Keshwan v State [2015] FJHC 795; HAA30.2015 (23 October 2015)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF FIJI
CRIMINAL JURISDICTION
AT LAUTOKA

CRIMINAL CASE: HAA 30 OF 2015

BETWEEN:

KESHWAN
APPELLANT

AND:

THE STATE
RESPONDENT

Counsel : Mr. Samuel K Ram for the Appellant
Mr. A. Dutt for the Respondent

Date of Hearing : 24th of September 2015
Date of Judgment : 23rd of October 2015

JUDGMENT

Introduction

1. The appellant files this appeal against the conviction and the sentence of the learned Resident Magistrate of Rakiraki dated 3rd of June 2015 and 1st of July 2015 respectively. The grounds of appeal against the conviction and the sentence are that;
   
   1. The learned trial Magistrate erred in law in convicting and sentencing the accused of an offence which did not exist under Section 291 of the Crimes Decree and when the charge did not state all the elements of the offence under the said Section,
      
   2. The Learned trail magistrate erred in law in identifying the elements of the offence under Section 291 of the Crimes Decree 2009, when he said that the elements included " without consent of owner", Fraudulently" " without claim of right made in good faith" and "took or carried away anything capable of being stolen" and the said provision provided that the elements as;
      
      1. The accused,
         
      2. Dishonestly appropriates property,
         
      100. which belongs to another persons and
           
      4. appropriates the property with the intention of permanently depriving the other person of the property.
         
   3. The learned Magistrate erred in convicting the accused when he found as a fact following;
      
      1. That an arrangement was made for the items which were subject of the charge and belongings to the prosecution witness to be kept with the Appellant and the complainant was aware of this arrangement,
         
      2. The goods were taken to the place of the accused for safekeeping,
         
      100. The Appellant was returning the goods, but the complainant did not take it,
           
      4. As the above clearly establishes that there was no dishonest appropriation of property or that the Appellant had taken the property with the intention to permanently deprive the owner of the property,
         
   4. The Learned Magistrate erred in sentencing in not properly applying the tariff for the offence of theft and in not properly identifying and applying all the aggravating and mitigating factors and the said sentence was harsh in the circumstances,
      
2. Upon being served with this petition of appeal, the Respondent appeared in court. Both parties were then directed to file their respective submissions, which they filed accordingly. Subsequently, the matter was set down for hearing on the 24th of September 2015. On that day, the counsel for the Applicant and the Respondent consented and agreed to conduct the hearing by way of further written submissions. I accordingly directed them to file their further written submissions, which they filed as per the direction. Having carefully considered the petition of appeal, and the respective submissions of the parties, I now proceed to pronounce my judgment as follows.
   

Background

3. The Appellant was charged for one count of theft contrary to Section 291 of the Crimes Decree in the Magistrate's court at Rakiraki. Subsequent to the hearing of the charge, the learned Magistrate found the Appellant guilty for the offence and convicted accordingly. The learned Magistrate then sentenced the Appellant for 18 months with 9 months to be served as immediate prison term and the remaining period was suspended for a period of 2 years. The Appellant has now appealed against the said conviction and the sentence.
   

First Ground of Appeal

4. Having considered the background, I now turn onto the first ground of appeal. The Appellant contended that the learned Magistrate convicted and sentenced the accused on a non existing offence under the Crimes Decree.
   
5. The learned counsel for the Appellant submitted that the particulars of offence does not state the mental element of the offence, that is "dishonestly appropriate the property" as defined under Section 291 of the Crimes Decree. Instead, the particulars of offence states that the accused stole the property, which is not used in Section 291 of the Crimes Decree.
   
6. Sections 58 and 61 of the Criminal Procedure Decree stipulate what should contain in the charge or information. It states that;
   

"Every charge or information shall contain—

1. A statement of the specific offence or offences with which the accused person is charged; and
   
2. Such particulars as are necessary for giving reasonable information as to the nature of the offence charged".
   

7. Section 61 of Criminal Procedure Code states that;
   
   1. A count of a charge or information shall commence with a statement of the offence charged, and this shall be called the statement of offence.
      
   2. Each statement of offence shall describe the offence shortly in ordinary language, avoiding as far as possible the use of technical terms, and without necessarily stating all the essential elements of the offence.
      
   3. The charge shall contain a reference to the section of the law creating the offence.
      
   4. After the statement of the offence, particulars of the offence shall be set out in ordinary language, and the use of technical terms shall not be necessary.
      
8. Accordingly, the statement of offence and the particulars of offence are the

two main components in instituting an action. The statement of offence describes the offence and the particulars of offence explains the nature of the charge. It is not required to use the language of legal parlance in the statement of offence and particulars of offence. It should be in ordinary language, avoiding as far as possible the use of technical terms. Moreover, it is not necessary to state all the essential elements of the offence in the statement of offence.

9. The Fiji Court of Appeal in Shekar & Shankar v State ( Criminal Appeal No AAU0056 of 2004) discussed the purpose of a charge, where it held that;
   

"The purpose of the charge is to ensure that the accused person knows the offence with which he is being charged. Whilst the particulars should be as informative as it reasonably practicable, it is not necessary slavishly to follow the section in the Act"

10. In State v Singh ( Criminal Appeal No AAU0097 of 2005S) the Fiji Court of Appeal expounded the purpose of the particulars of offence, where it observed that;
    

"The purpose of the particulars of offence is to indicate to the person accused of the offence the nature of the case the state intends to present. It does not need to set out the whole evidence and it is sufficient if it indicates how the case will be presented. What is important is the evidence the prosecution adduces"

11. In view of the submissions made by the learned counsel for the Appellant, it

appears that his main contention is focused on the particulars of the offence. He argues that the omission of the mental element of the offence as defined under Section 291 of the Crimes Decree, which is "dishonestly appropriate property" in the particulars of offence, made the charge defective and not known to the law.

12. Justice Goundar in Tavurunaqiwa v State (2009) FJHC 198; HAA022.2009 (10

September 2009),having cited R v McVitie ( 1960) 44 Cr.Ap. R 201), has discussed the applicable approach to determine the defective charge in an elaborative and inclusive manner, where his lordship held that;

A more relevant authority on the point of law is the decision of the English Court of Criminal Appeal in McVitie (1960) 44 Cr. Ap. R. 201. McVitie was followed by the Court of Appeal in Skipper. In McVitie the indictment charging the accused with possession of explosives omitted the word "knowingly" from the particulars of offence, which was an essential ingredient of the offence in the statute creating the offence. On appeal the Court of Criminal Appeal said:

"It is conceded that the appellant was in no way embarrassed by the omission in question. He admitted that he new he had explosives in his possession, and he certainly did not prove, even on a balance of probabilities, that he had them for any lawful purpose. But he says that he was tried on an indictment which was not merely defective but bad, since it disclosed no offence, and this must be a substantial miscarriage of justice precluding the application of the proviso.

Section 3 of the Indictments Act, 1915, provides as follows:

Every indictment shall contain, and shall be sufficient if it contains, a statement of the specific offence or offences with which the accused person is charged, together with such particulars as may be necessary for giving reasonable information as to the nature of the charge.

Rule 4(3) of the rules contained in the First Schedule to the Act provides that "The statement of offence shall describe the offence shortly in ordinary language, avoiding as far as possible the use of technical terms, and without necessarily stating all the essential elements of the offence, and if the offence charged is one created by statute, shall contain a reference to the section of the statute creating the offence" and rule 4(4) of the same rules provides: "After the statement of the offence, particulars of such offence shall be set out in ordinary language, in which the use of technical terms shall not be necessary."

The indictment in the present case conformed to these provisions, save only in one respect. If the words in section 3, "necessary for giving reasonable information," import an objective test (which we think they do) then the word "knowingly" should have been included in the particulars. In our opinion this did not make the indictment a bad indictment, but simply a defective or imperfect one. A bad indictment would be one disclosing no offence known to the law, for example, where it was laid under a statute which had been repealed and not re-enacted. In the present case the indictment described the offence with complete accuracy in the "Statement of Offence." Only the particulars, which merely elaborate the "Statement of Offence" were incomplete. The question of applying the proviso is to be considered, therefore, not upon the basis that the indictment disclosed no known offence but that it described a known offence with incomplete particulars."

Later in the judgment, the Court of Criminal Appeal said:

"In the present case it is clear that no embarrassment or prejudice was caused to the appellant by the omission of the word "knowingly" from the particulars, or from the arraignment. He had been properly charged in the first place, and properly committed for trial, and the Attorney-General's fiat was in proper form"

13. According to the principles enunciated in McVitie (supra) the court is first required to determine whether the charge is bad or defective. If the court is satisfied that the charge is defective, but not bad, then it requires to determine whether the accused was embarrassed or prejudiced by the defect.
    
14. I now draw my attention to the statement of offence and particulars of offence of this instant case, where it states that;
    

Statement of Offence,

Theft:- Contrary to Section 291 of the Crimes Decree No 44 of 2009

Particulars of Offence

Keshwan between 1st day of February and 30th day June 2011 at Volivoli, Rakiraki in the Western Division, stole 1 compressor valued at $ 665.00, 1 welding plant valued at $ 685, 1 grinding machine valued at $85, 4 spray guns valued at $360, 4 lead wire with tool box with tools $ 180 and 2 nanny goats valued $300 all to the total value of $ 2275, the property of Shiu Prasad.

15. In view of the statement of offence and particulars of offence, I find that the statement of offence has been accurately described the offence with reference to the relevant Section in the Crimes Decree. The only omission in the particulars of offence is the mental element as defined in Section 291 of the Crimes Decree. The learned counsel for the Appellant further contented that the word "stole" as stated in the particulars of offence is not stated under Section 291. Therefore the charge is not known under Section 291 of the Crimes Decree.
    
16. Having considered the first ground of appeal and the submissions made by the learned counsel of the parties, I find that the statement of offence and particulars of offence disclose a known offence but with incomplete particulars. Therefore, I find that the charge is not bad or unknown to the law.
    
17. The accused was represented by a lawyer during the hearing in the Magistrate Court. He has not taken any objection on the ground of such defectiveness of the charge. The accused defended himself in the Magistrate court against the charge of Theft. Accordingly, it appears that the accused was neither misled with the nature of the charge, nor with his defence. Thus, I find that such omission as discussed above, and the insertion of the word " stole" has not embarrassed and prejudiced the accused. Accordingly, the first ground of appeal fails.
    

Second Ground of Appeal

18. I now turn onto the second ground of appeal, which is founded on the contention that the learned Magistrate erroneously considered the elements of the offence of theft in his judgment. The learned counsel for the Appellant submitted that the learned Magistrate has considered the definition given in Section 259 of the repealed Penal Code in his judgment instead of Section 291 of the Crimes Decree.
    
19. The learned Magistrate in paragraph 17 of his judgment has considered the following items as the elements of the offence of theft;
    
    1. Accused,
    2. Without consent of owner,
    3. Fraudulently, and
    4. Without claim of right made in good faith,
    5. Took and carried away anything capable of being stolen ( items mentioned in the charge)
    6. With intent at the time of taking to permanently deprive the owner off the said items.
       
20. I do concur with the learned counsel's contention to the extent that the learned Magistrate has considered the elements of offence as defined under Section 259 of the repealed Penal Code. Section 259 of the Penal Code States that;
    

"A person steals who, without the consent of the owner, fraudulently and without a claim of right made in good faith, takes and carries away anything capable of being stolen with intent, at the time of such taking, permanently to deprive the owner thereof:"

21. In fact, the learned Magistrate was required to consider Section 291 of the Crimes Decree. Section 291 of the Crimes Decree states that;
    

"A person commits a summary offence if he or she dishonestly appropriates property belonging to another with the intention of permanently depriving the other of the property"

22. According to Section 291 of the Crimes Decree, the main elements of the offence of Theft are that;
    
    1. The Accused,
    2. Dishonestly appropriates,
    3. Property belonging to another,
    4. With the intention of permanently depriving the other of the property.
       
23. At this point, it is my opinion that it is prudent to consider the principles stipulated under Section 259 of the Penal Code and Section 291 of the Crimes Decree. If the court satisfies that both sections are founded on the same principles, then it is necessary to consider the judgment in its entirety in order to determine whether the learned Magistrate has formed his conclusion of the guilt of the accused based on those principles.
    
24. Section 291 of the Crimes Decree has introduced far reaching changes to the scope of definition of the offence of theft. It has reconstructed the main elements of the offence of theft from its existed definition under Section 259 of the Penal Code.
    
25. Section 291 introduces a new definition of mental element for the offence of theft, expanding the scope of its application. Under the previous regime of the Penal code, the mental element had been defined as "fraudulently and without a claim of right made in good faith". Section 291 of the Crimes Decree has replaced the existing mental element by the term of "dishonestly" with a more wider notion.
    
26. Section 291 of the Crimes Decree has also replaced the physical element of the offence of theft . It replaces the element of "takes and carries away anything capable of being stolen without the consent of the owner" with more wider and expanded element of "appropriates property belonging to another". The physical element as defined under Section 259 of the Penal Code was limited only to taking of the property. However, Section 291 of the Crimes Decree has expanded the physical act and it now covers not only of taking, but also to the assumption of the right of ownership, possession, or control of any property without the consent of the person to whom it belongs. Thus expanding the notion of "taking" to certain cases of obtaining possession without actually taking it.
    
27. Another notable change brought in by the Section 291 of the Crimes Decree is that, unlike Section 259 of the Penal Code, it has not limited the existence of the intention of permanently depriving the other of the property. Under the previous regime of Penal Code, such intention was required to be exist at the time of taking the property. However, Section 291 does not require such intention at the time of appropriation. Thus extending the criminal responsibility to an innocent acquisition followed by dishonest decision of keeping or disposing of the property without the consent of the owner.( Section 293(2) of the Crimes Decree).
    
28. Understanding of the purpose of introducing the Theft Act of 1968, replacing the Larceny Act of 1916 in UK, in my view, would assist in comprehending the purpose of the changes brought in to the legal domain by Section 291 of the Crimes Decree.
    
29. Section 1 (1) of the Larceny Act of 1916 has defined the offence of theft as;
    

"A person steals who, without the consent of the owner, fraudulently and without a claim of right made in good faith, takes and carries away anything capable of being stolen with intent, at the time of such taking, permanently to deprive the owner thereof"

30. It appears that the definition of the theft, given by Section 1(1) of the Larceny Act is apparently similar to the definition of Section 259 of the repealed Penal Code.
    
31. Theft Act of 1968 then repealed the Larceny Act introducing wider changes to the regime of theft and other related offences. Section 1 (1) of the Theft Act 1968 defines the offence of theft as;
    

"A person is guilty of theft if he dishonestly appropriates property belonging to another with the intention of permanently depriving the other of it; and "thief" and "steal" shall be construed accordingly"

32. Eight Report of the Criminal Law Revision Committee on Theft and Related

Offences has explained the purpose of the changes brought in by the Theft Act in relation to the offence of theft, where it states that;

"The committee generally are strongly on opinion that larceny, embezzelment and fraudulent conversion should be replaced by a single new offence of theft. The important element of them all is undoubtedly the dishonest appropriation of another person's property and we think it not only logical, but right in principle to make this the central element of the offence. In doing so the law would concentrate on what the accused dishonestly achieved or attempted to achieve and not on the means, taking or otherwise, which he used in order to do so. This would avoid multiplicity of offences"

33. Lord Stonham while moving the Bill of Theft Act in the House of Lords, explained the purpose of the introduction of Theft Act of 1968 in a succinct manner. Lord Stonham stated that;
    

We hope and believe that in dealing with an infinite variety of theft the Bill provides a simple, efficient, and satisfactory code.

In the hope of avoiding what would otherwise be an intolerably long speech, I propose to deal only with the more important provisions of the Bill and explain the thinking and policy behind them. Clauses 1 to 7 deal with the new offence of theft, which will replace the existing offences of embezzlement, fraudulent conversion, and the twenty or so different varieties of larceny. The law of larceny at present is difficult and complex. It calls for a great deal of interpretation by the courts, yet fails to deal with certain kinds of dishonesty which should certainly be punishable. To me as a layman, with memories of Bleak House, the deepest complexities of the law are in the field of Chancery: but I was interested to see that in a recent case—it was one which raised the fascinating question whether mussels are wild animals—a distinguished counsel said As one who normally practices in the Chancery Division I am left wondering at the legal complications that may arise in the more sophisticated forms of larceny. The Bill will reduce that wonder, but I am not sufficiently acquainted with the wilder habits of mussels to answer that legal poser............

The Committee's solution was a single offence of theft. This is Clause 1 of the Bill, and under it a person will be guilty of theft if he dishonestly appropriates property belonging to another with the intention of permanently depriving the other of it". Clauses 2 to 6 interpret the expressions used in this basic definition, and Clause 7 provides for a single maximum penalty. The law will thus concentrate on what the accused dishonestly achieved or attempted to achieve and not, as under the present law, on the means which he used in order to do so. In this way we avoid the need for a number of different offences which are all in the same family of theft". (HL Deb 15 February 1968 vol 289 cc212-23)

34. Lawton LJ in R v Feely (1973) 1 All ER 341, at 344) has summarised the changes brought in by the Theft Act, where his lordship observed that;
    

"The long title of the Act states with these words; "An Act to revise the law of England and Wales as to theft and similar or associated offences" The draftsman seems to have searched the statute book for all the statutes dealing with offences of dishonesty and it is probable that all the old enactments have been repealed so as to enable the Theft Act 1968 to deal comprehensively with this branch of the law. The design of the new Act is clear; nearly all the old legal terms to describe offences of dishonesty have been left behind; larceny, embezzlement and fraudulent conversion have become theft; receiving stolen goods has become handling stolen goods; obtaining by false pretences has become obtaining pecuniary advantage by deception. Words in everyday use have replaced legal jargon in many part of the Act. This is particularly noticeable in the series of section defining theft".

35. Having understood the purpose and the changes brought in by the Theft Act of 1968 in to the jurisdiction of UK, it is my opinion that Section 291 of the Crimes Decree has also brought in similar changes into the legal domain of Fiji Islands. Section 291 of the Decree has not changed the fundamental principles of the offence of theft. Actually, it has codified the various categories of offence of larceny found in the then Penal Code into a one single offence of Theft. While doing that, Section 291 has expanded the scope of the definition of Theft without changing the definition fundamentally. Accordingly, I find the offence of theft as defined under previous penal code and under Section 291 of the Crimes Decree are founded on the same fundamental elements and principles.
    
36. I now draw my attention to determine whether the learned Magistrate has properly and correctly considered those fundamental elements as discussed above in his judgment in order to reach his conclusion of the guilt of the accused.
    
37. The brief summary of this alleged incident is that while the complainant was in prison, the accused has taken to his house the items belonging to the complainant without his consent.
    
38. The learned Magistrate has considered the evidence given by the complainant, the partner of the complainant and the sister of the complainant and then held that the items were removed to the house of the accused without the consent of the complainant.
    
39. The learned Magistrate has then considered the evidence of the partner of the complainant, where she has stated that the accused told her that he will use the items and will return them once the complainant comes from the prison. The complainant in his evidence has stated that the accused has told him that he will return the items in two weeks, but never did so. The learned Magistrate having discussed the evidence given by the accused and the defence witness together with their demeanour, found the accused's version of the event unacceptable. Having considered these evidence, the learned Magistrate has then found that the accused has dishonestly appropriated the items belonging to the complainant.
    
40. Accordingly, I am satisfied that the learned Magistrate has correctly considered the relevant elements of the offence of Theft in his judgment, though he has mentioned the elements of the theft as defined by the previous regime of the Penal Code in paragraph 17 of his judgment. Hence, I find the second ground of appeal has no merit and it fails.
    

Third Ground of Appeal

41. I now draw my attention to the third ground of appeal, which is founded on the contention that there were no evidence of dishonesty. The learned counsel for the Appellant submitted that the learned Magistrate has erroneously convicted the accused when he found that there was an arrangement made to keep the items safely at the accused's place. The learned counsel further submitted that the learned Magistrate has further found that complainant refused to take the items, when it was returned by the accused.
    
42. Section 290 of the Crimes Decree stipulates the meaning of dishonest, where it states that;
    

dishonest means —

1. dishonest according to the standards of ordinary people; and
   
2. known by the defendant to be dishonest according to the standards of ordinary people.
   

43. Lawton LJ in R v Feely 9 (1973) 1 ALL ER 341) held that;
    

"The word "dishonesty" can only relate to the state of mind of the person who does the act with amounts to appropriation. Whether an accused person has a particular state of ind is a question of fact, which has to be decided by the jury where there is a trial on indictment and by the justices when there are summery proceedings".

44. Lord Lane CJ in R v Ghosh ( [1982] EWCA Crim 2; 1982) 2 ALL ER 689, 696) has discussed the applicable approach of determining whether the accused person acted dishonestly, where his Lordship held that;
    

"In determining whether the prosecution has proved that the defendant was acting dishonestly, a jury must first of all decide whether according to the ordinary standards of reasonable and honest people what was done was dishonest. If it was not dishonest by those standards, that it the end of the matter and the prosecution fails. If it was dishonest by those standards, then the jury must consider whether the defendant himself must have realised that what he was doing was by those standards dishonest".

45. In view of the aforementioned judicial precedents, it appears that the determination of the element of dishonest is a question of fact. The learned Magistrate is first required to decide the conduct of the accused is dishonest according to the standard of ordinary people. If he satisfies, he then needs to determine whether the accused had realised that what he was doing was dishonest according to those standards of ordinary people.
    
46. In this instant case, the learned Magistrate has refused to accept the evidence of the defence as credible, reliable and worthy of belief. He has then found in paragraph 30 of his judgment, that the accused fraudulently misrepresented to the sister of the complainant that the items could be kept at his place until the complainant comes from the prison. The accused then took the items and disposed them for his own use and benefit. The learned Magistrate has accepted and considered the evidence given by the complainant, the partner of the complainant, the sister of the complainant and the taxi driver in order to reach such a conclusion of his findings.
    
47. In view of the reasons discussed above, I am satisfied that the learned Magistrate has properly given his consideration to the evidence adduced before him in order to reach his conclusion that the accused has dishonestly appropriated the items belonging to the complainant, without his consent. I accordingly find that the third ground of appeal has no merit.
    

Fourth Ground of Appeal.

48. The fourth ground of appeal is founded on the ground that the learned Magistrate has not properly considered the applicable tariff and has failed to properly identify the aggravating and mitigating factors in his sentencing.
    
49. The learned Magistrate has stated in his sentence that the tariff for theft ranges from 2 to 9 months for first conviction and between 9 and 24 months for the second convictions depending on the value of the goods and circumstances of the stealing. In fact, the tariff identified by the learned Magistrate is not in conformity with the acceptable tariff limit enunciated in Ratusili v State [2012] FJHC 1249; HAA011.2012 (1 August 2012)
    
50. Justice Madigan in Ratusili v State (supra) set the following tariff limits for the offence of theft, where his lordship held that;
    

"From the cases then the following sentencing principles are established:

1. For a first offence of simple theft the sentencing range should be between 2 and 9 months.
   
2. Any subsequent offence should attract a penalty of at least 9 months.
   
3. Theft of large sums of money and thefts in breach of trust, whether first offence or not can attract sentences of up to three years.
   
4. Regard should be had to the nature of the relationship between offender and victim.
   
5. Planned thefts will attract greater sentence than opportunistic thefts"
   

51. In this instant case, the learned Magistrate has considered as aggravating factors the value and the nature of the stolen items, the benefit obtained by the accused from the stolen items, deceitful and calculated plan of the offence, and the breach of trust.
    
52. In respect of the mitigating factors, the learned Magistrate has taken into consideration the facts that the accused is married and having 4 children, and that he is the sole bread winner of the family. He has further considered that the accused is a first offender and has been remorseful.
    
53. The learned Magistrate has selected 18 months as the starting point.
    
54. This is a case involved with properties of substantive value and breach of trust. The learned magistrate has considered the fact that the accused and the complainant are known to each other and the accused has breached that trust by committing this offence. Accordingly, this case falls within the third category as expounded by Justice Madigan in Ratusili (supra). Hence, I find that the learned Magistrate has correctly selected 18 months as a starting point. However, I find the learned Magistrate has then fallen in error by again considering the value of the stolen items and breach of trust as aggravating factors. Nevertheless, I find no error of increasing 4 months for the other aggravating factors identified by the learned Magistrate in his sentencing. The learned Magistrate having considered the mitigating factors, has then reduced 4 months to reach the final sentence of 18 months.
    
55. Having reached to 18 months imprisonment, the learned Magistrate has then partly suspended the sentence in order to accommodate the rehabilitation. He found no exceptional or compelling circumstances to suspend the sentence wholly. Hence, I do not find any reason to interfere with the learned Magistrate's finding and conclusion in his sentence. Accordingly, I find the fourth ground of appeal has no merit.
    
56. In conclusion, I refuse and dismiss this Appeal and uphold the conviction and the sentence imposed by the learned Magistrate on 3rd of June 2015 and 1st of July 2015 respectively.
    
57. 30 days to appeal to the Fiji Court of Appeal.
    

R. D. R. Thushara Rajasinghe
Judge

At Lautoka
23rd of October 2015

Solicitors : Office of the Director of Public Prosecutions
Samuel K Ram, Barrister and Solicitor,