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High Court of Fiji |
IN THE HIGH COURT OF FIJI
(WESTERN DIVISION) AT LAUTOKA
COMPANIES JURISDICTION
Winding Up Cause No. 8 of 2018
IN THE MATTER of MILLENIUM PLANT COMPANY FIJI LIMITED with registered office at Lot 21, Nasilivata Road, Namaka Industrial Subdivion, Namaka, Nadi and the registered postal address id P.O.Box 10554, Nadi Airport.
AND
IN THE MATTER of the Companies Act.
____________________________________
BETWEEN: MOHAMMED SAHIQ & SONS LIMITED a limited liability company with registered office at Masimasi, Sabeto.
CREDITOR
A N D: THE MILLENIUM PLANT COMPANY (FIJI) LIMITED with registered office at Lot 21, Nasilivata Road, Namaka Industrial Subdivision, Namaka, Nadi and the registered postal address is P.O.Box 10544, Nadi Airport.
RESPONDENT
Before: Master U.L. Mohamed Azhar
Counsels: Ms. A. Swamy with Vreetika for the Contributory
Mr. I. Tikoca for the Creditor
Date of Ruling : 10.12. 2021
RULING
01. This is an application by a contributory of the above named respondent company, Abinesh Ronald Kumar (the Contributory), pursuant to, among others, sections 531 and 553 (1) of the Companies Act 2015. The summons is supported by an affidavit sworn by the said Contributory and seeks the following orders:
- That the leave be granted to the Contributory Abinesh Ronald Kumar to institute the within application,
- That order that the Winding-up Order pronounced on 11th October 2018 be permanently stayed,
- Cost of this application be costs in the cause, and
- Such other further relief as this Honourable Court deems just and fair.
02. The factual background of the matter is that, the Respondent Company owed a sum of $ 103,449.11 to the creditor and the Applicant Company over a commercial transaction. The Applicant Company then served the statutory demand pursuant to section 515 of the Companies Act on the Respondent Company. The Respondent Company neither complied with the statutory demand, nor did it apply to set aside the same. The Applicant Company then brought the petition for winding up after expiry of 21 days form service of the said statutory demand on the Respondent Company. The Applicant Company complied with the Rules of Winding Up and the Respondent Company did not oppose the application in terms of section 15 of the Winding Up Rules 2015. This court, having satisfied with the application, ordered to wind up the Respondent Company.
03. The contributory then filed the instant summons seeking an order to stay the said winding up order and allow the Respondent Company to operate. The summons was opposed by the Applicant Company and the affidavit in opposition was filed. The contributory replied to the affidavit in opposition and filed an affidavit. At hearing of the summons both counsels tendered their written submission in addition to their oral submission. Considering the grounds for stay and the facts of this matter, the court suggested the counsels for the contributory to consider the payment of total debt which paved way to the application for winding up. The counsels agreed for the same and there were several adjournments on basis that the Respondent Company would pay the debt to the Applicant Company. However, the Respondent Company failed to pay the debts and finally the counsel too informed the court that there were no instructions from the company.
04. The courts established the doctrine that, if a creditor cannot get paid without winding up the debtor company, it is ex debito justitiae that he should have a winding up order. Irvine CJ in Re Concrete Pipd Ceme Cement Products Ltd [1925] ArgusLawRp 95; [1926] VLR 34 explained the development of this doctrine at page 38 as follows:
The right of the petitionreditor, where he has established any of the grounds for wior winding up set out in sec. 137 of the Companies Act 1915, is said to be ex debito justitiae. The expression first appears in this connection in the judgment of Lord Selborne in In re Western Canada Oil etc. Co. [1873] UKLawRpEq 160; [1873] 17 Eq., 1 at page 6, where he says –“I entirely agree with the doctrine of Lord Cranworth: that if a creditor cannot get paid without winding up, it is ex debito justitiae that he should have a winding-up order.” The reference is to the judgment of Lord Cranworth in Bowes v. Hope Life Insurance and Guarantee Co. [1883] UKLawRpCh 158; [1865] 24 Ch. D., 259 at p. 265. At page 402 His Lordship stated:-“I agree with what has been said, that it is not a discretionary matter with the Court when a debt is established and not satisfied to say whether the company shall be wound up or not; that is to say, if there be a valid debt established, valid both at law and in equity.”
05. It is the ability of a company to pay the debt, as and when it becomes due and payable, that matters at this point in time and not its wealth. A wealthy company may be commercially insolvent if it is unable to pay its debt even though it has more investments which are not realizable as and when the debt becomes due and payable. The only consideration to determine the solvency of a company in terms of section 514 of the Companies Act 2015 is its ability to pay debts when they become due and payable. If a company is unable to pay its debts the public interest requires such company to be wound up, irrespective of its surplus of assets which are non-realizable as and when the debts becomes due and payable, to avoid the risk and prejudice to those with whom such company will do business in future. This is the rationale for the court to develop the above mentioned doctrine that, it is ex debito justitiae that the creditor should have a winding up order if his undisputed debt is not paid.
06. Conversely, the law of every system gives wide discretion to the court to stay such winding up orders on such terms and conditions as it thinks fit. Similarly, the section 553 (1) of Companies Act 2015 confers discretionary power on the court to stay all proceedings in relation to winding up of a company, at any time after an order for winding up. The section reads:
Power to stay winding up
553 (1) The Court may, at any time after an order for winding up, on the application either of the liquidator or the Official Receiver or any creditor or contributory, and on proof to the satisfaction of the Court that all proceedings in relation to the winding up ought to be stayed, make an order staying the proceedings, either altogether or for a limited time, on such terms and conditions as the Court thinks fit.
07. This jurisdiction of the court could only be invoked by the Liquidator or the Official Receiver or any Creditor or Contributory of the company. The underlying reason is to avoid the costs of unsuccessful applications falling on the general body of creditors when it is made payable by the company. Pennycuick V.C. inPractice Note Note (Winding Up Order: Rescission)(No. 2) [1971] 1 W.L.R. 757 said:
After discussith other judges of the Companies Court, I have the following further statement to make with with regard to applications
to disch#160;ng up orders: see: see Practite (Winding ding uing up Order: Rescission) [1971] 1. W.L.R. 4. Application#160;resci60;win0;winding up orders will henceforward only be entertained if made (a) by a by a creditor, or (b) by a
contributory, or (c)he company jointly with a creditor or with a contributory.
08. The courts, in exercising the discretion conferred on them with reference to staying proceedings under an order for the winding-up
of a company, adopted and acted upon the principles laid down in cases involving rescinding a receiving order or annulling an adjudication
in bankruptcy against an individual. In those cases the courts refused to act upon the mere assent of the creditors, and considered
not only whether what is proposed is for the benefit of the creditors, but also whether the rescission or annulment will be conducive
or detrimental to commercial morality and to the interests of the public at large. Buckley J in In re Telescriptor Syndicate, Limited (1903) 2 Ch. D. 174 followed the principles laid down by the Court of Appeal in In re Hester [1889] UKLawRpKQB 44; (22 Q.B.D. 632), In re Flatau ([1893] 2 Q.B. 219) and In re Taylor. ([1901] 1 K.B. 744) and adopted an analogical approach in winding up companies for insolvency. He said at pages 180 and 181that:
Where application is made in bankruptcy to rescind a receiving order or to annul an adjudication, the Court refuses to act upon the mere assent of the creditors in the matter, and considers not only whether what is proposed is for the benefit of the creditors, but also whether it is conducive or detrimental to commercial morality ad to the interests of the public at large. The mere consent of the creditors is but an element in the case. In In re Hester (1) some trenchant observations of Fry L.J. will be found on the idle notion that the Court is bound by the consents of the creditors. The Court has to exercise a discretion. It is bound to regard not merely the interests of the creditors. It has a duty with regard to the commercial morality of the county: see In re Hester [1889] UKLawRpKQB 44; (22 Q.B.D. 632); In re Flatau ([1893] 2 Q.B. 219); In re Taylor. ([1901] 1 K.B. 744) I am here asked to exercise an analogous jurisdiction, and I may say that it is in my opinion desirable that so far as possible the Court should not assume a different attitude or act upon a different principle in the winding-up of a company and in the bankruptcy of an individual.
09. The above approach has been followed in other jurisdictions as well. Gillard J followed the same approach in Re Mascot Home Furnishers Pty Ltd. (In liquidation), Re Spaceline Industries (Australia) Pty Ltd (In liquidation) [1970] VicRp 78; [1970 V.R 593. In the meantime, the courts directed that, the discretionary power of the court to revoke or vary an order of winding up at any time before it is perfected is one that ought to be exercised with great caution. Megarry J in his Practice Note (WinUp g Up Order: Rescission)(No. 2) [1971] 1 W.L.R. 4 ed thed that:
In recent years, applications scind a winding up order before it has been drawn up have become increasingly common. OwingOwing to the great increase in the number ch orders it often happens pens that some time elapses before the order can be drawn up. The making of the order, however, affects all creditors of the company, and gives the Official Receiver authority to act forthwith; and in the circumstances the inherewer of the court ourt to revoke or vary an order at any time before it is perfected is one that ought to be exercised with greation. Accordingly, although the m is one for the discreiscretion of the court  in each case, cation to reso rescind a winding up order will not normally be entertained by the court unless it is made within three or four days of the order, and is sued by an affidavit of assets and liabilities. If an apan application is made later than this, the affidavit should also establis exceptional circumstances relied upon as justifying the aphe application.
“From the various authorities, it seems that on an application for a stay, the following principles emerge:—
1. The granting of a stay is a discretionary matter, and there is a clear onus on the applicant to make out a positive case for a stay: In Re: Calgary and Edmonton Land Co. Ltd. (In liq.) (1975) 1 W.L.R. 355 at pp. 358/9 per Megarry J. See also s.243 of the Act.
2. There must be service of notice of the application for a stay on all creditors and contributories, and proof of this: Re South Barrule State Quarry Co. (1869) 8 Eq. 688; re Bank of Queensland Ltd. (1870) 2 Q.S.C.R. 113.
3. The nature and extent of the creditors must be shown, and whether or not all debts have been discharged: Krextile Holdings Pty. Ltd. v. Widdows (supra); Re Data Homes Pty. Ltd. (supra).
4. The attitude of creditors, contributories and the liquidator is a relevant consideration: s.243(1), Calgary and Edmonton Land Co. Ltd. (supra).
5. The current trading position and general solvency of the company should be demonstrated. Solvency is of significance when a stay of proceedings in the winding-up is sought: In re a Private Company [1935] NZGazLawRp 17; (1935) N.Z.L.R. 120; Re Mascot Home Furnishers Pty. Ltd. [1970] VicRp 78; (1970) V.R. 593 at p. 598.
6. If there has been non-compliance by directors with their statutory duties as to the giving of information or furnishing a statement of affairs, a full explanation of the reasons and circumstances should he given: Re Telescriptor Syndicate Ltd. (supra).
7. The general background and circumstances which led to the winding-up order should be explained: Krextile Holdings Pty. Ltd. v. Widdows (supra).
8. The nature of the business carried on by the company should be demonstrated, and whether or not the conduct of the company was in any way contrary to “commercial morality” or the “public interest”: Krextile Holdings Pty. Ltd. v. Widdows (supra); Re Data Homes Pty. Ltd. (supra).
The foregoing matters are not intended to be exhaustive......”
517.—(1) This section applies where, on an application to set aside a Statutory Demand, the Court is satisfied of either or both of the following—
(a) that there is a genuinp dispute between the Comp160;&and thed the resporespondent about the existence or amount of a debt to the demand relates;
(b) tha Company&pany has an o anetting claim. (Em. (Emphasis added).
The court’s initial approach should be that hopelessly insolvent companies should be wound up. No countenance should by exercising powers under s. 243 be given to any suggestion that the court was condoning or encouraging persons in our commercial community to carry on business activities in a company which was handicapped by a heavy burden of indebtedness and thereby unable to pay its debts in full at any given period.
It seems to me, therefore, that what I ought to do in this case is this. I do not for a moment say how the facts as regards this company may work out, but I decline to order a stay of these proceedings until it is proved to my satisfaction that the winding up order ought to be stayed. That will not be proved to my satisfaction until is shewn to me that all the facts are as I hope they are- that the trading operations of this company have been fair and above-board.
Quite apart from any authority (and I may mention In Re Telescriptor Syndicate Ltd [1903] UKLawRpCh 65; [1903] 2 Ch. 174) this language seems to me to make it abundantly clear that the jurisdiction is discretionary and that it lies on those who seek a stay to make out a sufficient case for it. In particular, the words “satisfied”, “just and beneficial”, “satisfaction of the court” and “ought to be stayed” seem to me to indicate that the applicant for a stay must make out a case that carries conviction.
U.L. Mohamed Azhar
Master of the High Court
At Lautoka
10.12.2021
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