Timo v State [2015] FJHC 9; HAM228.2014 (21 January 2015)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF FIJI
AT LAUTOKA
MISCELLANEOUS JURISDICTION
CRIMINAL MISCELLANEOUS CASE NO: HAM 228 OF2014

BETWEEN:

NACANIELI TIMO
Applicant

AND:

STATE
Respondent

Counsel: Applicant in Person
Ms. S. Kiran for Respondent

Date of Hearing: 11 December 2014
Date of Ruling: 21 January 2015

RULING

1. This is an application for permanent stay of proceedings.
   
2. The applicant was charged before this Court with two otherson one count of Aggravated Robbery contrary to Section 311 (1) (a) of the Crimes Decree No. 44 of 2009.
   
3. The particular of the offence is that the applicant with two others robbed VineshKumar on 4th June 2013 and the total value of the items robbed is $14,789.00.
   
4. This application was filed on 23rd September 2014. The grounds for application are:
   
   • (i) That delays in having this matter disposed is unreasonable
   • (ii) That the applicant will be prejudiced in his defence due to the prosecution delay
   • (iii) That in all the circumstances the delay is not only an abuse of process by the prosecution, the applicant will also receive an unfair trial
     
5. The principles for stay of prosecution are settled in Fiji. In Mohammed Sharif Sahim v. State [2007] FCA 17/07, the Court of Appeal when reviewing the law on criminal trial delay held that:
   

"...it was well settled since Apaitia Seru and Anthony Fredrick Stevens v. The State Crim. App. AAU 0041/42 of 1995 S that where the delay was unreasonable, prejudice to the accused could be presumed. This court in that case adopted the approach of the majority of the Supreme Court of Canada in R v. Morgan[1992]1SCR and New Zealand court of appeal in Martin v. District Court at Tauranga [1995] 2 NZLR 419 that stated:

" The general approach to a determination as to whether the right has been denied is not the application of a mathematical or administrative formula bur rather by a judicial determination balancing the interests which the section is designed to protect against factors which either inevitably lead to delay or are otherwise the cause of the delay. As I noted in Smith (R v Smith (1989) 52 CCC (3D) 97), (I)t is axiomatic that some delay is inevitable. The question is, at which point does the delay become unreasonable? ...While the court has at times indicated otherwise, it is now accepted that the factors to be considered in analyzing how long is too long may be listed as follows:

(i) The length of delay
(ii) Waiver of time periods
(iii) The reasons for the delay, including
(a) Inherent time requirements of the case;
(b) Actions of the accused;
(c) Actions of the Crown;
(d) Limits on institutional resources, and
(e) Other reasons for the delay, and
(iv) Prejudice to the accused."

6. In Johnson v State [2010] FJHC 356;HAM 177.2010 (23 August 2010), Hon. Mr. Justice D. Goundar stated:
   

"...The circumstances in which abuse of process may arise are varied. In R v Derby Crown Court, exp Brooks [1984] Cr. App. R.164, Sir Roger Ormrod identified two circumstances in which abuse of process may arise:

"...It may be abuse of process if either

(a) The prosecution have manipulated or misused the process of the court so as to deprive the defendant of a protection provided by law or to take unfair advantage of a technicality, or

(b) On the balance of probability the defendant had been, or will be, prejudiced in the prosecution of or conduct of his defence by delay on the part of the prosecution which is unjustifiable: for example, not due to the complexity of the inquiry and preparation of the prosecution case, or to the action of the defendant or his co-accused or to genuine difficulty in effecting service."

7. His lordship further quoted Justice Pain's remarks from State v Rokotuiwai [1998] FJHC 196 identifying the factors which needs to be considered in deciding whether delay is reasonable or not:
   

".. The length of the delay, the reasons for the delay, the actions of the defendant, the actions of the prosecutor, availability of legal and judicial resources, the nature of the charge and prejudice to the defendant may be relevant."

8. Hon. Mr. Justice Paul Madigan in TafizalRahiman v State [2011] FJHC 298 at paragraph 7 stated that:
   

"The facts to be considered when assessing whether delay is unreasonable or not are expounded in the Privy Council decision in Flowers v The Queen [2007] WLR 2396. The board held that the Court should take into account:

(i) The length of delay;
(ii) The reason for delay;
(iii) Whether or not the defendant has asserted his rights to a speedy trial; and
(iv) The extend of prejudice."

Stay in this case was refused even though the delay was 5 years because they were not brought to court which was a system failure and not an unreasonable delay.

9. The applicant had not filed any submissions. The state in their reply to the application had submitted the chronological history of this case.
   
10. The applicant was first produced in this Court on 1.8.2013. He pleaded not guilty to the charge on 4.12.2013. Applicant's voir-dire grounds were filed on 20.2.2014. The agreed facts are not filed as the co-accused is absconding since 30th July 2014.
    
11. The applicant has failed to show on balance of probabilities that due to delay he would suffer serious prejudice to the extent that no trial could be held.
    
12. The case is now fixed for mention on 28.1.2015 for the execution of the bench warrant against the co-accused.
    
13. In Nalawa v State CAV 0002/09 (13 August 2010) the Supreme Court of Fiji laid down the following principles may now be stated as basic to common law.
    

"(i) even where delay is unjustifiable a permanent stay is the exception and not the rule

(ii) where there is no fault on the part of prosecution, very rarely will a stay be granted.

(iii) No stay should be granted in the absence of any serious prejudice to the defence so that no fair trial can be held and;

(v) On the issue of prejudice, the trial court has process which can deal with the admissibility of evidence if it can be shown there is prejudice to an accused as a result of delay

14. A stay proceeding is an exceptional remedy, and will only be used if other remedies are not available to deal with the justice of the case. Considering all above, the delay in this case is not unreasonable.
    
15. Applying the above principles, I do not find merit in any of the grounds on which the application for stay is founded. The case is now to be mentioned on 28.1.2015. The application for permanent stay of the prosecution is, accordingly, disallowed and dismissed.
    

Sudharshana De Silva
JUDGE

At Lautoka
21st January 2015

Solicitors: Applicant in person
Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions for Respondent