Kaur v Singh [2016] FJHC 264; HBC54.2013 (13 April 2016)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF FIJI
WESTERN DIVISION
AT LAUTOKA

CIVIL JURISDICTION

CIVIL ACTION NO. HBC 54 of 2013

IN THE MATTER OF THE LAND TRANSFER ACTSection 169 of Part XXXIV

BETWEEN:

MANJIT KAUR of Votua, Ba.
PLAINTIFF

AND:

SARJEET SINGH of Lot 18, Votua, Ba
DEFENDANT

Mr. Roopesh Prakash Singh for the Plaintiff
Mr. Samuel Kamlesh Ram for the Defendant

Date of Hearing: - 23rd November 2015
Date of Ruling : - 13thApril 2016

RULING

(A) INTRODUCTION

(1) The matter before me stems from the Plaintiff's Originating Summons dated 03rd April 2013, made pursuant to Section 169 of the "Land Transfer Act", Cap 131, for an Order for Vacant Possession against the Defendant.

(2) The Defendant is summoned to appear before the Court to show cause why he should not give up vacant possession of the Plaintiff's property comprised in Crown Lease No. 18854, part of Nanunu & Nareba, in the Province of Ba, consisting an area of 1Rood and 1 perches.

(3) The application for eviction is supported by an Affidavit sworn by the Plaintiff on 18thMarch 2013.

(4) The application for eviction is vigorously resisted by the Defendant.

(5) The Defendant filed an "Affidavit in Opposition" sworn on 18th December 2013 opposing the application for eviction.

(6) The Plaintiff and the Defendant were heard on the Originating Summons. They made oral submissions to Court. In addition to oral submissions, the Counsel for the Plaintiff and the Defendant filed a careful and comprehensive written submission for which I am most grateful.

(B) THE FACTUAL BACKGROUND

(1) What are the circumstances that give rise to the present application?

(2) To give the whole picture of the action, I can do no better than set out hereunder the main averments/assertions of the pleadings.

(3) The Plaintiff in her Affidavit in Support deposes inter alia; (as far as relevant)

Para 3. THAT I am the registered lessee of the land comprised in Crown Lease Number 18854, Part of Nanunu & Nareba, in the Province of Ba, containing an area of 1 Rood and 1 Perches. (hereinafter referred to as the said land). I annexed hereto and mark as Exhibit A copy of the lease for the said land.

4. THAT the Defendant illegally occupies a portion of the said land.

5. THAT on the 29th of January 2013 I instructed my Solicitors to write to the Defendant requiring him to vacate the said land. I annexed hereto and marked as Exhibit B is a copy of my Solicitors aforementioned notice.

7. THAT despite the notice being served on the Defendant he continues to reside and occupy a portion of the said land.

(4) The Defendant for his part in seeking to show cause against the Originating Summons, filed an Affidavit in Opposition, which is substantially as follows; (as far as relevant)

Para 19. That on the 15th February 2011, I made application to the Lands Department for new lease of Lot 18. Exhibited hereto is marked 'SS-8' is a copy of the said receipt from Lands Department.

20. The Lands Department issued the lease to the Plaintiff on the 20th December 2011. Exhibited hereto is marked "SS-9' is a copy of the said lease.

21. The said lease purports to commence from 1st July 2010 when the Plaintiff and I made the application together to the Lands Department on the 15th February 2011.

22. The Plaintiff and I reside on the same Lot 18 mentioned in the above lease.

23. I further enquired with Lands Department regarding my application for lease sometimes in February 2013 and the lands department wrote to me on 21st February 2013 stating that my application is under process. They will get back to me once the application is processed. Exhibited hereto is marked 'SS-10' is a copy of the said letter.

24. In 1996 the land that is subject to present proceedings belonged to Votua Women Club. The Votua Women Club wrote to the Divisional Surveyor Western on the 2nd January 1996 stating the land be transferred to the Tagi Tagi Gurudwara Prabhandak Committee. Exhibited hereto is marked 'SS-11' is a copy of the said letter.

25. On the 14th March 1996, the Divisional Surveyor Western wrote to the Trustees of Votua Womens Club asking if they had any objections to the issue of lease for educational purpose. Exhibited hereto is marked 'SS-12' is a copy of the said letter.

26. On the 1st May 1996 another letter was written to Divisional Surveyor Western requesting the lease be transferred in the name of Tagi Tagi Gurudwara. Exhibited hereto is marked 'SS-13' is a copy of the said letter.

38. The Plaintiff house was erected near to the Kindergarten building and not in Lot 13.

39. My right of occupation came through my father Pyara Singh, Tagi Tagi Gurudwara Committee and Votua Womens Committee.

40. There are serious issued to be tried in this matter and the matter should be re-heard hence giving me opportunity to put my side of the story before the court.

41. I also belief that lands department should also be joined to this proceedings to rectify issues pertaining to the issuance of lease and previous correspondences.

(5) On 18th June 2014, the Plaintiff filed an Affidavit in reply which is substantially as follows; (as far as relevant)

Para 4. THAT as the paragraph 5 and 6 of the said affidavit, I say that the Director of Lands only inspects properties at its discretion and even if any such inspection would have revealed that the Defendant illegally occupied the subject land, it would not make any difference to the issuance of the Lease in my favour, whether there was an inspection or not.

6. THAT as to paragraph 8 of the said Affidavit I say that the Director of Lands after receiving the letter and all representations made by the Defendant allowed me to proceed with the eviction proceedings against the Defendant.

7. THAT as the paragraph 9 of the said Affidavit I say as follows,

7.1 I applied for the lease of the subject land and obtained the same.

7.2 The Lease is issued under my name.

7.3 I am the registered Lessee of the same.

7.4 The Defendant, though has written a lot of letters, complaints against me to stop the issuance of the Lease in my favour, he was not successful.

8. THAT as the paragraph 11 of the said affidavit I say that there is nothing suspicious in regards to the issuance of the Lease in my name and further Exhibit 5 being the approved plan, is only two pages of the plan that I have in my possession.

Save as expressly admitted I deny remainder of the allegation in paragraph 11 of the said affidavit.

9. THAT as to paragraph 12 of the said Affidavit I say that the building as marked by the Defendant clearly indicates that the same was 'vacant building' at the time of approval of the building plan by the Local Rural Authority.

(C) THE LAW

(1) Against this factual background, it is necessary to turn to the applicable law and Judicial thinking in relation to the principles governing the exercise of the discretion to make the Order the Plaintiff now seeks.

(2) Rather than refer in detail to the various authorities, I propose to set out, with only limited citations, what I take to be the principles of the play.

(3) Sections from 169 to 172 of the Land Transfer Act (LTA) are applicable to summary application for eviction.

Section 169 states;

"The following persons may summon any person in possession of land to appear before a judge in chambers to show cause why the person summoned should not give up possession to the applicant:-

(a) the last registered proprietor of the land;

(b) .....;

(c) ......

Section 170 states;

"The summons shall contain a description of the land and shall require the person summoned to appear at the court on a day not earlier than sixteen days after the service of the summons."

Section 171 states;

"On the day appointed for the hearing of the summons, if the person summoned does not appear, then upon proof to the satisfaction of the judge of the due service of such summons and upon proof of the title by the proprietor or lessor and, if any consent is necessary, by the production and proof of such consent, the judge may order immediate possession to be given to the plaintiff, which order shall have the effect of and may be enforced as a judgment in Ejectment.

Section 172 states;

"If the person summoned appears he may show cause why he refuses to give possession of such land and, if he proves to the satisfaction of the judge a right to the possession of the land, the judge shall dismiss the summons with costs against the proprietor, mortgage or lessor or he may make any order and impose any terms he may think fit;

Provided that the dismissal of the summons shall not prejudice the right of the plaintiff to take any other proceedings against the person summoned to which he may be otherwise entitled:

Provided also that in the case of a lessor against a lessee, if the lessee, before the hearing, pay or tender all rent due and all costs incurred by the lessor, the judge shall dismiss the summons.

[Emphasis provided]

(4) The procedure under Section 169 was explained by Pathik J. in Deo v Mati [2005] FJHC 136; HBC0248j.2004s (16 June 2005) as follows:-

The procedure under s.169 is governed by sections 171 and 172 of the Act which provide respectively as follows:-

"s.171. On the day appointed for the hearing of the Summons, if the person summoned does not appear, then upon proof to the satisfaction of the Judge of the due service of such summons and upon proof of the title by the proprietor or lessor and, if any consent is necessary, by the production and proof of such consent, the judge may order immediate possession to be given to the plaintiff, which order shall have the effect of and may be enforced as a judgment in ejectment."

"s.172. If a person summoned appears he may show cause why he refuses to give possession of such land and, if he proves to the satisfaction of the judge a right to the possession of the land, the judge shall dismiss the summons with costs against the proprietor, mortgagee or lessor or he may make any order and impose any terms he may think fit."

It is for the defendant to 'show cause.'

(5) The Supreme Court in considering the requirements of Section 172 stated in Morris Hedstrom Limited v. Liaquat Ali (Action No. 153/87 at p2) as follows and it is pertinent:

"Under Section 172 the person summoned may show cause why he refused to give possession of the land and if he proves to the satisfaction of the judge a right to possession or can establish an arguable defence the application will be dismissed with costs in his favour. The Defendants must show on affidavit evidence some right to possession which would preclude the granting of an order for possession under Section 169 procedure. That is not to say that final or incontrovertible proof of a right to remain in possession must be adduced. What is required is that some tangible evidence establishing a right or supporting an arguable case for such a right, must be adduced."

(6) The requirements of Section 172 have been further elaborated by the Fiji Court of Appeal in Azmat Ali s/o Akbar Ali v Mohammed Jalil s/o Mohammed Hanif (Action No. 44 of 1981 – judgment 2.4.82) where it is stated:

"It is not enough to show a possible future right to possession. That is an acceptable statement as far as it goes, but the section continues that if the person summoned does show cause the judge shall dismiss the summons; but then are added the very wide words "or he may make any order and impose any terms he may think fit" These words must apply, though the person appearing has failed to satisfy the judge, and indeed are often applied when the judge decides that an open court hearing is required. We read the section as empowering the judge to make any order that justice and the circumstances require.

(D) ANALYSIS

(1) This is an application brought under Section 169 of the Land Transfer Act, [Cap 131].

Under Section 169, certain persons may summon a person in possession of land before a judge in chambers to show cause as to why that person should not be ordered to surrender possession of the land to the Claimant.

For the sake of completeness, Section 169 of the Land Transfer Act is reproduced below;

169. The following persons may summon any person in Possession of land to appear before a judge in chambers to show cause why the person summoned should not give up possession to the applicant:-

(a) the last registered proprietor of the land;

(b) a lessor with power to re-enter where the lessee or tenant is in arrear for such period as may be provided in the lease and, in the absence of any such provision therein, when the lessee or tenant is in arrear for one month, whether there be or be not sufficient distress found on the premises to countervail such rent and whether or not any previous demand has been made for the rent;

(c) a lessor against a lessee or tenant where a legal notice to quit has been given or the term of the lease has expired.

(2) In all applications under Section 169 of the Land Transfer Act, the Plaintiff/Applicant must first satisfy the prerequisites of Section 169 and 170, before the burden shifts to the Defendant.

The first requirement of Section 169 of the Land Transfer Act is that the Plaintiff must be the "last registered proprietor" or a "lessor with power to re-enter where the lessee or tenant is in arrears" or a "lessor against the lessee or tenant where a legal Notice has been given or the term of the lease has expired."

I ask myself, under which limb of Section 169 is the application being made?

This is the threshold question. As far as Section 169 (b) and (c) are concerned they apply where there is a landlord and tenant relationship.

According to the Crown Lease No: 18854(Annexure – A), the Plaintiff became the lessee of the subject land on 01st July 2010. The Crown Lease is registered with the Registrar of Titles on 20th April 2012.

Therefore, the Plaintiff holds a registered lease and could be characterized as the last registered proprietor.

Section 169 (a) of the Land Transfer Act, Cap 131, requires the Plaintiff to be the last registered proprietor of the land.

The term "proprietor" is defined in the Land Transfer Act as "the registered proprietor of land, or of any estate or interest therein".

The term "registered" is defined in the Interpretation Act, Cap 7, as "registered used with reference to a document or the title to any immovable property means registered under the provisions of any written law for the time being applicable to the registration of such document or title"

On the question of whether a lessee can bring an application under Section 169 of the Land Transfer Act, if any authority is required, I need only refer to the sentiments expressed by Master Robinson in "Michael Nair v Sangeeta Devi", Civil Action No: 2/12, FJHC, decided on 06.02.2013. The learned Master held;

"The first question then is under which ambit of section 169 is the application being made? The application could not be made under the second or third limb of the section since the applicant is the lessee and not the lessor as is required under these provisions. But is the applicant a registered proprietor? A proprietor under the Land Transfer Act means the registered proprietor of any land, or of an estate or interest therein". The registration of the lease under a statutory authority, the iTLTB Act Cap 134, creates a legal interest on the land making the applicant the registered proprietor of the land for the purposes of the Land Transfer Act. He can therefore make an application under section 169 of the Land Transfer Act".

The same rule was again applied by the learned Master in "Nasarawaqa Co- operative Limited v Hari Chand", Civil Action No: HBC 18 of 2013, decided on 25.04.2014. The learned Master held;

"It is clear that the iTLTB as the Plaintiff's lessor can take an action under section 169 to eject the Plaintiff. This is provided for under paragraphs [b] & [c]. For the lessor to be able to eject the tenant or the lessee it must have a registered lease. It is not in dispute that the Plaintiff holds a registered lease, the lease is an "Instrument of Tenancy" issued by the iTLTB under the Agricultural Landlord and Tenancy Act. It is for all intents and purposes a native lease and was registered on the 29 November 2012 and registered in book 2012 folio 11824. It is registered under the register of deeds. There is nothing in section 169 that prevents a lessor ejecting a lessee from the land as long as the lease is registered. How will the lessee then eject a trespasser if the lessor in the same lease can use section 169? The lessee under section 169 can eject a trespasser simply because the lessee is the last registered proprietor. The Plaintiff does not have to hold a title in fee simple to become a proprietor as long as he/she is the last registered proprietor. A proprietor is defined in the Land Transfer Act as "proprietor" means the registered proprietor of land or of any estate or interest therein". The Plaintiff has an interest by virtue of the instrument of tenancy and therefore fits the above definition and can bring the action under section 169."

A somewhat similar situation as this was considered by His Lordship Justice K.A. Stuart in "Housing Authority v Muniappa", 1977, FJSC. His Lordship held that the Plaintiff Housing Authority holds a registered lease therefore it could be characterised as the last registered proprietor.

In Habib v Prasad, [2012] FJHC 22, Hon. Madam Justice Angala Wati said;

"The word registered is making reference to registration of land and not the nature of land. If the land is registered either in the Registrar of Titles Office or in the Deeds Office, it is still registered land. This land has been registered on 4th March, 2004 and is registered at the Registrar of Deeds Office, it is still registered land. The registration is sufficient to meet the definition of registered in the Interpretation Act Cap 7:-

"Registered" used with reference to a document or thetitle to any immoveable property means registered under the provision of any written law for the time being applicable to the registration of such document or title".

Being guided by those words, I am satisfied that the Plaintiff is the last registered proprietor of the land comprised in Crown Lease No:- 18854. The application for eviction is more specifically brought under Section 169 (a) of the Land Transfer Act.

I turn next to consider the requirements of Section 170 of the Land Transfer Act.
For the sake of completeness, Section 170 of the Land Transfer Act is reproduced below;

Particulars to be stated in summons

170. The summons shall contain a description of the land and shall require the person summoned to appear at the court on a day not earlier than sixteen days after the service of the summons.

Pursuant to Section 170 of the Land Transfer Act;

(1) The Summons shall contain a "description of the Land"

AND

(2) Shall require the person summoned to appear in the court on a day not earlier than "sixteen days" after the service of Summons.

I ask myself, are these mandatory requirements sufficiently complied with by the Plaintiff in order to found jurisdiction?

The Originating Summons filed by the Plaintiff does contain a description of the subject land. The subject land is sufficiently described. For the sake of completeness, the Originating Summons is reproduced below.

SUMMONS

LET ALL PARTIES concerned attend before a Master in Chambers at the High Court, Lautoka on the 27th day of July, 2015 at 8.30 o'clock in the forenoon on the hearing of an APPLICATION by the above named Plaintiff that the Defendant do show cause why he should not give up immediate vacant possession to the Plaintiff of all that land comprised in Crown Lease No. 18854, Part of Nanunu & Nareba, in the Province of Ba, containing an area of 1 Rood and 1 Perches and costs of this application.

The Plaintiff will rely on the affidavit of MANJIT KAUR filed herewith in support of this Summons.

This application is made pursuant to Section 169 of Part XXXIV of the Land Transfer Act.

(Emphasis added)

In light of the above, I have no doubt personally and I am clearly of opinion that the first mandatory requirement of Section 170 of the Land Transfer Act has been complied with.

(3) Now comes a most relevant and, as I think, crucial second mandatory requirement of Section 170 of the Land Transfer Act.

At this point, I cannot resist in saying that no argument was addressed to me by the Counsel for the Defendant on the second threshold criteria in Section 170 of the Land Transfer Act. Moreover, the Defendant did not make any reference to the second threshold criteria in his Affidavit in Opposition.

But I do not wish to rest the matter there.

I desire to emphasise that the court is bound to look into the "prerequisites" before the burden shifts to the Defendant. I regard this duty of the Court as more important than anything else in the administration of Justice. As mandated by Section 170 of the Land Transfer Act, in order to found the jurisdiction, the Plaintiff has to prove that the Defendant is summoned to appear and show cause on a day not earlier than sixteen days after the service of Originating Summons. There should be evidence placed before this Court to establish that the Defendant is summoned to Shaw cause on a day not earlier than sixteen days after the service of Originating Summons. Though the applications such as this are directed to be made in Chambers, they are not interlocutory and are concerned with the important matter of the right to the possession of land. The Court is here to administer justice. It is essential bear in mind that the concept of justice is not confined to the interests of particular litigants; it embraces and extends to the protection of the public veil. The crucial point is that the court should arrive at a just result.

Now let me return to the present case to consider the issue of whether the Plaintiff has satisfied that the Defendant is summoned to Shaw cause on a day not earlier than sixteen days after the service of Originating Summons. The Plaintiff has to prove this in order to found jurisdiction.

The Originating Summons was returnable on 27th July 2015.

It is worth remarking that the Plaintiff in the case before me did not file the Affidavit of Service of the Originating Summons. Thus, there is no evidence of date of service of the re-dated Originating Summons on the Defendant. It is true that the re-dated Originating Summons was served on the Defendant. But the issue is, when was it served on the Defendant? Was it served on the Defendant on a day not earlier than sixteen days that the Defendant is summoned to Shaw cause, as mandated by Section 170 of the Land Transfer Act?. I am not satisfied on this point. There is no evidence placed before this Court. The Plaintiff should have proved the service of the re-dated Originating Summons on the Defendant satisfactorily by filing the Affidavit of Service of the Originating Summons. The burden of satisfying the Court is on the Plaintiff. It is paradoxical that the onus is on the Plaintiff. The Plaintiff failed to discharge the burden/onus. The Plaintiff falls at the second hurdle.

Let me have a close look at the history of the proceedings.

❖ The substantive matter in this action is based on the Summons for ejectment filed by the Plaintiff, dated and filed on 3rd April 2013. The Application is made pursuant to Section 169 of the Land Transfer Act.

❖ On 22ndApril 2013, by registered bailiff, the Summons for ejectment and Affidavit of Manjit Kaur in Support was duly served on the Defendant where the Defendant accepted the service by acknowledging on the copies of the papers being served.

❖ On 14th June2013, since there had been no appearance for or on behalf of the Defendant, the Plaintiff was granted order in terms for the Summons for ejectment and the said Order was sealed on 4th July 2013 and the Defendant was duly served by the registered bailiff on 23rd July 2013.

❖ On 16thOctober 2013, the Plaintiff filed Writ of Possession against the Defendant, which was duly served by the Court Sheriffs on the Defendant.

❖ On 09th December 2014, the Defendant through his Solicitor filed a Summons to set aside the Order that was entered against the Defendant for vacant possession.

On 06th July 2015, by consent, the Court set aside the Order for vacant possession entered against the Defendant on 14th June 2013. On the same day, the Counsel for the Plaintiff, (Ms) Arathi Swamy sought 21 days to re-serve the Originating Summons on the Defendant after re-dating. The Court granted permission and adjourned the matter for 27th July 2015 for mention.

The minute sheet dated 06th July 2015, carries the following minute;

BEFORE THE ACTING MASTER OF THE HIGH COURT

Appearances:

Mrs Arthi Bandhanna Swamy for the Plaintiff

Mr. Niven Ram Padarath for the Defendant

Counsel's Submissions

The Plaintiff is conceding the Defendant's application to set aside default judgment.

Order:

Order in terms of Summons dated 09/12/2014.

The Plaintiff seeks 21 days to re-serve the Summons and Affidavit re-dating.

Case is adjourned for mention on 27/07/2015.

Acting Master of the High Court

According to the Court record, on 08th July 2015 i.e. after lapse of two days, the Originating Summons dated 03rd April 2013 was re-dated to 27th July 2015, by the Defendant.

The minute sheet dated 27th July 2015, carries the following minute;

BEFORE THE ACTING MASTER OF THE HIGH COURT

Appearances:

Mrs Arthi Bandhanna Swamy for the Plaintiff

Mr. Niven Ram Padarath for the Defendant

Counsel's Submissions

The Defendant is contesting the Summons for vacant possession.

Order:

21 days granted for the Defendant to file Affidavit in Opposition. To be filed on 17/08/2015. Thereafter 14 days for the Plaintiff to file Affidavit in Reply.

To be filedon 31/08/2015.

Hearing fixed for 21/09/2015 at 11.30 am.

Acting Master of the High Court

Despite the skillful advocacy of Counsel for the Plaintiff, the conduct of the Plaintiff in deliberately deciding not to file the Affidavit of Service of the re-dated Originating Summons on the Defendant is still not clear to me. The Plaintiff has embarked on a sleeveless errand in seeking an order for vacant possession, without proving that the Defendant was summoned to appear in the Court to show cause on a day not earlier than 16 days after the service of the re-dated Originating Summons as mandated by Section 170 of the Land Transfer Act. This needs to be proved in order to found jurisdiction. There is no iota of evidence to establish that the Defendant is summoned to show cause in court not earlier than sixteen days after the service of the re-dated Originating Summons. This is fatal to the Plaintiff's application since it is fundamental and it cannot be rectified simply by the use of Court's discretion. It is not the function of this Court. It would be quite wrong, in my opinion to seek to establish this mandatory requirement by statements of information and belief of the Defendant.

In the context of the present case, I am inclined to lean in favour of the judicial thinking reflected in the dictum of Hon. Judge Madraiwiwi in "Atunaisa Tavuto v Sumeshwar Singh", Action No:- HBC 0332 of 1997L. Hon. Judge Madraiwiwi says;

"This application can be disposed of without the need to consider the parties' substantive arguments. The summons is defective in not properly describing the subject property. Although the Housing Authority Lease No. 345322 was correctly stated, the plaintiff failed to fully state the additional particulars being "Crown Lease No. 10046 Lot 26 on DP 6420 in the province of Ba tikina of Ba consisting of an area of 552m2". If that were not enough the summons omitted the obligation that "the person summoned to appear on a day not earlier than sixteen days after the service of the summons" as mandated by Section 170 of the act. Their Lordships of the Supreme Court have emphasized the need to follow rules of the court and the consequences for not doing so Ponu Samy v. Dharam Lingam Reddy Appeal No. 1 of 1996 (SC) at 17. In applications such as this, the technicalities are strictly construed if only because of the drastic consequences that follow for one of the parties upon the relief sought being granted. It behooved the Plaintiff and his Counsel to have exercised more diligence in this regard."

(Emphasis Added)

Applying those principles to the instant case, I cannot resist in saying that the Plaintiff's Originating Summons can go no further.

In view of the approach, I have adopted, I do not think that there is any need for me to express my views on the merits of the Defendant's arguments relating to his right to possession. It will be at best a matter of academic interest only or at worst an exercise in futility to discuss the merits of the Defendant's arguments relating to his right to possession.

Essentially that is all I have to say!!!

(E) CONCLUSION

For the reason which I have endeavored to explain, I venture to say beyond a per adventure that the second mandatory requirement of Section 170 of the Land Transfer Act and the legal consequences that flow from non- compliance defeat the Plaintiff's claim for vacant possession.

Therefore, the Defendant needs not show any evidence of a cause to remain on the property since this matter can go no further. I cannot see any other just way to finish the matter than to follow the law.

Accordingly, there is no alternate but to dismiss the Originating Summons.

(F) FINAL ORDERS

(1) The Plaintiff's Originating Summons is dismissed.

(2) The Plaintiff is ordered to pay costs of $500.00 (summarily assessed) to the Defendant which is to be paid within 14 days from the date hereof.

I do so order.

Jude Nanayakkara
Master of the High Court

At Lautoka
13th April 2016