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High Court of Fiji |
IN THE HIGH COURT OF FIJI
WESTERN DIVISION
AT LAUTOKA
[CIVIL JURISDICTION]
Civil Action No. HBC 257 of 2016
IN THE MATTER of an application under section 169 of the Land Transfer Act (Cap 131)
BETWEEN : DAVENDRA PRASAD of Nasau, Nadi, Registered Proprietor.
Plaintiff
AND : MAHESH PRASAD of Nasau, Nadi, unemployed.
Defendant
Before : Acting Master U.L. Mohamed Azhar
Counsels: Mr. D.S.Naidu of Pillai, Naidu & Associates for the plaintiff
Mr. Inoke B. Lutumailagi of Lutumailagi & Associates for the Defendant
Date of Judgment : 08th December 2017
JUDGMENT
01. Before me is the summons for ejectment filed by the plaintiff on 02nd December 2016, pursuant to section 169 of the Land Transfer Act Cap 131 against the defendant, seeking an order on the defendant to deliver vacant possession of the property known as Certificate of Title No. 42457, Lot 2 on Deposit Plan No. 10398 situated in the District of Nadi in the Island of Viti Levu. The summons is supported by the affidavit sworn by the plaintiff and the documents marks as DP 1 to DP 4. The DP 1 is the copy of the Certificate of Title, the DP 2 is the copy of an agreement, the DP 3 is the Notice sent by the solicitors of the plaintiff to the defendant to vacate the said property and DP 4 is the reply sent by the defendant to the solicitors for the plaintiff.
02. The defendant upon service of the above summons, appearing through his solicitors filed the Notice of Intention to defend followed by an affidavit in opposition. He also attached a copy of a receipt, marked MP 1, for sum of $ 800.00 by a person whose signature is illegible. The plaintiff thereafter, filed an affidavit of one Sunil Dutt in reply to the affidavit of the defendant.
03. At the hearing of the summons both counsels made oral submission and the counsel for the plaintiff filed a written submission too, highlighting the facts of the case together with the law on the summary procedure under section 169 of the Land Transfer Act Cap 131. The counsel for the defendant sought time to file his submission and the court allowed him to file the same. However, it was not filed and on the next mention date, the defendant appeared in person. The court, then, granted further time to file his submission on or before 20.09. 2016 and adjourned the matter for judgment. Unfortunately, no such submission was filed on behalf of the defendant.
04. The procedure under the section 169 of the Land Transfer Act Cap 131 is a summary procedure to promptly and speedily restore the registered proprietor to the possession of the subject property when the occupier is unable to show his or her right to possess the particular property. This section provides a speedy procedure for obtaining possession when the occupier fails to show cause why an order should not be made: Mishra JA in Jamnadas v Honson Ltd [1985] 31 FLR 62 at page 65. The rationale for this speedy remedy available for the registered proprietors stems from the cardinal principle of the statute that, the register is everything and in the absence of any fraud, the registered proprietor has an indefeasible title against the entire world. The Fiji Court of Appeal in Subaramani v Sheela [1982] 28 FLR 82 (2 April 1982) held that:
The indefeasibility of title under the Land Transfer Act is well recognised; an prin principles clearly set out in a judgment of the New Zealand Court of Appeal dealing wrovisions of the New Zealanealand Land Transfer Act which on toint is substantitantially the same as the Land Transfer Ac oi. The case is Fels vels v. Know160;26 N.Z6 N.Z.L.R. 608. At page 620 it is t is said:
"The cardinal prie of tatute is that that the register is everything, and that, except in case of actual fraud onud on the part of the person dealing with the registered proprietor, such person, upon registration of the title under which he takes from the registered proprietor, has an indefeasible title against all the world."
05. The relevant provisions of the Land Transfer Act Cap 131 are as follows;
169. The following persons may summon any person in possession of land to appear before a judge in chambers to show cause why the person summoned should not give up possession to the applicant:-
(a) the last regid proprietor otor of the land;
(b) a lessor with pto re-enter nter where the lessee or tenant is in arrear for such period as may be provided in the lease and, in the absencany srovision therein,rein, when the lessee or tenant is in arrear for one month, whether there here be or be not sufficient distress found on the premises to countervail such rent and whether or not any previous demand has been made for the rent;
(c) a lessor against a lessee or tenant where a legal notice to quit has been given or the term of the lease has expired.
Particulars to be stated in summons
170. The summons shall contain a description of the land and shall require the person summoned to appear at the court on a day not earlier than sixteen days after the service of the summons.
Order for possession
171. On the day appointed for the hearing of the summons, if the person summoned does not appear, then upon proof to the satisfaction of the judge of the due service of such summons and upon proof of the title by the proprietor or lessor and, if any consent is necessary, by the production and proof of such consent, the judge may order immediate possession to be given to the plaintiff, which order shall have the effect of and may be enforced as a judgment in ejectment.
Dismissal of summons
172. If the person summoned appears he may show cause why he refuses to give possession of such land and, if he proves to the satisfaction of the judge a right to the possession of the land, the judge shall dismiss the summons with costs against the proprietor, mortgagee or lessor or he may make any order and impose any terms he may think fit;
Provided that the dismissal of the summons shall not prejudice the right of the plaintiff to take any other proceedings against the person summoned to which he may be otherwise entitled:
Provided also that in the case of a lessor against a lessee, if the lessee, before the hearing, pay or tender all rent due and all costs incurred by the lessor, the judge shall dismiss the summons.
06. Simply, the sections 169 and 170 set out the requirements for the applicant or the plaintiff and the application respectively. The Locus Standi of the person who seeks order for eviction is set out in section 169 and the requirements of the application, namely the description of land and the time period to be given to the person so summoned, are mentioned in section 170. The other two sections, namely 171 and 172, provide for the two powers that the court may exercise in dealing with the applications under the section 169. The burden to satisfy the court on the fulfillment of the requirements, under section 169 and 170, is on the plaintiff and once this burden is discharged, it then shifts to the defendant to show his or her right to possess the land. The exercise of court’s power, either to grant the possession to the plaintiff or to dismiss the summons, depends on how the said burden is discharged by respective party to the proceedings.
07. The plaintiff in his affidavit, which supports his summons, averred his locus standi to file this summons against the defendant, where he states that he is the last registered proprietor of all that piece and parcel of land known as Nasau comprised in Certificate of Title No. 42457, Lot 2 on Deposit Plan No. 10398 situated in the District of Nadi, in the Island of Viti Levu and containing an area of 4678 m2. The DP 1 – the certified true copy of Certificate of Title is the proof for the same. The plaintiff further explained in his affidavit the history of the title and stated that, one Narayan Datt (now deceased) was the original registered proprietor of CT 24786 having an area of 22 acres. The plaintiff and the defendant who is the younger brother of former occupied the said property under a contract. Thereafter, the plaintiff entered into an agreement with Narayan Datt to purchase 1 acre from him. The DP 2 is the copy of the agreement. Upon the subdivision, the plaintiff became the registered proprietor of the said piece of land containing a dwelling house, which is the subject matter of this application. The parents of the plaintiff too remained in the property and his mother is still occupying in the house therein after the death of his father. The defendant – the younger brother of the plaintiff is occupying a portion of that land without the consent of the plaintiff and refused to vacate despite the notice sent by the solicitors to vacate.
08. There is no issue on the proprietorship of the plaintiff. The defendant in paragraph 3 of his affidavit unequivocally admitted that the plaintiff is the last proprietor of the piece of land in dispute which is described in both summons and the affidavit of the plaintiff. Accordingly, the first requirement under section 169 is fulfilled by plaintiff and confirmed by the admission of the defendant.
09. The second requirement is the particulars to be stated in the summons, which is the description of the land as required by the section 170. The fact that, the application for ejectment involves with the property right of a citizen and the order for possession deprives him from his right, which has more effect on his social and economic wellbeing, the courts in all jurisdictions had a tendency to be little tough on the applicants, especially in relation to compliance and the technicalities of the respective statutes. This position is clearly reflected in the judgement of Atunaisa Tavuto v Suar Siu><b> HBC 332/97L court in that chat case held that, in application such as under section 169 of Land Transfer Act, the technicalities are strictly construed, because of the drastic consequences that follow fo of the parties upon the rehe relief sought being granted. That was a case where an application for vacant possession was sought, however, the applicant failed to give the particulars such as Crown Lease number, lot number and the situation of land, though the Housing Authority Lease number was correctly mentioned. The court dismissed the summons stating that, it behoved the plaintiff and his counsel to have exercised more diligence in that regard.
“The Court has not been provided nor able to locate any authorities to suggest that "a description" as per section 170 means a full description of the land. The Act itself does not specify what a. description of the land entails. What is adequate or full description? What is a sufficient description? The purpose is clearly for the parties to be informed as to what land the application relates to. This is clear from the supporting affidavit. In this regard I cannot concur with the sentiments of my brother Justice Madraiwiwi in &#tunaisa Tavuto < v Sume Singh(Civil Acti Action No. HBC0332 of 1997L) submitted by the Defence Counsel in suppf his argument on s.170. It is not clear what Justice Madraiwiwi had meant in stating that that "The Summons is defective in not properly describing the subject property" (emphasis added). It is not clear whether "a description means full or proper description. Further, the Supreme Court in the case of Ponsami v Dharam LingamyReddy (Appeal No. 1 of 1996 dealidealing with the need for compliance with the Supreme Court Rules not a statutory provision such as Section 170. The statute does not clearly specify "a dption" requires. res. In Vallas Premiji v. Vin. Vin. Vinod Lal, Nanki and Koki (Civil App0 of 1974) the Cohe Court of Appeal had accepted a description as in the present summons as sufficient”.
“At first sighth ses wouem toest that an Applicant should ould firstfirst obtain the Director's written consenonsent prit prior to the commencement ofion 169 proceedings angs and exhibit it to his affidavit in support. However I favour Lyons J.'s approach in Parvati Narayan v Suresh Pr60;Prasad /b><<> (unteutokautoka High Court ourt Civil Action No. HBC0275 of 1996L 15th August 1997 at p 4 insofar as his Lhis Lordship found that consent was not neat alce th>
i>"section 169 application (won (which hich is this the ride ridding off the land of a trespasser) is not a dealing of such a nature as requires the Director's consent."This must be correct for the Director's sanction is concerned with who is to be allowed a State lease or powers over it, and not with the riddance of those who have never applied for his consent. With respect I was unable to adopt the second limb of Lyons J's conclusion a few lines further on where his lordship stated that the order could be made conditional upon the Director's consent. For if the court's order of ejectment was not "a dealing" then such order would not require the Director's consent and the court would not be subject to se 13. The court is nots not concerned with the grant of or refusal of, consent by the Director, provided such consent is given lawfully. Consent is solely a mattr the Director. The statutory regime appears to acknowledgeledge that the Director's interest in protecting State leases is supported by the court's order of ejectment against those unable to show cause for their occupation of the land which is subject to the lease. The court is asked to make an order of ejectment against a person in whose favour the Director either, has never considered granting a lease, or has never granted a lease. The ejectment of an occupier who holds no lease is therefore not a dealing with a lease. Such occupier has no title. There is no lease to him to be dealt with. The order is for his ejectment from the land. There is no need for a duplicating function, a further scrutiny by the Director, of the Plaintiff's application for ejectment either before or after the judge gives his order”.
"Under Section 172 the person summonsed may show cause why he refused to give possession of the land if he proves to the satisfn of the Judge a right to possession or can establish an aran arguable defence the application will be dismissed with costs in his favour. The Defendants must show on affidavit evidence some right to possession which would preclude the granting of an order for possession under Section 169 procedure. That is not to sat finalfinal or incontrovertiblof of a&#f a right to remain in ssion muon must be adduced. Whatequired is that some tame tangible evidence establishing a right;or supr supng anable for sucr such a right must be adduced." #160;(Emphasis added)
Mahesh Prasad has paid the amount of $ 800.00 for land which Sunil Dutt(who as trustee & executor) of Farm No 12171. The land area is ¼ acre
Singature (illegible)
U.L.Mohamed Azhar
Acting Master
At Lautoka
08/12/17
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URL: http://www.paclii.org/fj/cases/FJHC/2017/930.html