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High Court of Fiji |
IN THE HIGH COURT OF FIJI
CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
AT LAUTOKA
CRIMINAL CASE: HAC 70 OF 2014
BETWEEN :
STATE
AND :
JIMI BETE
Counsel : Mr. Niudamu for State
Mr. Aman Ravindra-Singh & Mr. Anthony for the Accused
Date of Hearing : 26th of November to 1st of December 2015
Date of Closing Submissions : 02nd December 2015
Date of Summing Up : 04th of December 2015
Judgment : 07th of December 2015
Introduction
Background
The Law
"A person commits an indictable offence if-
or is not accompanied by an intention to cause death or bodily harm"
10. Section 241 (5) of the Crimes Decree states that;
11. Accordingly, the main elements of the offence of "manslaughter arising from breach of duty" are that;
deceased, and
negligence and therefore a crime,
12. The accused was the captain of the boat. Accordingly he was under a duty of care towards the deceased and other people at sea when he was in charge of the boat pursuant to Section 241 (5) of the Crimes Decree.
13. In view of the evidence adduced during the hearing and the agreed fact tendered by the parties, the main issue in dispute is that whether the accused made an omission while he was sailing his boat in that evening of 15th of May 2014 and the said omission caused the death of the deceased. If then, would that omission amount to a gross negligence that constitutes a crime and warranted a punishment.
14. Lord Heart CJ in R v Bateman ( 1925) 19 Cr App R 8, CCA, has discussed the applicable test of manslaughter by negligence, where his lordship held that;
'In expounding the law to juries on the trial of indictments for manslaughter by negligence, judges have often referred to the distinction between civil and criminal liability for death by negligence. The law of criminal liability for negligence is conveniently explained in that way. If A. has caused the death of B. by alleged negligence, then, in order to establish civil liability, the plaintiff must prove (in addition to pecuniary loss caused by the death) that A. owed a duty to B. to take care, that that duty was not discharged, and that the default caused the death of B. To convict A. of manslaughter, the prosecution must prove the three things above mentioned and must satisfy the jury, in addition, that A.'s negligence amounted to a crime. In the civil action, if it is proved that A. fell short of the standard of reasonable care required by law, it matters not how far he fell short of that standard. The extent of his liability depends not on the degree of negligence, but on the amount of damage done. In a criminal Court, on the contrary, the amount and degree of negligence are the determining question. There must be mens rea ... In explaining to juries the test which they should apply to determine whether the negligence, in the particular case, amounted or did not amount to a crime, judges have used many epithets, such as "culpable," "criminal," "gross," "wicked," "clear," "complete." But, whatever epithet be used and whether an epithet be used or not, in order to establish criminal liability the facts must be such that, in the opinion of the jury, the negligence of the accused went beyond a mere matter of compensation between subjects and showed such disregard for the life and safety of others as to amount to a crime against the State and conduct deserving punishment.'
15. The observation made by Lord Heart CJ in Bateman (supra) has further discussed and elaborated by Lord Mackay LC in R v Adomako ( [1994] UKHL 6; 1994) 3 ALL ER 79 at 86, where his lordship held that;
"On this basis in my opinion the ordinary principles of the law of negligence apply to ascertain whether or not the defendant has been in breach of a duty of care towards the victim who has died. If such breach of duty is established the next question is whether that breach of duty caused the death of the victim. If so, the jury must go on to consider whether that breach of duty should be characterised as gross negligence and therefore as a crime. This will depend on the seriousness of the breach of duty committed by the defendant in all the circumstances in which the defendant was placed when it occurred. The jury will have to consider whether the extent to which the defendant's conduct departed from the proper standard of care incumbent upon him, involving as it must have done a risk of death to the patient, was such that it should be judged criminal.
It is true that to a certain extent this involves an element of circularity, but in this branch of the law I do not believe that is fatal to its being correct as a test of how far conduct must depart from accepted standards to be characterised as criminal. This is necessarily a question of degree and an attempt to specify that degree more closely is I think likely to achieve only a spurious precision. The essence of the matter, which is supremely a jury question, is whether, having regard to the risk of death involved, the conduct of the defendant was so bad in all the circumstances as to amount in their judgment to a criminal act or omission"
Analyse
16. Bearing in mind the above discussed legal precedents, I now move to analyse the evidence presented during the course of hearing.
17. In view of the evidence given by the three witnesses of the prosecution, who were in the boat that was captained by the accused, the sea was bit rough and choppy. It was a bit windy and bright sunny evening as it was still the daylight. The boat was traveling fast as it was going against the tide. They have heard sound of waves hitting the front side of the boat. The boat rugged as it was hit by waves. The evidence reveals that he was seated on the right side of the engine and was looking at front from the right side of the boat as he was required.
18. Mr. Saso and Mr. MacGee both of them were in the other boat, had not seen the boat of the accused until it came and hit on their boat. Moreover, none of them had seen the way or the manner the boat of the accused came towards them. However, according to the caution interview of late Mr. Mosese, that he had seen the boat of the accused coming towards them some 200 meters away. He had presumed that the captain of that boat must have seen them, therefore he had not taken any steps to take his boat away from the direction of the incoming boat. When Mr. Moses had finally tried to turn the boat after seeing the boat of accused was very close and was going to hit on his, it was too late.
19. There is no specific evidence of what the omission the accused made in breach of his duty of care towards the deceased person. The accused was seated on the right side of the engine and was looking at the front from right side of the boat as he was required. It was established that the boat was traveling against the choppy and windy sea, obviously it was not a condition for a captain of a fibreglass boat to stand and maneuver his boat. Accordingly, it is my opinion that the prosecution has failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the accused failed to take necessary precautions in maneuvering his boat in that evening and his conduct amounts to a gross negligence and a crime.
20. I do not wish to discuss the second count in details as the second count is fundamentally founded on the gross negligent act of the accused person. In view of aforesaid opinion of mine that the prosecution has failed to establish beyond reasonable doubt that the accused failed to take necessary precautions in maneuvering his boat in that evening and his conduct amounts to a gross negligence and a crime, I further hold that the prosecution has failed to prove the accused is guilty for the second count beyond reasonable doubt.
21. Accordingly, I do not find there is a cogent reason to disagree with the majority opinion of the assessors in respect of the first count. However, I find there is a cogent reason to disagree with the majority opinion of the assessors in respect of the second count.
22. In my conclusion, I hold that the prosecution has failed to prove beyond reasonable doubt that the accused is guilty for these two counts as charged in the information. I accordingly find the accused is not guilty for the offence of "manslaughter arising from breach of duty' and the office of "reckless or negligent act" and acquit from the same.
23. 30 days to appeal to the Fiji Court of Appeal.
R. D. R. Thushara Rajasinghe
Judge
At Lautoka
07th of December 2015
Solicitors : Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions
Aman Ravindra Singh Lawyers for the Second Accused person
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URL: http://www.paclii.org/fj/cases/FJHC/2015/964.html