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High Court of Fiji |
IN THE HIGH COURT OF FIJI AT SUVA
CENTRAL DIVISION
CIVIL JURISDICTION
Civil Action No. HBC 108 of 2024
BETWEEN:
REYNAULD JOSEPH CALDWELL aka REY CALDWELL
PLAINTIFF
AND:
SEKOVE SORO AND KATHERINA LEDUA SORO
DEFENDANT
For the Plaintiff : Ms. Fong. M
For the Defendant : Not Present
Date of Decision : 16 August 2024
Before : Waqainabete-Levaci, S.L.T.T, Puisne Judge
JUDGEMENT
(SUMMONS FOR VACANT POSESSION)
PART A - BACKGROUND
PART B: LAW ON VACANT POSESSION
‘It is our opinion clear that the restriction of the definition of registered proprietor to purchaser for value applies only in the case specified, that is to say an erroneous description of the land concerned. There is nothing in subsection (b) to indicate that ‘registered proprietor’ in any other circumstances is to be interpreted only as ‘purchaser of value’. The indefeasibility of title under the Land Transfer Act is well recognized; and the principles clearly set out in a judgment of the New Zealand Court of Appeal dealing with provisions of the New Zealand Land Transfer Act which on that point is substantially the same as the Land Transfer Act of Fiji. This case is Fels -v- Knowles 26 N.Z.L.R 608. At page 620 it is said:
“The cardinal principle of the statute is that the register is everything, and that, except in case of actual fraud on the part of the person dealing with the registered proprietor, such person, upon registration of the title under which he takes from the registered proprietor, has an indefeasible title against all the world.”
The question of indefeasibility of title of the registered proprietor is fully examined and determined with authority by their Lordships of the Privy Council in Frazer -v- Walker, their judgment being set out in full in 1967 N.Z.L.R 1069. This Court must therefore hold that the title of the respondents are registered proprietors is not subject to any unregistered encumbrances such as those put forward on behalf of appellants. Accordingly this ground fails.”
“169. The following persons may summon any person in possession of land to appear before a judge in chambers to show cause why the person summoned should not give up possession to the applicant:-
(a) the last registered proprietor of the land;
(b) a lessor who seeks to re-enter where the lessee or tenant is in arrear for such period as may be provided the lease and, in the absence of any such provision therein, when the lessee or tenant is in arrear for one month, whether there be or be not sufficient distress found on the premises to countervail such rent and whether or not any previous demand has been made for the rent;
(c) a lessor against a lessee or tenant where a legal notice to quit has been given or the term of the lease has expired.
Particulars to be stated in summons
170. Therein shall contain a description of the land and shall require the person summoned to appear at the court on a day not earlier than sixteen days after the service of the summons.
Order for possession
171. On the day appointed for the hearing of the summons, if the person summoned does not appear, then upon proof to the satisfaction of the judge of the due service of such summons and upon proof of the title by the proprietor or lessor and, if any consent is necessary, by the production and proof of such consent, the judge may order immediate possession to be given to the plaintiff, which order shall have the effect of and may be enforced as a judgment in ejectment.
Dismissal of summons
172. If the person summoned appears he may show cause why he refuses to give possession of such land and, if he proves to the satisfaction of the judge a right to the possession of the land, the judge shall dismiss the summons with costs against the proprietor, mortgagee or lessor or he may make any order and impose any terms he may think fit;
Provided that the dismissal of the summons shall not prejudice the right of the plaintiff to take any other proceedings against the person summoned to which he may be otherwise entitled:
Provided also that in the case of a lessor against a lessee, if the lessee, before the hearing, pay or tender all rent due and all costs incurred by the lessor, the judge shall dismiss the summons.”
“The third ground of appeal, in my opinion, can have no validity in view of the provisions of Section 39 of the Land Transfer Act. The only circumstance in which the title of the respondent could be impeached would be on proof of fraud, that is to say, fraud on the part of the registered proprietor. There is no evidence whatever that respondent had acquired his registered title to the land through fraud; and in fact no allegation of fraud has been made against him. That being so, I would hold that the title of the respondent to the land is not subject to any interest, equitable or otherwise, of the appellant.”
PART C: ANALYSIS
“Where, however, the personal rights of an owner, as distinct from the rights of the mataqali, have been directly infringed, that person can bring an action for a remedy resulting from such infringement: see Serupepeli Dakai No 1 & ors v Native Land Development Corporation & ors Civ App No 30/1982 FCA: CA 543/1979 and Waisake (above).”
PART D: COSTS AND ORDERS
...................................................................
Ms Senileba LTT Waqainabete-Levaci
Puisne Judge
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URL: http://www.paclii.org/fj/cases/FJHC/2024/513.html