(2) Jurisdi tionexas dedee S.8- S.8 of the Decree conferred on the Tribunal the jurisdiction in respect of any claim which
dot ex$2,00in va
Then after setting out the statutory limitation of the Tribunal’s jurisdiction under `the Decree’ (none of which were applicable to the council’s claim in the case) the learned magistrate states :
`Now considering the appellant’s two grounds of appeal and whether they fall within the ambit of S.33f the Small Claims Tribunalbunal
Decree of 1991. I find they do not. The grounds of appeal in the Decree are very narrow. The claim was within $2,000 and the proceedings
were conducted by the referee in a fair manner.’
Quite plainly in dismissing the appeal the learned Magistrate consi that the appeal was incompetent in not coming within eitheeither
of the allowable grounds of appeal provided for in `the Decree’. It was therefore unnecessary for her to consider the appeal on its merits.
In arguing the present appeal, counsel for the Council confined himself tond (2) above which dealt with the decision by the Trhe Tribunal limiting the Council’s claim to arrears of rates accumulated for six (6)
years (i.e. 1991 to 1996 inclusive).
That six (6) year limitation counsel submits is a clear reference by the Tribunal to the statutory limitation permposed under Section 4(1n 4(1) of the Limitation Act (Cap.35) for`(a) actions founded on simple contract ...’ ; and `(d) actions to recover any sum recoverable by virtue of any Act, other then a penalty or forfeiture ...’
In so limiting the Coun claim counsel submits that the Tribunal erred in law in failing to `have regard to t to the law’ (See : Section 15(4) of (`the Decree’), in particular, the provisions of Section 8(1) of the Limitation Act (Cap.35) which imposes a twenty (20) year limitation period for any `action brought to recover any principal sum of money secured by ... a charge on property’. In this latter regard Section 75(1) of the Local Government Act (Cap.125) makes it clear that `... rates assessed and recorded in a rate book ... shall be a first charge on the land rated ...’ [See also : the judgment of Byrne J. in S.C.C. v. K.W. March Limited Civil Action No. 957 of 1982 (unreported)].
That submission however is one that necessarily addresses the merits of the appeal and wouldbe available in this appealppeal unless
it could be first shown that the learned magistrate erred in dismissing the Council’s appeal as incompetent.
In this latter regard counsel’s brief submission is that the learned magistrate erred in confining her consideration of the `jurisdiction’ of the Tribunal to being `merely and solely a question of the quantum of the claim before it’ and since the Council’s claim was for less than $2,000 therefore the Tribunal had `jurisdiction’ to hear and determine it [See : Section 8(1) of `the Decree’].
In other words whilst accepting that Section 33 of `the Decree’ only recog two (2) grounds of s of appeal counsel nevertheless submits ,that the term `jurisdiction’ in ground (b) of Section 33(1) `means more than just the monetary value of the claim and includes legal jurisdiction’ (whatever that may mean).
In Garthwaite v. Garthwaite (1964) PD 356 Diplock L.J. distinguished between the two senses in which the term `jurisdiction’ is used when he said at p.387 :
`In its narrow and strict sense the `jurisdiction’ of a validly constituted court connotes the limits whichimposed upon its power
to h to hear and determine issues between persons seeking to avail themselves of its process by reference (1) to the subject-matter
of the issue or (2) to the persons between whom the issue is joined or (3) to the kind of relief sought, or to any combination of
these factors. In its wider sense it embraces also the settled practice of the court to hear and determine issues which fall within
its `jurisdiction’ (in the strict sense) or as to the circumstances in which it will grant a particular kind of relief which it has
`jurisdiction’ (in the strict sense) to grant, including its settled practice to refuse to exercise such powers or to grant such
relief in particular circumstances.’
Having carefully considered the scheme of `the Decree’ I am satisfied `jurisdiction’ in Section 33(1)(b) i/b> is used in the strict sense and comprises not only the monetary restriction on claims provided for in Section 8(1) but also includes the orders that a small claims tribunal is empowered to make under Section 16(1) of `the Decree’ in giving effect to its determination of the dispute before it.
In this case there can be no dispute the monetary value of the Council’s claim was well within the `jurisdiction’< of the Tribunal to entertain and determine and no complaint can be nor was any raised on that score. Counsel complains however that
the various orders of the Tribunal are beyond the powers given it under Section 16 and are appealable as being in excess of its `jurisdiction’.
Whatsmore in determining a dispute before it the small claims tribunal is required in terms of Section 15(4), amongst other things, `(to) have regard to the law’ and, although `not bound to give effect to strict legal rights or obligations ...’, nevertheless, counsel argues, a determination that ignores or misapplies relevant legal principles cannot be said to have been arrived
at `... according to the substantial merits and justice of the case’.
This argument of counsel for the Council has thankfbeen addressed in the context of similar legislation in New Zealand which includes
an identidentical provision to Section 15(4) of `the Decree’ in the case of NZI Insurance v. Auckland District Court (1993) 3 NZLR 453.
Thorp J. in conceding the difficulty of interpreting the Section said at p.459 :
`Section 18(6) [which is identical to our Section 15(4)]> is not an easy provision to construe. It can properly be y be contended that, in the ordinary
sense of the term, a person would not be said to have `had regard’ to something if he or she did not know of its existence. On the
other hand, other provisions of the Act, such as those which make it unnecessary for referees to have professional legal qualifications
and disqualify persons with such qualifications from appearing before Tribunals, when taken in the context of the very broad spectrum
of disputes referable to tribunals, point the other way. At the least it is difficult to accept any interpretation which placed an
obligation on referees to know all relevant legal principles, or which would disqualify any referee who was not so informed.’
and later in rejecting the submission his lop said at p.460 :
`... my view is that the formulation of the right of appeal ...... has too plain and definite a meaning to yield to the inferences
which might otherwise be drawn from the requirement in Section 18(6) that tribunals `shall have regard to the law’ particularly when
due regard is had to the qualified nature of that requirement and to the clear intention of the Act that referees need not have legal
training and should not be assisted by professional advocates. But that analysis ...... as to the normal construction of the relevant
provisions is not intended to deny or disregard the awkwardness of marrying the provisions of Section 18(6) to an interpretation
which accepts that errors of law on the part of referees will, in the ordinary event, remain uncorrected’.
Returning then to Counsel’s complaint that theunal had wrongly limited the Council’s claim to six (6) years of rate arrears based ased on a pre-determined albeit declared `policy’ which plainly misinterprets the law as set out in Section 8 of the Limitation Act (Cap.35) read with Section 75(1) of the Local Government Act (Cap.125).
In this regard Section 16 empowers a small claims tribunal soas relevant for present purposes to :
p class=MsoNormal stal style="text-align: justify; margin: 1 36.0pt"> `make one or more of the following orders and may include therein such stipulations and conditions (whether to the time for, or the mode of, compliance or otherwise) as it thinks fit :
(a) p;&nbbsp;&nsp; &nsp; p; &nnsp;& the Trie Tribunal may order a party to the proceedings to oney y other party;
