Prasad v Prakash [2002] FJHC 308; HBC0157.2000 (22 August 2002)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF FIJI
AT LAUTOKA
CIVIL JURISDICTION

CIVIL ACTION NO. HBC0157 OF 2000

BETWEEN:

LAKSHMI PRASAD son of Ram Narayan Pande
as Executor and Trustee of the Estate of RAM
NARAYAN PANDE of Nadrau, Moto, Ba, Fiji,
Cultivator
Plaintiff

AND

GYAN PRAKASH son of Mangru alias Baleshwar of Nasoso, Nadi, Fiji, Cultivator
Defendant

Mr. V.P. Mishra for the Plaintiff
Dr. M.S. Sahu Khan for the Defendant

Dates of Hearing: 18 and 19 July 2000
Date of Judgment: 22 August 2002

JUDGMENT

The Plaintiff, acting for his father’s estate, seeks to regain possession of a freehold 10 acre cane farm, the agricultural tenancy for which he says expired at the end of 1999. The Plaintiff wishes to subdivide the land. The Defendant who succeeded to the remaining period of the tenancy upon his father’s death says he has the right now to ownership of one acre of that farm, on which he and his father had built 3 houses. He bases his claim to possession on a settlement agreement which he says he reached with the Plaintiff as the culmination of a series of legal actions between the parties. He claims it would be unconscionable now to deny his entitlement to this one acre.

On the 27th April 2000 the Plaintiff instituted proceedings by way of a summons to show cause pursuant to Section 169 of the Land Transfer Act Cap. 131. The High Court is allowed a special jurisdiction under Part XXIV of that Act to hear applications summarily which would normally result in an expeditious remedy. The Plaintiff filed two affidavits, one in support filed on the 27th April 2000 and one in reply of the 29th June 2000. The Defendant filed two affidavits in opposition, one on the 1st June 2000, and another, apparently without leave, on the 7th July 2000. The latter affidavit was said to be sworn on the 5th June 2000, “June” being presumably a typographical error for “July”. Paragraph 12 of the same gave the date of a judgment from the Ba Magistrate’s Court as being pronounced in “1988" which was no doubt an error, and “1998" must have been intended instead. However I have taken this, the second affidavit of the Defendant into consideration, along with the others in these proceedings, and grant necessary leave for its use [Ord. 41 r.4].

The Defendant does not dispute that the Plaintiff is “the last registered proprietor of the land” [Section 169 (a)] or that the Plaintiff is also “a lessor where the term of the lease has expired” [Section 169 (c)]. The potential ejector must satisfy one of three necessary prerequisites before commencing summary proceedings under this Act. The Plaintiff has satisfied two of the requirements. The Defendant does however say he is entitled to a grace year under the Agricultural Landlord and Tenant Act Cap. 270 (ALTA) to harvest his crops so as to allow him to continue his possession till the end of the year 2000.

A grace year is possible if the requirements of Section 9 (1) (f) (ii) of ALTA are met. They are:

“9. (1) The following conditions and covenants shall be implied in every contract of tenancy of an agricultural holding subsisting at or after the commencement of this Act:-

(f) on the part of the landlord -

(i) ................

(ii) that on termination of the tenancy the tenant, if he has paid all the rent and observed and performed all the conditions of the tenancy, shall be entitled, at the option of the landlord, during the next twelve months to cultivate and to reap any standing crops, or receive compensation in lieu.”

(emphasis added)

It would appear however that the tenant had not paid all of the outstanding rent by the end of the tenancy. There is no evidence placed before me that a sum of $7,000.00 which was part of a consent order of 27th April 2000 of the Agricultural Tribunal to cover rent arrears was ever paid by the Defendant. In any event, the question of the tenant being allowed to cultivate further after the expiry of the lease or to reap standing crops or indeed to receive compensation in lieu is “at the option of the landlord”. The landlord here, the Plaintiff, opposed such a grace period. But the expiry of the lease in December 1999, was a date already accepted by the Defendant in the Tribunal proceedings W/D 8/99 in which the Defendant (then Respondent) accepted that the 30 year ALTA lease was to run from 1.1.1970 (See Respondent’s Section, Answer to Question 8 on the form Application for Reference, as exhibited to Defendant’s 2nd affidavit). He had his present solicitors acting for him at the time. Additionally, the Plaintiff exhibited to his second affidavit, the instrument of tenancy which the Agricultural Tribunal ordered to be drawn up and executed by the parties which gave the commencement date of the lease as the 1st January 1970. The parties signatures were witnessed and counter-signed by their respective solicitors.

The reference to expiry of the lease in 2000 in the judgment of the Tribunal is to be read with a date of commencement of the original lease as found by the Tribunal to be derived from an agreement made in January 1970. The expiry therefore occurred on the 31st December 1999, and the Plaintiff at his option did not grant a year’s extension, nor did the Defendant qualify for an extension by reason of the unpaid rent arrears.

The Summons sufficiently described the land in question and section 170 has been complied with. The onus of proof is placed by the Land Transfer Act on the Defendant and the judge is only to dismiss the Summons “if (the Defendant) proves to the satisfaction of the judge a right to the possession of the land ” [Section 172].

The Agreement

The Plaintiff says that this is a plain case where a tenancy has expired and the tenant is refusing to vacate. The Defendant says he is the sole executor and trustee as well as the sole beneficiary of the estate of Mangru, his father, who died in 1991. Originally, after the Defendant’s father’s death, the Plaintiff had refused to accept the Defendant as the replacement tenant. The Defendant therefore applied to the Agricultural Tribunal (the first Reference) which made a declaration of tenancy in the Defendant’s favour. This decision was taken on appeal first to the Central Agricultural Tribunal, then on judicial review to the High Court, and finally to the Court of Appeal. All appeals were dismissed in favour of the Defendant.

The Plaintiff applied to the Tribunal again, this time for reassessment of rent (the second Reference). The second Reference was called first on the 6th April 1999 and was concluded in a hearing on the 27th April 2000 with a consent order referred to above. The Defendant deposed that he “and the Plaintiff had been having discussions with the view to settling the outstanding matters between the (sic) me and the Plaintiff and the outstanding matters were:

(i) The compensation to be paid to me by the Plaintiff in respect of the 3 substantial houses that had been erected on the said land.

(ii) Reassessment of rent.

(iii) Vacating the balance of the land except the house site.”

The Defendant considered there were no grounds for claiming any re-assessment of rent. He said “........... I and the Plaintiff amicably settled all the matters and agreed as follows:

(i) That out of the 10 acres of land I would vacate 9 acres of the said land being part of C.T. 19444 after harvesting of the sugar cane for the year 2000 except 1 acre which comprised the 3 house sites and all the three houses situate thereon and I would continue to enjoy the use and have full enjoyment and benefit of the 1 acre to the exclusion of the Plaintiff.

(ii) The Plaintiff agreed that he would be holding the said 1 acre of the said land comprised in C.T. 19444 as trustee for me until proper subdivision was done to enable a separate title to be issued to me in respect of the said 1 acre.

(iii) That I would abandon all my claims for $150,000.00 [One Hundred and Fifty Thousand Dollars] compensation for the houses.

(iv) That upon the issue of a separate title in my name in respect of the said one acre of the said land I would pay the sum of $25,000.00 [Twenty Five Thousand Dollars] to the Plaintiff which includes the costs of subdivision and to recover legal costs paid by the Plaintiff in all matters between me and the Plaintiff and costs of the Plaintiff who travelled to Fiji and other related matters including taking into account the value of the said 1 acre having regard to the matters stated herein.

(v) That I and the Plaintiff would agree without hearing of the reassessment of rental between $5,000.00 [ Five Thousand Dollars] and $10,000.00 [Ten Thousand Dollars] as a lump sum figure.

(vi) That the Plaintiff will have all the necessary documents executed within fourteen (14) days of 27th April, 2000 to have all the terms of settlement herein stated recorded and to take steps to implement the same.

(vii) That I would not institute legal proceedings to make any claim in respect of the compensation claims referred above.

The Defendant went on to explain:

“On the date of the hearing of the Second Reference the only outstanding matter was the rental and in view of the settlement reached on other matters referred above I relying on the settlement reached and the representation of the Plaintiff that he would implement the terms of settlement finally agreed to pay the Plaintiff the sum of $7,000.00 [Seven Thousand Dollars] as rental up to date. I would not have agreed to the reassessment of rental as agreed if the Plaintiff and me had not come to agreement of all the other issues referred to above and the necessary terms and conditions were filed in the Agricultural Tribunal.”

He said he would never have agreed to abandon his claim for compensation of $150,000.00 for the 3 houses, or agreed to the reassessment of rental if he and the Plaintiff had not reached the agreement mentioned above. He said this was a case to be “determined by proper evidence” and asked the court to stay proceedings until the hearing of another action in which the Defendant as Plaintiff was suing the present Plaintiff based on the oral agreement made prior to the 27th April 2000. He did not expand on what he meant by proper evidence. Both sides had tendered with their affidavits a number of documents as exhibits.

In his second affidavit the Plaintiff exhibited the consent order made by the Agricultural Tribunal on the 27th April 2000 when the Defendant was represented by Dr. M.S. Sahu Khan, his present counsel. The order for payment was said to be for “rent arrears”. He also exhibited a bankruptcy notice against himself issued on the same day as the settlement and the consent order, issued by the Defendant’s solicitors Messrs Sahu Khan & Sahu Khan. He exhibited his defence to the Defendant’s other action and said he did not discuss matters with the Defendant until the 6th April 2000 when the Defendant had agreed to pay rent arrears of $7,000.00. However he also said he had only come back from Australia on the 23rd April 2000, and he exhibited his passport entry stamp confirming such visit. He said he did not meet the Defendant until the 27th April 2000 when he did so at the Tribunal, and that settlement occurred at the Tribunal offices. The date given in the defence for such negotiations, namely the 6th April 2000 may, therefore be incorrect if the Plaintiff was not in the country by then. Certainly neither side has exhibited copies of letters showing negotiations in progress before the 27th April 2000. The 6th April date may have to be amended in the pleadings. The Plaintiff denied that there had been any agreement or any question of the Plaintiff holding 1 of the 10 acres in trust for the Defendant or any question of the Defendant paying $25,000.00 for such acre.

It is necessary to consider whether the Defendant has raised issues underpinned by credible evidence which require further investigation by this court so that this summons must needs be dismissed.

The Agreement to Subdivide

The Plaintiff denies there was any such agreement. He says the Defendant, if he had a claim concerning the 3 houses should have brought his claim to the Tribunal and sought compensation under Section 40 of ALTA. I shall return to the question of compensation further on.

The Plaintiff says any agreement to subdivide (which is denied) would not be enforceable unless it had the prior approval of the Director of Town and Country Planning [Section 4 Subdivision of Land Act Cap. 140]. The Defendant has not argued that the proviso to Section 4 is applicable here. Such approval application has to go to the Local Authority besides the Director, and various factors have to be taken into account, such as drains, roads, land usage, convenience of the neighbourhood, and whether the subdivision will prove offensive or noxious to the health or amenities of the people in the area.

No approach had been made by the Plaintiff to obtain the Director’s approval to subdivide, nor is there evidence of any such approach on the part of the Defendant. Assuming the Defendant is right in saying there was an agreement, what did the parties contemplate should happen in the event that the Director refuses to allow the subdivision? The oral agreement as related by the Defendant does not provide for such an outcome. All of the cases dealing with prior consent or approval indicate clearly that there are to be no dealings in, or active steps taken with, the land prior to the consent or approval being given:

Northern Hotels v Gordon C Oliver [1980] 26 Fiji L.R. 93; Ramdin v Pyara Singh [1977] 23 Fiji L.R. 128. If there were, the officials concerned with processing the consent or approval application would be incommoded by the Defendant going into possession of the proposed subdivided part whilst the suitability of the subdivision was under consideration. After the expiry of the tenancy the Defendant was holding over in respect of all of the 10 acres. He cannot resist a summary order for ejectment from 9 of the 10 acres on any of his arguments. As to the remaining 1 acre, his possession and occupation of that acre, which is yet to be subdivided, is premature. If there were an agreement to subdivide and the Defendant retained possession at the expiry of the lease, these facts together, prior to the approval, would make the agreement unlawful and unenforceable: Kuppan v Unni [1946-56] 4 Fiji L.R. 188 at p 193. Once the dealing has become void and a nullity, it cannot be revived: Jai Kissun Singh v Sumintra [1970] 16 Fiji L.R. 165. If the Defendant had vacated the land, made agreement with the Plaintiff subject to the approval, and awaited the Director’s approval, the agreement would not have been unlawful: Kumar Gurdial Singh v Mehar Singh & Another [1980] 26 Fiji L.R. 77 where it was also held that a lessee retaining possession in such circumstances must vacate. The mere execution of an agreement said to be subject to the Director’s approval is not in itself a prohibited dealing in land under the Subdivision of Lands Act: Harnam Singh & Another v Bawa Singh [1958-59] 6 Fiji L.R. 31. At any rate the burden of proof that the approval of the Director of Town and Country Plannning was obtained rests on the person who asserts he has a right to occupy the subdivided land concerned: Angamuttu & Others v Jai Narayan [1960-61] 7 Fiji L.R. 36 at p 38 which concerned the consent of the Board to the occupation of Native Land. In Phalad v Sukh Raj [1978] 24 Fiji L.R. 170 Henry J.A., in holding an agreement to be null and void, said at p 176:

“For the argument of counsel to succeed it would be necessary to read into (the) Section words which would permit a conditional alienation or dealing with the land conditional upon the consent being later given. This would render the words in (the) Section ‘without the consent of (the Director of Lands) first had and obtained’ mere surplusage of no effect. Further the transaction would not be null and void but only so if the consent were not subsequently obtained.

The words ‘alienate’ and ‘deal with’ as elaborated in (the) Section are absolute and do not permit conditional acts in contravention. If before consent, acts are done, pending the granting of consent, which come within the prohibited transactions, then the Section has been breached and later consent cannot make lawful that which was earlier unlawful and null and void.”

His Lordship concluded:

“The making of the agreement conditional upon consent being granted does not assist .... because (the) Section does not permit the conditional doing of the acts prohibited by (the) Section. The time factor is plain and mandatory.”

The judge was interpreting Section 12 of the Native Lands Trust Act Cap. 134. Fatiaki J. (now C.J.) adopted this reasoning in making a similar finding in Waiqele Sawmills Ltd v CMLA (unreported) Labasa High Court Civil Action No. 0042 of 1999; 20th May 2002, when interpreting Section 13 of the State Lands Act Cap. 132.

Though in Fiji an executory contract for subdivision prior to any actual subdividing may not be caught by the prohibition in Section 4 of the Subdivision of Lands Act, see observations of the Court of Appeal in Ram Devi v Satya Nand Sharma & Another [1985] 31 Fiji L.R. 130 at p 134, the Defendant’s retention of possession of the 1 acre may have amounted to a prohibited step in the subdividing prior to the Director’s approval (at p 134 H). If that were the case it would prevent, by reason of the unlawful dealing, any relief being granted by the court to the Defendant: Devi Dayal v Jagdish Kumar (unreported) Fiji Court of Appeal No. 38 of 1980. If prior subdivision without approval is unlawful, the creation of a trust in favour of the subdividee is no more lawful either. Both arrangements appear to undermine the Director’s ability to decline the application effectively, which is at the root of the reasoning for the prohibition in the way the courts have consistently found.

The Claim for Compensation

The Defendant has stressed he would never have abandoned his claim for compensation for the 3 houses unless all of the other issues had been agreed in the settlement agreement. What claim did he have? He and his father before him had an ALTA lease. Under Section 9 (1) (f) (ii) of ALTA, already referred to, compensation in lieu of lost crops could be recoverable in certain circumstances. However, such compensation is conditional upon all of the rent being paid, and is available only at the option of the landlord. But application can also be made to the Agricultural Tribunal for exercise of its powers in Sections 18 (3) and 22 (1) (b) of the Act to order compensation for improvements in certain circumstances.

Compensation for improvements is covered in Section 40. Improvements are those specified in the Schedule to the Act. Part I of the Schedule commences:

Improvements to which prior consent in writing of the landlord is required:

(1) Erection, alteration or enlargement of buildings required for the efficient operation of the holding. (underlining added)

Whether the erection of 3 houses for a small 10 acre farm fits that requirement is questionable, particularly if the valuation for such buildings amounts to $150,000.00. The proviso to Section 40 states:

“Provided that the tenant shall not be entitled to obtain compensation unless the consent or notice required to be obtained or given as specified in the Schedule has been so obtained or given and unless the tenant has, where requested by the landlord, served upon the landlord, within one month of the completion of the improvement, notice informing him of such completion.”

More would be required to register the landlord’s proper consent to such improvements than merely asking him to sign a copy of the tenant’s house plans. These difficulties may explain why no application was made to the Tribunal by the Defendant to claim compensation at the end of the lease.

Promissory Estoppel

In speaking of the doctrine of equitable or promissory estoppel, in Public Trustee of Fiji v Krishna Nair (unreported) Civil Appeal No. ABU0010 of 1996S; 21 April 1997, the Court of Appeal held at p 7:

:.... it is well established in the law of Fiji and, indeed, a wider scope of the doctrine as formulated in Australia and New Zealand in the last decade and a half has been accepted and applied by this Court. (See for example, Attorney General and Fiji Trade and Investment Board v Pacoil; Civil Appeal No. 14 of 1996).”

Promissory Estoppel is the nomenclature preferred by some jurists derived from the old equitable estoppel; Central London Property Trust Ltd v High Trees House Ltd [1946] EWHC KB 1; [1947] K.B. 130; see too comments of Professor Sir Roy Goode in Commercial Law at p 111 and note 137. The High Trees case recognised a wider principle than that existing under the common law with its doctrine of nudum pactum for promises not made under seal, and the court was prepared to hold as binding, promises not to assert a right if the other party had been thereby led to act in reliance on it. However the rule would not ground a cause of action and could only be used as a shield and not a sword.

It seems that even if the existence of an agreement were accepted here, no contract came into being. The parties had merely reached an agreement to establish a contractual relationship: Krishna Nair (supra at p 7). But the confinement of the doctrine to cases where there was a pre-existing contractual relationship has now been removed: Waltons Stores (Interstate) Ltd v Maher (1987-8) 164 CLR 387. Waltons Stores was cited in Krishna Nair with approval, the position being stated in the Waltons Stores case by Mason CJ and Wilson J at p 406 to be:

“..... the doctrine extends to the enforcement of voluntary promises on the footing that a voluntary departure from the basic assumptions underlying the transaction between the parties must be unconscionable. As failure to fulfil a promise does not of itself amount to unconscionable conduct, mere reliance on an executory promise to do something, resulting in the promisee changing his position or suffering detriment, does not bring promissory estoppel into play. Something more would be required. Humphreys Estate [1986] UKPC 58; (1987) 1 AC 114, suggests this may be found, if at all, in the creation or encouragement by the party estopped in the other party of an assumption that a contract will come into existence or a promise will be performed and that the other party relied on that assumption to his detriment to the knowledge of the first party.”

Brennan J. went on to lay down the necessary ingredients for proof for the establishment of an equitable estoppel. It was held that it was the unconscionable conduct of the Defendant that attracted the jurisdiction of the court and which also shaped the remedy. Lord Scarman in National Bank Plc v Morgan [1985] UKHL 2; [1985] A.C. 686 described “unconscionable” to be understood in the sense of referring to what one party “ought not , in conscience as between the parties to be allowed to do ..........” If the evidence is sufficient and credible this defence then is also available in Fiji.

Fraud

The Defendant alleges that the Plaintiff fraudulently induced him to give up his claim to $150,000.00 compensation for the houses and to settle to pay the rent arrears because of the agreement reached on all of the other issues. The onus of proof is on the Defendant for such a claim. Actual proof of fraud is required before the title of the registered proprietor will be defeated; Fels v Knowles 26 NZLR 608; Subarmani v Dharam Sheela [1982] 28 Fiji L.R. 82 at p 85. In Sigatoka Builders Limited v Pushpa Ram & Anor. (unreported) Lautoka High Court Civil Action No. HBC 182 of 2001L; 22 April 2002 I had said (at p 7):

“A threshold of evidence must be reached by the Defendant before the Plaintiff can be denied his summary remedy. In Wallingford v Mutual Society [1880] 5 AC 685 at p 697 Lord Selbourne LC said:

“With regard to fraud, if there be any principle which is perfectly well settled, it is that general allegations, however strong may be the words in which they are stated, are insufficient even to amount to an averment of fraud of which any Court ought to take notice. And here I find nothing but perfectly general and vague allegations of fraud. No single material fact is condescended upon, in a manner which would enable any Court to understand what it was that was alleged to be fraudulent.”

The factual circumstances of the agreement were far too vague here to undermine the Plaintiff’s title.

Whether Appropriate Case for Summary Proceedings?

Where the basic facts in a Section 169 application are not in dispute, chambers proceedings are the appropriate forum for dealing summarily with the action : Shyam Lal v Schultz [1972] 18 Fiji L.R. 152 at p 154. In Ram Devi v Satya Nand Sharma and Another ([1985] 31 Fiji L.R. 130 the Court of Appeal, in reversing the judge’s decision to dismiss the summons, said at p 134 B :

“It is true that orders under that section will not be made on disputed facts or in complicated law situations - but that must mean bona fide fact disputes arising from the evidence, or legal points which could not be simply identified.”

The court concluded at p 135 H:

“It is in our view a case where the observations of Gould V.P. quoted initially are of application. True there is now a contest as to fact - but it is obviously specious - this is a clear case.”

In Darshan Singh v Ram Singh [1987] 33 Fiji L.R. 63 at p 67 D the Court of Appeal said:

“In that case, though numerous documents had been produced, the basic facts were not in dispute and section 169 procedure was held to have been appropriate. We do not consider Gould V.P.’s dictum to mean that a bare allegation of fraud would, by itself, amount to a complicated question of fact.

There must, in our view, be some evidence in support of the allegation indicating the need for fuller investigation which would make section 169 procedure unsatisfactory. In the present case the appellant merely asserted that he had paid the money for the purchase of the property. This was denied by both Prasin Kuar and the respondent. There was nothing whatsoever before the learned judge to suggest the existence of any evidence, documentary or oral, that might possibly assist the appellant in treating the case as falling within the scope of section 169 of the Land Transfer Act and making an order for possession in favour of the respondent.”

Similarly in the case before me, though numerous documents have been produced the basic facts were not in dispute - for example the Plaintiff as registered land owner, the expiry of the lease, the continued occupation of the land by the tenant, the history of previous litigation, and the landlord’s refusal to allow a grace year. Though the existence of the agreement itself is disputed, there have been no details produced of when the agreement was reached, where it was discussed, over how many meetings, whether any notes were made of its terms, who was present, and whether it was made with the fore knowledge of the parties lawyers, whether they knew of the negotiations, and whether the lawyers were present when the points of settlement were reached or drawn up.

The Defendant has provided no evidence of these circumstances. Historically there was much litigation between the parties, most of the actions being before the alleged settlement but also three actions were carried on afterwards. Very senior lawyers were engaged and used for all of these matters, the same lawyers being used on each occasion. If a settlement were to be negotiated to resolve all of the outstanding issues, the parties lawyers would surely have been present or at least involved for these final negotiations and would have been able to record, initially in note form, each of the items agreed. Some of the settlement items allegedly agreed were complicated and needed to be carefully handled and phrased, such as trusteeship and the agreement to subdivide. Why would the parties not have had their lawyers present at this, perhaps the most significant moment, of their period of conflict? I note the Plaintiff was living overseas and yet there are no letters exhibited giving details of primary discussions or of negotiations by correspondence towards resolution and agreement. If as the Defendant says they did eventually come to an agreement at the Tribunal why on that very same day would the Defendant issue bankruptcy proceedings against the Plaintiff and the Plaintiff in turn issue his summons for ejectment. As the Privy Council had observed in Ram Shankar v Parekh Holdings Ltd, Privy Council Appeal No. 16 of 1975, a prima facie case (for the existence of an agricultural tenancy) has not been shown “by any evidence worthy of credence”. The Privy Council quoted from the Court of Appeal’s judgment below:

“..... nor has he by the manner in which he has chosen to put forward a case which at best could only be described as shadowy and suspect, shown sufficient cause to be permitted to remain in possession......”

The Privy Council agreed with the Court of Appeal that the defence raised was a “try-on”. In this case I have come to the same conclusion. The agreement referred to by the Defendant is not supported by any evidence of credence. This is a clear case not requiring any further investigation and the Plaintiff is entitled to a summary order for possession. I so order.

The Defendant’s claim for compensation can be pursued before the Agricultural Tribunal. There remains the other civil action which can also be pursued by the Defendant. In the result, the Plaintiff is to have an order for ejectment against the Defendant in respect of all 10 acres of the farm on CT 19444. The Defendant is to pay the Plaintiff’s costs which I fix summarily at $500.00 exclusive of disbursements which are to be taxed if not agreed.

A.H.C.T. GATES
JUDGE

Solicitors for the Plaintiff: Messrs Mishra Prakash & Associates, Suva
Solicitors for the Defendant : Messrs Sahu Khan & Sahu Khan, Ba