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Singhs Shopping Ltd v Labasa Town Council [2013] FJHC 586; Action9.2005 (24 October 2013)

In the High Court of Fiji at Labasa
Civil Jurisdiction


Action no: 9 of 2005


Singhs Shopping Limited
Plaintiff
vs


Labasa Town Council
Defendant


Appearances: Mr Amrit Sen for the plaintiff
Mr Adrian Ram for the defendant


Date of hearing: 29th and 30th November,2012, 22nd and 23rd April, 2013


JUDGMENT


  1. This litigation arises out of an incident that occurred in the early hours of 1st May,2003, in the Labasa town market. The plaintiff alleges that the defendant's agents broke into its shop, removed all its goods and stock and threw them outside. The plaintiff claims general and special damages. The defendant states the plaintiff was given notice of termination of tenancy or occupation, effective on 30th April,2003, and became a trespasser, after that date. On 1st May,2003, it was asked to remove its belongings. Any loss sustained by the plaintiff, was due to its refusal to vacate.
  2. The amended statement of claim
  3. The re-amended statement of defence

"On 1stMay,2003,the Plaintiff removed the goods and chattels and took possession of the premises.


On 1stMay,2003,the..Defendant wrote to the Plaintiff asking it to remove its belongings, but the Plaintiff did not do so."


3.11. By way of defence, it is stated that:
  1. The tenancy offended section 13 of the State Lands Act.
  2. No action can be brought under the arrangement of tenure in terms of section 59(e) of the Indemnity Bailment and Guarantee Act.
  1. The plaintiff's tenure was cancelled by mutual agreement, as at 30th April, 2003. The plaintiff was a trespasser and could be evicted. If any loss was sustained by the plaintiff, it was due to its refusal to vacate.
  1. The repl
  2. The hearing
5.7. DW 3

5.8. DW 4

5.9. DW 5
  1. The determination

Mr Ram contends that the plaintiff's tenancy is illegal,since the defendant had not obtained the consent of the Director of Lands for the sub-lease to the plaintiff, in terms of section 13 of the State Lands Act.


6.2.1. This argument was raised before Wati J, in an application to strike out this action, by the then second defendant.On an analysis of the relevant conditions of the lease agreement, Wati J held that the Director of Lands has given "blanket consent", to sublet the use of any building or structure in the land for kiosks, shops, advertisements, offices, stalls, booths or space.

6.2.2. Mr Sen, states that the issue has been adjudged. I disagree. As Mr Ram quite correctly points out, this finding was made, for the limited purpose of determining whether there was an arguable case, in an interlocutory ruling.I would hence proceed to make a final determination, on this matter.

6.2.3. It is undisputed that the lease is a protected lease and the property was leased to the defendant by the Director of Lands.

6.2.4. It is now convenient to look at the conditions of the lease granted to the defendant. It is on a construction of these conditions that the question in issue falls to be determined.

6.2.5. I read condition 4 of the lease:

The lessee shall not without the consent in writing of the lessor transfer sublet assign or part with possession of the demised land or any part thereof provided however that the lessee shall be entitled without such consent to sublet or licence the use of any part of any building or structure on the demised land for any advertising purposes or any kiosks, shops, offices, stalls, booths or


..provided by the lessee on the demised land in conformity with the provisions or condition (3) hereof to such persons and at such rents or fees and upon such other terms and conditions as the lessee may think fit. (emphasis added)


6.2.6. The introductory words of condition 4 reflect section 13(1). The proviso brings in the immediately preceding condition 3. This reads as follows:

The lessee shall use the demised land solely for the purposes of market, ..: provided that the lessee may in addition to or as part of any building or other structure erected in connection with those purposes construct or provide on the demised land such kiosks, shops office stalls or booths .. as in the opinion of the lessor shall not prejudicially affect the use of the demised land for the general purposes of a market.. (emphasis added)


6.2.7. At the core of the argument advanced by Mr Ram, is that condition 4 is ultra vires the powers of the Director of Lands, in providing that the lessee may sublet any part of the building, without his consent.

6.2.8. On a construction of the proviso to condition 4 read with condition 3, my view, is that the Director has given consent on a once and for all basis to the defendant (until the expiry of the lease),for its primary use and the ancillary purpose of facilitating a market.

6.2.9. The words "without consent" must be read with the phrase "to sublet or licence the use of any part of any building or structure on the demised land for..any kiosks, shops, offices, stalls, booths..in conformity with the provisions or condition (3)". (emphasis added)

6.2.10. A true construction of condition 4 is arrived at by seeking a meaning of the condition as a whole, rather than by concentrating exclusively on the words "without consent" and giving it a narrow linguistic interpretation. The purpose of the lease furnishes a compelling context.

6.2.11. In reaching this conclusion, I gained considerable guidance from the excerpts from two judgments of the Supreme Court of India, restating the cardinal rules of statutory interpretation, extensively quoted by Mr Ram.

6.2.12. In the first case, Union of India & Anr v Deoki Nandan Aggarwal, (1992) AIR 96 it was stated:

It is not the duty of the Court either to enlarge the scope of the legislation or the intention of the legislature when the language of the provision is plain and unambiguous ..The Court cannot add words to a statute or read words into it which are not there... The Court of course adopts a construction which will carry out the obvious intention of the legislature but could not legislate itself. .(emphasis added)


The second judgment is reported in (2009) AIR SC187. I reproduce excerpts from the citation in the closing submissions of the defendant:


Courts are not entitled to read words into an Act of Parliament unless clear reason for it is to be found within the four corners of the Act itself, (Per Lord Loreburn L. C. In Vickers Sons and Maxim Ltd. v. Evans (1910) AC 445 (HL).,,, .(emphasis added)


This judgment cites the aphorism of Lord Wensleydale in Grey v Pearson,(1857) 6 H.L.Cas.61, at page 106 enshrining what is termed the "golden rule" as follows:


The grammatical and ordinary sense of the words is to be adhered to unless that would lead to some absurdity or some repugnance or inconsistency with the rest of the instrument, in which case the grammatical and ordinary sense of the words may be modified, so as to avoid that absurdity and inconsistency, but no further.(emphasis added)


6.2.13. There would certainly be absurdity, if the defendant is required to obtain the consent of the Director of Lands, each time it seeks to lease out a kiosk, shop, stall or booth to tenants, who are more often than not, transient market vendors.

6.2.14. Mr Ram, does instruct that "stalls in the market are allocated to the intending vendors on a day to day basis and there is no permanency". This consideration provides the most cogent reason to reach an interpretation which the conditions embrace.

6.3. Section 59 (e) of the Indemnity Bailment and Guarantee Act

Mr Ram, next, submits that section 59 (e) of the Indemnity Bailment and Guarantee Act precludes the plaintiff from bringing this action, since there was no formal writing between the parties.


6.3.1. As I read the section, in my view, there is no requirement of a formal agreement. The relevant words are "some memorandum or note thereof is in writing and signed by the party to be charged therewith".(emphasis added)

6.3.2. Mr Sen, relies on several letters from the defendant to the plaintiff, as constituting the tenancy,commencing with its letter of 29th November,2001. I have referred to the contents of these letters in paragraph 6.6 below.

6.3.3. In my judgment, the letters constitute sufficient memoranda and notes in writing, to satisfy section 59(e).

6.4. Part performance

In this context, I note that the plaintiff has pleaded the doctrine of part performance, in its reply to the re-amended statement of defence. The defendant has acknowledged receipt of rent by its letters of 23 August,2002,and 20 March,2003, which would I refer to later in this judgment. With this digression, I return to consider the remaining subsidiary argument.


6.5. Was the defendant entitled to determine the tenancy

The defendant contends that it was entitled to determine the tenancy for two reasons.


6.5.1. Firstly, Mr Ram argues that the tenancy was on a month to month basis. He relies on the defendant's letter of 1st February,2002, informing the plaintiff that approval from the Prices and Incomes Board is being obtained for the increased rental, "until such time the tenancy shall remain on month to month basis at the present rental."(emphasis added)

The Council has resolved that if you accept the rental to be $ 1,100 vip per month and increase the deposit. A new agreement will be drawn effective from 1/1/02.


The tenancy shall be for a period of 3 years. (emphasis added)


6.5.1.1.2. On 23 August,2002, the defendant wrote to the plaintiff stating that the Prices and Incomes Board had agreed to a monthly rental of $ 880.00 VIP from 1 August,2002.

6.5.1.1.3. It is evident that the tenancy was stated to be on a monthly basis, in the letter of 1st February,2002, for a transitory period, until the increase was approved by the Board.

6.5.1.1.4. In my view the defendant's letter of 29th November,2001, unequivocally declares that the shop premises was demised to the plaintiff by the defendant, for a term of three years. It was conditional as regards the increase in rent, as expressly averred in paragraph 4 of the amended statement of defence. I need hardly add that the period of tenancy was not a matter for the Prices and Incomes Board.

6.5.1.1.5. In my judgment, the plaintiff had security of tenure of tenancy for a period of three years.

6.5.2. As a second leg, Mr Ram argues that Jagat Singh of the plaintiff company, agreed to vacate by 30 April,2003, at a discussion he had with the then Mayor. Reliance was placed on an exchange of correspondence between the parties in March, 2003.

6.5.2.1 The first is a letter dated 19th March, 2003, from the plaintiff attaching two months' rent, and stating in paragraph 5 that:

I hope fully feel other tenants of the council follow the que from here and pay all their dues so that the council can make developments for the betterment of our little town which was devastated by cyclone Ami.


6.5.2.2 I am nonplussed as to how it could possibly be concluded that the plaintiff, by agreeing to the developments, had agreed to vacate by 30 April,2003.

6.5.2.3 The second is a letter of 20th March, 2003,which refers to two options given to the plaintiff to vacate either by 31 March,2003,or 30th April,2003. I read this letter, in its entirety:

Re: Rental – Council Premises

I refer to your letter dated 19th instant which I received today together with your cheque for sum of one thousand and eight hundred dollars ($1,800.00).


The Council had issued a notice dated 06/2/03 to Singh's Shopping Ltd to give vacant possession of council premises situation at Labasa Market.


As discussed earlier (04/3/03) between Mr J Singh of Singh's Shopping Ltd and the Mayor, Cr Charan J SinghJP that if Singh's Shopping Ltd gives vacant possession of councils premises by 31/3/03 the council had assured that it shall not accept rent for month of March 2003.


It was further discussed between the parties that if Singh's Shopping Ltd gives vacant possession of council premises by 30/4/03 then Singh Shopping Ltd shall pay rent for months of March and April being for sum of one thousand and eight hundred dollars ($1,800.00).


Now that you have paid rent for March and April 2003, it is understood that Singh Shopping Ltd shall comply the council premises upto April 2003 and it shall also make arrangement to give vacant possession by 30/4/03 as per our notice dated 6/2/03.


The Council is firm with its decisions and it shall upgrade to market area therefore you are advised to give vacant possession of Council premises on or before 30/4/2003. (emphasis added)


Yours faithfully


M.RAFIQ

LEGAL OFFICER

for TOWN CLERK/CEO


6.5.3. It is evident from the penultimate paragraph that the defendant had reached an unilateral understanding.

6.5.4. In my judgment, the plaintiff had not agreed to vacate the premises.

6.6. In my view, the defendant's arguments, that it was entitled to determine the tenancy prior to the expiry of three years, are misconceived.

6.7. I turn from these linguistic points to the crucial point in this case.

6.8. The plaintiff's claim

The scene opens in the early hours of 1st May,2003, when the defendant's agents demolished the plaintiff's shop, removed all his goods and placed them outside. The demolition is justified. I would read the defendant's letter of 1st May,2003, in its entirety.

ATTENTION:MR JAGAT SINGH


Dear Sir,


Re: VACANT POSSESSION – LABASA TOWN COUNCIL PREMISES COLLECTION OF YOUR ITEMS FROM MARKET COMPLEX


Please refer to our earlier letters dated 06/02/03 and 25/04/03 regarding vacant possession of council premises situated at Labasa Market.


The Council had given you ample time to give vacant possession of council premises and despite serving remainders you had failed to vacate the said premises. The Council needed the premises for its own development and the Council had no choice but to demolish its premises after 30/04/03.


Please be advised to collect your items from the market premises within 24 hours time from the date of this letter and failure to do so within the stipulated period the Council will dispose all perishable items to avoid health risk to ratepayers and the market vendors.


We would appreciate your assistance and cooperation in this matter.


Yours faithfully,


M RAFIQ

LEGAL OFFICER

for TOWN CLERK/CEO


6.9. The demolition was a fait accompli, when the plaintiff received this letter at 4.55 pm, on the same day, as noted therein. It was admittedly done, after midnight on 30th April,2003,in the early hours of 1st May, 2003. The letter is hence addressed to the plaintiff's shop, at Park Street.

6.10. Mr Ram, relies by analogy, on the decision in Hemmings and Wife v The Stoke Pages Golf Club Ltd, (1920) KB 720.In this case, the plaintiffs were permitted to occupy premises belonging to the defendants, as a condition of their employment with the defendant. The plaintiff refused to vacate, at the end of his employment. The defendants got the plaintiff and his furniture removed.

6.11. In my view, the facts are not comparable. The plaintiff in that case, had ceased to be an employee. He was a trespasser and no injury had been sustained by him. I refer to the following passage from the judgment of Bankes LJ at page 733, as quoted in the closing submissions of the defendant:

"..the plaintiff, having no title to the possession as against his landlord, can have no right of action against him as a

trespasser, for entering upon his own land, even with force; for, though the law had been violated by the defendant, for


which he was liable to be punished under a criminal prosecution, no right of the plaintiff had been infringed, and no injury had been sustained by him for which he could be entitled to compensation in damages.."(emphasis added)


6.12. In the present case, the plaintiff's shop was dismantled and goods removed, during the period of tenancy. There was no countervailing consideration for the eviction. Not a shred of evidence was adduced of any minutes of a meeting of the Council,that the plaintiff's shop in the market would be dismantled and its contents removed.

6.13. Mr Sen cites the case of William Leitch & Co v Leydon, (1931) AC 90 at page 106 for the proposition that trespass to goods is actionable per se. The authority cited does not state so. Lord Blanesburgh,in summarising the arguments of the appellant, "without indicating upon it any opinion of my own" stated further at page 106 that the "wrong to the appellants in relation to that trespass is constituted whether or not actual damage has resulted therefrom either to the chattel or to themselves: see Pollock on Torts, 13th ed., p. 364". In the case of trespass to goods, damages is measured by their value, as stated by Lord Hanworth MR in Re Simms,(1934) 1 Ch1 at page 17.

6.14. General damages

The first point of claim is a claim for general damages. The statement of claim provides that the loss of income from 30th April, 2003, for the unexpired term of tenancy of 1 year, 8 months was $10,000 per month. The schedule of special damages filed on 23rd August, 2007, claims $ 30,000 per month.


6.14.1. The revenue statements of the plaintiff company, for 2003 and the preceding years, do not support either of the claims.

6.14.2. PW 1, in cross-examination, said that the balance sheet for the year ended 2003, does not reflect the proper accounts of the plaintiff. He said that the documents were lost, when the shop was dismantled. I find no qualification to this effect, in the Directors' Report. Moreover, DW4 said that he was given original documents, to prepare the accounts.

6.14.3. It transpired that the plaintiff had another shop at Park Street, which was operating concurrently with the plaintiff's market shop, prior to, and after the incident. DW4 said that the revenue statements reflect the aggregate profit of both shops. Mr Ram concludes that the loss of income from the market shop cannot be assessed.

6.14.4. That argument is formidable, but would be manifestly unjust. The courts have in several instances, granted damages, where loss of profits could not be accurately assessed.

6.14.5. In Newbrook v Marshall,(2002)2 NZLR 606 at page 614, Richardson P delivering the judgment of the Court of Appeal stated as follows:

Where there are variables involved, as usually occurs in assessments of business profits or losses, if precise figures had to be proved few plaintiffs could succeed. Where, as here, it is established that a particular factor was causative but its precise contribution to the loss could not be correctly calculated in precise dollar terms, a more robust approach is required of the courts. It is not a matter of whether an expert could give a reasoned assessment and could defend the number he or she came up with. As Lord Mustill said in Smith New Court Securities Ltd v Scrimgeour Vickers (Asset anagement) Ltd [1996] UKHL 3; [1997] AC 254 at p 269 "The assessment of damages often involves so many unquantifiable contingencies and unverifiable assumptions that in many cases realism demands a rough and ready approach to the facts.(emphasis added)


Richardson P referred to the case of Walsh v Kerr, (1989) 1 NZLR 494 at 494 where Cooke P stated:


There are cases where, although the assessment can only be largely speculative and the evidence is exiguous, the court will do the best it can to arrive at a figure if satisfied that there has been some real damage..


The judgments of the New Zealand Court of Appeal were cited in AG of Fiji vs Metuisela Cama,(ABU 0030 of 2004S). The FCA stated:


Where, for whatever reason, damages cannot be assessed accurately, and the court is required to take a broad global approach to the assessment of damages, that approach should be conservative. The claimant should not receive the benefit of any doubt if it is unable to prove its loss precisely. (emphasis added, underlining mine)


6.14.6. I turn to the evidence in this case. The revenue statements provide that:

6.14.7. On an analysis of the revenue statements, I find that the net income of the plaintiff has increased from 2000 to 2002, as follows:

6.14.8. Adopting a conservative approach, I hold that there would have been a 20 % increase in the percentage of profits, in 2003, if the market shop was not dismantled. The expected net income for 2003, would then be $16,728. Instead, the net income decreased to $ 11,905.21, with a resulting loss of profit of $ 5633.

6.14.9. I award the plaintiff, a sum of $ 5633, as general damages.

6.14.10. The plaintiff has not provided any evidence with respect to its trading in 2004 and 2005. As Lord Keith of Kinkel .stated in Tai Hing Cotton Mill Ltd v Kamsing Knitting Factory,(1979) AC 91 at page 106 "the ends of justice would be best served if they were to fix a new figure of damages as best they can they can upon the available evidence, such as it is". Accordingly, I make no award with respect to the second and third years of tenancy.

6.14.11. Aggravated and Exemplary Damages

The closing submissions of the plaintiff seeks aggravated and exemplary damages. The claim for exemplary damages is not pleaded. In respect of aggravated damages, it is sufficient if the facts relied to support a claim, are pleaded: the White Book, Vol 1 (1995), para 18/12/6.


6.14.12. Aggravated damages are a species of compensatory damages granted to compensate for cases of insolent, outrageous and high-handed trespass, as in the present case.

6.14.13. The case of Govind Prasad v NLTB and Ratuu Sakiusa Mutuku,(HBC 145 of 2002) Mr Sen points out, is distinct from the present case, as regards the period of the lease. In that case, the plaintiff had a 30 year lease, that was extended for a further 29 years. The head of the land owning unit had driven him out of the property.The High Court awarded $ 250,000 as general damages, since he had been deprived of his 30 year lease and family home. Aggravated damages in a sum of $ 10,000 and exemplary damages in a sum of $ 25,000, were also awarded. The judgment was upheld in appeal.

6.14.14. The case before me is almost a counterpart of the case of Drane v Evangelou, (1978) 1 WLR 455 where a couple, protected by statute from eviction, found that their landlord had barred the entrance to a maisonette leased to them, put all their belongings in the back yard, thereby damaging the goods. Lord Denning, upheld the county court judge's decision that such "monstrous" behaviour called for exemplary damages of GBP 1000. Lawton LJ and Goff LJ said it was proper to award aggravated damages. Lawton LJ at page 461 stated that it "brings the law into disrepute if people like the defendant can act with impunity in the way he did".

6.14.15. Lord Reid in Broome v Cassell & Co.,[1972] UKHL 3; (1972) 2 WLR. 645 at pgs 685 to 686 stated:

The only practical way ..is first to look at the case from the point of view of compensating the plaintiff. He must not only be compensated for proved actual loss but also for any injury to his feelings and for having had to suffer insults, indignities and the like. And where the defendant has behaved outrageously very full compensation may be proper for that..Then if it has been determined that the case is a proper one for punitive damages the tribunal must turn its attention to the defendant and ask itself whether the sum which it has already fixed as compensatory damages is or is not, adequate to serve the second purpose of punishment or deterrence. If they think that sum is adequate for the second purpose as well as for the first they must not add anything to it. It is sufficient both as compensatory and as punitive damages. But if they think that sum is insufficient as a punishment then they must add to it enough to bring it up to a sum sufficient as punishment. The one thing which they must not do is to fix sums as compensatory and as punitive damages and add them together. They must realise that the compensatory damages are always part of the total punishment." (emphasis added)


6.15. In my judgment, the appropriate figure for aggravated damages is $ 5,000.
6.16. Special damages

In Mahendra Naidu and Ravindra Patel C.A. No. 105/197999 (West Div) it was stated:


No receipt or evidence has been tendered... I am unable to guess what it would be and I do not allow it. As Lord Goddard and the F.C.A. have pointed out claimants are expected to call evidence supporting their claims and not simply to say this is what I have paid or suffered in losses expect to be awarded those sums".(emphasis added)


6.16.9.2 The second concept was that loss of stock in trade is required to be recorded in a balance sheet or in a note to that effect. This argument is certainly not without attraction. The balance sheet for the year ending 31 December,2003, does not expressly reveal a loss of stock. I express my view, on this argument in paragraph 6.6.12 below.

6.16.9.3 Thirdly, Mr Ram submits that the balance sheets produced for the years ending 2000 to 2003, show that stocks were on an average of $ 2000 to $ 4000. Mr Sen argues that stocks are low at the close of a year, due to holidays. Mr Ram's riposte was that there would be a low stock level at any time, not $ 30,000, as claimed, since it was a running business. It is not necessary for me to reach a conclusion on either of these contentions.

6.16.10. At the hearing, PW 1 testified that the plaintiff supplied items to the Fiji Military Force, the Labasa hospital, Labasa College and Prisons Dept on a weekly basis. Fish was supplied every week for the following values: $300 worth to the Fiji Military Force; $1500 worth to the Labasa hospital; $1000 worth to Labasa College and $1000 to Prisons Dept. No evidence in support was adduced.

6.16.11. PW1 said that the freezers contained 450 to 500 kg of fish, purchased at $4.50 a kg. The fish was rotten, as the freezer was unplugged. PW3 also said that there was 1500 kg of fresh fish. In so far as this evidence is supported by the testimony of DW 2, I would allow the claim for 1500 kg of fish. DW 2, who dismantled the shop, recollected that there was a big tub with fish. DW 5 also accepted that there was a stock of fish, though he disputed the quantity claimed. I accept that the plaintiff could not call transient fishermen, who do not issue invoices, as pointed out by Mr Sen

6.16.12. Albeit, the balance sheet for the year ending 31 December,2003, does not depict a loss of stock of trade, in the light of the evidence referred to in the preceding paragraph, I would presuppose that the closing figure of stock recorded of $ 2,338.75 in the balance sheet reflects the loss of fish .

6.16.13. The plaintiff is entitled to a sum of $ 6,750 as special damages.

6.17.4 I decline the claim for renovation costs. This was not reflected in the balance sheet for the year ended 2003, nor was any evidence of a building contract, invoices or payments produced.

7. The plaintiff is entitled to the following reliefs:


  1. General damages in a sum of $ 5,663.
  2. Aggravated damages in a sum of $ 5,000
  1. Special damages in a sum of $ 6,750.

8. Orders


(a) The plaintiff is entitled to judgment against the defendant in a sum of $ 17,413.

(b) The defendant shall pay the plaintiff costs summarily assessed in a sum of $ 6,000.

24 October, 2013
A.L.B. Brito-Mutunayagam
Judge


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