Mr. Khan did not see him do any of this. The rest he could leave to the Accused.
The Accused promised that once his client was acquitted he would sue the police. He would not make Mr. Narayan a party to those proceedings instead he would pay Mr. Narayan an unspecified sum of money out of the lump sum obtained thereby in damages.
The Accused was interviewed by police under caution on 24th July 2003. He availed himself of his constitutional right to consult a lawyer, and did so before the main questioning commenced. He said he had been practicing as a barrister and solicitor since 1994, and was admitted as such in New Zealand, Fiji, Tasmania and Queensland. He was a commissioner for oaths and a notary public.
When it was suggested that he had met the complainant and asked him to change one part of his story in the corruption case against Attai Khan, the Accused said the allegation was false. More details of the conversation were put to him but he said they were false.
He asserted that he wanted to save Attai Khan in his court case because he believed he was innocent. He denied discussing anything to do with the case with Mr. Narayan. At least a part of the digital recording was played to the accused and he denied that one of the other voices was Mr. Narayan's. He was positive the voice was not his own. He said Mr. Narayan was lying in saying that it was his voice. He also alleged Mr. Narayan had offered him $45,000 if he could have Attai Khan convicted for corruption.
In these proceedings the Accused has accepted that the translation of the recording in Hindi is essentially correct save for a few inconsequential inaccuracies. He now accepts that it was indeed his voice in the recording, as well as that of Mr. Narayan. He admits the offence, and admits that he had made the approach to Mr. Narayan to change his evidence, what Mr. Raza called "one stupid act, " and "one act of madness."
Besides being a lawyer in private practice, the accused has no previous convictions."
"It is sometimes said that the jurisdiction of the Tribunal and of this Court invoked by complaint against a solicitor is not to punish a solicitor but to protect the public. In New South Wales Bar Association v Evatt [1968] HCA 20; (1968) 117 CLR 177 at 183 to 184 the court referred to Clyne v New South Wales Bar Association [1960] HCA 40; (1960) 104 CLR 186 at 201 to 202 and said: "The power of the Court to discipline a barrister is, however, entirely protective, and, notwithstanding that its exercise may involve a great deprivation to the person disciplined, there is no element of punishment involved." However the distinction between the two stated objectives of protection and punishment is blurred and can be misleading. Obviously where a barrister or solicitor has been convicted and punished for a serious offence the jurisdiction of the court to disbar the barrister or remove the name of the solicitor from the roll can be said to have nothing to do with punishment see Ziems v Prothonotary (1957) 1997 and [1957] HCA 46; 97 CLR 279 at 286. In Ex parte Brounsall (778) [1778] EngR 95; 2 Cowp 89, 98 ER 1385 a solicitor had been convicted of stealing a guinea and had suffered imprisonment for 9 months and also branding on the hand. On an application to strike him off the role and in answer to an argument advanced on the solicitors behalf that he had already received sufficient punishment, Lord Mansfield at 830 and 1385 said that the defendant's having been burnt on the hand was no objection to his been struck off the roll. "And it is on this principle; that he is an unfit person to practice as an attorney. It is not by way of punishment: but the Court on such cases exercises the discretion, whether a man whom they have formally admitted, is a proper person to be continued on the roll or not. "See also incorporated Law institute of New South Wales v Meagher [1909] HCA 87; (1909) 9 CLR 655 at 680. Such cases illustrate that the supervisory jurisdiction of the court and statutory bodies such as the Tribunal is directed in part to ensuring that the requirement enshrined in the Charter of Justice that persons admitted to practice as solicitors be fit and proper persons or, in the language of s16 of the Legal Profession Act 1987, of good fame and character is maintained. It follows that if a solicitor is shown not to be a fit and proper person he or she should be removed from the roll. The order for removal is not punitive but protective. Accordingly it is no answer for the solicitor to say that he or she has already been punished for the conduct which shows unfitness.
But the supervisory jurisdiction of the Court and the Tribunal is also directed to protecting the public more generally by maintaining and encouraging appropriate standards of professional behaviour."
"When the jurisdiction of the Tribunal is invoked under Pt 10 Division 7 of the Act to conduct a hearing into a complaint of professional misconduct by a legal practitioner, the primary consideration is to protect the public, by preventing a person unfit to practice from holding himself or herself out to the public as a legal practitioner in whom members of the public might repose confidence. But the tribunal must also act so as to deter the offender in the future and any other practitioner minded to behave in like manner. In the case of a solicitor these elements together or separately may call for the removal of the solicitors name from the roll or the imposition of a substantial fine. Subjective considerations which would mitigate the sentence imposed by a criminal court may be significant if the protective exercise being undertaken by the tribunal requires that they be taken in to account"
"The facts of Ziems are totally removed from the present case. Ziems undoubtedly establishes that conviction and sentence are, not necessarily determinative. The court must look at the true fact But nothing In the judgments cast dout upon the earlier decision of In re Davis [1947] HCA 53; (1947) 75 CLR 409, in which Dixon J, with whose reasons Williams J agreed, said (at 420):
- "The Bar is no ordinary profession or occupation. The duties and privileges of advocacy are such that, for their proper exercise and effective performance, counsel must command the personal confidence, not only of lay and professional clients, but of other members of the bar and of judges. It would almost seem to go without saying that conviction for a crime of dishonesty of so grave a kind as housebreaking and stealing is incompatible with the existence in a candidate for admission to the bar of the reputation and the more enduring moral qualities denoted by the expression 'good frame and character, which describes the test of his ethical fitness for the profession".
"The objective of disciplinary proceedings is the protection of the public and the maintenance of proper standards in the legal profession. In the Southern Law Society v Westbrook [1910] HCA 31; (1910) 10 CLR 609 at 619, O'Connor) said that:
- "... the court in maintaining a solicitor on the roll Is holding out to the public that he is a fit and proper person to be entrusted by the public with those difficult and delicate duties and that absolute confidence which the public must repose in persons who fulfill the duties of solicitors."
In incorporated Law Institute of NSW v Meagher [1909] HCA 87; (1909) 9 CLR 655 at 681, Isaacs J said:
- "There is therefore a serious responsibility on the Court a duty to itself, to the rest of the profession, to its suitors, and to the whole of the community to be careful not to accredit any person as worthy of public confidence who cannot satisfactorily establish his right to that credential. It is not a question of what he has suffered in the past; it is a question of his worthiness and reliability for the future."
At least in cases where the practitioner has undergone punishment under the criminal law, the function of the court is not to punish the practitioner but to protect the public by maintaining standards in the profession. In the New South Wales Bar Association v Evatt (1968) 177 CLR 177 at 183-4, the court said
- "The power of the court to discipline a barrister is, however, entirety protective, and not withstanding that its exercise may involve a great deprivation to the person disciplined, there is no element of punishment involved."
In Ziems v The Prothonotary of the Supreme Court of NSW [1957] HCA 46; (1957) 97 CLR 279 at 297-8, Kitto J summarized the approach in this way:
- "The issue is whether the appellant is shown not to be fit and proper person to be a member of the Bar of New South Wales. It is not cable of more precise statement. The answer must depend upon one's conception of the minimum standards demanded by a due recognition of the peculiar position and functions of a barrister in a system which treats the bar as in fact, whether or not it is also in law, a separate and distinct branch of legal profession. It has been said before and in this case the Chief Justice of the Supreme Court has said again, that the bar is no ordinary profession or occupation. These are no empty words, nor is it their purpose to express or encourage professional pretensions. They should be understood as a reminder that a barrister is more than his clients confidant, adviser and advocate, and must therefore possess more than honesty, learning and forensic ability. He is, by virtue of a long tradition, in a relationship of intimate collaboration with the judges, as well as with his fellow members of the bar, in the high task of endeavoring to make successful the service of the law to the community. That is a delicate relationship, and it carries exceptional privileges and exceptional obligations. if a barrister is found to be, for any reason, an unsuitable person to share in the enjoyment of those privileges and in the effective discharge of those responsibilities, he is not a fit and proper person to remain at the bar. Yes it cannot be that every proof which he may give of human frailty so disqualifies him. The ends which he has to serve are lofty indeed, but it is with men and not with paragons that he is required to pursue them. It is not difficult to see in some forms of conduct, or in convictions of some kinds of offences, instant demonstration of unfitness for the bar. Conduct may show a defect of character incompatible with membership of a self-respecting profession; or, short of that, it may show unfitness to be joined with the bench and the bar in the daily co-operation which the satisfactory working of the courts demands. A conviction may of its own force carry such a stigma that Judges and members of the profession may be expected to find it too much for their self-respect to share with the person convicted the kind and degree of association which membership of the bar entails. But it will be generally agreed that there are many kinds of conduct deserving of disapproval, and many kinds of convictions of breaches of the law, which did not spell unfitness for the bar; and to draw the dividing line is by no means always an easy task."
"But the whole approach for a court to a case of personal misconduct must surely be very different from its approach to a. case of professional misconduct. Generally speaking, the latter must have a much more direct bearing on the question of a man's fitness to practice than the former".
"If a barrister is found to be, for any reason, an unsuitable person to share in the enjoyment of those privileges and the effective discharge of those responsibilities, he is not a fit and proper person to remain at the bar."
STANDARD OF PROOF
"The "clarity" of the proof required where so serious a matter as fraud is to be found, is an acknowledgment that the degree of satisfaction for which the civil standard of proof calls may vary according to the gravity of the fact to be proved: see Briginshaw v Briginshaw [1938] HCA 34; (1938) 60 CLR 336 per Dixon J.."
"No matter how grave the fact which is to be found in a civil case, the mind has only to be reasonably satisfied and has not with respect to any matter in issue in such a proceeding to attain that degree of certainty which is indispensable to the support of a conviction upon a criminal charge: see Helton v Allen [1940] HCA 20; (1940) 63 CLR 691 per Dixon, Evatt and McTiernan JJ.
"We acknowledge the serious impact that adverse disciplinary decisions can have on the right of individuals to work in their occupation and on personal reputations. The flexible application of the civil standard will, however, give all due protection to persons who face such proceedings."
"In my view, the standard of proof for disciplinary proceedings in Honk Kong is a preponderance of probability under the Re H approach. The more serious the act or omission alleged, the more inherently improbable must it be regarded. And the more inherently improbable it is regarded, the more compelling will be the evidence needed to prove it on a preponderance of probability, if that is properly appreciated and applied in a fair-minded manner, it will provide appropriate approach to proof in disciplinary proceedings. Such an approach will be duly conducive to serving the public interest by maintaining standards within the professions and the services while, at the same time, protecting their members from unjust condemnation."
COMPLAINT NUMBER 3
COMPLAINT NUMBER 4
COSTS
ORDERS
That the name of Abhay Kumar Singh be struck from the Roll.
That the complaint be dismissed.
The respondent is fined the sum of $1,000.00 to be paid to the Commission within 14 days.
Dated: 25 January, 2010
JOHN CONNORS
COMMISSIONER
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