Lal v Land Transport Authority [2009] FJHC 157; HBC213.1994 (31 July 2009)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF FIJI
AT LABASA
CIVIL JURISDICTION

Civil Action No. HBC 213 of 1994

BETWEEN:

RAVIND MILLAN LAL & OTHERS
Plaintiffs

AND:

LAND TRANSPORT AUTHORITY
Defendant

AND:

AUSTRALIAN AND NEW ZEALAND BANKING GROUP
Garnishee

FINAL JUDGMENT

Of: Inoke J.

Counsel Appearing: Mr V Mishra for the Plaintiffs
Mr K Qoro for the Defendants.

Solicitors: Mishra Prakash & Associates for the Plaintiffs
Messrs Qoro Legal for the Defendants

Date of Hearing: 28, 29,30 July 2009
Date of Judgment: 31 July 2009

INTRODUCTION

[1] This is the Plaintiffs’ ex-parte application under Order 49 Rule 2 of the High Court Rules 1988 for “garnishee orders” in satisfaction of their judgment against the Defendant, Land Transport Authority (“LTA”), obtained on 22 June 2007. In simple language, the Plaintiff brings this application to start off a process where ultimately, this Court will order the ANZ Bank to pay out of the LTA’s bank account the amount of the judgment. This amount is close to $900,000.

[2] The application was first called before me on 27 July 2009 ex-parte as the Plaintiff was entitled to under the Order. I expressed my concern to Counsel for the Plaintiff that I should hear from the LTA as the Crown Proceedings Act may apply, in particular section 20, preventing execution of a judgment against the State and its institutions in the way that he is proposing in this application.

[3] Despite Counsel’s different point of view, he courteously and respectfully agreed and offered to advise the LTA Counsel and I adjourned the matter for hearing on 28 July 2009.

[4] Mr Qoro appeared for the LTA with limited instructions and Mr Mishra again appeared for the Plaintiff on 28 July 2009.

[5] I heard oral submissions, mainly from Mr Mishra, Mr Qoro not able to participate much without full instructions, and because I felt there was urgency in delivering a judgment, I adjourned the matter to Wednesday, 29 July 2009 for me to deliver my judgment. I had considered the matter but felt that it is of such importance not only to the LTA but to other similar corporate bodies that I should take more time to consider it more fully and as well give an opportunity for the LTA to make and file submissions. I also offered Counsel to let the Registry know if they wanted to make oral submissions as well before me on Thursday. I then adjourned the matter to Friday 31 July for delivery of my judgment.

[6] Counsel took up my invitation and both filed written submissions and made further oral submissions and I heard them on the afternoon of Thursday 30 July 2009. I was concerned to have such an important issue fully ventilated and a decision given promptly after full consideration. I am very grateful for Counsel’s efforts and assistance. I then adjourned it to Friday 31 July 2009 for delivery of my judgment. This is my judgment.

BRIEF HISTORY

[7] This case has a sad history. The Plaintiff lost his wife, two sons and a daughter in a car accident in 1991. He sued several defendants for damages as the executor of the estate of his deceased family members. He obtained judgment against the defendants but it appears that they were all impecunious so it was not worth the Plaintiff’s while to execute his judgment against them.

[8] The rest of the facts I reproduce from the interlocutory judgment of Justice Phillips in this case, reported in Lal v Kumar [2007] FJHC 140; HBC213.1994 (25 January 2007), as follows: “Subsequently the Attorney General was joined in respect of a claim against the Police and the LTA was joined in respect of a claim against its predecessor, the Transport Control Board. The matter came up for hearing before Justice Finnigan on 17 July 2006. The LTA had taken no steps in the action and Justice Finnigan granted the plaintiffs application and entered judgment in liability by default against the LTA. The hearing proceeded before Justice Finnigan as a hearing of assessment of personal injury damages primarily against the 1st, 2nd and 3rd defendants. Judgment against the 1st, 2nd and 3rd defendants was delivered on 22 August 2006. In total the plaintiffs were awarded compensation in the sum of $884,272.

In a further ruling on 26 January 2007, his Lordship granted leave to the plaintiffs to amend their statement of claim against the LTA.

The amended statement of claim was heard by Justice Connors in May 2007. In his judgment of 22 June 2007, Justice Connors found interalia that the LTA owed to the plaintiff a duty of care and that it breached that duty in failing to fulfill its statutory obligations as to the Motor Vehicle (Third Party) Insurance at the time that the motor vehicle registration was effected or renewed. His Lordship found that the LTA by virtue of its breach of statutory duty steps into the shoes of the third party insurer and was accordingly liable to the plaintiff for damages determined by Justice Finnigan in his judgment of 22 August 2006 and entered judgment against the LTA for the amounts as determined by Mr. Justice Finnigan.”

[9] The LTA appealed against the judgment of Mr. Justice Connors in the Fiji Court of Appeal and lost and has now filed an appeal to the Supreme Court. That appeal is yet to be heard.

[10] In the mean time the Plaintiff is seeking to enforce the Judgment of Connors J of 22 June 2007 by bringing these garnishee proceedings.

[11] As I have said, this is a very sad story and I do sympathise with Mr Mishra and his client but I remind myself that I should not be distracted by such sentiments and that the Plaintiff’s judgment can only be executed in the way that he now seeks if the law allows it. I must commend Mr Mishra for his untiring efforts to do justice for his client, and I do not say this in a callous way at all, but the Court can only do justice according to law.

DEFENCE SUBMISSIONS

[12] Before I go on to consider the Plaintiff’s submissions, I wish to acknowledge Defence Counsel’s submissions both oral and written, as I think one of his submissions immediately disposes of the Plaintiff’s application. Counsel referred me to the amendment to section 24 of the Land Transport Act, which I will deal with below, and a judgment of the Malawi High Court: Apex Car Sales v. AG [2003] MWHC 72. That case dealt with a similar issue that is being raised here, however, it is of little assistance because Malawi did not have a law equivalent to our Crown Proceedings Act. It is interesting though, because that case referred to another case (unreported) in which the Malawi High Court refused, wrongly it turned out, garnishee proceedings against the Government.

[13] However, Counsel’s reference to Sundarji v Sundarji [1999] FJHC 41; HBC1025j.86s (4 June 1999) is more to the issue at hand. There are two preliminary issues that have to be decided. Order 49 rule 1(1) requires that, firstly, the garnishee (ANZ Bank here) be indebted to the judgment debtor (LTA here), and secondly, that there is a proper garnishee. In Sundarji, the judgment creditor garnisheed the liquidator of a company in receivership. Singh J held that a debt is one that is due and payable now and a debt accruing is a debt which is due but payment of it is in the future and whether it is an ascertained sum or unascertained sum is immaterial. His Lordship also held that the liquidator in that case was a proper garnishee.

[14] Counsel points out that the Plaintiff’s affidavit in support, at paragraphs 11 and 12, seeks to attach monies that have been collected by the LTA, such as road taxes, fines, fees and levies paid by motorists and road users, and held by the ANZ Bank. Clearly, such monies cannot by any stretch of the law be viewed as a debt owing by the ANZ Bank to the LTA. The debt, if any, is owed by the motorists and others that are obliged by law to pay for fines, etc, to the LTA. Thus garnishee proceedings can only be issued against these individuals. For the reasons, I have given below, the LTA collects these monies as a servant or agent of the State therefore such proceedings are prohibited by virtue of Order 77 rules 11 and 12 of the High Court Rules 1988 and section 20(4) of the Crown Proceedings Act. Further, once the fines, etc, are paid, there is no debt owing by the Bank. Thus, the monies that the Plaintiff is seeking to garnishee is not a debt capable of attachment and it also follows that the ANZ bank is not a garnishee within the meaning of Order 49 rule1(1).

[15] This of itself is sufficient to dispose of the Plaintiff’s application. However, in recognition of the efforts of Counsel as a result of this Court directing them to address the application of the Crown Proceedings Act, I will go on and consider their submissions.

CONSIDERATION OF THE PLAINTIFF’S APPLICATION

[16] The application is brought under Order 49 of the High Court Rules 1988.

[17] Order 49 Rule 1 provides:

“(1) Where a person (in this Order referred to as “the judgment creditor”) has obtained a judgment or order for the payment by some other person (in this Order referred to as “the judgment debtor”) of money, not being a judgment or order for the payment of money into court, and any other person within the jurisdiction (in this Order referred to as “the garnishee”) is indebted to the judgment debtor, the Court may, subject to the provisions of this Order and of any enactment, order the garnishee to pay the judgment creditor the amount of any debt due or accruing to the judgment debtor from the garnishee, or so much thereof as is sufficient to satisfy that judgment or order and the costs of the garnishee proceedings.”

“(2) An order under this rule shall in the first instance be an order to show cause, specifying the time and place for further consideration of the matter, and in the meantime attaching such debt as is mentioned in paragraph (1), or so much thereof as may be specified in the order, to answer the judgment or order mentioned in that paragraph and the costs of the garnishee proceedings.”

[18] Counsel for the Plaintiff submitted that despite the appeal, because he is only seeking an interim order, that is, an order to show cause rather than an order to actually garnishee the LTA’s bank account, I can and should grant the order that he seeks. I note however, that under Order 49 rule 1(2), an interim order does in fact attach the LTA’s bank account, so the interim order does more than simply asks the garnishee to show cause.

[19] Garnishee proceedings are subject to the provisions of Order 49 “and of any enactment”: O 49 r (1). Therefore to proceed in any event would require an inquiry as to whether there were any other enactments to which these proceedings were subject to. I took the view that the Crown Proceedings Act, Cap 24 may apply so I asked Counsel to address me on this issue.

[20] Further, if the LTA falls within the meaning of the “State” as used in Order 77 of the High Court Rules 1988, which deals with “Proceedings by and against the State”, then the Plaintiff cannot bring this application either because Order 77 rules 11 and 12 prohibit it.

THE ISSUE

[21] Thus, the issue is: Does the Crown Proceedings Act and Order 77 rules 11 and 12 of the High Court Rules 1988 apply to the LTA thereby prohibiting the Plaintiff from executing its judgment against the LTA by garnishee proceedings?

[22] The starting point is section 20(4) of the Act. Section 20 is headed “Satisfaction of orders against the Crown.” Subsection 4 provides:

“Save as aforesaid no execution or attachment or process in the nature thereof shall be issued out of any court for enforcing payment by the Crown or any such money or costs as aforesaid, and no person shall be individually liable under any order for the payment by the Crown, or any Government department, or any officer of the Crown as such, of any such money or costs.”

[23] Sections 20(1) to 20(3) provide (so far as relevant):

“(1) Where in any civil proceedings by or against the Crown...any order (including an order for costs) is made in favour of any person against the Crown or against a Government department or against any officer of the Crown as such, the proper officer of the court shall, on an application in that behalf made by or on behalf of the person at any time after the expiration of twenty-one days from the date of the order ... issue to that person a certificate in the prescribed form containing particulars of the order...”

“(2) A copy of any certificate issued under this section may be served by the person in whose favour the order is made upon the Attorney-General.”

“(3) If the order provides for the payment of any money by way of damages or otherwise, or of any costs, the certificate shall state the amount so payable, and the Chief Accountant shall, subject as hereinafter provided, pay to the person so entitled or to his barrister and solicitor the amount appearing by the certificate to be due to him together with the interest, if any, lawfully due thereon:

Provided that the court by which any such order as aforesaid is made or any court to which an appeal against the order lies may direct that, pending an appeal or otherwise, payment of the whole of any amount so payable, or any part thereof, shall be suspended, and if the certificate has been issued may order any such directions to be inserted therein.”

[24] It must be conceded that the predecessor of the LTA was a “Government department or an officer of the Crown as such” and was therefore protected by subsection 4 of section 20 and could not have been subjected to Order 49 garnishee proceedings. Any process to satisfy a judgment against it would have been limited to that provided for in section 20(1) to 20(3) of the Crown Proceedings Act.

[25] I therefore asked Counsel to consider whether the incorporation of the LTA changed this position.

[26] Put simply, the matter boils down to interpretation of the Crown Proceedings Act to ascertain whether the LTA fell within the meanings of “the State” or “a Government department” or “an officer of the State as such” as used in the provisions of section 20 of the Act and whether the LTA is part of the State for the purpose of the enforcement provisions of the High Court Rules.

THE PLAINTIFF’S SUBMISSIONS

[27] Mr Mishra, on behalf of the Plaintiffs, submitted that the Crown Proceedings Act did not apply to the LTA because the Authority is a statutory company, similar to the Fiji Electricity Authority (FEA) and the Fiji Sugar Corporation (FSC), and is no longer a Government department. It is a separate legal and independent legal entity with its own existence.

[28] I do not think that the LTA is like the FSC so the analogy fails because the Fiji Sugar Corporation Limited (Repeal) Act 2005 provides in section 2(2) that “the Fiji Sugar Corporation Limited is preserved and shall continue and be deemed to be a company wholly incorporated under the Companies Act after the commencement of this Act”. There might be some similarity with the FEA but the analogy does not advance his case at all.

[29] Counsel referred me to the provisions of the Land Transport Act 1998, which he said supported his submission that the LTA is a separate and distinct entity from the State. Under Section 6 the LTA could sue and be sued. Sections 7 and 8 set up its structure and functions. Section 9 sets out the powers of the Authority. Certain actions of the former department, he submitted, are now delegated to the LTA. Section 24 provides for its funds and resources, and pursuant to section 32 “all real and personal property vested in or belonging to the State and administered by the Department of Road Transport and all other property of every description vested or belonging to the State for the use of the Department of Road Transport shall without further assurance vest in the Authority on the commencement of the Act.”

[30] With the greatest of respect to Counsel I have to disagree. The sections of the Land Transport Act that he referred me to, in my view, defeat his own argument and at best do not assist him.

[31] Section 6 refers to the right to sue and be sued. As I pointed out to Counsel, the section did not assist him because that was not what he was asking for here. It is not about suing the LTA but execution of a judgment against it.

[32] I also put the proposition to him that if he accepted that the assets now owned by or vested in the LTA were formerly owned by or vested in the Department of Road Transport, and if garnishee proceedings could not have been taken against the former Department for those very same assets, surely such proceedings cannot now be taken against the LTA for the very same assets simply on the basis that the Department is now a corporate entity?

[33] Counsel referred to section 2 of the Crown Proceedings Act. He says he does not have a claim against the State, only a claim against the corporation, the LTA.

[34] Again, I think the section does not assist the Plaintiff because the issue here is not about suing or being sued but enforcement of a judgment. Further, the provisions of section 20 clearly cover judgments against the State as well as its departments and officers as such.

[35] Counsel also referred me to: Subarmani v Native Land Trust Board [2007] FJCA 50; ABU0095.2005S (22 June 2007). The point that was decided by the Court of Appeal in that case was that the NLTB was not capable of being wound up under the provisions of the Companies Act. It did not assist the Plaintiff, but Counsel submitted that I should take into account the fact that Connors J subsequently allowed garnishee proceedings to issue against the NLTB in that case. The question that is in issue in this case did not appear to be raised or argued but in any event, the NLTB is a different creature all together from the LTA. Further, in light of what I have said above that the monies held by the ANZ Bank is not a debt owed by the Bank, the issue of garnishee orders by Connors J, with respect, must be in doubt.

[36] Counsel also wanted to rely on dicta in Subramani:[1]

“We consider that the Board was not intended by Parliament to be a company capable of being wound up, whether as an unregistered company or otherwise, under the Companies Act Cap 247. See Tamlin v Hannaford [1950] 1 KB 18, 23, where Denning LJ said of a similar statutory corporation that its property was liable to execution but it was not liable to be wound up at the suit of any creditor."

[37] That required me to examine Tamlin v Hannaford [1950] 1 KB 18. The question in that case was whether the British Transport Commission was a servant or agent of the Crown. If it was, then it was not bound by the Rent Restriction Acts, as the Act did not bind the Crown. The Court found that the Commission was not a servant or agent of the Crown. In coming to that decision, the Court considered the provisions of the Act that created the Commission. At page 22-23, Denning LJ, who delivered the judgment of the Court on the question asked of the Court, said this:

"In the case of the British Transport Commission, this depends on the true construction of the Transport Act, 1947. We have considered the provisions of that statute and, for the sake of clarity, we propose to state their effect without referring to the various sections in detail.

The Transport Act, 1947 brings into being the British Transport Commission, which is a statutory corporation of a kind comparatively new to English law. It has many of the qualities which belong to corporations of other kinds to which we have been accustomed. I has, for instance, defined powers which it cannot exceed; and it is directed by a group of men whose duty it is to see the those powers are properly used. It may own property, carry on business, borrow and lend money, just as any other corporation may do, so long as it keeps within the bounds which Parliament has set. But the significant difference in this corporation is that there ar no shareholders to subscribe the capital or to have any voice in its affairs. The money which the corporation needs is not raised by the issue of shares but by borrowing; and its borrowing is not secured by debentures, but is guaranteed by the Treasury. If it cannot repay, the loss falls on the Consolidated Fund of the United Kingdom; that is to say, on the taxpayer...There are no profits to be made or distributed. The duty of the corporation is to make revenue and expenditure balance one another, taking, of course, one year with another, but not to make profits. If it should make losses and be unable to pay its debts, its property is liable to execution, but it is not liable to be wound up at the suit of any creditor..."

[38] It is clear from this passage that the enabling Act in Tamlin expressly allowed execution against the assets of the Commission. This case is therefore not a precedent for the proposition put forward by Counsel for the Plaintiff that a statutory corporation such as the LTA is not immune from execution by garnishee proceedings. One must examine the provisions of the Land Transport Act 1998 to see if the LTA is an agent or servant of the State. Tamlin is authority for the proposition that one must look at the provisions of the enabling Act to decide the question of whether a subordinate body acts as agent or servant of the State.

[39] In considering whether any subordinate body is entitled to Crown privileges, the question is not so much whether it is an emanation of the State but whether it is properly to be regarded as the servant or agent of the State: see Tamlin (supra) at p. 22 and the case authorities cited therein.

[40] The weakness in the Plaintiff’s argument is that he looks at the transition from a Government department to a statutory corporation superficially by making the presumption that the change in legal personality, i.e. incorporation by statute, severs the connection between the LTA and the State. It is clear from Tamlin that one needs to look further, for example, into the functions that the LTA perform and its purpose and objectives.

THE LAND TRANSPORT ACT 1998

[41] The preamble to the Act says:

"TO ESTABLISH THE LAND TRANSPORT AUTHORITY, TO REGULATE THE REGISTRATION AND USE OF VEHICLES, THE LICENSING OF DRIVERS OF VEHICLES AND THE ENFORCEMENT OF TRAFFIC LAWS AND TO PROVIDE FOR THE REPEAL OF THE TRAFFIC ACT AND FOR RELATED MATTERS"

[42] Section 6(2) provides:

"(2) The Authority shall be a body corporate with perpetual succession and a common seal and may enter into contracts and sue and be sued in its corporate name and shall have the power to acquire, hold and dispose of property both real and personal and generally do all such acts and things that are necessary for or incidental to the performance of its functions under this Act or any other written law."

[43] More relevantly, section 24(1) of the Act provides:

"(1) The funds and resources of the Authority shall consist of –

(a) Any property, investments, mortgages and debentures acquired by or vested in the Authority and any money earned or arising therefrom;

(b) The fees and fixed penalties paid to the Authority under this Act;

(c) The Road User Levy collected by the Authority, appropriated for Government.[2]

(d) Money borrowed by the Authority for the purpose of meeting any of its obligations or discharging any of its functions;

(e) All money appropriated by Parliament to the Authority;

(f) All other money or property which may in any manner become payable to or vested in the Authority in respect of any matter incidental to its powers and duties."

[44] Significantly, Subsection 2 of section 24, which provided that the Authority may invest moneys standing to its credit in accordance with the law for the time being in force in Fiji, was amended by the Land Transport Authority (Amendment) Promulgation 2008 (Promulgation 1 of 2009) as follows:

"(2) Any money received by or on behalf of the Authority under this Act or any other written law shall be received and paid by the Authority to the Consolidated Fund except the Road User Levy which shall be paid into the Infrastructure Rehabilitation and Development Fund Account by the Authority for the Ministry responsible for Transport."

[45] I have already referred to section 32 of the Act which vested all real and personal property belonging to the State and administered by the Department of Road Transport and all other property vested or belonging to the State for the use of the Department of Road Transport. By virtue of that section, all land vested in or belonging to the State, as the Minister responsible for land matters may from time to time determine, shall vest in the Authority without further assurance.

[46] Other provisions such section 24(1)(d) and section 27 show a nexus between its funds and the Consolidated Fund. It can only borrow amounts more than $500,000 if the Minister for Finance gives his approval in writing: section 25(2).

[47] It is obvious from an analysis of these provisions that the LTA is a servant or agent of the State. It is required by law to collect money for and on behalf of the State and pay it into the Consolidated Fund or to the Ministry responsible for transport. This is the same money that the Plaintiff here is attempting to garnishee. The Authority holds property previously belonging to the State. It is partly funded by the State. It is clearly a corporation nothing like the British Railway Commission.

[48] I therefore find that the LTA is a servant or agent of the State and is therefore, for the purposes of execution of a judgment against it, immune from garnishee proceedings by virtue of Order 77 Rules 11 and 12 of the High Court Rules 1988.

STATUTORY INTERPRETATION: SECTION 20 CROWN PROCEEDINGS ACT

[49] Even if I were wrong in so finding, I am of the opinion that section 20(4) of the Crown Proceedings Act applies thereby precluding the Plaintiff from proceeding under Order 49 of the High Court Rules. He is limited in terms of execution to his rights provided in section 20 of the Act.

[50] My finding that the LTA is a servant or agent of the State of itself means that Section 20(4) of the Act applies. The same result can be arrived at, in my opinion, in another way as a matter of statutory interpretation.

[51] There is no definition section in the Crown Proceedings Act. The Interpretation Act, Cap 7, by virtue of the Interpretation (Amendment) Decree 1989, defines "State" to mean "the Republic of Fiji and in relation to any period prior to 7 October, 1987 includes the Crown in right of its Government of Fiji." The Interpretation (Amendment) Act 1998 defines "Government" as "Government of the State". There is no definition of "Department" or "Government department". The Act defines "officer" as "a person in the permanent or temporary employment of the Government of Fiji" and "person" includes "any company or association or body of persons, corporate or unincorporate."

[52] Not much assistance can be gained from the literal interpretation of the section.

[53] I would prefer to adopt a purposive interpretation approach.

[54] The Preamble to the Crown Proceedings Act states:

"AN ACT TO AMEND THE LAW RELATING TO THE CIVIL LIABILITIES AND RIGHTS OF THE [STATE] AND TO CIVIL PROCEEDINGS BY AND AGAINST THE [STATE], TO AMEND THE LAW RELATING TO THE CIVIL LIABILITIES OF PERSONS OTHER THAN THE [STATE] IN CERTAIN CASES INVOLVING THE AFFAIRS OR PROPERTY OF THE [STATE] AND FOR PURPOSES CONNECTED WITH THE MATTERS AFORESAID."

[55] The policy behind section 20 is to stop the assets of the State being encumbered and restrained by the normal execution processes thereby stopping the whole machinery and operation of the public service from functioning and bringing the whole country to a standstill. See also Order 77 rules 11 and 12 of the High Court Rules 1988. The policy is perhaps best explained in the judgment of Rowlatt J in Rederiaktiebolaget Amphitrite v The King [1921] 3 KB 500. This was a case where the British Government gave an assurance to a Swedish ship owner that if they sent their ship into a British port with a particular class of cargo she would not be detained. On the faith of this assurance, the ship was sent. The Government subsequently withdrew the assurance and detained the ship. The owner sued the British Government for damages for breach of contract. The action failed because the Court held that there was no contract. At page 503, Rowlatt J said this:

"My main reason for so thinking is that it is not competent for the Government to fetter its future executive action, which must necessarily be determined by the needs of the community when the question arises. It cannot by contract hamper its freedom of action in matters which concern the welfare of the State."

[56] In the same way, the execution of judgments obtained against the State should not be allowed to fetter the State’s future executive action.

[57] I have examined the provisions of the Land Transport Act 1998 above. I am of the view that the functions and activities of the LTA involve the affairs or property of the State and for purposes connected therewith. It comes within the policy of the Act and its protection.

THE FINAL OUTCOME

[58] I therefore find that the monies held by the ANZ Bank cannot be the subject of garnishee proceedings because it is not a debt within the meaning of Order 49 rule 1(1) of the High Court Rules 1988.

[59] I also find that the LTA was acting as an agent or servant of the State for the purposes of collecting those funds and therefore cannot be subject to garnishee proceedings because of Order 77 rules 11 and 12 of the High Court Rules 1988.

[60] I also find that the section 20(4) of the Crown Proceedings Act prohibits the issue of garnishee proceedings against the LTA as agent or servant of the State or, alternatively, as a body performing functions and activities which involve the affairs or property of the State and for purposes connected therewith.

[61] For these reasons, the Plaintiff is precluded by section 20(4) of the State Proceedings Act and Order 77 Rules 11 and 12 of the High Court Rules 1988 from filing this application under Order 49 of the High Court Rules. He must proceed under the provisions of section 20 of the Act.

ISSUE OF SECTION 20 CERTIFICATE

[62] I discussed with Counsel the issue of a certificate under sections 20 if I should hold that the Crown Proceedings Act applied. Counsel for the Plaintiff wishes to make further submissions in that regard so I leave that open for now. Apart from that, there is nothing further for the Court to decide.

[63] The Plaintiff’s application is dismissed accordingly.

COSTS

[64] Bearing in mind the difficulties that the Plaintiff is facing in executing his judgment, I make no order as to costs.

ORDERS

[65] My Orders are as follows:

• (a) The Plaintiff’s motion filed on 25 July 2009 for garnishee orders against the Defendant is dismissed.
  
• (b) There is no order as to costs.
  
• (c) The Plaintiff is at liberty to bring the matter before me in respect of the issue of a certificate under section 20 of the Crown Proceedings Act.
  

Sosefo Inoke
Judge

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^[1] At para 16.
^[2] Inserted by amendment: Land Transport Authority (Amendment) Promulgation 2008 (Promulgation 1 of 2009) section 3.