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High Court of Fiji |
IN THE HIGH COURT OF FIJI
AT LABASA
CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
Criminal Case No. HAC 72 of 2022
THE STATE
-v-
SEMI TUATEGU
1ST ACCUSED
JOAPE DRAUNA
2ND ACCUSED
APIMELEKI TUINAVITILEVU
3RD ACCUSED
LAISENIA VEISEYAKI
4TH ACCUSED
NIUMAIA RASERU
5TH ACCUSED
Counsel: Mr. E. Kotoilakeba for the State
Ms. M. Besetimoala for the 1st Accused
Ms. K. Marama for the 2nd Accused
Mr. I. Rusaqoli for the 3rd Accused
Ms. S. Devi for the 4th Accused
Ms. V. Kirti for the 5th Accused
Date of Trial: 22, 23 and 25 September 2025
Date of Judgment: 12 December 2025
JUDGMENT
(The complainant has been granted name suppression. I shall refer to her as “the complainant” in this Judgment.)
Introduction
The prosecution case
9. Further agreed facts helpfully narrowed the issues for my determination. Each of the 2nd to the 5th accused accept that they had sexual intercourse with the complainant at Korokadi on 29 June 2018. Each of the accused was a youth at the material time. The 1st accused had just turned 18 years of age, the 2nd accused was 18 years old, the 3rd accused was 16 years old, the 4th accused was 17 years old, and the 5th accused was also 17 years of age. At the material time, therefore, three of the five accused were what would now be termed children in conflict with the law.
Prosecution evidence
15. Mr. Rusaqoli suggested that his client (the 3rd accused) was the second person to have sex with the complainant, and when he asked her for sex, she replied for him to hurry up. The complainant denied that. She agreed that she had lay on the grass and removed her pants before having sex with the 3rd accused. She agreed that she did not push him away and explained that she was scared. She agreed that she did not tell the 3rd accused that she did not want to have sex with him and also did not tell the 1st accused that she did not wish to have sex with the 3rd accused. She maintained that she did not consent to sex with the 3rd accused. She did not tell anyone about the incident until the following Monday because she was ashamed and scared.
16. When Ms. Marama, for the 2nd accused, suggested that the complainant had waited for 5 to 10 minutes before her client approached her for sex, she denied that. She also denied that she was sitting in a “hook” position exposing her naked private parts to the 2nd accused. She said that she took off her panty when the 2nd accused approached her for sex.
21. Dr Talei Vasuitaukei was stationed at Nabouwalu Hospital in 2018. She examined the complainant on 3 July 2018. The history given was that she had been raped by some iTaukei youths at Korokadi settlement during the National Sports and Wellness Day on 29 June 2018. There was a small tear at the base of her vaginal wall. In answer to a question from the Court, Dr Vasuitaukei confirmed that the medical findings were as consistent with the complainant having had consensual sex with 5 boys as they were with her having had non-consensual sex with 5 boys.
Half-time submissions
24. Mr. Kotoilakeba argued that the complainant’s evidence supported that the 1st accused had effectively extorted her into having sex with the second boy (3rd accused). Her consent was not freely given, as the 1st accused must very well have appreciated. Whilst he accepted that there was no direct evidence that the 1st accused extorted the complainant into non-consensual sex with the 2nd, 4th and 5th accused, all the surrounding circumstances pointed to him having encouraged the other boys to have sex with the complainant when he must have appreciated that she had not freely consented to sex with those boys. He had assisted the other accused to have sex with the complainant without her consent by threatening to besmirch her reputation.
25. I found that there was sufficient evidence to put each of the accused persons to their respective defences.
26. Having been explained their options, each of the accused elected not to give or call evidence in his own case.
Closing submissions
29. As I understood his argument, the Court can be sure that the complainant did not consent to sex with the 2nd – 5th accused because she gave credible and reliable evidence that she had not consented to sex with the 2nd – 5th accused. Mr. Kotoilakeba invited the Court to find that each of the 2nd – 5th accused either knew that the complainant did not freely and voluntarily give consent for them to have sex with her or were reckless as to whether she consented.
34. I allowed Ms. Besetimoala further time to file supplementary submissions on the difficult issue whether her client may be convicted of rape, as a secondary party, in the event the 2nd – 5th accused are acquitted of rape. In her helpful supplementary submissions, Ms. Besetimoala acknowledges what would appear to be a conflict between section 45(2) and section 45(5) of the Crimes Act 2009. Whereas section 45(2) provides that, in order for a person to be guilty of aiding and abetting another person to commit an offence, that offence must have been committed by the other person, section 45(5) of the Act provides that a person may be found guilty of aiding and abetting the commission of an offence even if the principal offender has not been found guilty. Ms. Besetimoala submits that, when considering section 45 of the Act in totality, it is clear that in order for a person to be found guilty of aiding and abetting a person to commit an offence a principal offender must have been convicted of that offence.
35. For the second accused, Ms. Marama pointed to the complainant’s evidence that she had removed her own panty before having sex with her client. Also, the complainant had remained in the same place when having sex with each of the boys one after the other. The accused had not surrounded her or done anything to prevent her leaving that place.
37. Ms. Devi highlights that the complainant testified that she was standing up and about to wear her pants when the 4th accused approached and told her to lie down for them to have sex. She lay down and opened her legs. Ms. Devi argues that she would not have done that if she was not consenting to sex. There were no coercive circumstances. The complainant could have simply walked away. The 4th accused reasonably believed that the complainant was consenting.
Law
39. Section 207(1) of the Crimes Act 2009 (“the Act”) provides that any person who rapes another person commits an indictable offence. Relevantly for present purposes, Section 207(2) states that:
“(2) A person rapes another person if-
(a) The person has carnal knowledge with or of the other person without the other person’s consent; or ...”
40. Section 14 of the Act provides:
“214. In order for a person to be found guilty of committing an offence the following must be proved-
(a) The existence of such physical elements as are, under the law creating the offence, relevant to establishing guilt;
(b) In respect of each such physical element for which a fault element is required, one of the fault elements for the physical element.”
41. Since section 207 of the Act does not specify the fault elements of rape, section 23 of the Act comes in to play:
“23. –(1) If the law creating the offence does not specify a fault element for a physical element that consists only of conduct, intention is the fault element for that physical element.
(2) If the law creating the offence does not specify the fault element for a physical element that consists of a circumstance or a result, recklessness is the fault element for that physical element.”
42. The statutory definition of recklessness is provided in section 21 of the Act:
“21.-(1) A person is reckless with respect to a circumstance if-
(a) He or she is aware of a substantial risk that the circumstance exists or will exist;and
(b) Having regard to the circumstances known to him or her , it is unjustifiable to take the risk.
(2) ......
(3) The question whether taking a risk is unjustifiable is one of fact.”
44. Section 206 of the Act provides relevant definitions:
“206. In this Part –
(1) The term “consent” means consent freely and voluntariy given by a person with the necessary mental capacity to give consent, and the submission without physical resistance by a person to an act of another person shall not alone constitute consent.
(2) Without limiting sub-section (1), a person’s consent to an act is not freely and voluntarily given if it is obtained -
(a) by force; or
(b) by threat or intimidation; or
(c) by fear of bodily harm; or
(d) by exercise of authority; or
(e) by false and fraudulent representations about the nature or purpose of the act; or
(f) by a mistaken belief induced by the accused person that the accused person was the person’s sexual partner”
45. Finally, since the prosecution case against the 1st accused is founded in his complicity in offending by the other accused persons, it is necessary to set out the material parts of section 45 of the Act as follows:
“45.-(1) A person who aids, abets, counsels or procures the commission of an offence by another person is taken to have committed that offence and is punishable accordingly.
(2)For the person to be guilty-
(a) the person’s conduct must have in fact aided, abetted, counselled or procured the commission of the offence by the other person; and
(b) the offence must have been committed by the other person.
(3) Subject to sub-section (6), for the person to be guilty, the person must have intended that –
(a) his or her conduct would aid abet, counsel or procure the commission of any offence (including its fault elements) of the type the other person committed; or
(b) his or her conduct would aid, abet, counsel or procure the commission of an offence and have been reckless about the commission of the offence (including its fault elements) that he other person in fact committed. ...
(4) ...
(5) A person may be found guilty of aiding, abetting, counselling or procuring the commission of an offence even if the principal offender has not been prosecuted or has not been found guilty.”
Analysis and resolution
47. The first issue that I must resolve is whether the 2nd to 5th accused, or any of them, committed the offence of rape. Since it is agreed that each of them had carnal knowledge of the complainant, the narrow issue is whether the complainant freely and voluntarily consented to have sex with each of the 2nd – 5th accused.
49. I remind myself that there may be many reasons why a complainant of a sexual offence might not immediately make a complaint, whether to family, friends or others. There can also be understandable reasons why someone does not involve the Police straight away. Research shows that complainants of sexual offences react in different ways. Some complain close in time to the alleged offending. Others do not. This can be because of shame, shock, confusion or fear of getting into trouble, not being believed, causing problems for other people, or because of a fear about the process that may follow. Importantly, there is no such thing as a "typical" response. Different people react to situations in different ways. A complaint made some time after the alleged offending does not of itself mean the complaint was untrue, just as an early complaint does not of itself mean it was true. In this case, the complainant testified that she delayed reporting out of fear and shame. I find that perfectly understandable, particularly in the circumstances of this case where reporting the rapes would have required the complainant to acknowledge that she willingly had sex with the 1st accused in a pine field.
50. I am sure that the complainant was raped by each of the 2nd – 5th accused.
51. The second, and more important, issue for present purposes is whether any of the accused may be found guilty of those rapes.
52. The prosecution must prove that each of the accused is guilty. The accused do not have to prove anything to me. The defence does not have to prove that the accused is innocent. The prosecution will only succeed in proving that the accused is guilty if I have been made sure of his guilt. If, after considering all of the evidence, I am not sure that the accused is guilty, my verdict must be not guilty.
54. The evidence led by the prosecution does not make me sure that the 2nd – 5th accused knew that the complainant was not freely and voluntarily engaging in sexual intercourse with each of them. Whilst I accept that the 3rd accused (the second youth to have sex with the complainant) was in the vicinity when the 1st accused said that he would publicly humiliate the complainant unless she had sex with the 3rd accused, I cannot be sure that the 3rd accused was aware of that threat having been made. The complainant accepts that she removed her own panty and lay down before having sex with the 3rd accused. The evidence points to the 2nd, 4th and 5th observing the complainant having sex with the 1st and 3rd accused in a pine field. They would, no doubt, have observed that the complainant remained in situ after each sexual encounter. Whilst fully acknowledging that the complainant’s submission without physical resistance shall not alone constitute consent, that is a point that goes to whether she did, in fact, consent (I have found that she did not) rather than to the central issue of whether each of the accused knew that she was not consenting. The fact that the complainant did not say anything to any of the accused to indicate that she did not consent, in the context of all the surrounding circumstances, leads me to the firm conclusion that none of them knew that the complainant was not consenting to sexual intercourse.
56. The 1st accused is in a somewhat different situation. I accept the complainant’s evidence that he said: “if I won’t fuck that person he will go and tell around that I fucked him.” Does it necessarily follow that he was reckless as to whether the complainant consented to sex with the other four boys? The evidence is that the complainant did not say anything in response to the 1st accused. When the 3rd accused approached her for sex, she removed her panty and had sex with him. The 1st accused did not stick around for that. I would expect a fully mature adult to appreciate the risk that a threat to humiliate the complainant would negate her free and voluntarily consent, but in all the circumstances of this case I am very far from being sure that the 1st accused would have appreciated that risk. In my view, he was not reckless.
57. Since the 1st accused’s accessorial liability requires proof that he was at least reckless about the commission of the rapes committed by the 2nd – 5th accused (including the fault elements), it follows that I must find the 1st accused not guilty and acquit him accordingly.
58. 30 days to appeal to the Court of Appeal.
...................................
Hon Mr Justice Burney
At Labasa
12 December 2025
Solicitors
Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions for the State
Office of the Legal Aid Commission for the Accused
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