PacLII Home | Databases | WorldLII | Search | Feedback

High Court of Fiji

You are here:  PacLII >> Databases >> High Court of Fiji >> 2016 >> [2016] FJHC 675

Database Search | Name Search | Recent Decisions | Noteup | LawCite | Download | Help

  Download original PDF


Organic Earth (Fiji) Ltd v Chute [2016] FJHC 675; HBC356.2015 (25 July 2016)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF FIJI
AT SUVA
CIVIL JURISDICTION


Civil Action No. HBC 356 of 2015


BETWEEN: ORGANIC EARTH (FIJI) LIMITED a company having its registered office at 1 Taramati Street, Vatuwaqa, Suva.


PLAINTIFF


AND: ROSALIA CHUTE currently living at Lot 2, Isa Lei Road, Lami.


DEFENDANT


BEFORE: Master Vishwa Datt Sharma


COUNSELS: Ms. Babara Malimali - for the Plaintiff

Mr. Devanesh Sharma - for the Defendant


Date of Hearing: 30h March, 2015

Date of Ruling: 25th July, 2016


RULING
(Application seeking Vacant Possession pursuant to
s169 of the Land Transfer Act Cap 131)


INTRODUCTION

  1. The Plaintiff by the Originating Summons dated 19th November, 2015 seeks for the following orders:
  2. There are 2 (Two) affidavits filed before the Court:
    1. Affidavit in Support of Samara Prasad sworn on 19th November, 2015 (“Plaintiffs Affidavit”);
    2. Affidavit in Response of Rosalia Chute sworn on 12th January, 2016 (“Defendant’s Affidavit”);
  3. This case proceeded to hearing on a defended basis and both parties to the proceeding made oral/written submissions at the hearing.
  4. This court has a duty to determine the pending issue before the court in a just and fair manner in terms of the laws provided for in ss169, 171 and 172 of the Land Transfer Act [Cap 131].

THE LAW


  1. The application is filed in terms of s.169 of the Land Transfer Act [Cap 131] which provides as follows:

“The following persons may summon any person in possession of land to appear before a judge in chambers to show cause why the person summoned should not give up possession to the applicant:

(a) the last registered proprietor of the land;

(b) a lessor with power to re-enter where the lessee or tenant is in arrear for such period as may be provided in the lease and, in the absence of any such provision therein, when the lessee or tenant is in arrear for one month, whether there be or be not sufficient distress found on the premises to countervail such rent and whether or not any previous demand has been made for the rent;

(c) lessor against a lessee or tenant where a legal notice to quit has been given or the term of the lease has expired.”


  1. Pursuant to section 172 of the Act the onus is on the Defendant to show cause why he refuses to give up possession to the Plaintiff and why an order for possession should not be made against him.
  2. The Plaintiff is the registered Lessee or a proprietor in this instant case. The term “Lessee” is defined as proprietor of a Lease or sub lease in the Land Transfer Act. Therefore, the term “Lessee” follows within the ambits of section 169 application.
  3. In the case of Ram Narayan v Moti Ram (Civ. App. No. 16/83) Gould J.P. said:

"... the summary procedure has been provided in the Land Transfer Act and, where the issues involved are straightforward, and particularly where there are no complicated issues of fact, a litigant is entitled to have his application decided in that way."


  1. The procedure under s.169 is governed by sections 171 and 172 of the Land Transfer Act (Cap 131) respectively which stipulates as follows:

"s.171. On the day appointed for the hearing of the Summons, if the person summoned does not appear, then upon proof to the satisfaction of the Judge of the due service of such summons and upon proof of the title by the proprietor or lessor and, if any consent is necessary, by the production and proof of such consent, the judge may order immediate possession to be given to the Plaintiff, which order shall have the effect of and may be enforced as a judgment in ejectment."


s.172. If a person summoned appears he may show cause why he refuses to give possession of such land and, if he proves to the satisfaction of the judge a right to the possession of the land, the judge shall dismiss the summons with costs against the proprietor, mortgagee or lessor or he may make any order and impose any terms he may think fit."

(Underline is mine for emphasis)


  1. As far as the requirements in terms of section 172 are concerned, the Supreme Court in the case of Morris Hedstrom Limited v. Liaquat Ali (Action No. 153/87 at p2) said as follows and it is pertinent:

"Under Section 172 the person summoned may show cause why he refused to give possession of the land and if he proves to the satisfaction of the judge a right to possession or can establish an arguable defence the application will be dismissed with costs in his favour. The Defendants must show on affidavit evidence some right to possession which would preclude the granting of an order for possession under Section 169 procedure. That is not to say that final or incontrovertible proof of a right to remain in possession must be adduced. What is required is that some tangible evidence establishing a right or supporting an arguable case for such a right must be adduced."


  1. The requirements of section 172 have been further elaborated by the Fiji Court of Appeal in Ajmat Ali s/o Akbar Ali v Mohammed Jalil s/o Mohammed Hanif (Action No. 44 of 1981 – judgment 2.4.82) where the court said:

"It is not enough to show a possible future right to possession. That is an acceptable statement as far as it goes, but the section continues that if the person summoned does show cause the judge shall dismiss the summons; but then are added the very wide words "or he may make any order and impose any terms he may think fit" These words must apply, though the person appearing has failed to satisfy the judge, and indeed are often applied when the judge decides that an open court hearing is required. We read the section as empowering the judge to make any order that justice and the circumstances require. There is accordingly nothing in section 172 which requires an automatic order for possession unless "cause" is immediately shown.

(Emphasis added)


  1. In Premji v Lal [1975] FJCA 8; Civil Appeal No 70 of 1974 (17 March 1975) the Court of Appeal said:

‘These sections and equivalent provisions of the Land (Transfer and Registration) Ordinance (Cap. 136-1955 Laws of Fiji) have been considered in a number of cases in this court and the Supreme Court. In Jamnadas & Co. Ltd. v. Public Trustee and Prasad Studios Ltd. (Civil Appeal No. 39 of 1972 - unreported) this court said –

‘Under Section 172 of the Act the Judge is required to dismiss the summons if the respondent proves to his satisfaction a right to possession ...’


  1. Under Section 172 of the Act the judge is empowered to dismiss the summons if the respondent proves to his satisfaction that she has a valid defence, a right to possession, locus standi and or a licence. It further provides that a judge may make any order and impose any terms that he may think fit. The dismissal of the summons is not to prejudice the right of a Plaintiff to take any other proceedings to which he may be otherwise entitled.
  2. Reference is made to the case authorities of Caldwell v. Mongston (1907) 3 F.L.R. 58 and Perrier Watson v. Venkat Swami (Civil Action 9 of 1967 - unreported) wherein the Supreme Court held-

that if the proceedings involve consideration of complicated facts or serious issues of law, it will not decide the cases on summary proceedings of this nature, but will dismiss the summons without prejudice to the Plaintiff’s right to institute proceedings by Writ of Summons.’


Plaintiff’s Case


  1. The Plaintiff’s Affidavit filed in this case deposed as follows:

Defendant’s Case


  1. The Affidavit in Response deposed by the Defendant states as follows:

ANALYSIS and DETERMINATION


  1. The question for this court to determine is whether the Plaintiff is entitled to the vacant possession of the premises located at Lot 2 Isalei Road Lami comprised and described in the Certificate of Title No. NL 16044 being Lot 2, 3 Matmakita Subdivision, Lami, of which the Plaintiff is the registered proprietor or Lessee of in terms of s.169 of the Land Transfer Act [Cap 131]?
  2. In this case, the Plaintiffs must first comply with the requirements of section 169 of the Land Transfer Act cap 131, which are stated hereunder as follows:

(Underline for emphasis)


  1. In this instance, the first limb of s169 applies; there is no dispute that the plaintiff is the last registered proprietor of the property.
  2. In this respect the plaintiff has annexed in her affidavit a certified true copy of the Memorandum of Native Lease No. 16044.

The Memorandum of Lease No 16044 clearly shows that the Lease was transferred to the Plaintiff on 03rd August, 2015.


  1. The Plaintiff is for the purposes of section 169 the last registered proprietor and Lessee of the said property.
  2. After the Plaintiff has established the first limb test of section 169 that is that the Plaintiff is the registered proprietor and Lessee of the property, then the Defendant bears the onus of showing cause as to why vacant possession should not be granted to the Plaintiff.
  3. Pursuant to section 172 of the Land Transfer Act Cap 131. The Defendant needs to satisfy this court on affidavit evidence that she has a right to possession. (Case of Muthusami v Nausori Town Council F.C.A. 23/86 refers).
  4. There is no need to prove conclusively a right to possession and it is sufficient for the Defendant to prove that there is some tangible evidence establishing the existence of a right or of an arguable defence. (Case No. 152 of 1987- Morris Hedstrom Ltd v Liaquat Ali refers).
  5. The Defendant has appraised Court with an issue amongst other issues in his written submissions in terms of the requirements of section 170 of the Land Transfer Act Cap 131.

Therefore, it is appropriate that I deal with this issue first and then decide whether I should proceed to write my ruling in respect of the substantive matter in its entirety.


The issue that he raised is as follows;-


(a) The Originating Summons filed by the Plaintiff does not contain an accurate description of the subject land as per the requirement of Section 170 of the Land Transfer Act.

According to the Defence, the land is not contained in a Certificate of Title; it is contained in a document called a Memorandum of Lease. Further, the description of the land is not: Lot 2, 3 Matmakita Subdivision, Lami.


As far as this Court is concerned, the Plaintiff has not stated the correct description of the land at paragraph A of the Originating Summons in conformity with what the description is as per the annexure marked “SP2”.


The correct description of the property should be;


Native Lease 16044 being Lots 2 and 3 Matamakita Subdivision, in the Tikina of Suva, in the Province of Rewa containing an area of 2 Roods 29.7 perches and owned by the Yavusa Naukuvatu, Nayavumata and Vatuwaqa.


The annexure marked “SP2” is evidence of a Memorandum of a Native Lease No. 16044 and not a Certificate of Title. There is a difference between a Certificate of Title and a Lease but both can be categorized as “instrument of Title” under the Land Transfer Act.


A Certificate of Title is issued to the owner or proprietor of the subject property in Freehold lands and Crown Grants. A Certificate of Title is an official land ownership record.

A Memorandum of Lease is issued to the proprietor or leaseholder of iTaukei land. This Lease is an official land ownership record of iTaukei land.


  1. The Plaintiff Counsel was at liberty to seek for the amendment and or regularize the form or content or in any other respect the failure on her part when this issue was raised by the Defence Counsel.
  2. The necessary application could have been made pursuant to Order 2 Rule 1 (O.2, r.1), of the High Court Rules, 1988.
  3. The Counsel failed to do so for the reasons best known to her.
  4. Since the hearing has now been concluded and the case is impending Court’s Ruling, it is rather too late in the proceedings.
  5. Therefore, I find that the Plaintiff has not complied with the requirements of Section 170 of the Land Transfer Act.
  6. Accordingly, I order as follows:-

ORDERS


(i) The substantive Originating Summons together with the Affidavit in Support is hereby Dismissed.


(ii) Costs is summarily assessed at $500 to the Defendant within 14 days.


Dated at Suva this 25th day of July, 2016


..............................................................
MR VISHWA DATT SHARMA

Master of High Court, Suva


cc. Ms. Barbara Malimali of Pacific Chambers, Suva.

Mr. Devenesh Sharma of R.Patel Lawyers , Suva.


PacLII: Copyright Policy | Disclaimers | Privacy Policy | Feedback
URL: http://www.paclii.org/fj/cases/FJHC/2016/675.html