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Wati v Permanent Secretary for Health [2016] FJHC 661; HBC149.2009 (15 July 2016)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF FIJIAT SUVA
CIVIL JURISDICTION


Civil Action No. HBC 149 of 2009


BETWEEN:


PUSHPA WATI
PLAINTIFF


AND:


THE PERMANENT SECRETARY FOR HEALTH
1ST DEFENDANT


THE ATTORNEY-GENERAL OF FIJI
2ND DEFENDANT


COUNSEL : Mr D. Singh for the Plaintiff
Ms R. Mani, Ms S. Daunabuna and Ms L. Ramoce for the Defendants


DATE OF JUDGMENT : 15 July 2016


JUDGMENT


Introduction


  1. On 5 June 2009, Plaintiff filed Writ of Summons with Statement of Claim against the Defendants claiming special and general damages in respect to personal injuries allegedly suffered by her when on 27 June 2007, she stepped and fell on her left hip during her course of employment at Colonial War Memorial Hospital (“CWMH”).
  2. On 1 July 2009, Defendants filed Statement of Defence.
  3. Pursuant to Leave granted on 10 September 2009, Plaintiff on 11 September 2009 filed Amended Statement of Claim.
  4. On 16 September 2009, Defendants filed Statement of Defence to Amended Statement of Claim.
  5. On 16 July 2010, Plaintiff filed Affidavit Verifying List of Documents.
  6. Thereafter, no action was taken in this matter until 11 January 2013 (lapse of almost three (3) years), when Plaintiff filed Notice of Intention to Proceed.
  7. On 21 January 2013, this matter was called before the then Master of the Court who noted that Defendants have not filed Affidavit Verifying List of Documents and made following Orders:-

(i) Defendants do file and serve their Affidavit Verifying List of Documents within fourteen (14) days and if not their Statement of Defence will be struck out;

(ii) Fourteen (14) days from thereafter for Plaintiff to file and serve Minutes of Pre-Trial Conference;

(iii) Fourteen (14) days from thereafter for Plaintiff to file and serve Order 34 Summons and Copy Pleadings and if not then Plaintiff’s action will be deemed struck out.


  1. It appears, that when the then Learned Master made the above order he did not realize that this action involves personal injury claim and as such discovery of document is automatic and parties are not required to file Affidavit Verifying List of Documents. Order 25 Rule 8(1) of High Court Rules.
  2. On 1 February 2013, Defendant in compliance with the then Masters Order filed Affidavit Verifying List of Documents.
  3. On 13 February 2013, Plaintiff filed Minutes of Pre-Trial Conference.
  4. On 28 February 2013, Plaintiff filed Copy Pleadings and Order 34 Summons which was called on 16 April 2013, and this action was referred to a Judge.
  5. This matter was called in this Court on 30 May 2013, when it was adjourned for trial on 19 and 20 November 2013.
  6. Trial was completed on 20 November 2013, and by consent parties were directed to file Submissions by 15 January 2014.
  7. I note that the Defendants do not challenge the fact that Defendants owed Plaintiff a duty to provide safe system of work and to ensure that Plaintiff’s health is not put in danger during the course of her employment.
  8. The issues that need to be determined are as follows:-

(i) Whether Defendants breached any duty of care owed to the Plaintiff?

(ii) Whether Defendant’s breach caused Plaintiff injuries which resulted in Plaintiff suffering pain, special and general damages?

(iii) Whether Plaintiff was contributory negligent?

(iv) What is the quantum of damages?


Documentary Evidence


  1. By consent the following documents forming part of Agreed Bundle of Documents dated 19 November 2013 was tendered as Exhibit 1 to 6:-

1. Medical Report by Dr. Oten Bwabwa dated 22nd April, 2008;

2. Medical Report by Dr. Oten Bwabwa dated 20th May, 2009;

3. Wages Slips;

4. Medical Report by Dr. Sitiveni Traill dated 20th November, 2009;

5. Occupational Health and Safety Policy;

6. Photos.


Plaintiffs Case


  1. Plaintiff gave evidence herself and did not call any other witness.
  2. Plaintiff during her evidence in chief gave evidence that:-

(i) She was born on 19 November 1952;

(ii) The accident took place on 27 June 2007, at the washroom and the time of the accident she was working as Laundry Hand at CWMH Laundry Department and has been employed in the CWMH Laundry Department for fifteen (15) years prior to the accident;

(iii) The accident happened when she slipped and fell down as there was water on the smooth floor;

(iv) She did not see the water when she fell down;

(v) At the time of accident she was wearing massaging sandal which had proper grips as the sandal was new;

(vi) CWMH gave her safety boots which she returned to the Supervisor as it got old, was damaged and water could get in the boot;

(vii) She returned the safety boots to her Supervisor two months prior to the accident and the safety boots was two years old.

(viii) She asked the Supervisor for new pair of safety boots but was told that Ministry does not have the money;

(ix) There were no signs to caution that the floor was wet and the staffs’ were rostered to clean the floor;

(x) The place she fell was not always wet;

(xi) Forty Four (44) staff worked at the Laundry Department out of which twenty two (22) ladies were rostered to clean the floor and the day of the accident, floor was mopped by Farida;

(xii) There was no door mat where she fell but was one (1) meter away;

(xiii) She worked nine (9) hours a day and the Laundry was busy;

(xiv) She fell at lunch time when she was going to tea room;

(xv) The floor is mopped three (3) times a day which is in the morning, after lunch and in the afternoon;

(xvi) When she fell, color of the floor was maroon;

(xvii) After she fell she could not get up, she was hurt, was in pain and was sweating;

(xviii) One lady, namely Roshni assisted her by lifting her up and making her sit on a chair in the tea room;

(xix) Roshni then called Ambulance and she was taken to the Accident and Emergency Unit (“A&E”) at which time she was in pain as her hip had broken;

(xx) At A&E an X-Ray was conducted after her blood pressure and level of diabetes was checked;

(xxi) On the day of accident she was admitted and was admitted for eight (8) days;

(xxii) Surgical operation was carried out on her when metal plate was inserted;

(xxiii) After being discharged from hospital she went for review for five or six times;

(xxiv) Metal is still fitted in her hips and she feels lot of pain during cold season;

(xxv) She walks with a limp, because after the accident both her legs are not of same length;

(xxvi) Because of her injuries, she finds it hard to stand for long, hard to sit, cannot lift heavy objects and she cannot attend functions where she has to sit and have difficulty in twisting her hips;

(xxvii) At time of accident her pay was $165.44 per week and she is claiming for loss of wages for twenty (20) days sick leave which she has not been paid with Fiji National Provident Fund contribution;

(xxviii) She is claiming $300.00 for travelling expenses and for medication (pain killer);

(xxix) She is taking panadol when she has pain;

(xxv) She finds it hard to go marketing, visit relatives and do shopping;

(xxxi) She returned to work after seven (7) months from date of accident at the same place;

(xxxii) For seven (7) months she found it had to go to washroom, eat and sleep and she was able to move about on walker;

(xxxiii) When she returned to work she was not doing same work but was folding gowns while sitting;

(xxxiv) She left employment in 2009, when she retired at the age of fifty five (55) years.


19. During Cross-Examination Plaintiff:-


(i) Confirmed that at time of accident she was working at the Laundry Department of CWMH and that she had been employed for fifteen (15) years;
(ii) The Laundry area would be more wet, then outside of the washroom which is mostly dry;
(iii) Agreed that she fell in the washroom and that washroom has basin and sink and there is water around the area;
(iv) Stated that, that area will be wet sometimes but not all the time
(v) She had been on the walker for four (4) months;
(vi) Agreed that safety boots were to be worn at all times and that she is aware that it is Occupational Health and Safety (“OHS”) requirement that uniform had to be worn during working hours;
(vii) She would attend OHS training sometimes but not always;
(viii) She was aware about the OHS Policy which was put on the notice board in the Laundry area;
(ix) She used to wear safety boots but, when she did not have it, she did not wear it;
(x) At time of accident she did not have the safety boots and when she asked the supervisor she was told that the Ministry had no money;
(xi) Agreed that correct description of footwear she was wearing at time of accident was flip flop and not sandals;
(xii) She could not recall if there was any staff to assist her and that she only saw Roshni and agreed that there could have been other people;
(xiii) Agreed that, there was system in place to clean floor at CWMH and twenty two (22) ladies were assigned to clean the floor;
  1. During re-examination Plaintiff agreed that if water fell in morning session it will be mopped in the midday session.

Defendant’s Case


  1. Defendants called Alvin De Asa, Orthopedic Surgeon as their first witness (“DW1”).
  2. DW1 during his evidence in chief gave evidence that:-

23. During Cross-Examination DW1:-


(i) In reference to Intertrochanteric fracture mentioned under the heading “History” in Exhibit 2 he explained that such fracture occurs in the proximal part of the femur, the thigh bone which is trochanteric region;
(ii) The fracture stated in Exhibit 2 is closed (no open wound) and undisplaced (no major separation of fragment);
(iii) Stated that intertrochanteric means it is trochanteric region and is not in danger region;
(iv) Stated that the fracture below the neck (trochanteric region) which does not disturb flow of blood;
(v) In reference to “DHS” under the heading “History” in Exhibit 2 he explained that “DHS” means Dynamic Hip Compression Screw which allows patient to mobilize early and mechanically allow for compression of the fracture site as mentioned on page 1 of Exhibit 4 which were consistent with the injuries sustained by the Plaintiff because they are subjective finding on persons subjective complaints;
(vi) Stated that Plaintiff sustained severe fracture (paragraph 3, page 2, Exhibit 4) means that with the type of injuries there is recorded mortality rate of twenty five percent (25%),whether within six (6) months surgery is done or not;
(vii) Agreed that his findings in respect to reduction in length of leg is same as that of Dr. Traill’s findings;
(viii) Could not answer as to how Dr. Oten found shortening of left leg by two percent (2%) and stated it could probably be as a result of Dr. Oten using different tape and the test carried out;
(ix) Stated that Antalgic Gait (page 2 – Exhibit 4) means limp due to pain and the person who suffers from Antalgic Gait limps;
(x) Stated that whether person with one leg shorter will limp depends on amount of shortening and if it is less than two percent (2%) then person will not limp or it will not be noticed;
(xi) Stated that he did not observe Plaintiff walk a distance;
(xii) Agreed that Dr. Traill and his assessment of Plaintiff are same and stated that the assessment is subjective to the person doing the assessment;
(xiii) Agreed that there could be marked discrepancy in assessment of permanent disability amongst doctors and stated that it is because lot of factors are involved;
(xiv) He used AMA Guidelines to Evaluation of Permanent Impairment 6th edition, functional history of patient, physical examination, and diagnostic (clinical) studies done on the patient to assess the permanent disability;
(xv) Explained that MMI stated under the heading “Current Symptoms” in Exhibit 2 means Maximal Medical Improvement;
(xvi) Stated that from what is said by Dr. B. Oten under the heading “Clinical Studies” means that the screw is still in place and agreed that Dr. B. Oten’s assessment on whole person impairment is 11%;
(xvii) Stated that when a surgical registrar prepares a report and signs for a consultant surgeon the report should be shown to the consultant surgeon;
(xviii) In reference to Exhibit 4 he agrees that the report states that fracture was to left neck of femur (paragraph 3) and Plaintiff was reviewed seven (7) times;

24. In Re-Examination DW1 stated that:-


(i) To observe patients walking a distance can be part of examination but is limited or restricted and he cannot see them walking for a long distance;
(ii) He observed Plaintiff walking in clinic but did not observe her walking for long distance.
  1. Defendant’s Second Witness was Makesi Muanitabua, an employee at Linen Store, Laundry Department, CWMH (DW2).
  2. During her evidence in chief DW2 gave evidence that:-

27. During Cross-Examination DW2 stated that:


(i) At the time of accident she was sitting at her table and did not have direct view of the wash room where Plaintiff fell;
(ii) No sign saying “Danger Area Slippery When Wet” was placed;
(iii) There was a staff named Tina but was not aware if she fell one (1) week after the accident;
(iv) She was familiar with the procedure for returning old boots and requesting for new boots;
(v) Timeframe for getting new boots when old boots are returned will depend on the Domestic Stock Officer and whether boots are available;
(vi) In response to suggestion that if boots were not available immediately then it would take months to get it she responded that it is not that long and month is too long;
(vii) Timeframe to get new boots will also depend on size of boots;
(viii) Washroom did not have hand rails;
(ix) Tea girl is rostered to mop the floor and the roster is done on monthly basis;
(x) At time of accident there were forty staff (40) with twenty two (22) male staff and eighteen female staff;
(xi) Female staff were rostered to mop the floor and the floor was mopped three times a day;
(xii) When the supervisor goes on leave during month of December and January she acted as supervisor of Plaintiff;
(xiii) She was not the supervisor at the time of accident;
(xiv) She noticed Plaintiff wearing massage flip flops and when she asked her to wear boots, Plaintiff said to her that boot is heavy for her;
(xv) She informed the Lady Supervisor about Plaintiff wearing massage flippers just once;
(xvi) When asked if people working with her are expected to meet deadlines she said that whatever they could achieve during the day, they do, or else they do it the next day.
  1. Defendants third witness was Aminiasi Koroi, Supervisor at Health Housekeeping Services Co-operative Ltd (“HHSCL”) (DW3).
  2. During evidence in chief DW3 gave evidence that:-

30. During Cross-Examination DW3:-


(i) Stated that he knows Plaintiff by face;
(ii) Confirmed that he was working at CWMH in June 2007 and he did not receive any accident report from laundry department;
(iii) Stated that he did not receive any complaints by anyone that a worker by the name of Pushpa Wati was not wearing safety boots in contravention of OHS policy;
(iv) Stated that in 2007,Makisi was the Supervisor in Landry section and was still working there and was at work a day before he gave evidence but was not sure if Makisi was at work on the day he was giving evidence;
(v) Stated that in June 2007, Mr. Ram was the store man but has retired;
(vi) Stated that he came in between the Supervisor and the Store-man when there was delay and there was an urgent need;
(vii) Agreed that if delay and urgent need is not communicated to him, then he would not know what goes wrong as he acted on complaints;
(viii) CWMH has a purchasing officer;
(ix) Agreed that procedure to request for replacement boot is as follows:-
(x) His role in the sequence of events is that if Supervisor finds that there is no boot then he has to speed up the process;
(xi) If Purchasing Officer does not have money to purchase, then his duty is to make sure that Employer looks for the money somehow;
(xii) Disagreed that ‘somehow’ could mean months and stated that all OHS Representatives go around to make sure that all staff comply with the standards and if they do not, they could not be allowed at the work place;
(xiii) In response to question as to when there is no budget he stated that, with OHS there is no excuses and the Employer has to look for money somehow;
(xiv) If Purchasing Officer says there is no money, then he went to management and if management said that there is no money then he as OHS Committee Chairman had to influence the Employer to make sure they get the money to buy the boots.

31. In Re-Examination DW3 gave evidence that:-


(i) Lot of cases of delay in providing footwear to staff was reported to him;
(ii) He did not receive any complaints about Pushpa Wati’s footwear;
(iii) It is not possible for staff to go around without footwear for months;

Whether Defendants Owed Duty of Care to the Plaintiff


  1. Even though the Defendants in their submissions have not challenged that they owe a duty of care to the Plaintiff I just want to state that employers owe duty of care to its employees to provide safe system of work and to protect its employees from foreseeable risk and dangers.
  2. The common law duty has also become a statutory duty pursuant to Section 9 of Health and Safety at Work Act (1996).
  3. The Plaintiff was an employee of CWMH and as such CWMH owed her a duty of care to provide safe system of work, free of danger and risk to the Plaintiff.

Whether Defendants Breached Their Duty of Care


  1. Plaintiffs evidence was that she fell in the washroom; Laundry Department after the floor was mopped and was wet.
  2. Defendants evidence was that they had OHS Policy in place and they provided uniform for staff which included safety boots.
  3. DW2 gave evidence that Plaintiff was wearing massage flippers and Plaintiff did not want to wear safety boots because it was heavy.
  4. DW2 also stated that Plaintiff was wearing massage flippers for “quite so long”.
  5. DW3 evidence was that he never received any complaint as OHS Committee Chairman about Plaintiff not wearing safety boots.
  6. He also stated that if staff does not comply with OHS Policy then they will not be allowed to work.
  7. Whilst I accept the evidence that there was OHS Policy in place at CWMH Laundry Department I have doubts so to whether such policy was strictly enforced.
  8. Having OHS Policy and Safety Policy in place and pasting it on notice board is one thing and enforcing those policies is another.
  9. No evidence has been produced to Court to show that Plaintiff was ever given any warning to not to wear massage flippers even though she have been wearing massage flippers.
  10. Plaintiff also gave evidence that no sign was placed in the wash room to warn about the wet floor. In this regard I accept Plaintiffs evidence that the floor was wet after it was mopped.
  11. I have not given any weight to the photos tendered as Exhibit 6 on the ground that no evidence was produced to say when the photos were taken and for what purpose.
  12. After analyzing the evidence of Plaintiff and Defendants witnesses, I find that Defendants breached their duty of care owed to Plaintiff to provide safe system of work by failing to enforce the OHS Policy and putting signs to warn that the area is slippery when wet.

Whether Plaintiff Contributed to Her Injury


  1. Defence relied on the case of Staply v. Gypsum Mines Ltd [1953] UKHL 4; [1953] AC 663; Barrett v. Ministry of Defence [1994] 1 WLR 1217; Jebson v. Ministry of Defence [2001] 1 WLR 2055; Rushton v. Turner Brothers Asbesto Co. Ltd [1959] 1 WLR 96.
  2. The principle in respect to issue on contributory negligence was stated in Gani v. Chand & Ors. [2006] Civil Appeal No. ABU0117 of 2005 (10 November 2006) by Fiji Court of Appeal as follows:-

“The basic principle of contributory negligence is that, when a court is awarding damages to the Plaintiff for injuries caused by the defendant, it may reduce the award if the plaintiff can be shown to have contributed to the injury by some negligence on his part. However, whilst the liability of the defendant arises from a duty towards the plaintiff, the assessment of contributing negligence is not based on a similar duty on the plaintiff towards the defendant. It was explained by Lord Simons in Nance v. British Columbia Electric Railway Co. Ltd [1951] Ac 601, 611: “The statement that, when negligence is alleged as the basis of an actionable wrong, a necessary ingredient in the conception is the existence of a duty owed by the defendant to the Plaintiff to take due care, is, of course, indubitably correct. But when contributory negligence is set up as a defence, its existence does not depend on any duty owed by the injured party to the party sued, and all that is necessary to establish such a defence is to prove to the satisfaction of the injury that the injured party did not in his own interest take reasonable care of himself and contributed, by this want of care, to his own injury. For when contributory negligence is set up as a shield against the obligation to satisfy the whole of the plaintiff’s claim, the principle involved is that, where a man is part author of his own injury, he cannot call on the other party to compensate him in full.

...this, however, is not to say that in all cases a plaintiff who is guilty of contributory negligence owes to the defendant no duty to act carefully.”


49. The facts of Staply case are stated in the judgment of Lord Reid at pages 484 and 485 which is as follows:-


“Before the accident Staply and Dale were working together, Staply being a breaker. He was a steady workman with long experience, but rather slow. He had for a time been a borer but had reverted to being a breaker. A well-recognized danger in the mine is a fall of part of the roof. The roof is not generally shored up as any weakness in it can be detected by tapping it. If it is “drummy”, giving a hollow sound, it is unsafe and must be taken down. There are three ways of doing this – with a pick, or with a pinch bar or crow bar, or by firing a shot. Whichever way is adopted, of course, men doing the necessary work must not stand immediately below the dangerous part of the roof. One morning when Stapley and Dale arrived at their stope they tested the roof and found it to be dummy. They saw the foreman, Church, about it and he ordered them to fetch it down. They all knew that meant that no one was to work under the roof before it had come down. Church did not say which method was to be adopted. Both men were accustomed to this work and the method was properly left to their discretion. They used picks, but after half an hour had made no impression. The work was awkwardly placed as a fault ran across the mouth of the stope, the floor and roof inside being about eighteen inches higher than outside. Probably they could not use a pinch bar, but they could easily have prepared the place for firing a shot and sent for the shot firer. Instead, according to dale whose evidence was accepted, they agreed that the roof was safe enough for them to resume their ordinary work, and did so. There was a quantity of gypsum lying in the stope and if the roof had been safe their first task would have been to get to the haulage way. To do that, Stapley had to enter the stope and break the gypsum into smaller pieces and Dale had to make preparation in the twitten. So they separated, and when Dale came back half an hour later he found Stapley lying dead in the stope under a large piece of the roof which had fallen on him.


There is no doubt that if these men had obeyed their orders the accident would not have happened. Both acted in breach of orders and in breach of safety regulations and both ought to have known quite well that it was dangerous for Stapley to enter the stope.”


  1. The Trial Judge in Stapley found that accident occurred due to Dale’s fault and as such held Respondent liable but reduced the award by fifty percent. The Respondent appealed to Court of Appeal and the Appellant cross appealed. The Court of Appeal allowed Respondent’s appeal and dismissed the cross appeal.
  2. The Appellant appealed to House of Lords which assessed contributory negligence at eighty percent (80%).
  3. Lord Reid in agreeing with the assessment of contributory negligence stated as follows:-

“A Court must deal broadly with the problem of apportionment, and, on considering what is just and equitable, must have regard to the blameworthiness of each party, but ‘the claimants share in the responsibility for the damage’ cannot, I think, be assessed without considering the relative importance of his acts in causing the damage apart from his blameworthiness. It may be that in this case Dale was not much less to blame than Stapley, but Stapley’s conduct in entering the stope contributed more immediately to the accident than anything that Dale did or failed to do.”


  1. In Stapley’s case, both Stapley and Dale continued to work under the roof when they were ordered by their foreman to bring the roof down after they complained to him about the condition of the roof.
  2. In this instance, no evidence was produced to show that the Plaintiff was given warning for not wearing safety boots or any other shoes which had proper grips.
  3. In Jebson case the Claimant was a soldier and he travelled in a lorry for a night out organized by their Company Commander for relaxation purpose. It was not disputed that there would be a party and good deal of drinking. The lorry was only to be driven by the authorized driver who was on duty. Lance – Sergeant Myoh was appointed “senior passenger” and as such was:-

“Designated vehicle supervising officer and seated in the vehicle with the driver. He is in charge of all passengers and is to ensure that the vehicle is not overloaded ...[and]... he is to ensure that the vehicle is driven in a safe and proper manner”.


  1. On return journey the claimant and other soldiers except for driver and senior passenger were drunk. One of the Lance Corporal stood on his seat and climbed on the tailgate with intention of climbing on the canvas roof.
  2. Claimant tried to persuade the Lance Corporal to come down and himself climbed on the tailgate.
  3. Claimant then had change of heart and stood with the Lance Corporal on the tailgate. Claimant fell on the road and was injured.
  4. Evidence of three young women who were following in a car driven by one of them was that the claimant, the Lance Corporal and another man were showing off by waving and shouting at occupants of the car. Driver of the car dropped back because of the fear that they may fall on the road.
  5. Claimant then attempted to climb on the canvas roof and in the process lost his footing and fell on the road.
  6. The trial Judge held the Defendant liable but assessed contributory negligence at 75% which was upheld on appeal. Lord Justice Porter at page 29 stated as follows:-

“Finally, on the basis of success under Issues 1 and 2, the claimant appeals against the judge’s assessment of 75% contributory negligence upon his part. Mr. Braithwaite made short submissions in this respect. However, he failed to persuade me that the judge was other than right in regarding the claimant as largely the author of his own misfortune. On any view his actions were foolish and dangerous in the extreme. He had already sought to discourage Lance – Corporal Fear from pursuing a similar course. It is not known what led to a change of heart on the claimant’s own part. However, no sensible (nor indeed any) reason has been advanced for that change of heart. In my view there are no grounds to interfere with the Judge’s apportionment”.


  1. In Barrett’s case, the Executrix of the Estate of Terence Barrett claimed for damages. The deceased was a naval officer and while on duty consumed liquor and became drunk and as a result he passed out on coma and became asphyxiated on his own vomit and later died.
  2. The Trial Judge held the employer liable and held deceased guilty of contributory negligence and reduced damages by 25%. On Appeal the Court of Appeal held that the employer only became liable after the deceased collapsed because it assumed responsibility when deceased was no longer capable of looking after himself and that the measures taken by the employer fell short of the standard reasonably expected. The assessment on contributory negligence was increased from twenty five percent (25%) to two thirds.
  3. Lord Justice Beldan at page 96 paragraphs D, E stated as follows:-

“The immediate cause of the deceased’s death was suffocation due to inhalation of vomit. The amount of alcohol he had consumed not only caused him to vomit, it deprived him of the spontaneous ability to protect his air passages after he had vomited. His fault was therefore a continuing and direct cause of his death. Moreover, his lack of self-control in his own interest caused the appellant to have to assume responsibility for him”.


  1. In Rushton’s case:-

Plaintiff was employed by the defendants to operate a fibre crushing machine, which consisted of a rotating pan within which were two rotating stones connected by a central pin. From time to time, in the course of the work, the crushed fibre tended to stick in the grooves along which slid a trap-door at the base of the machine. Through this trapdoor the crushed fibre was discharged into a chute periodically during the day. The machine could be cleaned from above by lifting the cover of the pan, and in that case the machine was stopped and the stones automatically stopped rotating; but the usual method of cleaning the grooves was from below the machine, by opening the trapdoor and putting one’s hand in through the door having first stopped the rotation of the stones. The defendants knew that this was the method which their workmen normally used. There was no guard or barrier at this part of the machine, but it was the practice among the defendants’ work men to stop the machine before attempting to clean the grooves. When the Plaintiff first started to operate a crushing machine, he received adequate training in regard to using and cleaning the machine and was instructed never to attempt to clean the grooves when the machine was in motion. He also received from the defendants a card with safety instructions and warning him not to touch any part of the machine when it was in motion expect those parts which formed part of his normal job and which he had been instructed to do the foreman or a teacher operative. After the plaintiff had been employed on the machine for about six months, it was discovered one afternoon that a small piece of metal from the top edge of one of the grooves, separating the groove from the pan with the rotating stones, had broken away. It was decided that it would be safe to continue to use the machine for the remainder of that shift, and the Plaintiff continued to operate the machine, knowing its condition. Later in the afternoon, when the groove required cleaning, he put his left hand into the machine without stopping it and his fingers were crushed.”


  1. The Court held that the Plaintiff’s action was quite deliberate despite all the training and instructions and the course of the accident was wholly attributed to him.
  2. What transpired in this case is not same as to what happened in Stapley and in Jenson, Barett and Ruston case for following reason:-
  3. Defendants submitted that Plaintiff was contributory negligent for following reasons:-

“7.3 (a) Conduction of OHS training;

(b) A OHS Policy was and still is in place;

(c) The OHS Policy is displayed inside the laundry area;

(d) It is expected that the workers in the laundry area know the OHS Policy in place as training was conducted and workers were always reminded to wear the proper safety attire;

(e) A duty roster was enforced whereby the floor is mopped 3 times a day;

(f) The proper work and safety attire is distributed to the workers. For the laundry area workers these were uniforms and safety shoes;

(g) There is a fully functional OHS Committee which existed at the time of the Plaintiff’s accident and still exists todate.


  1. DW2’s evidence was that Plaintiff wore massage flippers because Plaintiff stated to her that the safety boots were heavy.
  2. If that was so, then I fail to understand why DW2 did not report this to the OHS Committee Chairman or CWMH Management.
  3. It appears that the Supervisor and other senior staff in the Laundry Department of CWMH was well aware of the fact that Plaintiff was wearing massage flippers instead of safety boots for quite some time but did not enforce the OHS Policy.
  4. There was no evidence of any written warning (memorandum or letter) given to the Plaintiff.
  5. However, the Plaintiff was an experienced worker and should have known it is not safe to wear footwear which is not closed and had grips whilst working in a area such as laundry department. If she was not provided safety boots then she should reported it to OHS Representative.
  6. As a result I assess contributory negligence at fifteen percent (15%).

Special Damages

Travelling Expenses/Medical Report


  1. Plaintiff gave evidence that after being discharged she had to travel to hospital seven (7) times for review which was confirmed by Dr. Traill in his report. She claimed $60.00 for travelling expenses.
  2. No documentary evidence has been produced to prove the amount claimed by Plaintiff. However:-
  3. As such I accept Plaintiff’s evidence that she incurred travelling expenses and medical report and allow her claim for $65.00.
  4. Plaintiff gave evidence that after being discharged from hospital she bought pain killers as panadol to overcome pain but do not have any documentary evidence.
  5. In view of what I said of Paragraph 77 of this Judgment, I will allow $200.00 for medication, as claimed in the statement of claim.

Loss of Earning and Fiji National Provident Fund


  1. It was undisputed evidence of Plaintiff that Plaintiff’s weekly gross wages was $165.44 and she was paid wages while she was admitted at the hospital.
  2. Plaintiff retired in April at the age of fifty five (55) years.
  3. Plaintiff’s evidence is that after the accident she was not paid wages for twenty (20) days sick leave which means that she was paid normal wages until she retired. I therefore award Plaintiff loss of wages and FNPF contribution at $509.10 which is made up as follows:-

$165.44 x 52 weeks/365 x 20 days $471.39

8% of $471.39 (FNPF) 37.71
$509.10

  1. Hence the total claim allowed for special damage is $774.10 which is made up as follows:-

Travelling expenses: $ 65.00

Medication expenses: $200.00

Loss of wages and FNPF: $509.10

$774.10


General Damages


  1. Plaintiff claim damage for pain and suffering, future economic loss and loss of future care;

Pain and Suffering


  1. The Fiji Court of Appeal in Chand & Anor. v. Amin Civil Appeal No. ABU 0031 of 2012 (2 October 2015) stated as how damage is to be assessed for pain and suffering in very simple terms as follows:-

“The assessment of damages under this dead depends upon the consequences to the individual plaintiff (Bresatz v Przibilla [1962] HCA 54; (1962) 108 CLR 541 at 548 cited in Law of Torts by Balkin& Davis 5thed. at 11.28). In Hail v Rankin [20001] QB 272 the English Court of Appeal had acknowledged monetary inflation to be considered while making the awards. However the amounts decided on in previous cases can be considered no more than as a guide, and any particular determination must depend on such factors as the intensity of the pain felt by the plaintiff and its likely duration (Balkin& Davis (supra) at 11.28).”


86. In Chand & An. A v. Amin; Civil Appeal No. ABU 0031 of 2012 (2 October 2015 Respondent/Plaintiff suffered from disc injury as a resullifting heavy objects during his employment. The Learned Trial found tund that the Rthe Respondent/Plaintiff has suffered from pain and could not play soccer which was his interest and had problems with his sex life because of back pain. Respondentntiffalso using sing crutchrutches and in terms of Medical Officer’s evidence Respondent’s/Plaintiff’s situation woot get better.


  1. The Learned Trial Judge awarded $85,000.00 for past and future pain and suffering and loss of amenities of life, which was upheld on appeal.
  2. In Asish Mudaliar v. Rajesh Rama & Anor; Labasa High Court Civil Action No. 3 of 2012 (4 April 2014), Plaintiff suffered injuries as a result of being crushed between two buses.

&##160;; < <

e Court found tlaintiff suffered pain and sund sufferiffering, lng, lost aost amenities of life and injury suffered by Plaintiff was severe. Piff ae of trial (4/4/2014/2014) was 36 years old.



The Court awarded $60,000.00 for pain and suffering and loss of ames of life.


89. ټ In Eta NEta Naqelita v. Ram Kumar; Labasa High Court Civil Action No. 19 of 2010, Plaintiff suffered following injuries:-

“1. Laceration upper lip ann chin

  1. In Nasese Bus Company Limited & Anor v. Muni Chand, Civil Appeal No. 40 of 2011(8 February 2013) Respondent/Plaintiff suffered:-

(i) & ټ cl0; closed displaceplaced comminuted intra-articular fracture of left ankle;

(ii) ټ < closed extensige deng inju injury right thigh;

(iii) &#16ra anterious cruciaruciaruciate ligament injury right knee; and

(iv) &##160; mul abrasions to both uppe upper and lowers.

ondenintiff was awarded $65,000.0000.00 by t by the Hohe Honorabnorable Trial Judge for pain and suffering which award was increased to $90,000n app/p>

  1. In Tamanibuici v. Prasad & Anor. Labasa High Court Civil Action No. HBC 34 of 2012 (29 September 2015) the Plaintiff suffered following injuries:-

ټ < n&#“(i) & F60;turacof r ght femur;

&ـʔ< < ); #60;&;;160;; Fracture ofre of left forearm and ulnaeft ap>

Piff ae of accident was fourteen (14) years oars old. He had gone througgeryrgeryrgery wher whereby rod was inserted in his right thigh and his leg ut on.&#16aintiff was was admitadmitted oted on 5 June 2009.


The medical officer’s evidence was that Plaintiff’s skin and muscle was cut to release tension and ease flow of blood. After swelling of Plaintifintiff’s right leg increased that he had to go through open reduction surgery because the fracture of right femur was bad and had to be straightened. After thigery tiff’s217;s leg leg was put on plaster.


Plaintiff was discharged on 5 August 2009, but was re-admitted on 21ember 2009, because fracture had not united. On 29 September 20laintiffntiff went thrt through another open reduction and internal fixation surgery and was discharged on 1st October 2009.


In total Plaintiff was admitted for seventy(71) days.


Thi> This Court awarded Plaintiff $70,000.00 for past pain and suffering and $10,000.00 for future pain and suffering.


  1. In Attorney General of Fiji v. Broadbridge [2005] Civil Appeal No. CBV005 of 2003s (8 April 2005) the injuries suffered by the Plaintiff and treatment he received in brief are as follows:
    • (i) He suffered a fractured forearm and fracture hip joint.
    • (ii) At Colonial War Memorial Hospital (CWM) a plaster cast was fitted to his hip.
    • (iii) Court noted that his condition has not properly diagnosed by CWM as it was not discovered at that stage that his hip was dislocated with significant damage to the surrounding area.
    • (iv) Plaintiff had to undergo surgery in New Zealand.
    • (v) Plaintiff continued to suffer from chronic pain in the hip and knee joint.
  2. The Trial Judge awarded Plaintiff $75,000.00 for pain and suffering which on appeal was reduced to $60,000.00 by Fiji Court of Appeal. The appellant did not challenge the Fiji Court of Appeal decision in this respect.
  3. In Dre v. Ministry of Health and Anor. [2009] Civil Action No. 20 of 2007 (24 June 2009), the Plaintiff went to Nabouwalu Hospital for treatment of pain in her right ear. The doctor who attended to Plaintiff inserted the needle below the thumb of the right hand. After a short while Plaintiff was in extreme pain and started crying and subsequently it was discovered that the injection was wrongly inserted with into the artery which resulted in lack of blood and oxygen flow to that part of the body. There was no option but to amputate Plaintiff’s right hand. The Court awarded $75,000.00 for pain and suffering and loss of amenities of life.
  4. I accept the evidence of Dr. Alvin De Asa in respect to the assessment carried out by him and his findings which is in conformity with Dr. Sitiveni Traill’s assessment.
  5. After analyzing the evidence produced in Court I asses the amount for pain suffering as follows:
    • (i) Past pain and suffering - $30,000. 00
    • (ii) Future pain and suffering - $5,0000.00

Future Economic Loss


  1. Plaintiff worked at CWMH until she retired and as such he not suffered any future economic loss. Even if she did, no evidence was produced in Court in this regard.
  2. Hence, Plaintiff’s claim for future economic loss is dismissed.

Loss of Future Care


  1. No evidence has been produced to show that Plaintiff needs future care.
  2. Hence, Plaintiff’s claim for future care is dismissed.

Interest


101. I think it is just and fair that interest on special damage be assessed at three percent (3%) and on general damage be awarded at four percent (4%). The reason for awarding four percent (4%) interest on general damage is that Plaintiff has been quite slow in prosecuting this action.


Costs


  1. I have taken into consideration that the trial lasted for two (2) days and parties have filed submissions.

Conclusion


  1. This Court holds that:
    • (i) Defendants owed a duty of care to the Plaintiff.
    • (ii) The Defendants breached their duty of care owed to the Plaintiff which was the cause of Plaintiff’s injury.
    • (iii) Plaintiff contributed to her injury which is assessed at fifteen percent (15%).
  2. Defendants are to pay the Plaintiff a sum of thirty seven thousand eight hundred nineteen dollars ($37,819.00) being special and general damages including interest up to the date of Judgment which said sum is made up as follows:

Special Damages [paragraph 84] $774.10

Less 15% - Contributory Negligence 116.10

$658.00

Interest at less 3% percent from 27/06/2007 (date of

Accident) to 15/07/2016 (date of Judgment)-(3307 days) $179.00 $ 837.00


General Damages

Past Pain and Suffering $30,000.00

Less 15% - Contributory Negligence 4,500.00 $25,500.00

Interest at 4% per annum from 05/06/2009 (date of

Writ) to 15/07/2016(date of Judgment)- (2588 days) $ 7,232.00 $32,732.00


Future Pain and suffering $5,000.00

Less 15% - Contributory Negligence 750.00 $ 4,250.00

Total $37,819.00


Orders


105. I make the following Orders:


(i) Defendant do pay Plaintiff the sum of $37,819.00 (thirty seven thousand eight hundred nineteen dollars) including interest;


(ii) Defendants do pay Plaintiff cost of this action assessed in the sum of $3,500.00.


Kamal Kumar

JUDGE


At Suva

15 July 2016


Daniel Singh Lawyers for the Plaintiff

Office of the Attorney General for the Defendants


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