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High Court of Fiji |
IN THE HIGH COURT OF FIJI
WESTERN DIVISION
AT LAUTOKA
[CIVIL JURISDICTION]
Civil Action No. HBC 239 of 2015
BETWEEN
RAVIN NARAYAN SHARMA of Lautoka City, Unemployed.
Plaintiff
AND
KAMAL PRASAD, ANISH PRASAD and URMILA PRASAD
all of Lautoka City trading as VIJENDRA’S TAILORING CENTRE
of Yasawa Street, Lautoka
Defendants
Before : Master U.L. Mohamed Azhar
Counsels : Mr. Raratabu for the Plaintiff
Ms. Ravai for the Defendant
Date of Ruling : 03rd April 2018
RULING
01. Before me is the Notice of Motion filed on 09.01.2017 by the defendants. It states that, the application is made pursuant to Order 2 rule 2 (2), Order 13 rule 10 and Order 19 rule 9 of the High Court Rule and the inherent jurisdiction of this court. The defendant by this motion sought the following orders from the court:
- That, the default judgment entered against the defendants on the 15th day of November 2016 to be set aside,
- That, the Statement of Defence and Counter Claim which was struck out on 16th day of September 2016 is to be reinstated in this action,
- Such further and/or other orders as deemed necessary by this Honourable Court.
02. The Motion was supported by the affidavit sworn by the one Cedric Steven, the law clerk of the defendants’ solicitors. The plaintiff opposed the Motion and filed the affidavit in opposition which was later replied by an affidavit sworn by the first named defendant. The counsels for both parties agreed to dispose this motion by way of written submission and accordingly, they filed their respective submission citing the relevant authorities.
03. Since the Motion seeks to set aside the default judgment entered against the defendants, it would be prudent to briefly note the circumstances of entering default judgments, both final and interlocutory, and court’s power to set aside the same, before embarking on the contentious issues to be decided by the court in this matter. There are various rules which allow entering judgments for default of the parties to an action. The rules (1 to 6) under Order 13 provide for entering default judgments for failure to give notice of intention to defend a matter, and the appropriate rule under that Order to be followed depending on the nature of the claims. Finally, the rule 10 under that Order provides for the discretion to set aside any of such default judgment entered in accordance with the various rules under that Order. The court can enter the judgment against the party who does not appear at the hearing of summons under Order 14 rules 1 and 5, and the judgment given may be set aside in terms of Order 14 rule 11.
04. The Order 16 rule 5 (2) allows the court to enter the judgment for default of a third party or the defendant and also gives discretion to set aside or vary the judgments so entered under that rule. Order 19 is similar to Order 13 in providing different rules depending on the nature of the claims. However, the rules under this Order apply, only if the defendant fails to file and serve the defence within the specified period. Again the rule 9 provides for the discretionary power to set aside the same. Finally, the court can give judgment when a party fails to appear on the trial date and the same judgment may be set aside under and by virtue of Order 35 rule 2. It should be noted here that, whenever the rules provide for entering default judgments, they also specifically provide for the discretion to set aside the same.
05. Since the courts given discretionary power to set aside the judgments entered for the default of any party, the courts have set the principles applicable and settled the law on exercising this discretion and setting aside a default judgement, both in common law jurisdiction and our local jurisdiction. There are number of authorities, which are frequently cited by the courts when exercising the discretion to set aside the judgments entered for the default of any party. Anlaby v. Praetorius [1888] UKLawRpKQB 55; (1888) 20 Q.B.D. 764; Mishra v Car Rentals (Pacific) Ltd [1985] FJCA 11; [1985] 31 FLR 49 (ember 1985); O>O’Shannessy v Dasun Hair Designers Ltd [1980] 2 NZLR 762; Evans v Bartlam [1937] 2 All E.R. 646; Burns v. Kondel [1971] 1 Lloyds Rep 554; Fiji National Provident Fund v Datt [1988] FJHC 4; (1988) 34 FLR 67 (22 July 1988); Eni Khan v. Ameeran Bibi & Ors (HBC 3/98S, 27 March 2003; Wearsmart Textiles Limited v General Machinery Hire limited and Shareen Kumar Sharma( 1998) FJCA26; Abu 0030u.97s (29 May 1998); Fiji National Provident Fund v Datt [1988] FJHC 4; [1988] 34 FLR 67 (22 July 1988 ) are the most important foreign and local cases, to name a few. This court extensively discussed the principles in a recent case of Chand v M R Khan Brothers Transport Company [2017] FJHC 679; HBC197.2016 which was decided on 19th of September 2017.
06. Mostly, the default judgments are entered either under Order 13 or Order 19, when a case is at the pre-trial stage, and the primary consideration, in setting aside, is whether the defendants have merits to which the Court should pay heed. If merits are shown the court will not prima facie desire to let a judgment pass, on which there has been no proper adjudication. However, the default judgment, which was entered against the defendants in the instant case, was not in accordance with any of the above procedures. The defendant duly filed the notice intention to defend which was followed by the statement of defence and counter claim. The plaintiff then filed the reply to the defence and defence to counter claim. After closure of pleadings, the plaintiff filed the summons for direction, which was returnable on 01.09.2016. There is no affidavit of service for the proof that, the summons for directions was served on the defendants. Neither the defendants nor their solicitors appeared on that day. However, the court made orders in terms of the summons and directed the plaintiff to file the Affidavit Verifying List of Documents. The matter was then adjourned to 16.09.2016. There was no representation for the defendants on that day too. The court then struck out the defence and counter calim for non-appearance for two consecutive days. The plaintiff then entered the default judgment on 15.11.2016. Upon service of default judgment, the defendants filed this Motion seeking orders mentioned above.
07. As I discussed above, the reasons and the procedure for entering default judgments are provided in the rules. However, the reason and the procedure for entering default judgment against the defendnats in this case is peculiar to the rules, the main question is whether the High Court Rules allow the court to strike out a defence for non-appearance of the defendant on mention days and also allow the plaintiff to enter the default judgment as he did in this case. If the above question is answered affirmatively, then rules should provide for the discretion too, to set aside the same. If it is answered negatively, then there is no option for the court than reversing the said order of striking out of the defence and counter claim, and reinstating the defence that was struck out. Unfortunately, neither the plaintiff nor the defendant advanced any argument on this this line. The defendant only argues that, the default judgement was irregularly entered, and on the other hand, the plaintiff states that, the supporting affidavit is not proper as it was deposed by the law clerk, and the defendant did not have intention to defend as they failed to appear on two consecutive days.
08. Since the plaintiff raised the concern on the supporting affidavit filed on behalf of the defendants, I must first deal this issue before finding the answer to the question raised in the preceding paragraph, as the argument of the plaintiff shakes up the base of the defendants’ Motion. The plaintiff’s counsel, citing several cases on swearing an affidavit by the law clerk, objected the supporting affidavit of law clerk of the defendants’ solicitors, as it lacks the authority to do so.
09. The Order 41 of the High Court Rules deals with the matters connected with the affidavits that are filed in civil suits. There is no requirement, in any of the rules under this Order, for an authority for a person who swears an affidavit. The only rule, that provides for the contents of an affidavit, is the rule 5, which reads;
Contents of Affidavit (O.41, r.5)
5.-(1) Subject to Order 14, rules 2(2) and 4(2), to Order 86, rule 2(1), to paragraph (2) of this rule and to any order made under Order 38, rule 3, an affidavit may contain only such facts as the deponent is able of his own knowledge to prove.
(2) An affidavit sworn for the purpose of being used in interlocutory proceedings may contain statements of information or belief with the sources and grounds thereof.(Emphasis added).
Contents of affidavit (O.41, r.5)
5. (1) Subject to –
(a) Order 14, rule 2(2) and 4(2);
(b) Order 86, rule 2(1) and 4(1A);
(ba) Order 88, rule 5(2A);
(c) Order 113, rule 3;
(d) Paragraph (2) of this rule, and
An affidavit may contain only such facts as the deponent is able of his own knowledge to prove.
(2) An affidavit sworn for the purpose of being used in interlocutory proceedings may contain statements of information or belief with the sources and grounds thereof.
Effect of Rule
This rule was taken from the former O.38, r.3. Its effect is to require that save in the excepted cases, an affidavit must contain the evidence of the deponent, as to such facts only as he is able to speak to of his own knowledge, and to this extent, equating affidavit evidence to oral evidence given in Court.
The excepted cases are:
(1) Affidavits under O.14, rr. 2 (2) and 4(2) either by the plaintiff or by the defendant;
(2) Affidavits under O.86, rr. 2 (1) and 4 (1A) either by the plaintiff or defendant;
(2A) Affidavits under O.86, r.5 (2A) in support of applications by a mortgagee claiming possession or payment;
(3) Affidavits under O.88, r.5(2A) in support of applications by mortgagees for possession or payment;
(4) Affidavits under O.113, r.3 on behalf of the plaintiff in summary proceedings for possession of land;
(5) Affidavits for use in interlocutory proceedings; and
Affidavits made pursuant to an order under O.38, r.3(2) that evidence of any particular fact may be given at the trial by statement on oath of information or belief. (Emphasis added).
Affidavits are a source of providing evidence and anyone privy to knowledge and information has a right to depose to an affidavit. (Emphasis added).
In the Supreme Court Practice (1967) (The White Book) the following note appears at page 117:
‘The affidavit may be made by the Plaintiff or by any person duthorized to make it. If not made by the Plaintiff, the affi affidavit itself must state that the person making it is duly authorized to do so- Chingwin –ssellssell (1910) 27 T.L.R. 21”.
“Where an affidavit in support of a summons under Order 14 is sworn by a person other than the plaintiff he should state his means of knowledge and also the fact that he is authorized to make the affidavit.”
There was a liquidated demand, but that the affidavit was irregular, in as much as the deponent was not a person who could swear positively to the facts and verify the cause of action and the amount claimed within Order XIV, r.1, and his affidavit was only made on information and belief. The conditions imposed by the rule were not fulfilled, and the Court had no jurisdiction to make an order under Order XIV.
He says, “I verily believe that there is no defence to this action,” and then, “It is within my own knowledge that the said debt was incurred and is still due and owing, such knowledge being obtained from correspondence received from the plaintiff and also from correspondence and conversations I have had with Messers. Pritchard, Englefield & Co. I am duly authorized by the plaintiff to make this affidavit.” In my opinion it is impossible to say that this is an affidavit made by a person who can swear positively to the facts. It is obviously nothing more than a statement made on his information and belief, that information being derived from his own client, the plaintiff, who tells him this is due – and that obviously will not be enough to enable him to make the affidavit – and from further statements made by Pritchard, Englefield & Co., who, beyond all doubt, were not the solicitors for the defendant Grunwaldt at the time when those statements were made. Is it possible that the deponent can swear positively to the facts as to the stamped paper for forty-three documents, which is the first item in the bill which is given here? Is it possible that he can swear this sum was paid? I might go through all the items. Is it possible that he can swear that the fees charged by Dr. Lagos and another attorney, amounting to 1,500l in all, were due? It seems to me we should be giving an irrational and improper extension to Order XIV, r.1, if we said that such an affidavit as that, made in aid of the plaintiff, was sufficient to bring his claim within the peculiar provisions of Order XIV. In my opinion on that ground there was no jurisdiction under Order XIV, to make the order which was made. We might as well say that the plaintiff’s solicitor in every case could make an affidavit to satisfy Order XIV, and that would be dangerous beyond anything. There may be cases (I do not wish to be misunderstood on this point) in which the plaintiff’s solicitor or the plaintiff’s solicitor’s clerk may be perfectly competent to make an affidavit satisfying the conditions of Order XIV, r.1. There are no conditions here which justify us in saying that the plaintiff’s solicitor could make the affidavit and swear positively to the facts, and swear positively verifying the amount claimed.(Emphasis added)
'When the matter was called before the Master on 20.9.2010, the Master could and should have set a time frame to have pre-trial conference
since the plaintiffs had commenced their action by way of Writ of Summons. Therefore, it is my considered view that the Master should nve stve struck out the plaintiffs' action solely on the ground solely on the ground of non-appearance.(Emphasis added).
One of the first and highest duties o Courts is to take care that the act of the Court does no injury to any of the Suitors, and, and when the expression “the act of the Court” is used, it does not mean merely the act of the Primary Court, or of any intermediate Court of appeal, but the act of the Court as a whole, from the lowest Court which entertains jurisdiction over the matter up to the highest Court which finally disposes of the case. It is the duty of the aggregate of those Tribunals, if I may use the expression, to take care that no act of the Court in the course of the whole of the proceedings does an injury to the suitors in the Court.
"There is a strong distincstinction between setting aside a judgment for irregularity in which case the Court has no discretion to refuse to set it aside, and setting it aside where the judgment though regular, has been obtained through some slip or error on the part of the defendant in which case the Court has a discretion to impose terms as a condition of granting the defendant relief".
U.L. Mohamed Azhar
Master of High Court
At Lautoka
03/04/2018
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