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Kento (Fiji) Ltd v Naobeka Investment Ltd [2018] FJHC 169; HBC44.2016 (9 March 2018)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF FIJI
WESTERN DIVISION AT LAUTOKA

CIVIL JURISDICTION

HBC NO. 44 OF 2016


KENTO (FIJI) LIMITED

[PLAINTIFF/APPLICANT]


V


NAOBEKA INVESTMENT LIMITED

[1ST DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT]


AND


SOUTH SEA CRUISES LIMITED

[2ND DEFENDANT/RESPONDENT]


Counsel : Mr. S. Inoke for the Plaintiff/Applicant.

: Mr. I. Tikoca for the 1st Defendant/Respondent.

: Ms. Tabuadua for the 2nd Defendant/Respondent.

Written Submissions by : Applicant on 20th December, 2017

2nd Respondent on 2nd December, 2017

Date of Hearing : 9th November, 2017

Date of Ruling : 9th March, 2018

Ruling by : Justice Mr. Mohamed Mackie

_____________________________________________________________________________

R U L I N G
[On Indemnity Cost]

_____________________________________________________________________________


  1. Introduction:
    1. This ruling pertains to an application for Indemnity Cost made, on behalf of the1st and 2nd Defendant - Respondent on 9th November2017, when the application for the Extension of Time for Leave to Appeal, Leave to Appeal and Stay, that had been made by the Plaintiff- Applicant (applicant) on 15th December 2016, was withdrawn before me.
    2. Instead, the learned Counsel for the applicant (applicant’s counsel) opted to proceed with the hearing into a similar application of the applicant that had been made in the action bearing No: - HBC -27/2016 that involves the parties in this action and two other defendants.
    3. The ruling in the said action No: HBC-27 -2016 was pronounced by me on 23rd February 2018 granting the applicant’s application for the extension of time to file leave to appeal and leave to appeal against the learned Master’s ruling dated 18th November 2016, and no cost was ordered in favour of the 2nd respondent, hereof, who happened to be the 2nd respondent in that application too, albeit cost was moved for on its behalf, for the reasons stated in that ruling.
  2. Brief History: (Action No:- HBC-44 of 2016)
    1. The applicant filed the writ of summons together with the statement of claim against the 1st and the 2nd defendant – respondents (respondents) on 15th March 2016.
    2. The 2nd respondent filed the statement of defense on 27th April 2016.
    1. The 2nd respondent filed the striking out application on 4th May 2016.
    1. This action was struck out by the leaned Master (Master) on 18th November 2016 and by the impugned ruling summarily assessed cost of $500.00 to both the respondents was ordered.
    2. The applicant filed the application for the leave for extension of time for leave to appeal and leave to appeal on 15th December 2016.
    3. The 2nd respondent filed its reply affidavit on 23rd February 2017.
    4. The matter came up for hearing before me on 9th November 2017, as stated above, being subjected to few mention dates necessitated due to change of judges.
  1. The Law and the Principles that Govern the Indemnity Cost:
    1. Order 62, Rule 37 of the High Court Rules empowers courts to award indemnity costs at its discretion. For the sake of completeness, Order 62, Rule 37 is reproduced below.

Amount of Indemnity costs (O.62, r.37)

37. - (1) the amount of costs to be allowed shall (subject to rule 18 and to any order of the Court) be in the discretion of the taxing officer.


  1. G.E. Dal Pont, in “Law of Costs”, Third Edition, writes at Page 533 and 534;

‘Indemnity’ Basis


“Other than in the High Court, Tasmania and Western Australia, statute or court rules make specific provision for taxation on an indemnity basis. Other than in the Family Law and Queensland rules – which define the ‘indemnity basis’ in terms akin to the traditional ‘solicitor and client basis’ – the ‘indemnity basis’ is defined in largely common terms to cover all costs incurred by the person in whose favour costs are ordered except to the extent that they are of general law concept of ‘indemnity costs ’. The power to make such an order in the High Court and Tasmania stems from the general costs discretion vested in superior courts, and in Western Australia can arguably moreover be sourced from a specific statutory provision.


Although all costs ordered as between party and party are, pursuant to the ‘costs indemnity rule’, indemnity costs in one sense, an order for ‘ indemnity costs ’, or that costs be taxed on an ‘indemnity basis’, is intended to go further. Yet the object in ordering indemnity costs remains compensatory and not penal. References in judgments to a ‘punitive’ costs order in this context must be seen against the backdrop of the reprehensible conduct that often justifies an award of indemnity costs rather than impinging upon the compensatory aim. Accordingly, such an order does not enable a claimant to recover more costs than he or she has incurred.”


  1. Principles Governing Indemnity Costs: Principles governing the award of indemnity costs are set out in a number of authorities.
  1. Discussion:-
    1. Apart from the oral submissions made at the hearing, the learned Counsel for the 2nd respondent (2nd respondent’s Counsel) and the applicant’s Counsel have tendered respective written submissions, for which I am grateful to them.
    2. It is to be noted that when the Learned Master struck out this action on 18th November 2016, by the impugned ruling, the cost to be paid to both the 1st and the 2nd respondents by the applicant was also fixed as summarily assessed cost of $500.00. It means that for the whole action, till it’s striking out, the total cost granted for both the respondents was limited to $500.00 and that order remains unchallenged.
    3. Thus, the 2nd respondent’s claim for cost should be limited only to subsequent proceedings, commenced by the applicant on 15th December 2016 by filing the application for extension of time and leave to appeal, which was withdrawn by the applicant’s counsel on 9th November 2017, without leaving room for incurring further costs, admittedly, by giving notice by the applicant’s solicitors prior to the hearing date.
    4. Though, the learned Counsel for the 1st respondent too joined the Counsel for the 2nd respondent in moving for indemnity costs, I find that no notice of such move has been given by the 1st respondent’s Solicitors to the applicant’s Solicitors. The reply affidavit filed by ASIVENI LUTUMAILAGI, for and on behalf of the 1st respondent, does not speak about any cost.
    5. Therefore, in the absence of notice for indemnity cost, the 1st respondent shall not be entitled for such cost. So the cost what the 1st respondent can now seek, beyond the cost ordered by Master on 18th November 2016, is not indemnity cost.
    6. This 2nd respondent, in this action No: HBC - 44 of 2016, which has reached its tail end , and in the actions bearing No:- HBC 27 of 2016, which awaits its appellate process after the extension of time and leave to appeal being granted, has so far been defended by the same firm of Solicitors.
    7. The action No:-HBC- 27 of 2016 still stands to proceed for trial against the 2nd and 3rd respondents since the striking out therein was only in respect of this 1st respondent and 4th defendant- respondent therein and in the event the 2nd respondent succeeds in that action at the end, perhaps it can claim substantial cost for all the work done in that action.
    8. The 2nd respondent who had filed its Statement of defense in this action 44 of 2016, to contest the matter subsequently filed the striking out application in order to have a short cut and though succeeded in it, had to end up with only a summarily assessed cost of $500.00, that too to be shared with the 1st respondent. Had the action proceeded for trial without interruption, and in the event the 2nd respondent succeeded on its apparently, arguable and sound defense it would have, probably, reaped a higher cost.
    9. All the receipts tendered, annexed to the reply affidavit of Nouzab Fareed on behalf of the 2nd respondent, in proof of its purported payments to the Solicitors are in relation to the period prior to 18th November 2016 on which date the striking out order was made, except for one receipt dated 13th January 2017 for 2778.27 dollars.
    10. Since the notice of the leave to appeal and the extension of time to appeal applications had been served on the 2nd respondent , admittedly, only on 23rd January 2017 the above payment of $2772.27 purportedly made on 13th January 2017could not have been on the account of these proceedings necessitated by the leave to appeal application of the applicant.
    11. The 2nd respondent has not satisfied this court that it had to incur a substantial cost in relation to this action after the impugned ruling of striking out was made on 18th November 2016. The subsequent Court appearances have been made not purely for HBC-44/16 action. The 2nd respondent is at liberty to make its claim for suitable cost in relation to HBC-27 of 2016, provided it successfully defends it and subject to any other considerations.
    12. I observe that delay, if any, occurred during the pendency of the leave to appeal application preferred by the applicant was not due to any specific fault on the part of the applicant and the applicant has shown due diligence during the process and also withdrawn it at the earliest available opportunity, which in turn has saved all the parties from further expenses.

Was there reprehensible conduct on the part of the Plaintiff?

  1. To justify an award of indemnity costs, the Court needs to be satisfied that the applicant has conducted itself “wholly unreasonably in connection with the hearing” and that such conduct was “reprehensible...to signify the Court’s condemnation as to the way the applicant has conducted the litigation. (Tuidama v Devi Civil Action No. HBC105.2008 (18 February 2009); Rokotuiviwa v Seveci Civil Action No. HBC374.2007 (12 September 2008); Singh v Naupoto (Unreported, High Court of Fiji at Suva, Civil Action No: HBC199 of 2008, 8 August 2008)
  2. I am not satisfied that the applicant has conducted itself in such a “reprehensible” manner, such as to warrant the Court’s condemnation and an award of indemnity costs. I note that the applicant has only endeavored to continue to prosecute its ill-fated action by filing the leave to appeal application, against the 1st and 2nd respondents, on the grounds of appeal relied on for its relief.
  3. I cannot see any abuse of process by the applicant, in merely making its application for leave to extend the time and for appeal. The 2nd respondent has not proved that it had to defend the leave to appeal application of the applicant in this action incurring extra and substantial cost. It has just defended this application while purportedly defending the application in the connected matter HBC: 27 of 2016, which did not warrant the 2nd respondent to actively participate as he was not a party to the application.
  4. The 2nd respondent has not substantiated its purported claim for indemnity cost to be imposed on the applicant in relation to the leave to appeal application of the applicant in this matter.
  5. In my view, payment of summarily assed nominal cost of $ 500.00 each to the 1st and 2nd respondents would suffice, in order to do justice, on account of the proceedings necessitated on the applicant’s application.
  1. Final Orders:
    1. The application for the indemnity cost by the 1st and 2nd respondents against the applicant refused.
    2. The applicant shall pay unto the 1st and 2nd respondents $500.00 each being the summarily assessed cost within 3 weeks. Total cost will be $ 1000.00.
    3. Proceedings stand terminated.

........................................
A.M. Mohamed Mackie

JUDGE
At Lautoka

9th March, 2018



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