Kumar v Fletcher Construction (Fiji) Ltd [1999] FJHC 124; Hbc0316j.97s (19 November 1999)

Fiji Islands - Kumar v Fletcher Construction (Fiji) Ltd - Pacific Law Materials

IN THE HIGH COURT OF FIJI

AT SUVA

CIVIL JURISDICTION

CIVIL ACTION NO. 316 OF 1997

BETWEEN:

AJAY KUMAR
s/o Dwarka Prasad
Plaintiff

AND:

FLETCHER CONSTRUCTION (FIJI) LIMITED
Defendant

Mr. R.I. Kapadia for the plainti> Mr. R. Krishna for the defendant

JUDGMENT

(Assessment of damages)

By a writ of summons dated 7 August 1997 issued herein the plaintiff seeks damages (general and special) and alternatively compensation under the Workmen's Compensation Act.

The hearing of the action was both on the issue of liability and assessment of damages. As ordered written submissions were filed by both counsel at the conclusion of the hearing.

The Facts

The facts, very briefly, are that on 31 May 1996 the plaintiff a carpenter who was working on a Village 6 cinema project, was instructed by his employer the defendant company to drill holes for 'dynabolts' for sub-contractor M.I.W. (the M.I.W). The plaintiff was using a 'scaffold' owned by the sub-contractor to complete the assigned task at the time of the accident. The scaffold collapsed and the plaintiff who was standing thereon doing his job fell to the ground with the scaffold falling on him. As a result the plaintiff suffered severe injuries as hereafter appearing.

Plaintiff's injuries

The injuries suffered by the plaintiff are as stated in the Statement of Claim and in the evidence adduced before me. The Medical Reports being Exhibits P1,P2 & P3 which I reproduce state as hereunder.

Exhibit "P1" dated 12.8.1977 stated, inter alia, as follows:-

"The above patient was employed by Fletcher Constructions and sustained injury to the left elbow and right wrist on 31/05/96. He was seen and admitted to hospital on that date.

On Examination:-

Swelling of the (R) wrist, Swelling and inability to move the (L) elbow.

Investigation:-

Radiological X-Rays revealed 1) Fracture (R) distal Radius; communited open fracture of the (L) lower Humerus.

Treatment:-

fracture were treated conservatively - pain relief, manipulation under Anaesthesis, POP Back slab, antibiotic Intervenous.

Prog:-

ROM of the Elbow limited, Osteoarthritis of the (L) Elbow, Osteosthritis of the (R) Radio Ulna joint".

Exhibit "P2" dated 25.6.98 and addressed to Mr. R.I. Kapadia stated as follows:-

"I reviewed this man on 21 May 1998. He suffered injuries to the right wrist and left elbow on 31 May 1996. These consisted of a fracture to the distal radius and a compound fracture of the left lower humerus. Treatment consisted of both operative treatment and plaster immobilisation for several weeks followed by a period of physiotherapy. He is now left with the following disability; The left elbow has a range of motion of 50-90 degrees (normal 0-135 degrees). The right wrist has a good range of motion with mild residual pain. Functionally he is hampered by the fact that he has difficulty lifting heavy objects with the left arm. As it is now been two years, I consider that these findings are permanent".

Exhibit "P3" dated 26.1.1999 and addressed to Krishna & Co. stated as follows:-

"Mr. Kumar was seen by me on 3.1.98. Made available to me were his medical report notes # 077692 and the report of Dr. Piscioneri. Mr. Kumar tells me that he had been a carpenter who fell about 27 feet during the construction of the village 6 cinema.

Admitted 31.5.96.

Discharged 25.6.96.

Diagnosis on admission:

1- Superficial wounds to the hand. 2- Open fracture left humerus (arm). 3- Fracture right radius (forearm). Treatment: Wound debridgement, antibiotics, fracture splintage.

His present problem list includes: 1- Pain and restricted movement of the left elbow joint. 2- discomfort of the wrist joint. 3- Discomfort to the left hip joint. The pains are especially so with cooler weather and during exertion. He tells me that he takes no regular medicines. He has been unable to work as a carpenter since. Examination: He has a normal gait pattern. He has normal hip joint movement. He has a normal appearance to the wrist with normal movement. He has normal forearm rotation. He has a restricted left elbow range of motion of 20 to 110 degrees flexion. There is pain with this movement especially the extremes. I feel Mr. Kumar's condition is stable and one would not expect progression of symptoms. He has post-traumatic arthritis to the elbow seen with the pain and restricted motion. This would certainly affect his work as a carpenter, although I feel his activities be restricted he could within limits undertake less strenuous work. I feel that 10 percent disability would be reasonable in this case. This being for the functional limitations of the elbow injury. No further surgery is required now or in the immediate future".

Consideration of the issue

The issues for my determination are as follows (as stated p27 of the Defendant's written submissions):

1. Whether it was as a result of the negligence and/or breach of duty and/or breach of the contract of his employment and of the terms thereof by the Defendant that the Plaintiff sustained personal injuries on 31st May, 1996.

2. Whether it was the negligence of the independent sub-contractor, M.I.W. Contractors, as a result of which the Plaintiff sustained injuries.

3. The quantum of damages.

Plaintiff's counsel's submission

Mr. Kapadia submitted that the plaintiff was acting in the course of his employment when he got injured. He said that if the scaffold on which the plaintiff was working was properly inspected then the accident could have been avoided. The defendant company's omission to inspect the scaffold before allowing the plaintiff to work on it amounted to negligence and breach of duty of care. He firstly bases the plaintiff's claim under the common law of negligence. The defendant company failed to take reasonable care for the plaintiff's safety. The defendant company, its servants or agents caused the plaintiff to work from a sub-standard scaffold and exposed the plaintiff to a risk of damage or injuries of which they knew or ought to have known. It was the duty of the defendant company who was the employer of the plaintiff to provide the plaintiff with safe working place and all the safety measures that would avoid the plaintiff from being exposed to the risk. He relies on the principle laid down by Lord Wright in the case of Wilsons and Cyde Coal Co. Ltd v English [1937] UKHL 2; (1938) A.C. 57 at p.84.

Mr. Kapadia further submits that the employer's duty to take reasonable care for the employee's safety exists regardless of the fact whether the employment is dangerous or not (Munkman on Employer's Liability, 10th edition, p.80). He also stated that the duty to take reasonable care is the ruling principle and that all other rules or formulas must be taken subject to this principle. He relied on the principle laid down by Lord Keith in the case of Cavanagh v Ulster Weaving Co. Ltd [1960] AC 145.

Secondly, Mr. Kapadia deals with the issue of "subcontractor". He submitted that the defendants cannot get rid of the duty of care mentioned above by saying that M.I.W was the sub-contractor. The overall responsibility of the satisfactory completion of the village 6 cinema project was the defendant's. M.I.W had a contract with the defendant and therefore it acted as the defendant's agent and as an independent contractor. In this way, the plaintiff's counsel submits that the defendant is liable in two ways firstly, in failing to exercise a proper duty of care and secondly, for the acts of its agent M.I.W.

The plaintiff's counsel argued that the fact that the scaffold belonged to the sub-contractor cannot make the defendant escape the duty imposed upon it and thus the liability. The defendant had delegated the duty to the sub-contractors and their duty of care continued despite the delegation of the duty. He relied on the principle summarised by Lord Denning in the case of Cassidy v Ministry of Health (1951) 1 All E.R. 586 and on Charlesworth on Negligence 6th edition on page 74.

Thirdly, Mr. Kapadia deals with liability based on breaches of statutory duties. He relied on sections 24 and 25 of the Factories Act, 1971 and on Regulations 12 to 15 and on Regulation 17 of the Construction Regulations, 1970. He submitted that a safe scaffold was not provided to the plaintiff and that it was the duty of the defendant to provide the plaintiff with safe equipments to work with.

Mr. Kapadia goes on to discuss the issue of contributory negligence. He submitted that the plaintiff did not do anything to cause his fall and that it was solely the fault of the defendant company.

The plaintiff's counsel seeks general damages in the sum of $40,000-00 for pain and suffering and loss of amenities. The plaintiff also claims special damages in the sum of $26,970-00 being made up of transport expenses, loss of wages and loss of income from farm and outside work.

The plaintiff's counsel also claims an amount of $83,200-00 being the amount of loss of prospective earnings. He submitted that the plaintiff was earning $132-00 per week gross at the time of the accident from his job at Fletcher Construction alone for normal time and more with over-time. The plaintiff earned $50-00 per month from his farm. Therefore the plaintiff was earning over $200-00 per week. Counsel submitted that it would be fair to say on evidence that the plaintiff's loss of prospective earnings in future would be in excess of $100 per week. He arrived at the figure as follows:-

$100 x 52 weeks x 16 years = $83,200.00.

Interest is claimed at the rate of 6% per annum on general damages from the date of accident until the date of hearing and at 3% per annum on the special damages from the date of issue of the writ until the date of hearing.

Defendant counsel's submission

Mr. Krishna for the defendant submits that the defendant company is not liable for the accident suffered by the plaintiff. He argues that the sub-contractor owned the scaffold which broke and caused the plaintiff to fall. Furthermore, he submits that the plaintiff was not working on or from the scaffold and that the scaffold was not sub-standard and that it did not belong to the defendant. The defendant denies liability and hence claims that it was the negligence of the plaintiff that caused and/or contributed to the said accident. The particulars of contributory negligence he relies on are as stated in paragraph 8 of the statement of defence:-

(a) Jumping from a height of 1.5 metres from a concrete beam onto a scaffold owned by the said subcontractor when it was not safe to do so and the force or pressure of his weight that caused the scaffold 'weld' to fall.

(b) Exposing himself to a risk of damage or injury by jumping onto a scaffold from a height of 1.5 metres from the beam above the said scaffold.

Determination of the issues

The Law

Under this head I would deal with the issues of common law duty of care, statutory duty of care, the issue of subcontractor and finally the issue of contributory negligence that the defence counsel has raised.

It is the common law that a employer has a duty to take reasonable care for the safety of his workmen in all the circumstances of the case. This duty exists whether the employment is inherently dangerous or not. The employer's duty of reasonable care is the ruling principle. On this aspect I refer to the following authorities:

Lord Wright in the case of Wilsons (supra) at 84 said:

"The whole course of authority consistently recognizes a duty which rests on the employers, and which is personal to the employer, to take reasonable care for the safety of his workmen, whether the employer be an individual, a firm or a company, and whether or not the employer takes any share in the conduct of the operations."

Lord Oaksey said in the case of Paris v Stepney Borough Council [1950] UKHL 3; [1951] AC 367 at 384:-

"The duty of an employer towards his servant is to take reasonable care for his servant's safety in all the circumstances of the case."

Munkman on Employer's Liability, 10th Edition, page 80:-

"This duty exists whether the employment is inherently dangerous or not ...."

Lord Keith in the case of Cavanagh v Ulster Weaving Co. Ltd [1960] AC 145 at 166 said that the ruling principle is:

".....that an employer is bound to take reasonable care for the safety of his workmen, and in every case the question is whether the circumstances are such as to entitle judge or jury to say that there has or has not been a failure to exercise such reasonable care."

Charlesworth on Negligence 6th edition in paragraph 1032 on pages 618-619 says that the employer's duty

"is a single personal duty, which is non-delegable, and the importance of this feature is that the employer must see that care is taken by all those persons engaged by him. It is insufficient merely for him to take care himself. Lord Oaksey expressed in his opinion that: "The duty of his employer towards his servant is to take reasonable care for the servant's safety in all the circumstances of the case." It has also been described as "the duty of taking reasonable care... so to carry on his operations as not to subject those employed by him to unnecessary risk." Lord Keith opined that "the ruling principle is that an employer is bound to take reasonable care for the safety of his workmen, and all other rules or formulas must be taken subject to this principle." It follows from the above that the master's duty is stricter than the duty to take reasonable care for oneself and it exists whether or not the employment is inherently dangerous."

In this case I hold that the defendant company was under an obligation to provide the plaintiff with a safe working place because it was the employer in this situation. The defendant had only assigned or delegated some of the tasks to the sub-contractor, part of which was given to the plaintiff. The employer or the defendant's duty to take care does not cease at any point during the period of employment. At this stage it is important to deal with the issue of sub-contractor and the duty of the employer when a sub-contractor is employed.

Sub-contractor's liability

In my view it is not the issue whether the sub-contractor was the agent of the defendant company or an independent contractor. The issue basically is whether an employer's duty of care ceases when he delegates the duty to some other person, body, servant or agent. An employer is liable for the acts of his agents. Is he then not liable for the acts of the independent contractor to whom he himself has assigned the task? This is the crucial issue to be decided.

The law as I see from the authorities is that if a person is under a duty of care then responsibility does not cease upon delegating the work to someone else whether it be to a servant or to an independent contractor. Lord Denning in the case of Cassidy (supra) at page 586 stated that:-

"I take it to be clear law, as well as good sense, that, where a person is himself under a duty to use care, he cannot get rid of his responsibility by delegating the performance of it to someone else, no matter whether the delegation be to a servant under a contract of service or to an independent contractor under a contract for services." (emphasis mine).

The defendant's argument is that the scaffold which broke was not its but the sub-contractor's and that due to the negligence of the sub-contractor, providing a defective scaffold and the negligence of the employer to provide to the plaintiff a proper and a safe place to work, the plaintiff has suffered severe injuries. I hold that defendant is liable both for its own negligence and also for the negligence of the sub-contractor. If M.I.W., the sub-contractor is taken as the independent contractor then still the defendant company cannot escape liability and this is borne out by the authorities as hereunder.

In Green v Fiberglass Ltd (1958) 2 All E.R. 521 at page 525 Salmon J stated:-

"There are of course, cases where, by virtue of a contract, or by the operation of law, an obligation may be imposed on a man to do an act, or to ensure that it is done and done carefully. In such cases, the defendant cannot shelter behind any independent contractor whom he may have employed." (emphasis added)

In Charlesworth on Negligence, 6th Edition on page 73 in paragraph 114 it is stated that:-

"The employer, however, is liable for his own act or neglect and accordingly, if he contracts with an independent contractor to do some act which he is not entitled to do, or to perform some duty which is thrown upon him, either by statute or common law, he will be liable for the way in which the contractor has performed the act or the duty, even though it be done negligently."

On page 74, paragraph 116 (supra) it is stated that:-

"If an employer who has a duty to perform, either by statute or at common law, makes a contract with an independent contractor for the performance of that duty instead of doing it himself he is liable for the negligence of the independent contractor in the performance of the duty."

Statutory duty of care

As a result of the defective scaffold the plaintiff got involved in the accident. As the law states, it is the defendant's duty to provide the workman with a safe working place and with safe working equipments. In this regard I refer to the provisions of section 24 of the Factories Act 1971 and Regulations 12 to 15 and Regulation 17 of the Construction Regulations 1970.

It was the defendant's duty to ensure that the scaffold was safe enough for the plaintiff to work on it despite the fact that the sub-contractor was engaged in the completion of the task that the plaintiff was doing at the material time.

Issue of Contributory Negligence

It has to be decided whether the plaintiff had contributed to the fall that he had suffered on 31 May. The plaintiff had stated in the trial that other workmen used to work on the scaffold and that he himself had worked on the scaffold several times before the fall. This is not disputed. However what is disputed is the argument by the plaintiff that he slowly came down onto the scaffold which broke. The defendant on the other hand argues that the plaintiff had jumped on to the scaffold and that due to the jumping and the heavy weight the scaffold 'broke'.

I find that the plaintiff had considered it safe enough to work on the scaffold because other workmen and he himself had previously used it. It was the duty of the employer to have had the scaffold inspected, a duty which it did not discharge.

It was argued that the plaintiff ought to have been careful of the danger. Here using the scaffold to work was a practice which was adopted and the plaintiff was merely following that practice. The defendant was still under an obligation to see that the system adopted was safe enough.

In the House of Lords case of General Cleaning Contractors Ltd v Christmas (1952) 2 All E.R page 1110 it was held that:-

"Even assuming that the other systems of carrying out the work, e.g. by the use of safety belts or ladders, were impracticable, the appellants were still under an obligation to ensure that the system that was adopted was as reasonably safe as it could be made and that their employees were instructed as to the steps to be taken to avoid accidents; the appellants had not discharged their duty in this respect towards the respondent; and therefore, they were liable to him in respect of his injury."

Per Lord Reid: Where a practise of ignoring an obvious danger has grown up it is not reasonable to expect an individual workman to take an initiative in devising and using precautions. It is the duty of the employer to consider the situation, to devise a suitable system, to instruct his men what they must do, and to supply any implements that may be required."

The defendant's argument that the jumping caused the scaffold to break is also disposed of by the plaintiff's argument on the authority of Carr v Mercantile Produce Co., Ltd (1949) 2 All ER 531 at page 537 where Stable J said:-

"In expressing my conclusions I do not seek to detract in any way from the expressions of opinion in this and other courts emphasizing the categorical nature of the duty and the high standard required. The Factories Act is there not merely to protect the careful, the vigilant, and the conscientious workman, but, human nature being what it is, also the careless, the indolent, the inadvertent, the weary, and even, perhaps in some cases, the disobedient".

On the evidence before me I find that the defendant has not discharged its obligation to provide the plaintiff with safe equipments and a safe working place. The plaintiff I find did not contribute to his fall.

It is clear from the evidence before me that the Plaintiff's supervisor asked him to set up the beam. Mr. Phillip Logan the defendant's witness who was the Project Manager for the Company saw that the Plaintiff was "helping the sub-contractor or MIW contractors to drill some holes for a structural beam which holds the roof in place".

Mr. Logan in evidence in chief when asked by Mr. Krishna: "Was that a job assigned to him by the defendant company?" answered "He was told to give them (the sub-contractors) a hand". When Court asks "Told by whom?" he said "by Fletchers (the defendant)". In answer to Mr. Krishna he said "he was requested to go out there by Fletchers to go and drill a hole to help them out because they were going too slow".

In the outcome, I find on the evidence before me that the defendant is solely liable for the accident and is liable to pay damages for injuries received by the plaintiff in this accident.

Consideration of heads of Damages

I now turn to consider the damages claimed by the plaintiff.

In making awards which are fair and reasonable the court does fall back on previous awards so that the figures arrived at are in proportion to awards in other cases of those who have suffered injuries of comparable severity. (Bristow J in Lim Poh Choo and Islington Area Health Authority [1979] 1 Q.B. 196 at 201 C.A.)

It is quite evident from the plaintiff's condition that there has been a loss of amenities of life. The two medical doctors have assessed the plaintiff's functional disability at 10% and 15%. The plaintiff's sex life is greatly affected and he will not be able to enjoy sporting activities in future. He is having a restricted arm movement which can be called his permanent disability. He cannot further carry out his carpentry work. The trauma of falling from such a height will remain a frightening experience for the plaintiff for the rest of his life.

General Damages

Under the head of General Damages the plaintiff claims damages for pain and suffering and for the loss of amenities of life to which he is entitled. In Kemp & Kemp Volume 1 Page 2-007 to 2-010 it is stated that:-

"... the court must take in to account, in making its assessment in the case of any particular plaintiff, the pain which he actually suffered and will suffer and the suffering which he has undergone and will undergo. Pain and suffering are not measurable by any absolute standards and it is not easy, if indeed possible other than in the most general way, to compare the degree of pain and suffering experienced by different people, however, the individual circumstances of particular plaintiffs clearly have a effect upon the assessment of damages".

Looking at the nature of the fall and its consequences, the plaintiff's past and future sufferings have to be taken into account. L.J. Greer in the case of Heaps v Perrite Ltd (1937) 2 All E.R. 60 stated that:-

"We have also to take into account not only the suffering which he had immediately after the accident but the suffering that he will have throughout his life in future".

As for loss of amenities, damages under this head will compensate the plaintiff for his loss of enjoyment resulting from the accident, namely, when he can no longer do the things that he was accustomed to doing. "Damages within this category are included loss of any five senses, loss of sex drive, damage to the plaintiff's marriage prospects, loss of enjoyment of hobbies, employment and, indeed loss of any facet of life. The court will take into account how long the plaintiff will be deprived of these amenities; if it is for the rest of his life the amount of damages will be awarded in proportion to the plaintiff's age and life expectancy. However, age is not necessarily the determinative factor...." Khan, M and Robson, M on Medical Negligence, 1997, Page 204-2050.

In any assessment under the head of general damages the Crown has regard as far as possible to other awards for general damages for consistency and fairness. On this aspect the Court of Appeal in Attorney-General of Fiji at Doctor Hubert Elliott v Paul Praveen Sharma 1994 FCA at p.358 thus which I have borne in mind:-

"The third ground of appeal concerns the level of the general damages awarded in relation to the circumstances of the case and the previous decisions of the courts in Fiji. There is no doubt that in fixing the quantum of general damages a trial judge, having calculated the amounts which appear to be appropriate under the various heads of such damages, must then consider whether the total of those amounts is itself appropriate in all the circumstances of the case. In coming to a conclusion on that matter he should have regard to the need for consistency in the level of general damages awarded in similar cases. However, such similarity must include matters such as the pre-injury earning capacity or prospects of the injured person, not merely the nature of the injury. There may also be disparity in the degree of pain and suffering and the extent of the loss of the amenities of life. Disparity in such matters justifies disparity in the quantum of general damages."

In the case before me, the disability of the plaintiff is assessed at 10-15% and he has been deprived of the many amenities of life. I consider that the sum of $40,000 (forty thousand dollars), as suggested by Mr. Kapadia, is the appropriate level of award for pain and suffering and loss of amenities.

Special damages

The plaintiff's claim for special damages are as set out in counsel's written submissions (at page 19). I have considered the claims bearing in mind Mr. Krishna's comments on them.

I have allowed the claims with necessary amendments as follows:-

1. Transport expenses and expenses incidental
to wife's attendance to hospital 300.00

2. Loss of 1/3rd wages at a rate of $44 per
week for 21/7/97 - 8/8/97) 2,596.00

3. Loss of 1/3rd wages at a rate of $44 per
week for 21/7/97 - 8/8/97) 88.00

4. Loss of wages at a rate of $118 per week
from 18/8/97 - 12/2/99 (78 weeks) 9,204.00

5. Loss of income from farm at a rate of
$50 per week from 1/6/96 - 12/2/99
(141 weeks) Disallowed

6. Loss of income from outside extra work at
$200 per month from 1/6/96 - 12/2/99
(32½ months) Disallowed

$12,188.00

It will be noticed that I have made reductions as follows:

(a) item 1 from $440 to a nominal amount of $300 as suggested by Mr. Krishna

(b) item 2 ($2596.00) is agreed by counsel

(c) item 4 (10,296.00) is reduced to $9204 calculated at net wage per week of $118.

Mr. Krishna says that the plaintiff is not entitled to any award for loss of income from the farm or the alleged extra week-end work.

Loss of prospective earnings will be assessed at the date of trial with reference to a multiplicand and a multiplier.

The plaintiff earned $132.00 per week gross and nett was $118.00. I am not satisfied in the absence of proper evidence that there was a loss of income from the farm; nor is there any documentary evidence of loss of income from alleged overtime work.

The total for special damages which I have allowed comes to $12,188.00.

Loss of prospective earnings

I would work out the loss of prospective earnings at $118 per week nett and not $132 gross weekly earnings. I would assess his loss at $60 per week using a multiplier of 16 years. This would amount to $49920.00 (60 x 52 weeks x 16 years).

Interest

The plaintiff has pleaded interest and therefore he is entitled to it on general and special damages. In the case of Pickett and British Rail Engineering Limited (1980) AC 136 at 137 it is stated that the purpose of giving interest on general damages was to compensate a plaintiff for being kept out of the capital sum and in Jefford and Anor. v Gee [1970] EWCA Civ 8; (1970) 2 WLR 702 at 703 it is stated that "in general interest should be allowed on special damages from the date of accident to the date trial at half the appropriate rate". No interest would be awarded for the loss of future earnings and future financial loss.

Under section 3 of the Law Reform (Miscellaneous Provisions) (Death and Interest) Act Cap. 27 which provides as follows, it is in the discretion of the court to fix the interest rate:

"In any proceedings tried in the (High) Court for the recovery of any debt or damages the Court may, if it thinks fit, order that there shall be included in the sum for which judgment is given interest at such rate as it thinks fit on the whole or any part of the debt or damages...."

In my view an interest rate of 6% per annum on the general damages from the date of the accident until the date of hearing and 3% which is half the appropriate rate as stated in the case of Jefford (supra) on special damages from the date of the writ until the date of hearing are reasonable.

Conclusion

The summary of awards is as follows:

1. General damages for pain and suffering and loss of amenities of life
$40,000.00

2. Special damages
$12,188.00

3. Loss of prospective earnings
$49,920.00

4. Interest of 6% p.a. on general damages from the date of accident (31.5.96) to date of judgment (19.11.99)
$8,400.00

5. Interest at 3% p.a. on special damages from the date of Writ (8.8.97) until date of judgment (19.11.99)
$900.00

$111,408.00

There will therefore be judgment for the plaintiff against the defendant in the sum of $111,408.00 with costs to be taxed if not agreed.

D. Pathik
Judge

At Suva
19 November 1999

Hbc0316j.97s