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High Court of Fiji |
IN THE HIGH COURT OF FIJI AT SUVA
CIVIL JURISDICTION
Civil Case No: HBC 59 of 2018
BETWEEN: JOSAIA VOREQE BAINIMARAMA of New Wing, Government Buildings, Suva, Prime Minister of the Republic of Fiji.
FIRST APPLICANT
A N D: AIYAZ SAYED-KHAIYUM of Suvavou House, Victoria Parade, Suva, Minister of Economy and Attorney- General of Fiji.
SECOND APPLICANT
A N D: AMAN RAVINDRA – SINGH of Tukani Street, Lautoka, Fiji, Barrister and Solicitor.
RESPONDANT
Appearance : Ms. Gul Fatima for the Applicants
Respondent appeared in person
Sentence Hearing : Tuesday, 9th August 2022 at 10.30 a.m
Sentence : Tuesday, 16th August 2022 at 2.30 p.m
SENTENCE
(A) INTRODUCTION
- [1]. In a ruling delivered on 28.07.2022, the respondent was found guilty of contempt of court.
- [2]. The hearing in the applicants’ application for committal for contempt of court was concluded on 13.06.2022 and the court’s decision was delivered on 28.07.2022. The court found the respondent guilty of contempt of court. The mitigation and sentence hearing was scheduled for 01.08.2022.
- [3]. However, before the mitigation and sentencing hearing, the respondent filed an application for permanent stay of the proceedings. On 01.08.2022 the respondent did not appear in court but by his instructions to counsel who appeared on his behalf insisted that the application for permanent stay be dealt with. The hearing of the application for permanent stay was scheduled for 03.08.2022.
- [4]. At the hearing of the application for permanent stay, both parties made oral submissions to court and were directed to file written submissions by Friday, 05.08.2022.
- [5]. My Judgment on the respondent’s application for stay was pronounced on 09.08.2022. I refused the application for permanent stay.
- [6]. On 09.08.2022, counsel for the applicants, Ms Fatima, in making sentencing submissions urged the court that a custodial sentence be imposed on the respondent in the higher scale as he continued and persisted posting libelllous posts on his Facebook using ‘Violent Voreqe’ and ‘korrupt khaiym’ after Justice Seneviratne adjudged they were defamatory. She said the respondent had also delayed in complying with the orders of the court.
- [7]. The respondent took the stand to give evidence and said that the opinion of Justice Seneviratne was not a court order, and no injunction or gag order was made stopping him from referring to the applicants as ‘Violent Voreqe’ and ‘korrupt khaiyum’. Further, he said that he removed original defamatory post as ordered by the court, published a public retraction and apology on his social media and in the print media.
- [8]. At the end of sentencing submissions, I reserved the sentence and directed the parties to file written sentencing submissions by mid-day 11/08/2022. As directed by the court, both parties filed sentencing submissions for which I am grateful.
- [9]. This is my sentence for contempt of court.
(B) BACKGROUND
[10]. The background facts were set out in detail in my decision dated 28.07.2022 and since they are relevant to sentencing it is appropriate to reproduce it below.
[11]. On 09.09.2020, the applicants sought leave under Order 52, Rule 2 to institute committal proceedings for contempt of court against the respondent for disobedience to Justice Seneviratne’s judgment orders dated 24.7.2020. The application was made ex-parte.
[12]. The application for leave was supported by an affidavit and a statement which sets out the grounds for committal.
[13]. Leave was granted on 12.10.2020.
[14]. A motion pursuant to Order 52, Rule 3(1) of the High Court Rules, 1988 was filed on 15.10.2020 where the hearing of the committal was set down for 25.10.2020 within the 14 day timeline.
[15]. On 25.10.2020, the court extended the hearing date because personal service could not be effected on the respondent.
[16]. The court allowed the applicants time to serve the respondent. Since the applicants could not serve the respondent, an application was made on 05.11.2020 to effect service through substituted service. This was allowed under Order 10, Rule 2 of the High Court Rules, 1988.
[17]. On 09.11.2020, the court granted leave to serve the documents by way of substituted service.
[18]. The service was effected by way of substituted service on 20.11.2020. The respondent did not enter an appearance on 01.12.2020. The court adjourned the committal hearings for 16.03.2021.
[19]. On 16.03.2021, the respondent entered an appearance and raised a preliminary objection. On 01.04.2021, the court delivered the ruling and the court overruled the preliminary objection. The respondent did not enter an appearance on 01.04.2021 and 06.05.2021.
[20]. The respondent again entered an appearance on 28.10.2021. The respondent sought 28 days to file Affidavit in Opposition. The court granted 28 days for the respondent to file Affidavit in Opposition to the committal application. The hearing was again adjourned for 18.01.2022. The respondent did not file an affidavit in opposition to the committal application. The respondent again defaulted appearance on 18.01.2022 and the hearing was adjourned for 25.02.2022 and eventually to 13.06.2022.
[21]. On 13.06.2022, the respondent took his plea. He pleaded not guilty to the alleged contempt. The court gave him the right to reply to the charge. The respondent chose not to give oral evidence under oath explaining his position to the alleged contempt.
[22]. The committal hearing for contempt of court was decided only in accordance with the evidence and arguments properly and openly put before the court. At the committal hearings for contempt of court, the respondent was before the court and had every opportunity of presenting his case on facts. The respondent did not go into the witness box to explain his position to the alleged contempt. It was open to the respondent to cross-examine the applicants as to the affidavit evidence. He chose not to cross-examine. The respondent did not file an affidavit in opposition to the applicants’ affidavits despite he was given 28 days. All those tools were available to the respondent. As such in the absence of defence, the court accepted the veracity of the matters to which the applicants have deposed as to the respondent’s culpability.[1]
[23]. In the committal proceedings the applicants’ evidence before me is all on affidavits:
- The affidavit of the second applicant sworn on 28.08.2020 and filed on 09.09.2020.
- The supplementary affidavit of the second applicant sworn on 07.10.2021 and filed on 08.10.2021.
[24]. The statement filed by the applicants on 09.09.2020 pursuant to Order 52, Rule 2(2) of the High Court Rules, 1988 sets out the grounds for committal as follows:
“For failure to obey a court order sealed on 28th July 2020 and served on 01st August 2020 whereby the respondent was ordered to publish an immediate apology and also pay a sum of $120,000.00 as damages within 30 days from 28th July, 2020.”
[Emphasis added]
[25]. On 28.07.2020, Suva High Court Registry sealed Orders delivered in his Lordship J Seneviratne’s judgment and on 01.08.2020, applicants’ solicitors’ bailiff served the respondent with the sealed orders. The affidavit of service of the bailiff is annexure marked “D” referred to in the affidavit of the second applicant sworn on 27.08.2020.
[26]. The rationale of the Judgment of J. Seneviratne dated 24.07.2020 which is the point that determined Judgment and Judgment orders is paragraph (7) of the Judgment which is binding in nature. It is reproduced below with paragraph (6) for the sake of clarity.
(6). I will below reproduce the entire text of the article posted on the Face Book by the defendant:
Regime Dirty Politics.
I am sickened at the recent series of temples around Fiji. I cannot help but wonder how in an election year in the past three months at least 6 temples have been desecrated. Someone surely wants all the attention.
These criminals were well organised and I am even assumed that they went out of their way to buy red paint which was later used when they committed these crimes.
Even during the worst days of racial, religious and ethnic tensions in 1987 and 2000, we never had six temples desecrated within a period of three months.
These series of desecrations appear to be part of a grand plan and not some random acts of stupidity and misled thoughts as we have seen in the past.
Notice how Korrupt Kaiyum & Commissioner of Police conveniently appear at temple open forums and promise safety and security. These promises are further propped by the regime’s number 1 print propaganda machine the Fiji Sun which runs the headlines: “We Will Keep You Safe” & “We Won’t Tolerate These Acts”.
The plan all along has been to:
Phase 1: desecrate these temples,
Phase 2: create a climate of fear with the community,
Phase 3: show up and promise security.
Stop the desecration of temples in Fiji for cheap political gains. These sick and despicable crimes were organised by Korrupt Kaiyum, Violent Voreqe & their henchman.
[Emphasis added]
(7). These allegations are very serious in nature. One does not make allegations of this nature unless they are true and have very strong grounds to justify them. The 1st plaintiff is the Prime Minister of Fiji who were elected to that post by the people of Fiji. The people would not have voted for him if they did not have confidence and trust in him that he would discharge his duties honestly and efficiently. The people who read the above article would certainly have lost faith in the 1st plaintiff because he is referred to in the said article as Violent Vorege. The 2nd plaintiff who is the Minister of Economy and the Attorney General, was also elected by the people of Fiji to be a member of the Parliament. Without any reasonable ground he has been referred to as Korrupt Kaiyum. People have various political affiliations but one must not defame the character of another for his own political gain. This is what exactly has happened in this case. No court will have sympathy towards people who violate the rights of others in the guise of exercising their rights guaranteed by the Constitution.
[Emphasis added]
[27]. The ratio of paragraph (7) of the judgment is that the words ‘violent voreqe’ and ‘korruptkaiyum’ are defamatory and are injurious to the rights of the applicants. The court then turned to the question of quantum of damages to be awarded.
Continuation of the conduct - The disturbing feature of the matter
[28]. After Seneviratne J. delivered the Judgment and after the commencement of Committal Proceedings, the respondent continued to post the following posts on his Facebook and used the hashtags #violen tvoreqe and #korrupt kaiym when referring to the applicants despite having a judgment in place which clearly condemned and adjudged that the words ‘violent voreqe’ and ‘korrupt kaiym’ are defamatory. (Reference is made to paragraph (11) to (48) of the unchallenged affidavit evidence of the second applicant sworn on 07.10.2021).
i. Post dated 13th October 2020 - Annexure 2
ii. Post dated 16th October 2020 - Annexure 3
iii. Post dated 21st October 2020 - Annexure 4
iv. Post dated 1st November 2020 - Annexure 5
v. Post dated 25th November 2020 - Annexure 6
vi. Post dated 19th December 2020 - Annexure 7
vii. Post dated 21st December 2020 - Annexure 8
viii. Post dated 4th February 2021 - Annexure 9
ix. Post dated 5th February 2021 - Annexure 10
x. Post dated 6th February 2021 - Annexure 11
xi. Post dated 11th February 2021 - Annexure 12
xii. Post dated 15th February 2021 - Annexure 13
xiii. Post dated 20th February 2021 - Annexure 14
xiv. Post dated 3rd March 2021 - Annexure 15
xv. Post dated 20th April 2021 - Annexure 16
xvi. Post dated 6th May 2021 - Annexure 17
xvii. Post dated 26th May 2021 - Annexure 18
xviii. Post dated 4th June 2021 - Annexure 19
xix. Post dated 10th June 2021 - Annexure 20
xx. Post dated 12th June 2021 - Annexure 21
xxi. Post dated 14th June 2021 - Annexure 22
xxii. Post dated 4th July 2021 - Annexure 23
xxiii. Post dated 11th July 2021 - Annexure 24
xxiv. Post dated 30th July 2021 - Annexure 25
xxv. Post dated 5th August 2021 - Annexure 26
xxvi. Post dated 19th August 2021 - Annexure 27
xxvii. Post dated 9th September 2021 - Annexure 28
xxviii. Post dated 15th September 2021 - Annexure 29
xxix. Post dated 16th September 2021 - Annexure 30
xxx. Post dated 24th September 2021 - Annexure 31.
“#Coup Free Fiji
#Fiji Government Broke
#Fiji Government Financially Crippled
#Fiji Government Stop the Torture
#Fiji Government Stop Human Rights Violations
#Fiji Government Where is the Mission Millions
#Most Corrupt Fiji Government in History”
“#Our People Are Starving
#Regime Lies On a Daily Basis
#Where Are Food Rations
#Millions Spent On Empty Planes While People Starve
#Life in Dictatorship
#Broke Government Only Care for Themselves
#i am a witness”
“#Our People Are Starving
#Regime Lies On a DailyBasis
#Where Are Food Rations
#Millions Spent On Empty Planes While People Starve
#Life in Dictatorship
#Broke Government Only Care for Themselves
#i am a witness”
“#Criminals Run Fiji
#Fiji Mafia
#Coup Free Fiji”
“#Coup Free Fii
#Terrorists Run Fiji
#Criminals Run Fiji
#Fiji Mafia Control Fiji
# L am a Witness
(C) SENTENCING
The sentencing principles
[29]. The task for the court now is to determine how should its powers to punish the respondent contemnor for contempt of court under Order 52 of the High Court Rules, 1988 be exercised? Contempt, whether civil or criminal, share a common characteristic. It is as Lord Diplock said in A.G v Leveller Magazine Ltd[2] that they involve an interference with the due administration of justice either in a particular case or more general as a continuing process. The power to punish for contempt is not for personal vindication of the Judges; the real offence is the wrong done to the public by weakening the authority and influence of a tribunal which exists for the public good alone[3]. In cases of contempt the dominant purpose is vindication of the authority of the court and promotion of the public welfare by protection of the majesty of the law from attack.
[30]. Contempt are neither wholly civil nor altogether criminal. And it may not always be easy to classify a particular act as belonging to either one of these two classes. It may, partake of the characteristics of both[4]. The object of proceedings for contempt would be coercive in its character, and proceeding is in the interest of the public welfare and in vindication of the authority of the court, and that this feature dominates the proceeding and fixes its character as punitive rather than remedial. An offence of contempt is punishable with a fine or imprisonment, and unlike a criminal offence, it is not subject to any limits on the duration of imprisonment or the amount of fine.
[31]. In determining what penalty should be imposed on the respondent contemnor by the court there are a number of factors that are usually considered to be relevant. In Attorney-General for the State of New South Wales v Radio 2UE Sydney Pty Ltd and John Laws[5] Powell JA indicated that it was appropriate to consider the objective seriousness of the contempt and the level of culpability (i.e, intentional conduct, reckless conduct, negligent conduct or conduct without any appreciation of consequences.)
[32]. Apart from seriousness and culpability, other factors that should be considered in the case are
- any plea of guilty,
- any previous convictions for contempt,
- any demonstrations of remorse and,
- Character and personal circumstances.
[33]. In deciding whether an act of contempt is serious enough to warrant imprisonment, two factors are determinative: first, the likely interference with the due administration of justice and second, the culpability of the offender[6]. Sentences of imprisonment tend to be more common in cases which involve a blatant refusal to adhere to an order of the court[7]. The considerations of public policy underlying the contempt jurisdiction generally are the protection of the administration of justice and the maintenance of the courts authority. There lies at the heart of both civil and criminal contempt the need for society both to protect its citizen’s rights and to maintain the rule of law[8].
[34]. Those who commit contempt must be denounced, and that deterrence is an important consideration. However, as with all sentencing exercises the objective seriousness of the relevant conduct and the defendant’s personal culpability for the conduct must be assessed. In accordance with ordinary sentencing principles a defendant’s means and any personal aggravating or mitigating factors will be taken into account[9].
[35]. For the purposes of punishment, various classes of contempt have been identified in the cases. They include technical, wilful and contumacious contempt. For technical contempt, the court will usually accept an apology from the contemnor. It may order that the contemnor pay the costs of the proceedings brought to uphold the authority of the courts of law. An illustration of a technical contempt may be found in ‘Ainsworth v Hanrahan[10]. That was a case where counsel, in the course of cross-examination of a party, without leave of the relevant court, used answers given by the party to interrogatories administered in other proceedings. No penalty was imposed.
[36]. A similar approach is sometimes taken to contempt which are more than technical and which, although wilful, are not found to have been deliberate. An illustration of this class of contempt may be found in ‘Attorney-General for New South Wales v Dean[11]. In that case a police officer participated in a police media conference and identified a suspect in a murder investigation in such a way as to interfere in the suspect’s right to have a fair trial according to law. The court found an absence of a specific intent to interfere in the administration of justice. But this was neither an answer nor a defence to the charge. Nor was ignorance of the law of contempt an excuse. The court, nevertheless, contended itself with a declaration that the police officer had been guilty of contempt. It ordered him to pay the costs of the proceedings.
[37]. The most serious class of contempt, from the point of view of sanction, is contumacious contempt. Not every intentional disobedience involved a conscious defiance of the authority of the court which is the essence of this class of contempt[12]. This class of contempt is reserved to cases where the behaviour of the contemnor has been shown to be aimed at the integrity of the courts and designed to degrade the administration of justice, as distinguished from a simple interference with property rights manifested by a court order[13]. In cases where such a measure of willfulness is established, the court may proceed to punish the convicted contemnor by the imposition of a custodial sentence or a fine or both.
The following case authorities have dealt with contempt of court in Fiji
[38]. I gratefully quote from the Judgment in Re Chaudhry[14], in relation to material facts and sentence passed in following cases.
Name of Case | Facts | Penalty |
Parmanandam case | The material constituting the contempt was contained in a lengthy speech made at a political meeting, part of which was subsequently
published in a pamphlet alleging: “the NFP platform[is] to clean the judiciary once and for all”, magistrates were being appointed as Judges which called into question whether they may be “sacrificing a principle or a rule, or a particular rule of law, for the sake of expediency or for the sake of promotion”,
questioning the appointment of an Australian as Chief Justice with his position being paid by the Australian government and how this
reflected upon Fiji’s independence, questioning appointments to the Court of Appeal when “their future appointments in sessions depend entirely upon” the Chief Justice, and that “TWO SUVA LAWYERS WERE CONDEMNED IN ABSENTIA IN A COURT OF LAW” by the Chief Justice which the Court of Appeal found “was a clear imputation that the Chief Justice had disregarded basic and elementary principles of justice” and was imputation that was false. Contemnor apologises to both Supreme Court and Court of Appeal. | Six months imprisonment reduced to three months by Court of Appeal. |
[39]. Chaudhry case | [40]. The material constituting the contempt was published in a pamphlet which repeated suggestions that some judges and magistrates were corrupt. This was published in the Daily Post on 14 July 1997 under the heading “Judiciary Corrupt” and was as follows: | Court costs to be paid within 7 days fixed at FJ$500 |
[41]. The Fiji Times case (2009) | [42]. On 22 October 2008, the following letter to the Editor was published on page 6 of The Fiji Times as follows: | Parties pleaded guilty. The editor-in-chief of the Fiji Times was sentenced to a term of imprisonment of three months which was suspended upon him entering
into a good behaviour bond for 12 months. The publisher was discharged without conviction upon entering into a good behaviour bond for 12 months. Fiji Times Limited was ordered to pay a fine of FJ$100,000.00. Fiji Times Limited was ordered to enter into a $50,000 bond for 2 years on behalf of its Chairman. |
[50]. Nicholas case | [51]. The contemnor was quoted in an article that appeared in the website of the Sunday Star Times on 6 November 2011 containing the following the words: | Fined $15,000 and $3500 costs. Ordered to arrange for an apology directed to the judiciary of Fiji. |
[54]. The Fiji Times case (2017) | [55]. On Monday 7 November 2011, an article entitled “FIFA Probes Doc” was published on page 30 of the Fiji Times. The impugned article contained the words and statement: | Fiji Times Limited was fined FJ$300,000.00. The Second Respondent (Brian O'Flaherty) was ordered to pay a fine of FJ$10,000.00. (Reduced to $7,500.00 by Court of Appeal). The Third Respondent (Fred Wesley) was sentenced to a term of six months imprisonment. |
[57]. Viliame case | [58]. The contemnor had brought a claim against the defendants seeking a declaration that the Articles of Association of Air Terminal Services (Fiji) Ltd which permitted the removal of directors as oppressive and prejudicial and that the contemnors removal as a director was illegal, oppressive, null and void. The Defendants filed a strike out application. Before the court delivered its judgment on the strike out application, the contemnor filed an ex parte application to stop an AGM. The application was heard and dismissed on the day it was filed. The contemnor then went ahead and made various statements and interviews regarding the outcome of the case, the judge who was nominated to hear the case and the entire Fijian judiciary. The video was made publicly accessible on the social networking site Facebook. | Costs in the sum of $9000.00 to the Applicants and convicted as charged for contempt of scandalizing the court and sentenced to immediate
imprisonment of a period of three (3) months. |
[39]. In Re Chaudhry (supra) the respondent’s Facebook posts were intended to convey that the Hon. Chief Justice and the entire Fijian Judiciary is corrupt, pliant and bias towards the Fijian Government. The respondent was found guilty for contempt of courts and he was sentenced to fifteen (15) months imprisonment.
Deliberate, conscious and contumacious disobedience to court orders
[40]. It must be remembered that the respondent’s contempt arose from the respondent’s act of disobedience to adhere to the Judgment orders of the court dated 24.07.2020 and sealed on 28.07.2020 which are in the following terms:
- The defendant is ordered to pay the plaintiffs $120,000.00 as damages ($60,000.00 to each plaintiff) within 30 days from the date of this judgment.
- The defendant is ordered to render in writing a public retraction and apology to the plaintiffs in prominent print which is to be published on his Face Book page and in all local daily newspapers.
- The defendant is ordered to remove the subject article from his Face Book page immediately.
- The plaintiffs are entitled to 6% interest on the sum awarded from 07th March 2018 to the date of the judgment.
- The defendant is also ordered to pay the plaintiffs $8,000.00 as costs (summarily assessed) of this action within 30 days from the date of the judgment.
[41]. A disobedience of court orders is a civil contempt but it can become a criminal contempt (after it has been proved beyond reasonable doubt) for the purpose of punishment if the contempt involves deliberate defiance or is contumacious in nature.
[42]. The respondent did not challenge by way of an appeal process the obligations imposed by or owed to court as per judgment orders dated 24.07.2020 and sealed on 28.07.2020. The Judgment orders required the respondent to do certain things within the time specified in the Judgment. The respondent is bound by the Judgment and its orders and the Judgment can be enforced by committal of the person bound by the Judgment.
[43]. The respondent pleaded not guilty to the charge of contempt brought against him. No admissible evidence was put forward by the respondent at the committal hearing to establish that he has fully or partially complied with the orders of J. Seneviratne’s Judgment dated 24.07.2020. The respondent contemnor did not go into the witness box to explain the meaning of his conduct. The respondent chose not to file an affidavit in opposition explaining his conduct despite he was given 28 days to file the same. At the commencement of the committal hearing, during the course of the committal hearing and right throughout the committal hearing there was nothing on the record to point any difficulty the respondent is facing in complying with the orders of the court. I note that he did not even seek time from the court to ensure compliance with the orders after he was served with the motion pursuant to Order 52, Rule 3(1). Right throughout he maintained his plea of not guilty but never raised a defence by way of admissible evidence to the charge of contempt brought against him.
[44]. The respondent made no excuse whatsoever for non-compliance. No defence was raised by way of affidavit evidence or sworn testimony. He maintained the plea of not guilty right throughout. No sensible excuse has been offered by way of affidavit evidence or sworn testimony for non - compliance. This act of disobedience can neither be justified nor excused and his failure to confirm to lawful orders of the court in the absence of defence or excuse shows his wilful, perverse, intentional and deliberate disregard to the obligations imposed on him by the court or owed to the court by the Judgment orders dated 24.07.2020. Hence, casual, accidental or unintentional disregard to the obligations imposed by the court or owed to the court are excluded. The respondent’s wilful, perverse, intentional and deliberate disregard to the obligations imposed on him by the court or owed to the court by the Judgment orders dated 24.07.2020 is a far cry from a piece of breath- taking insouciance. The evidence of the case demonstrated not only that he acted in wholesale disregard of his obligations under the orders of the court. His wholesale flagrant, repeated and persistent disregard of his obligations under the orders of the court, coupled with an awareness of the consequence can properly be regarded as ‘contumelious’ conduct.
[45]. I conclude that the conduct of the respondent contemnor was contumacious and would warrant punishment for criminal contempt rather than civil contempt. As I said earlier, a civil contempt (disobedience of orders) can become a criminal contempt for the purpose of punishment if the contempt involves deliberate defiance or is contumacious in nature. In civil contempt the sole purpose is to achieve enforcement.
Contumacious conduct is conduct that is deliberately defiant[21]. Pluhowsky v Registrar of Court of Appeal (NSW) [22] Kirby J. used the language of ‘ deliberate defiance’. The word contumacious means what has been termed ‘ a perverse and obstinate resistance to authority’[23].
[46]. The penal notice on the sealed order served on the respondent clearly states that; “If you within – named defendant, Aman Ravindra – Singh disobey this order by the time therein limited, you will be liable for process of execution for the purpose of compelling you to obey the same.” This satisfies me that the respondent was well aware of the consequence of the disobedience.
[47]. The seriousness of breaches of court orders was discussed by Merkel J in Australian Industry Group v Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union[24].
“The rule of law in a democratic society does not permit any member of that society, of matter how powerful, to pick and choose the laws or court orders that are to be observed and those that are not. Maintenance of the rule of law in our society does not only require that parties are able to resort to courts to determine their disputes (Patrick Stevedores Operations (No 2) Pty Ltd v Maritime Union of Australia [1998] HCA 31; (1998) 153 ALR 641 at [1] per Hayne J), it also requires that parties comply with the orders made by the courts in determining those disputes.
If the individual respondents believed that the orders of Whitlam J were wrongly made, then it was open to them to appeal, or apply for leave to appeal, against those orders.”
[48]. Mens Rea (intention) is not an element of contempt of court charges. The supreme court in the Fiji Times Ltd v A.G[25] said at para 47 that .... “In any event, it is well established that under the common law mens rea is not an element of the offence of contempt of court and that is the position in Fiji.”
[49]. Fiji is a democratic state constitutionally based on the rule of law. In order to enable the judiciary to discharge its primary duty to maintain a fair and effective administration of justice, it follows that the judiciary must as an integral part of its constitutional function have the power and the duty to enforce its orders and to protect the administration of justice against contempt which are calculated to undermine it.
Remarks
[50]. The initial defamatory article contained the words “Korrupt kaiyum” and “Violent voreqe”. Justice Seneviratne has adjudged on these terms as being defamatory towards the applicants and injurious to the rights of the applicants. Instead of abstaining from the usage of these defamatory terms which are injurious to the rights of the applicants, the respondent continued usage of these libellous terms on 31 Facebook posts despite being fully aware of the order of J. Seneviratne and contempt proceedings. [See paragraph 28 above]. It is quite apparent to me from the unchallenged affidavit evidence of the applicants that the respondent repeated and persisted in positing posts on his Facebook referring to the applicants, after J. Senevirante’s orders were served on him and after committal proceedings were served on him. The conduct of the respondent is in disobedience of a finding, ratio and the judgment made by the court on behalf of the applicants. This shows that there was a flouting of the authority of the court and willful affront of its power and a conduct disclosing a purpose to flout the court and its findings ratio and the judgment and subversive of the administration of justice. His continuous usage of the said defamatory terms on 31 Facebook posts despite being fully aware of the Judgment of J. Seneviratne, shows his hostility to the court as the means afforded by government for the administration of justice, contumacy towards the court and towards its Judgments and this disobedience is in such a character and in such a manner as to indicate a contempt of court rather than a disregard of the rights of the adverse party. No discussion is required to demonstrate the substantive injury compensable in damages caused to the applicants from the wrongful conduct of the respondent. The personal injury to the adverse party in whose favour the court has made the finding gives a remedial character to the contempt proceedings. The punishment is to secure to the adverse party the right which the court has awarded them.
[51]. At the sentence hearing respondent took the stand to give evidence and said that the opinion of a judge was not a court order and no injunction or gag order was made restraining him from referring to the applicants as such.
[52]. It must be remembered that the rationale of the Judgment of Justice Seneviratne dated 24.07.2020 which is the point that determined Judgment and Judgment orders is paragraph (7). The ratio of paragraph (7) of the judgment is that words ‘Violent Voreqe’ and ‘korrupt kaiym’ are defamatory and injurious to the rights of the applicants. The court then turned to the question of damages. Viewed in that light, the respondent being a practicing Barrister and Solicitors in Fiji why wait for a restraining order? The respondent was not contrite nor did he make any attempt to withdraw the offending 31 Facebook posts. Instead, he repeatedly maintained that he has a legitimate right to refer to the applicants as such which overrode the courts ratio and finding in the Judgment to the contrary. This involves a flagrant challenge to the authority of the court. This is the conduct of an officer of the court leading up to the present proceedings. However, I note that the respondent has not been charged for that.
[53]. AGGRAVATING FACTORS
Breach of Trust
Plea of not guilty
MITIGATING FACTORS
[54]. One obvious mitigating factor that counts in favour of the respondent is the fact that there are no previous convictions for contempt. It is stated that the respondent has no prior criminal conviction of any kind. It can fairly be stated that the respondent has a good character. When the contemnor is a first time offender there is a general desire to keep offenders, and especially first-time offenders, out of prison[29]. This consideration, though relevant, is of much less weight and pales in the case of contumacious contemnor.
[55]. Order 1 was due on 23 August 2020 [30 days from date of Judgment].
[56]. On 27 July 2022 [11 months and 4 days from when the sum was due, and 9 months and 15 days from when the Leave was granted to institute committal proceedings], the Respondent emailed the Applicants’ Lawyers and notified them that he had paid $120,000.00 to the Official Receiver.
[57]. The applicants have instituted Bankruptcy proceedings against the respondent in Lautoka Magistrates Court and the receiving order was made on 06.07.2022. This spurred the Respondent to pay the amount of $120,000.00 with the Official Receiver.
[58]. The above are the circumstances leading up to the payment. In mitigation, the respondent said that he did not have the money earlier. He said he took a loan and liquidated some assets to raise the funds. I cannot accept this. He should have sought time from the court to make the payment when the motion for committal was served on him instead after a number of interlocutory proceedings on preliminary matters and a full hearing. The full hearing was delayed on many occasions by reason of the particular challenges presented by the respondent. He is expecting leniency from the court when everything else has failed. There is a stark contrast between purging the contempt at the earliest possible opportunity, and purging the contempt at the end of long litigation when everything else has failed. With respect, the absence of bona fide of the respondent is obvious from the timing of the payment. Consequently, purging the contempt by belated compliance with order number One carries very little weight. Besides, this matter does not involve civil contempt where the sole purpose is to achieve enforcement to vindicate the rights of the applicants. As I said earlier, this matter involved criminal contempt where the primary purpose of exercising the power is to vindicate the authority of the court.
[59]. In respect of Order 2, the Respondent attempted to render in writing a public retraction and apology to the Applicants in the Fiji Times. This was published on 7 July 2022 – after the Hearing in these proceedings had completed and the parties awaited Decision of this Court. A copy of the apology and retraction is enclosed in Tab 1.
[60]. This apology and retraction is unacceptable. It does not refer to the date of the Judgment. It does not specify what the respondent is apologizing for. It does not make reference to the proceedings commenced by the applicants. Consequently, it carries a very little weight.
[61]. The Orders of the Judgment pertaining to a defamatory article that was written by the respondent was published on his Facebook post. As was pointed out, is it not fair that the Respondent refer to this in his apology and retraction?
[62]. In Young v Registrar[30], the Court of Appeal declined to exercise their discharge power in respect of the convicted appellant as the apology was not considered to be genuine. Rather, Powell JA described it (at 292G) as “no more than an empty collection of words”.
[63]. I conclude that the apology and retraction published in the Fiji Times is not genuine and does not assist the respondent in purging his contempt.
[64]. In respect of Order 3, the Respondent was required to publish the apology and retraction to the Applicants on his Facebook page. To date, this has not been done.
[65]. Order 4 required payment of interest on the damages awarded to the Applicants. To date, this has not been paid.
[66]. Order 5 required the Respondent to pay costs to the Applicants within 30 days from the date of the Judgment. To date, this has not been done.
[67]. I have no affidavit evidence concerning the respondent’s personal circumstances. There is no affidavit material filed on behalf of the respondent in support of mitigation.
Appropriate Sentence
General Principles
[68]. In Registrar of the Court of Appeal v Maniam (No 2), [31]Kirby P said (at 314):
“A conviction of contempt of court is a conviction of an offence, criminal in nature. Punishment of the convicted contemnor must therefore take into account the considerations normally applicable to the punishment of crime and apt to uphold the purpose of this jurisdiction, viz, the undisturbed and orderly administration of justice in the courts according to law. Thus, in determining the punishment which is apt to the circumstances which have led to a conviction of contempt, it is appropriate to bear in mind the purposes of punishing the contemnor; deterring the contemnor and others in the future from committing like contempts; and denouncing the conduct concerned in an approximately emphatic way: see Director of Public Prosecutions v John Fairfax & Sons Ltd (1987) 8 NSWLR 732 at 741.”
[69]. Further, his Honour elaborated (at 315):
“The most serious class of contempt, from the point of view of sanction, is contumacious contempt. Not every intentional disobedience involves a conscious defiance of the authority of the Court which is the essence of this class of contempt: see Australian Consolidated Press Ltd v Morgan [1965] HCA 21; (1965) 112 CLR 483 at 500. This class of contempt is reserved to cases where the behaviour of the contemnor has been shown to be aimed at the integrity of the courts and designed to degrade the administration of justice, as distinguished from a simple interference with property rights manifested by a court order: cf Root v MacDonald 157 NE 684 (1927) at 688; 54 Am LR 1422 (1927) at 1429. In cases where such a measure of willfulness is established, the court may proceed to punish the convicted contemnor by the imposition of a custodial sentence or a fine or both.”
[70]. Similar considerations are also applied by the Federal Court in Kazal v Thunder Studios Inc (California):[32] These considerations are:
(a) the seriousness of the contempt proved;
(b) the contemnor’s culpability;
(c) the reasons or motive for the contempt;
(d) whether the contemnor has received or tried to receive a benefit from the contempt;
(e) whether there has been any expression of genuine contrition by the contemnor;
(f) the character and antecedents of the contemnor;
(g) the contemnor's personal circumstances;
(h) personal and general deterrence; and
(i) the need for denunciation of contemptuous conduct.
[71]. Since these proceedings were commenced under Order 52 of the High Court Rules it is appropriate to consider any guidance as to penalty that might be provided by Order 52. It is abundantly clear that under Order 52 a person found guilty of contempt of the Court is liable to be convicted and sentenced to a term of imprisonment[33].
[72]. The seriousness of breaches of court orders was discussed by Merkel J in Australian Industry Group v Automotive, Food, Metals, Engineering, Printing and Kindred Industries Union[34] ; “The rule of law in a democratic society does not permit any member of that society, no matter how powerful, to pick and choose the laws or court orders that are to be observed and those that are not. Maintenance of the rule of law in our society does not only require that parties are able to resort to courts to determine their disputes (Patrick Stevedores Operation (No 2) Pty Ltd v Maritime Union of Australia [1998] HCA 31; (1998) 153 ALR 641 at [1] per Hayne J), it also requires that parties comply with the orders made by the courts in determining those disputes. If the individual respondents believed that the orders of Whitlam J were wrongly made, then it was open to them to appeal, or apply for leave to appeal, against those orders instead, they breached them. The fact that the breaches are by union leaders holding important offices in a federation of national trade unions makes them more, rather than less, serious: see Gallagher v Durack [1983] HCA 2; (1983) 152 CLR 238 at 244.”
[73]. This court is seeking to achieve the followings in imposition of punishment for criminal contempt involved in this case which is in the form of wilful, deliberate, perverse and contumacious disobedience to judgment orders of Justice Seneviratne dated 24.07.2020;
- Denunciation (to drive home the point that such behavior is unacceptable)
- Specific deterrence (to prevent a recurrence of such behavior)
- General deterrence (to signal to others that such behaviour will be dealt with severely)
[74]. As stated by this court earlier, the sole purpose of civil contempt is to achieve the enforcement. I made a clear finding earlier in this decision that the contempt involved in this matter is criminal in nature because there was wilful, perverse, deliberate and contumacious disobedience to Judgment orders dated 24.07.2020 and hence the primary purpose of exercising the power changed from vindication of rights of the applicants to vindication of the authority of the court. In 2018, the New South Wales Court of Appeal in Dowling v Prothonotary of the Supreme Court[35] in particular, Basten JA, with whom Meagher JA agreed, held that sentencing legislature have no application to proceedings for civil and criminal contempt. The most significant impact of the Downing decision relates to structure and content of the orders that can be made in respect of criminal contempt; non parole orders can no longer be made, aggregate sentences can no longer be set; and alternatives to custodial imprisonment such as intensive community corrections orders are no longer available to criminal contempt. Therefore, the statutory considerations contained in the Fiji sentencing legislature does not apply when imposing a punishment to the respondent for criminal contempt.
[75]. An offence of contempt is a common law offence. This means that the maximum penalty for contempt is at large subject only to the restriction in the Bill of Rights restriction upon cruel punishment[36].
[76]. I have reached a conclusion that nothing but a sentence of imprisonment should be imposed on the respondent chiefly because of the gravity of the criminal contempt – A wilful, deliberate, perverse and contumacious disobedience to the Judgment orders of Justice Seneviratne dated 24.07.2020. The rule of law requires that those whose rights are infringed should seek the aid of the court, and respect for the legal process can suffer if those who need protection fail to get it. That is why deliberate, perverse, wilful and contumacious disobedience to orders of the court has always earned severe punishment.
[77]. The following matters which are referred below are additional considerations;
[78]. And also there is a strong need to ;
- Denunciate the respondent’s conduct.
- To specially deter legal practitioners from engaging in such conduct.
- To generally deter future litigants from engaging in similar conduct and
- To protect the rule of law, the integrity of the judiciary and its pronouncements and the administration of justice.
[79]. Due to the reasons given above, I sentence the respondent to a term of Ten [10] months imprisonment.
[The counsel for the applicants submitted that the circumstances warranted a custodial sentence and they made submissions seeking a higher scale custodial sentence. The quasi – prosecutorial role of counsel for the applicants imposes fundamental limits on going further on sentence than assisting court to avoid a sentencing error. That may include submissions as to the type of disposition that is appropriate, such as to whether a custodial sentence was called for and perhaps whether it should include actual incarceration. But it entails refraining from advocating for any particular duration or range of sentence to be imposed.[37]]
[80]. The power of Courts to punish for contempt is a necessary and integral part of the independence of the judiciary, and is absolutely essential to the performance of the duties imposed on them by law. Without it they are mere boards of arbitration whose judgments and decrees would be only advisory. If a party can make himself a judge of the validity of Orders which have been issued, and by his own act of disobedience set them aside, then are the Court’s impotent, and what the Constitution now fittingly calls the “judicial power” would be a mockery. This power has been uniformly held to be necessary to the protection of the Court from insults and oppressions while in the ordinary exercise of its duties, and to enable it to enforce its judgments and orders necessary to the due administration of law and the protection of rights of suitors[38].
FINE
[81]. The Court has inherent jurisdiction to impose fines for contempt having regard to its seriousness. Neurom Ltd v Trans, H.C. Auckland CP 623/SW 01, 14/05/2002. The Courts in Fiji have imposed fines of $20,000[39], $25,000[40] and $50,000[41] for civil contempt.
[82]. In Taylor Bros Limited v Taylors Group Limited[42], the New Zealand Court of Appeal held that the Court can apportion the payment of fine to both the Crown and the plaintiff.
The jurisdiction regarding a fine must and does extend to ordering that part of it be paid to a complainant who has set the Court proceedings in motion....... Perhaps there is no fundamental objection in principle to accepting even that the Court could order the whole fine to be paid to the complainant. We think, however, that this would be to go too far. The contempt jurisdiction exists in the public interest as a sanction to ensure that Orders of the Court are complied with. An element of amends to the public institution should always be present in a fine.
[83]. The New Zealand High Court in ‘Blomfield v Slater’[43] ordered that a portion of the fine imposed for contempt be paid to the complainant.
ORDER
The respondent is sentenced to a term of Ten (10) months immediate imprisonment for contempt of court.
.................................
Jude Nanayakkara
JUDGE
High Court - Suva
Tuesday, 16th August 2022
[1] HKSAR v Lee Ming Tee, unreported Hon Kong Court of Final Appeal; Hklii: [2003] HKCFA 54. See also, Jai Prakash Narayan v Savita Chandra, Civil Appeal No:- 37 of 1985, date of Judgment 08.11.1985.
[2] (1979) AC. 440 at 449
[3] R v Dunbabin Ex-parte Williams (1935) 53 CLR 434
[4] Bessettee v Conkey 194 U.S 324
[5] unreported appeal decision of the New South Wales Supreme Court No:- 40236 of 1998, delivered on 11th March 1998; (1998) NSWSC 29
[6] R v Thomson Newspaper Ltd (1968) 1 ALL ER 268 at 269
[7] OCM Opportunity Fund II, LP v Burhan Uray (2005) 3 SLR 60
Lim Meng Chai v Heng Chok Keng (2001) SGHC 33
[8]Arlidge, Eady & Smith on Contempt, Fifth Edition, p.158
[9] Solicitor – General v Krieger (2014) NZHC 172, Solicitor-General v Alice (2007) 2 NZLR 783
[10](1991) 25 NSWLR 155
[11](1990) 20, NSWLR 650
[12]Australian Consolidated Press Ltd v Morgan [1965] HCA 21; (1965) 112 CLR 483 at 500
[13] Root v MacDonald 157 NE684
[14] [2019] FJHC 488
[15] [1972] 18 FLR 90 (23 June 1972) (‘Paramanandam case’);
[16] [1999] FJHC 28; [1999] 45 FLR 87 (4 May 1999) (‘Chaudhry case’);
[17] [2009] Civil Action No.124 of 2008 (22 January 2009) (‘The Fiji Times case (2009)’);
[18] (2013) C.A. No. 364 of 2011 [8 February 2013] (‘Nicholas case’);
[19] [2017] FJSC 13; CBV0005.2015 (21 April 2017) (‘The Fiji Times case (2017)’);
[20] Lautoka High Court Civil Action No. HBC 117 of 2017 (6 July 2018) (‘ATS case’).
[21] Amieu v Mudginberri Stations PTE Limited, (1986) HCA 46.
[22] (1999) 198 CLR 435
[23] Commissioner for Fair Trading v Voulon (2006) WASC 261
[24] [2000] FCA 629 at [79]- [80] (Merkel J).
[25] [2017] FJHC 13 at para 47
[26] [1993] pp 746 - 747
[27] [1985] pp.218 - 219
[28] (1999) 2 WLR 1305
[29] Templeton Insurance v Thomas (2013) EWCA Civ35 at 27, R V Kefford (2002) Cr. App. R (S) 106 and R v Seed and Stark (2007), 2 Cr. App. R (S) 69
[30] (1993) 32 NSWLR 262
[31] (1992) 26 NSWLR 309
[32] (2017) 256 FCR 90; [2017] FCAFC 111 at [101] (Besanko, Wigney and Bromwich JJ).
[33] Paramanondam v A.G [1972] 18 FLR 90 at p.99
[34] (2000) FCA 629 at 79-80
[35] (2018) 99 NSWLR 229
[36] Wood v Galea (1997) 92 A Crim R 287 at 290 and Smith v The Queen (1991) 25 NSWLR 1 at 13-18
[37] Barbaro v The Queen , [2014] HCA 2; (2014) 253 CLR 58 at 29-33
[38] Bessette v Conkey; 194 U.S 324, 333
[39] Paradise Transport Ltd v Land Transport Authority [2018] FJHC 844
[40] In the matter of Credit Corporation Fiji Ltd v Sisters Aircool & Electrical Services Limited [2012] FJHC 1496
[41] Rajendra Chaudhary, Civil Action No. HBC 313 of 2018
[42] (1991) (1) NZLR 91 (CA)
[43] [2015] NZHC 2239
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