Director of Public Prosecutions v Ali [2025] FJHC 451; HBM15.2024 (21 July 2025)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF FIJI
WESTERN DIVISION
AT LAUTOKA
[CIVIL JURISDICTION]

Civil Action No. HBM 15 of 2024

BETWEEN
THE DIRECTOR OF PUBLIC PROSECUTIONS of 25 Gladstone Road, Suva, Fiji.
APPLICANT

AND
ALZAID SHAIN ALI of Lot 34, Block A, Unit 12, Anderson Road, Martintar, Nadi.
FIRST RESPONDENT

AND
GRACE KATIA LIUVOLIGA of Lot 34, Block A, Unit 12, Anderson Road, Martintar, Nadi.
SECOND RESPONDENT

AND
WESTPAC FIJI of 175 Vitogo Parade, Lautoka.
FIRST INTERESTED PARTY

AND
MOHAMMED ARIF HUSSEIN of Tavela, Korovuto, Nadi.
SECOND INTERESTED PARTY

Before : Hon. Justice U.L. Mohamed Azhar.

Counsels : Ms. N. Tikoisuva with Ms. S. Swastika for the Applicant.
Mr. S. Heritage for the First and Second Respondents.

Date of Hearing : 15.04.2025
Date of Ruling : 21.07.2025

JUDGMENT

01. The Applicant by an Ex-pate Motion, supported by an affidavit sworn by Detective Constable 5824 Atama Rogocake of Fiji Police Force, moved the court for Restraining Orders in respect of following properties:

1. White Honda Fit shuttle registration number MH 673, Chassis Number/VIN: GG73103922;
   
2. Black Audi registration number MQ 975, Chassis Number/VIN: WAUZZZ8R1GA037676;
   

100. The sum of $ 75,831.16 available in Westpac bank account number 9807007951 belonging to Alzaid Shain Ali as at 19/02/24;
     

4. The sum of $ 23,076.73 available in Westpac bank account number 9808268123 belonging to Grace Katia Liuvoliga as at 19/02/24;
   
5. The sum of $ 6,300.00 that was found in possession of the first respondent at the time of arrest and held in Lautoka Police Station exhibit safe.
   

02. The Ex- Parte Motion was filed pursuant to section 19 A and section 34 of the Proceeds of Crime Act 1997 (the Act). The court was satisfied that, there were reasonable grounds for suspecting that the properties ( the vehicles and the moneys mentioned above) were tainted properties for which a forfeiture order may be granted under section 19 E of the Act. The court therefore granted certain interim orders, namely (a) freezing order on transfer both vehicle mentioned in the Motion, (b) order to keep both vehicle in police custody until further order of this court, (c) freezing order on the both accounts mentioned on the Motion, and (d) order to deposit the amount held in police exhibit safe to the Trust Account of the Court. Further the court directed the Applicant to file and serve the Originating Summons for the purpose of 19 C of the Act.

03. The Applicant thereafter filed the Originating Summons pursuant to sections 19 C and 19E of the Act seeking civil forfeiture orders in respect of the same properties. The Originating Summons was supported by an affidavit sworn by the same deponent. The interim orders and the Originating Summons were served on the Respondents and the interested parties. The first and second Respondents only opposed the Summons and an affidavit sworn by the First Respondent was filed on behalf of both Respondents.

04. At hearing, both counsels relied on their respective affidavits. Briefly, the counsel for the Applicant argued that, the factual matters are uncontested and the court is to decide the question of fact on the balance of probabilities pursuant to section 72 of the Act. The counsel further submitted that, the properties were in possession of the Respondents at the time of alleged commission of the offence and they had effective control over the properties. The counsel for the Applicant highlighted that, large amount over $ 10,000.00 was deposited into accounts of the respondents with no accompanying details as to where that money would have come from. The counsel further submitted that, the respondents were renting a property in Martintar, Nadi for monthly rent of $ 2,500.00 with no legitimate source of income. The counsel concluded that, those properties are tainted properties and moved the court to forfeit the same to the state.

05. Conversely, the counsel for the Respondents relied on the affidavit and denied that the properties were tainted properties. He submitted that, the affidavits filed by the respondents indicate that, the deposits were made by the family members from overseas. The counsel alleged that, the applicant did not file the affidavit denying respondents’ affidavit and nor did they cross-check with the relatives of the respondents living overseas. The respondents barely denied the allegations in the supporting affidavit and specifically stated in almost all paragraphs that, ‘the applicant should strictly prove’. The counsel further submitted that, inference under section 11 (2) of the Act could only be made when the accused is convicted. In this case, the criminal charges are pending and the respondents have not been convicted for the alleged offences. The counsel moved the court, on these grounds that, the summons filed by the applicant be dismissed and the restraining orders be lifted with costs on indemnity basis.

06. In response, the counsel for the applicant highlighted the section 19 E (5) which allows application of sections 11 (2) and (3) with appropriate modification to civil forfeiture. The counsel further submitted that, there is no narration to the large amount of deposits to the accounts of the respondents and therefore, the applicant did not file the affidavit in reply. The counsel admitted that, the respondents are facing charges at the moment. The counsel moved the court to decide the matter on balance of probability taking into consideration the totality of the evidence before it.

07. Even though the Act was brought almost three decades ago, the applications for civil forfeiture have been filed in the courts very recently. This is mainly after the drug peddlers started to use Fiji as a ‘Pacific Hub’ for their illicit drug activities. It is therefore necessary discuss the matters such as the scope of the Act, the procedure for civil forfeiture, the burden casted on each party and the test to be applied by the court when determining an application for forfeiture orders under the Act. This discussion would assist to determine the issues raised by the counsels in this matter.

08. The Act was brought for the purpose of providing pecuniary penalty of the proceeds of crime; depriving persons of proceeds, benefits and properties connected with serious offences; and to assist the law enforcement agencies to trace such proceeds, benefits and properties. In essence, the Act provides for (a) legal framework for pecuniary penalty and forfeiture of proceeds of crimes to deprive persons of the proceeds, benefits and properties connected with serious offences, (b) legal framework to assist the law enforcement agencies to trace such proceeds, benefits and properties, and (c) establishes certain offences namely, money laundering, possession of properties suspected of being proceeds of crime, financing terrorism, and failure to deliver restrained or forfeited properties. In order to achieve the purpose, the Act also imposes duties in corporate entities and allows the court to lift corporate veils in certain circumstances as well.

09. The procedure under the Act applies to the serious offence which, according to section 3 of the Act, means an offence of which the maximum penalty prescribed by law is death, or imprisonment for not less than six months or a fine of not less than $ 500. However, the Act does not affect, prejudice, limit or restrict operation of any other law which provides forfeiture order or remedy or other power to the police (see: Section 76 of the Act). The proceedings under the Act for restraining orders or forfeiture orders or pecuniary penalty orders are civil proceedings. Except in relation to the offences under the Act, the rule of criminal proceedings do not apply to the proceedings under the Act. In contrast, the rules of evidence applicable in civil proceedings apply to the proceedings under the Act. The section 27 B clearly provide this position as follows:

Proceedings civil, not criminal

27B.-(1) Proceeding on an application for a restraining order, forfeiture order or pecuniary penalty order are not criminal proceedings.

(2) Except in relation to an offence under this Act-

(a) the rules of construction applicable only in relation to the criminal law do not apply in the interpretation of this Act; and

(b) the rules of evidence applicable in civil proceedings apply, and those applicable only in criminal proceedings do not apply, to proceedings under this Act.

10. Under the Act, the court has jurisdiction to grant pecuniary penalty order on conviction, forfeiture order on conviction, civil forfeiture order for tainted or terrorist property, and unexplained wealth declaration on application of either the DPP or the Commissioner of Fiji Independent Commission Against Corruption (According to section 4A, a reference to DPP shall be construed as reference to DPP and Commissioner of FICAC). The court also has jurisdiction to grant certain restraining orders to give effect to the forfeiture orders and pecuniary penalty orders.
    
11. The application before the court was filed the DPP pursuant to section 19 C of the Act. The section 19C of the Act permits the DPP to apply to the court for a non-conviction based forfeiture order on the basis any particular property is tainted property. The application to the court under this section is independent from any criminal proceedings and it is not affected by pendency of any criminal proceedings against any person who claims interest in the alleged tainted property. The proceedings should not to be stayed; nor should it be adjourned for the purpose of awaiting the outcome of any proceeding. The Act clearly stipulates this proposition in section 27 D as follows:

"Stay or adjournment of proceedings

27D. Proceedings for an order or declaration are not to be stayed or adjourned for the purpose of awaiting the outcome of any criminal proceedings that have commenced or are to commence involving a person whose property is or may be affected by the proceedings.

12. Likewise, the order made by the court in an application filed pursuant to section 19C of the Act is not affected by the outcome of criminal proceedings, or of an investigation with a view to institute such proceedings in respect of an offence connected with such tainted property. The section 19 E (4) reads that:
    

(4) The validity of an order under subsection (1) is not affected by the outcome of criminal proceedings, or of an investigation with a view to institute such proceedings, in respect of an offence with which the property concerned is in some way associated.

13. The first requirement to be fulfilled by an applicant in a proceeding under section 19 C of the Act is service of Written Notice of the Application. The section 19D (1) mandatorily requires the Director of Public Prosecution to give not less than 30 days written notice of the application to any person who is known to have interest in the tainted property in respect of which the application is being made. The said section 19 D (1) is as follows:

19D. Where the Director of Public Prosecutions applies under section 19C for a forfeiture order-

(a) the Director of Public Prosecutions must give no less than 30 days written notice of the application to any person who is known to have an interest in the tainted property in respect of which the application is being made; (Emphasis is added).

14. The reason for this mandatory requirement is firstly, to provide adequate time for such person to prepare his or her defence, and secondly to avoid arbitrary acquisition of property in violation of the right guaranteed by section 27 of the Constitution.
    
15. The applicant then bears onus of proof. Generally, but not necessarily, the application for civil forfeiture order under section 19 E commences with the application for restraining orders for tainted property or terrorist property under section 19 A of the Act. Such application for restraining orders are made on the premises that, there are grounds for the belief that a particular property is tainted property or terrorist property for which a forfeiture order may be made under section 19 E or 19 H. Therefore, in application for civil forfeiture order the applicant bears the onus of proving the matters necessary to establish the grounds for making the order applied for. The section 27 C of the Act provide for this proposition, and it reads as follows:

Onus of proof

27C. The applicant in any proceedings under this Act bears the onus of proving the matters necessary to establish the grounds for making the order applied for." (Emphasis is added).

16. Conversely, the onus on the respondent or the person who claims interest in the property is to produce evidence at the hearing of the application. The section 19 D (b) of the Act reads that:

(b) any person who claims an interest in the property may appear and produce evidence at the hearing of the application; (Emphasis is added).

17. The above section should be read with the section 19 E (1) and (2) of the Act. That section is as follows:

19E.-(1) Subject to subsection (2), where the Director of Public Prosecutions applies to the Court for an order under this section and the Court is satisfied on a balance of probabilities that the property is tainted property, the Court may order that the property, or such of the property as is specified by the Court in the order, be forfeited to the State.

(2) Where a person claiming an interest in property to which an application relates satisfies the Court that the person-

(a) has an interest in the property;

(b) did not acquire the interest in the property as a result of any serious offence carried out by the person and-

(i) had the interest before any serious offence occurred; or

(ii) acquired the interest for fair value after the serious offence occurred and did not know or could not reasonably have known at the time of the acquisition that the property was tainted property,

the Court shall order that the interest shall not be affected by the forfeiture order, and the Court shall declare the nature and extent of the interest in question. (Emphasis is added).

18. Accordingly, in a proceeding for an order for civil forfeiture, the applicant bears the onus of proving the matters necessary to establish the grounds for making the order applied for. On the other hand, the duty of the respondent or any person who claims interest in the alleged property is to produce evidence that, (a) he has an interest in the property; (b) he did not acquire the interest in the property as a result of any serious offence carried out and (i) he had the interest before any serious offence occurred; or (ii) acquired the interest for fair value after the serious offence occurred and did not know or could not reasonably have known at the time of the acquisition that the property was tainted property.
    
19. The court then should apply the balance of probability test (according to section 72 of the Act), which means, which version of the proposition, as advanced by the parties, or which can be drawn from inferences within the case, is more likely to be than not? If Court is satisfied that, it is more probable or likely that, the properties are tainted properties, the court should forfeit them to the state. If the court finds that, it is more probable that, the properties are not tainted, the court shall order that properties shall not be affected by forfeiture order.
    
20. It is pertinent to note here that, the Act uses the term “may” when it allows the court to make forfeiture order. The phrase in section 19 E is “..... the court may order that...”. The term “may” is generally constructed as ‘permissive’ or giving discretion. However, use of the term “may” in this section, should not be constructed as the discretion given to the court for two reasons. Firstly, the term “may” in some cases interpreted as having compulsory force (see: Cooper v. Hall [1968] 1 W.L.R. 380; Border Rural District Council v. Robert [1950] 1 K.B. 716; Re Shutter [1960] 1. Q.B. 455). Secondly, if the court is given discretion even after it finds that the properties are tainted properties, it would defeat the very purpose of the Act. Therefore, the term “may” in this section should be constructed as having mandatory force in this section. Accordingly, if the court is satisfied on balance of probabilities that, a property or portion of it is tainted property, the court has no option than making order for forfeiture of such property or part of it.
    
21. The section 3 of the Act defines ‘tainted property’, in relation to a serious offence or a foreign serious offence, to mean (a) property used in, or in connection with, the commission of the offence; (b) property intended to be used in, or in connection with, the commission of the offence; and (c) proceeds of crime. In the meantime, the section 4 (1A) defines ‘proceeds of crime’ and reads that:

(1A) In this Act, in relation to a serious offence or a foreign offence, "proceeds of crime" means property or benefit that is-

(a) wholly or partly derived or realised directly or indirectly by any person from the commission of a serious offence or a foreign serious offence;

(b) wholly or partly derived or realized from a disposal or other dealing with proceeds of a serious offence or a foreign serious offence; or

(c) wholly or partly acquired proceeds of a serious offence or a foreign serious offence,

and includes, on a proportional basis, property into which any property derived or realised directly from the serious offence or foreign serious offence is later converted, transformed or intermingled, and any income, capital or other economic gains derived or realised from the property at any time after the offence."

22. In addition to the above definitions to ‘tainted property’ and ‘proceeds of crime’, the Act authorizes the court to infer certain facts in order to determine whether property is tainted. This is provided in section 11 (2) of the Act as rightfully pointed out by the counsels for the applicant. The section 11 (2) reads:

(2) In determining whether property is tainted property the court may infer –

(a) where the evidence establishes that the property was in the person’s possession at the time of, or immediately after, the commission of the offence of which the person was convicted, that the property was used in, or in connection with, the commission of the offence;

(b) where the evidence establishes that the property was under the effective control of the person at the time of, or immediately after, the commission of the offence of which the person was convicted, that the property was derived, obtained or realized as a result of the commission by the person of the offence of which the person was convicted and for purposes of this paragraph “effective control” shall have the same meaning as in section 25 of this Act;

(c) where the evidence establishes that the property, and in particular money, was found in the person’s possession or under the person’s control in a building, vehicle, receptacle or place during the course of investigations conducted by the police before or after the arrest and charge of the person for the offence of which the person was convicted that the property was derived, obtained or realized as a result of the commission by the person of the offence of which the person was convicted;

(d) where the evidence establishes that the value, after the commission of the offence, of all ascertainable property of a person convicted of the offence exceeds the value of all ascertainable property of that person prior to the commission of that offence, and the court is satisfied that the income of that person from sources unrelated to criminal activity of that person cannot reasonably account for the increase in value, that the value of the increase represents property which was derived, obtained or realized by the person directly or indirectly from the commission of the offence of which the person was convicted.

23. There is no doubt that, above inferences are relevant to the conviction-based forfeiture order. However, as rightfully submitted by the counsels for the applicant, the section 19 E (5) provides that, section 11 (2) among others, applies to the application for non-conviction based civil forfeiture order, with appropriate modifications necessary to such application. The section 19E (5) is as follows:

19E (5). Sections 7, 8, 11(2), (3), (4) and (5), 12, 13, 16 and 17 shall apply with the appropriate modifications as are necessary to an application for a forfeiture order under this section.

24. The vehicle bearing registration numbers MH 673 is Honda Fit Shuttle. The annexure marked as “AA08” is the copy of the statement given by one Ilisapeci Vodo Mole an officer at the Land Transport Authority (LTA) after the search that was carried out at LTA. It is evident from his statement that, the above vehicle is registered under the name of the first defendant. The first defendant did not answer the question put to him during the cautioned interview about the said vehicle. The second respondent clearly admitted that, the first defendant is the owner of the said vehicle. In the meantime, the respondents in their affidavit completely denied the averment regarding this vehicle. The contradictory position taken by the respondent regarding the ownership of the vehicle affect the credibility of their averment in their affidavit. The annexure marked as “AA08” establishes that the said vehicle was in possession of the first respondent at the time of, or immediately after alleged offences to which both the respondents were charged.
    
25. The vehicle bearing registration number MQ 975 is a black AUDI station wagon. The annexure marked as “AA08” further suggests that, it is registered to one Mohammed Arif Hussein. Mohammed Arif Hussein is a barber/hair dresser by profession. He gave a statement to the police regarding this vehicle during the police investigation. The statement is marked as “AA10” and annexed with the supporting affidavit. He specifically stated that, he knew the first respondent being his customer. Arif Hussein further stated that, on 14.02.2024 first respondent approached him for a favour. The first respondent asked Ariff Hussein if he was willing to get this vehicle MQ 975 transferred to his name. Ariff inquired the first respondent why he did not transfer to his own name. The first respondent replied that, he had lot of business debts and it would be safer if it was transferred to Ariff’s name. The first respondent also stated that, he would transfer it to his name in two weeks or a month.
    
26. Ariff agreed to help the first respondent and both went to LTA office in Ba. There was a lady claiming to be the owner at LTA office. Ariff was asked to sign certain documents and he did. The vehicle was then transferred to Ariff’s name. He drove to his saloon in Nadi. The first respondent at about 4.30 pm on the same day came to his saloon and took the vehicle. It was the first time he saw the vehicle. Ariff confirmed that, he did not pay any consideration for the vehicle. Nor did he claim any interest over the said vehicle at any time. The circumstances, in which the purported transfer took place, give rise to a reasonable inference that the said vehicle bearing registration number MQ 975 was transferred to Ariff for the purpose of avoiding the forfeiture order.
    
27. In addition, the investigation revealed that, the respondents have been using the same vehicle when they approached the complainant in that drug case. There registered owner - Ariff never made any claim over the said vehicle. The respondents stated in paragraphs 12 and 14 that, the applicant did not provide the physical ownership of both vehicles. It appears that, they deny the ownership of both vehicle. However, the respondents moved the court to dismiss the restraining order granted by this court in relation to both vehicles and also moved the court to grant them cost on indemnity basis for this application. On one hand, the respondents dispute the fact that, both vehicle were owned by them and require the applicant to strictly prove it. On the other hand they want the restraining orders lifted to enable them to take the possession of the both vehicles. If they were not the owners of both vehicle and if they did not have interest over them, why should they seek to dismiss the restraining orders with costs on indemnity basis?
    
28. It is obvious from the position taken up by the respondents that, they surreptitiously claim interest over both vehicles and tries to get them by moving to dismiss the restraining orders. Merely claiming interest over the properties is not sufficient to discharge the burden in proceedings for civil forfeiture orders. In addition to the interest, the respondent and others who claim interest should produce the evidence to show that, they did not acquire the interest in the property as a result of any serious offence carried out; they had the interest before any serious offence occurred; or they acquired the interest for fair value after the serious offence occurred; and did not know or could not reasonably have known at the time of the acquisition that the property was tainted property.
    
29. However, the respondents failed to produce such evidence in this proceeding. The evidence adduced by the applicant establishes that both vehicles were in the respondents’ possession and effective control at the time of alleged commission of the offence. Thus, pursuant to section 11 (2) (a) and (b) read with section 19 E (5), this court infers that, both vehicles were used in alleged commission of the offence connected with this case.
    
30. The other properties are (a) the sum of $ 75,831.16 available in the Westpac bank account number 9807007951 belonging to the first respondent as at 19/02/24; (b) the sum of $ 23,076.73 available in the Westpac bank account number 9807007951 belonging to the second respondent as at 19/02/24; and (c) sum of $ 6,300.00 found in possession of the first defendant at the time of arrest.
    
31. The evidence adduced by the applicant establishes that, the first and the second respondents are unemployed. Even though the respondents denied this evidence, they failed to provide their employment details. The annexure marked as “AA13” is the copy of the Form filled by the first defendant to open the account in question in this case. He opened this account in the year 2017. He declared in that Form that, he was unemployed. As at 19 February 2024, the remaining balance was $ 75,831.16, as it is evident from the annexure marked as “AA14”. In addition, a sum of 6,300.00 was found in his possession at the time of arrest.
    
32. Likewise, the Form filled by the second defendant to open the account in question is marked as “AA15” and annexed with the supporting affidavit. It indicates that, she opened the said account in the year 2023 and she was unemployed at that time. The remaining balance as at 19 February 2024 was sum of $ 23,076.73. The investigation revealed that the respondents rented a flat in a prime place in Martintar, Nadi from one Rakesh Chand for a sum of $ 2,500 per month since 23 October 2023. The property manager at that time was one Nikhil Niklesh Prasad. He has given a statement to the police to that effect. The copy of the statement is marked as “AA20” and annexed with the supporting affidavit.
    
33. There is sufficient evidence before the court that, the respondents are unemployed and without legitimate sources of income. The respondents merely denied the evidence adduced by the applicant. The respondents took up the position that, the relatives from overseas sent those money. However, they failed to substantiate their claim with evidence. Thus, evidence before the court establishes that, the money was found in possession of the respondents and in their respective bank account at the time of alleged offence and that the unemployed respondents are unable to reasonably account for the increase in the money in their possession and in their bank accounts. Accordingly, the court is entitled, pursuant to section 11 (2) (c) and (d) read with section 19 E (5), to infer that, those money was derived, obtained or realized by the respondents directly or indirectly from the alleged commission of the offence for which they were charged.
    
34. Accordingly, based on the evidence adduced and the inference drawn pursuant to section 11 (2) read with section 19 E (5) of the Act, the court is satisfied that, it is more probable or likely that, the properties mentioned in the Originating Summons are tainted properties than not.
    
35. Lord Brandon Of Oakbrook explained the standard of proof on balance of probability in Rhesa Shipping Co SA v Edmunds (The Popi M) [1985] 1 W.L.R. 948 (16 May 1985) as follows:
    

The legal concept of proof of a case on a balance of probabilities must be applied with common sense. It requires a judge of first instance, before he finds that a particular event occurred, to be satisfied on the evidence that it is more likely to have occurred than not.

36. Thus, the Court is satisfied on a balance of probabilities that the properties mentioned in the Originating Summons are tainted properties, and should be forfeited to the State. In the meantime, I direct myself to some additional powers vested in the court by two important sections of the Act. Those powers are important to achieve the purpose the Act. Those two sections are section 19 E (3) and section 27 A. The section 19E (3) provides for residuary power to make any other orders that the court considers appropriate to facilitate the transfer of forfeited properties. The section 27 A provides for a specific power to annul and or cancel and or set aside any transaction or conveyance, or transfer of money or other property where the circumstances give rise to a reasonable inference that, it was done for the purpose of avoiding forfeiture orders. Those two sections read as follows:

19 E (3) The Court may, when it makes a forfeiture order or at any time thereafter, make any other orders that it considers appropriate, including orders for and with respect to facilitating the transfer of property.

Voiding of contract

27A. A court may, before making a forfeiture order or pecuniary penalty order, set aside any conveyance or transfer of money or other property or interest therein that occurred in circumstances that give rise to a reasonable inference that the money, property or interest was conveyed or transferred for the purpose of avoiding the forfeiture order or pecuniary penalty order unless the conveyance or transfer was to a third party acting in good faith and without notice.

37. For the above reasons, I make the following orders and directions:
    
    1. The transfer of vehicle number MQ 975 to the second interested party is hereby set aside;
       
    2. The vehicles bearing registration numbers MH 673 and MQ 975 which are currently kept in police custody are forfeited to the state;
       
    100. The sum of $ 75,831.16 available in Westpac bank account number 9807007951 belonging to first respondent is forfeited to the state;
         
    4. The sum of $ 23,076.73 available in Westpac bank account number 9808268123 belonging to the second respondent is forfeited to the state;
       
    5. The sum of $ 6,300.00 that was found in possession of the first respondent at the time of arrest and was later deposited into the trust account of the court is forfeited to the state;
       
    6. The first interested party (Westpac Fiji) is ordered to transfer all forfeited money available in two accounts mentioned above to the Forfeited Assets Fund with immediate effect;
       
    7. The Registrar of this court is directed to transfer the money deposited into Trust Account of the Court to Forfeited Assets Fund;
       
    8. The Registrar of this court is further directed to sign and or execute all documents necessary to facilitate the transfer of the forfeited properties to the state;
       
    9. Office of the DPP and or the AG may take necessary steps as provided in section 12 of the Act;
       
    10. The Land Transport Authority, Fiji is ordered to facilitate the transfer of the forfeited vehicles to the state; and
        
    11. The first and second respondents are ordered to jointly pay summarily assessed costs in sum of $ 5000 to the state within a month from today.
        

U.L.Mohamed Azhar
Acting Judge

At Lautoka
21.07.2025