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High Court of Fiji |
IN THE HIGH COURT OF FIJI
AT LABASA
APPELLATE JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL APPEAL CASE NO: HAA 011 OF 2017 LAB
BETWEEN: PETERO YAVALA
APPELLANT
AND: STATE
RESPONDENT
Counsels : Mr. A. Kohli for Appellant
Ms. A. Vavadakua for Respondent
Hearings : 21 and 24 July, 2017
Judgment : 28 July, 2017
JUDGMENT
FIRST COUNT
Statement of Offence
FOUND IN POSSESSION OF ILLICIT DRUGS: Contrary to Section 5 (a) of the Illicit Drug Control Act of 2004.
Particulars of Offence
PETERO YAVALA, on the 3rd day of February, 2012 at Navesidrua, Seaqaqa in the Northern Division without lawful authority was found in possession of 4.0 kilograms of cannabis, an illicit drug.
SECOND COUNT
Statement of Offence
CULTIVATION OF ILLICIT DRUGS: Contrary to Section 5 (a) of Illicit Drug Control Act of 2004.
Particulars of Offence
PETERO YAVALA, on the 03rd day of February, 2012 at Naweni, Savusavu in the Northern Division without lawful authority cultivated 32 plants of cannabis sativa an illicit drugs.
(i) That the Learned Trial Magistrate erred in law and in fact in admitting the evidence of PW1 Miliana Werebauinona in the absence of any evidence of her qualifications.
(ii) That the Learned Trial Magistrate erred in law and in fact in coming to a finding that since PW1 Miliana Werebauinona held the post of Government Analyst appointed by the Government she was not required to produce all her educational certificate before the hearing.
(iii) .That the Learned Trial Magistrate erred in law and in fact in admitting the evidence of PW1 Miliana Werebauinona in reading the report of former Government Analyst Miliakere Nawaikula when Mere Nawaikula could have given evidence.
(iv) That the Learned Trial Magistrate erred in law and in fact in admitting the evidence of PW1 Miliana Werebauinona when the prosecution had failed to inform the accused that it intended not to call the person who made the analysis, as a witness.
(v) That the Learned Trial Magistrate erred in law and in fact in finding that the drugs that was analyzed was the drug that was found in the possession of the accused.
(vi) That the Learned Trial Magistrate erred in law and in fact in failing to take into consideration that the weight of the drugs in Count 1 was the weight of the wet leaves.
(vii) That the sentence handed out by the Learned Trial Magistrate is harsh and excessive and wrong in principal.
(viii) That the Learned Trial Magistrate erred in law and in fact in admitting the caution interview of the accused.
Conviction Appeal Ground No. 5 (i) and 5 (ii):
7. I will discuss the two appeal grounds together because they relate to the same issue. It was well settled that in a Magistrate
Court trial, the learned trial Magistrate was the judge of fact and law. As such, he decides all questions of law that arises in
the proceeding. As the judge of fact, he decides all questions of fact that arises in a trial. In this case, the prosecution called
six witnesses, while the defence called one witness.
8. Of course, in his judgment on 3 May 2017, the trial Magistrate accepted the evidence of Miliana Raravuso Werebauinona (PW1). The appellant complained that she did not provide evidence of her qualification. The complaint is not correct and misconceived. On pages 63 and 101 of the court record, she outlined her qualifications while giving evidence on oath. The learned trial Magistrate, as judge of fact, accepted the above in his 3 May 2017 judgment, and as such, he was entitled to do so. Appeal Grounds 5 (i) and 5 (ii) are thus dismissed.
Conviction Appeal Ground No. 5 (iii) and 5 (iv):
9. I will consider the two grounds together because they involved the same issue. The answer to the appellant’s complaint
abovementioned lies with an understanding of section 133 (1), (2), (3) (b), (4) and (5) of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009, which
read as follows:
133.—(1) Any plan, report, photograph or document purporting to have been made or taken in the course of an office, appointment
or profession by or under the hand of any of the persons specified in sub-section (3), may be given in evidence in any trial
or other proceeding under the provisions of this Decree, unless the person shall be required to attend as a witness by—
(a) the court; or
(b) the accused person, in which case the accused person shall give notice to the prosecutor not less than 14 clear days before
the trial or other proceeding.
(2) In any case in which the prosecutor intends to adduce in evidence a plan, report, photograph or document a copy of it shall
be delivered to the accused not less than 21 clear days before the commencement of the trial or other proceeding.
(3) The following persons shall be the persons to whom this section shall apply—
(b) Government analysts and chemists and laboratory superintendents employed by the Government;
(4) The court may presume that the signature to any plan, report or document is genuine and that the person signing it held the qualification, appointment or office which he or she professed to hold at the time when the plan, report or document was signed.
(5) The contents of any report which the prosecution intends to give as evidence under this section and about which notice has been given under sub-section (2), may be referred to and commented upon by any other expert called as a witness in any criminal trial.
10. Section 133(I) of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009 allowed the receipt into evidence of the “Certificate of Analysis” prepared by Ms. Miliakere Nawaikula, who was the Government Analyst at the material time. The “Certificate of Analysis” were tendered as Prosecution Exhibit No. 1 by the then Government Analyst Ms. Miliakere Werebauinona (PW1). This procedure was permissible by virtue of section 133 (1), (3) (b), (4) and (5) of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009. The problem of Ms. Miliakere Nawaikula actually attending the trial to give evidence on the “Certificate of Analysis” lies on the court and the accused, by virtue of section 133 (1) (a) and/or (b) of the Criminal Procedure Act 2009. The burden is on the court or the accused to call for Ms. Miliakere Nawaikula to give evidence on the “Certificate of Analysis” within the terms of section 133 (1) (a) and/or (b) abovementioned. The defence, by their own actions, choose not to call Ms. Nawaikula. They did not repeatedly call on the prosecution and check whether or not Ms. Miliakere Nawaikula will be called on the trial date. So many pre-trial conferences were carried out but the above actions were not noted in the record. Thus, the defence can blame no-one, but themselves. Appeal Grounds 5 (iii) and 5 (iv) are not made out, and they are accordingly dismissed.
Conviction Appeal Ground No. 5 (v):
11. Again, in a Magistrate Court trial, the learned trial Magistrate was the judge of fact and law. In the court record, at pages
113, 115, 117, 119 and 131, Corporal Opeti (PW2) gave evidence that he was part of the police team that seized the relevant cannabis
sativa drugs from the accused in the taxi and from his farm. PW2 said, he took the relevant drugs to Seaqaqa Police Station and
handed the same to Police Officer Ratu Meli (PW4). PW4, in pages 79 to 81, 87 to 89 and pages 159 to 167 of the court record, said
he received the relevant drugs from PW2 and later took the same to Ms. Miliakere Nawaikula (government analyst) for analysis.
PW4 said he later received the “certificate of analysis” and the relevant drugs from Ms. Nawaikula, and took the same
to Seaqaqa Police Station for safe-keeping. The certificate of analysis was the one tendered as Prosecution Exhibit No. 1 in this
case. The appellant’s complaint in Appeal Ground 5 (v) were unfounded. It is dismissed accordingly.
Conviction Appeal Ground No. 5 (vi)
12. In section 2 of the Illicit Drugs Control Act 2004, the word “illicit drug” means any drug listed in Schedule 1. In Schedule 1 of the Act, the word “cannabis plant”
means “any fresh, dried or otherwise” cannabis plant, and includes “any part of any plant of the genus cannabis”.
Whether or not the weight of the cannabis plant seized in count no. 1 was wet or dried, was really irrelevant, in terms of the
definition abovementioned. Thus the learned Magistrate did not err at all. He took into account what was said in the government
analyst’s “certificate of analysis” i.e. Prosecution Exhibit No. 1. This appeal ground is misconceived and thus
dismissed accordingly.
Conviction Appeal Ground 5 (viii):
13. The learned Magistrate referred to the Fiji Court of Appeal authority of Rokonabete v State, Criminal Appeal AAU 0048 of 2005S. The case had directed on the procedure to be followed when a voir dire trial was conducted
in the Magistrate Court. Mr. A. Kohli is an experienced criminal lawyer in Fiji, and he doesn’t need to be told on the voir
dire trial procedure in the Magistrate Court. For the purpose of this appeal, a voir dire trial is normally done before the trial
proper or during the trial proper, when the prosecution intends to call into evidence the caution interview and/or charge statements,
containing the alleged confession. A voir dire is not done, after the prosecution closes its case. Counsel filed his voir dire
challenge after the prosecution had closed their case. Simply, they had missed the boat. In any event, there was no miscarriage
of justice because the defence throughly challenged the voluntariness of the alleged confession in the trial proper. This obviously
went to the weight of that evidence. This appeal ground is misconceived and it is accordingly dismissed.
Sentence Appeal Ground 5 (vii):
14. On this ground, the prosecution fouled up on the drafting of count no. 2. They did not include the weight of the illicit drugs.
Why they did not do so, I don’t know. In the 50 cases that was examined in Kini Sulua vs State, Criminal Appeal AAU 0093 of 2008, they all had weights mentioned in the particulars of offence. Bavesi v The State [2004] HAA 0027 of 2004 had been overruled by Kini Sulua v State (supra). Consequently, the learned Magistrate sentencing in count no. 2 was flawed because he was relying on an authority that
had been overruled. I understand the learned Magistrate’s dilemma. But the problem started with the prosecution in how
they draft the charges. On count no. 2 as it is presently drafted, no possible sentence can be passed because no weight is attached.
What should had been done was that the learned Magistrate should have asked the prosecution to correct the problems created by
count no. 2 before the prosecution closed their case during the trial proper.
15. Given the above, the sentence in count no. 1 remained and is affirmed. The sentence in count no. 2 is quashed. In its place, the accused still stands convicted and is discharged. To the above extent, the appellant succeeds in his sentence appeal.
16. In summary, the learned Magistrate’s sentence in count no. 1 stands i.e. 5 years imprisonment, and no-parole period is given. On count no. 2, accused remained convicted, but is discharged.
Salesi Temo
JUDGE
Solicitor for Appellant : Kohli & Singh, Labasa
Solicitor for Respondent : Office of Director of Public Prosecution, Labasa
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