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High Court of Fiji |
IN THE HIGH COURT OF FIJI
AT SUVA
MISCELLANEOUS JURISDICTION
MISCELLANOUES CASE NO. HAM 199 OF 2016S
BETWEEN : AHMAD RIAZ UD DEAN
APPLICANT
AND : THE STATE
RESPONDENT
Counsels : Ms. S. Vaniqi for Applicant
Ms. S. Navia and S. Tivao for Respondent
Hearings : 17 March 2017, 15 and 26 June, 2018
Judgment : 28 December, 2018
JUDGMENT
FIRST COUNT
Statement of Offence
KEEPING A BROTHEL: Contrary to Section 170 of the Penal Code, Cap. 17.
Particulars of Offence
AHMAD RIAZ UD DEAN f/n Gutlam Ali between the 1st day of January, 2008 to the 31st day of December, 2008 at Suva in the Central Division, managed a brothel.
SECOND COUNT
Statement of Offence
KEEPING A BROTHEL: Contrary to Section 170 of the Penal Code, Cap. 17.
Particulars of Offence
AHMAD RIAZ UD DEAN f/n Gutlam Ali between the 1st day of January, 2009 to the 31st day of January, 2010 at Suva in the Central Division, managed a brothel.
THIRD COUNT
Statement of Offence
KEEPING A BROTHEL: Contrary to section 233 (a) of the Crimes Decree No. 44 of 2009.
Particulars of Offence
AHMAD RIAZ UD DEAN f/n Gutlam Ali between the 1st day of February, 2010 to the 19th day of February, 2011 at Suva in the Central Division, managed a brothel.
“DATE EVENT
2011
Pre-Filing of Charges
21st February 2011 Charged for the offence of Managing a Brothel at the Major Crimes Unit. The accused was bailed by police to appear in the Suva Magistrates’ Court on 3rd March 2011. No record of whether the charge was filed in the Suva Magistrate’s Court.
2015
Filing of Charges
10TH September 2015 Charge and summons against the accused was filed at the Suva Magistrates’ Court by ODPP. The same was served to the accused on 5th October 2015. The accused was to appear in the Suva Magistrates’ Court on 9th October 2015.
9th October 2015 1st Call
Case called before RM George, the charge was read out to the accused and he was given his legal right. The accused wishes to engage a counsel. State sought time to prepare disclosures. The matter was adjourned to 2/12/2015. Bail was extended.
2nd December 2015 Mention
The accused was served with full disclosures. Right to counsel was again given to the accused. He informed the court that he will peruse the disclosures and see if he needs a lawyer. He also informed the Court that he will be writing to ODPP as police had charged him differently from ODPP. State informed the Court that police had charged the accused and released on bail; however, the charges were never filed in court. The file was sent to ODPP for sufficiency of evidence. The ODPP found that there was sufficient evidence to proceed and also there were sufficient evidence to charge the accused for other charges; therefore, proceeded with it. RM George explained to the accused that ODPP have the right to change the charges against him. The accused still maintained that he will write to ODPP. The matter was adjourned to 4/2/16 for plea and check on the representation of the accused.
04th February 2016 Mention
Case called in court before RM George. Mr Bulisea appeared for the accused on instructions of Vaniqi Lawyers. The accused informed the court that he had made representation to ODPP on 18/1/16. The State asked for further time to consider the same. The matter was adjourned to 29/3/16. Bail extended.
29th March 2016 Mention
The accused was present with his counsel, Ms. Vaniqi. State sought further time to confirm its position on the representation made by the accused. RM George warned the State to finalise their position. The matter was adjourned to 29/4/16. Bail was extended.
29th April 2016 Mention
Case adjourned to 24/5/16 for Mention. Accused was not present. Bench Warrant issued.
02nd May 2016 Returnable Date of Bench Warrant
Case called before RM George. The accused was present. The State informed the court that they have considered the representation made by the accused and confirmed that they will continue with the matter. The accused took his plea. He pleaded not guilty to all the three counts. The matter was adjourned to 28/11/16 for mention to fix a trial date. Bail extended.
28th November 2016 Mention
Case called before RM George. Ms. Vaniqi informed the court that they have filed an application for Stay in the High Court. Trial
date could not be fixed due to the application made in the High Court. The matter was adjourned pending the High Court application”.
“1. THAT I am the abovenamed Applicant.
- 1st January 2008 till 31st December 2008 for Count 1,
- from 1st January 2009 till 31st January, 2010 for Count 2,
- and between 1st February 2010 till 19th February, 2011 for Count 3.
“ In R v Derby Crown Court, exp Brooks [1984] 80 Cr. App. R. 164, Sir Roger Ormrod said:
“The power to stop a prosecution arises only when it is an abuse of the process of the court. It may be an abuse of processes if either: (a) the prosecution have manipulated or misused the process of the court so as to deprive the defendant of a protection provided by law or to take unfair advantage of a technicality, or (b) on the balance of probability the defendant has been, or will be, prejudiced in the prosecution of or conduct of his defence by delay on the part of the prosecution which is unjustifiable: for example, not due to the complexity of the inquiry and preparation of the prosecution case, or to the action of the defendant or his co-accused or to genuine difficulty in effecting service”.
The inherent power to stay criminal proceedings to prevent abuse of process has long been recognised in common law. But it should only be employed in exceptional circumstances (State v Waisale Rokotuiwai HAC 009 of 1995).
In case of Director of Public Prosecutions v Jackaran Tokai and others (Trinidad and Tobago)[1996] (12th June 1996) Privy Council Appeal No. 53 of 1995 (Judgment delivered on 12th June, 1996).
Their Lordships said:
“However, we remind ourselves of the principles outlined earlier in this judgment and the observation of Lord Morris of Borth-y-Gest in Connelly v Director of Public Prosecutions [1964] A.C.1254,1304, that:
‘generally speaking a prosecutor has as much right as a defendant to demand a verdict of a jury on an outstanding indictment, and where either demands a verdict a judge has no jurisdiction to stand in the way of it’.
Stays imposed on the grounds of delay or for any other reason should only be employed in exceptional circumstances. If they were to become a matter of routine, it would be only a short time before the public, understandably, viewed the process with suspicion and mistrust. We respectfully adopt the reasoning of Brennan J. in Jago v District Court of New South Wales [1989] HCA 46; (1989) 168 C.L.R. 23.
In principle, therefore, even where the delay can be said to be unjustifiable, the imposition of a Permanent Stay should be the exception rather than the rule. Still more rare should be cases where a stay can properly be imposed in the absence of any fault on the part of the complainant or prosecution. Delay due merely to the complexity of the case or contributed to by the actions of the defendant himself should never be the foundation for a stay.
In answer to the second question posed by the Attorney-General, no stay should be imposed unless the defendant shows on the balance of probabilities that owing to the delay he will suffer serious prejudice to the extent that no fair trial can be held: in other words, that the continuance of the prosecution amounts to a misuse of the process of the court. In assessing whether there is likely to be prejudice and if so whether it can properly be described as serious, the following matters should be borne in mind: first, the power of the judge at common law and under the Police and Criminal Evidence Act 1984 to regulate the admissibility of evidence; secondly, the trial process itself, which should ensure that all relevant factual issues arising from delay will be placed before the jury as part of the evidence for their consideration, together with the powers of the judge to give appropriate directions to the jury before they consider their verdict.”.
Salesi Temo
JUDGE
Solicitor for Appellant : Vaniqi Lawyers, Suva
Solicitor for Respondent : Office of DPP, Suva.
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