State v Transport Control Board, Ex parte Tradewinds Taxis and Buses Ltd [1998] FJHC 195; Hbj0017j.1994s (21 August 1998)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF FIJI
AT SUVA
CIVIL JURISDICTION

JUDICIAL REVIEW NO. 17 OF 1994

STATE

V

TRANSPORT CONTROL BOARD

Ex parte:

TRADEWINDS TAXIS AND BUSES LIMITED
and LATCHANS EXPRESS SERVICES LIMITED

Mr. G. P. Shankar for the Applicants
Mr. I. Tuberi for the Respondent

JUDGMENT

This is an application by the applicants TRADEWINDS TAXIS AND BUSES LIMITED and LATCHANS EXPRESS SERVICES LIMITED (the "applicants") for Judicial Review of the following decision of the Respondent the Transport Control Board (the "Board") under Or.53 of the High Court Rules (as set out in the Application for Judicial Review):

"(a) On 25th May, 1994 the Transport Control Board refused application by Tradewinds Taxi and Buses Limited for minor amendment to its Road Service Licence No. 12/10/94 to include in its licence Bus numbers CP909, and CO707 and to delete Bus numbers BO850, BS141, and BZ683, from the said licence, and to allow the applicant Latchans Express Services Limited the management control and operation of the said licence and bus service under it but the Board by its letter dated 31st May, 1994, advised the second named applicant that the application has been summarily dismissed. (underlining mine)

(b) That the Transport Control Board on 25th May, 1994 summarily refused application for transfer of Road Service Licence No. 12/10/94 held by Tradewinds Taxis and Buses Limited to Latchans Express Services Limited and notified the second applicant by its letter dated 31st May, 1994.

(underlining mine)

(c) That on 25th May, 1994 the Board indefinitely suspended the Road Service Licence No. 12/10/94, and notified the second applicant by letter dated 1st June, 1994." (underlining mine)

Relief sought

The relief sought are as follows (as in Application for Judicial Review):-

"(a) Certiorari to bring before this Court for the purpose of having the same quashed the resolutions and/or decisions of the Transport Control Board.

(b) Declaration that the resolutions or decisions of the Transport Control Board are arbitrary unlawful, unreasonable, irrational, subject to procedural impropriety and made or given in breach of the principles of natural justice.

(c) Prohibition prohibiting the Transport Control Board from enforcing the said decisions or resolutions, and the applicants seek interim prohibition.

(d) Mandamus requiring the Board to hear the application for transfer of Road Service Licence in accordance with law.

(e) Interim injunction restraining the Transport Control Board or others from enforcing the said resolutions or decision until the final hearing and determination of the application for Judicial Review.

(f) Alternatively for an order that all actions, proceedings, hearings or other matters relating to Road Service Licence No. 12/10/94 or the operation of buses under it be stayed pending the hearing of the application."

Grounds of relief

The grounds on which relief sought are as follows (as in the application for Judicial Review):

"Certiorari

(a) That the Transport Control Board was wrong and acted contrary to the principles of natural justice in summarily refusing the application for transfer of Road Service Licence which was made in prescribed and/or approved form, and was in accordance with the provisions of Section 71 of the Road Traffic Act. In any event Section 65 of the Traffic Act did not empower the Transport Control Board to summarily dismiss the application for transfer of Road Service Licence.

(b) That the Board's decision to summarily dismiss the application for minor amendment is wrong, unlawful contrary to the principles of natural justice and contrary to the spirit and intention of Section 73 of the Traffic Act because the Board has been allowing minor amendment as sought without formal hearing.

(c) That the indefinite suspension of Road Service Licence is wrong, unlawful, contrary to the principles of natural justice, and also contrary to the requirements of Section 68 of the Traffic Act.

Declaration

(a) That the Transport Control Board acted arbitrarily in that it made the decision to suspend the Road Service Licence indefinitely, summary refusal of the application for Transfer of Road Service Licence, and the summary refusal of the application for minor amendment were, made and/or reached by the Transport Control Board, unlawfully contrary to principles of natural justice in that it did not give the applicants an opportunity of being heard, and such decision was wrong, and not in accordance with the intention and spirit of the Traffic Act.

(b) It acted unlawfully in that it had no powers to either suspend the licence indefinitely or to summarily dismiss the applications for Transfer of Road Service Licence and the application for minor amendment and it did not give the applicants an opportunity of being heard before making such decisions.

(c) That the decisions of the Transport Control Board are unreasonable and irrational in that the Board or Tribunal acted fairly and reasonably and directing its mind to the provisions of the Traffic Act, and having regard to the principles of natural justice would make such a decision which is so unreasonable and irrational that no Board or Tribunal acting fairly and reasonably would make such an unreasonable and irrational decisions.

(d) That the decisions are subject to procedural impropriety in that the Board failed to consider its powers, failed to consider the requirements of Section 68 of the Traffic Act, and failed to give the applicants fair play in action before making arbitrary decisions.

(e) That the Board in making the decisions acted contrary to the principles of natural justice in that it was under express and/or implied duty to give the applicants opportunity of being heard before making such decisions.

Prohibition

This relief or remedy is sought to stop the Transport Control Board from implementing or enforcing its decisions because they are unlawful, contrary to provisions of Traffic Act, and in breach of the principles of natural justice. Prohibition is also sought as an interim relief on the same grounds.

Mandamus

This relief is sought to compel or require the Transport Control Board to act lawfully, and in accordance with its powers, and according to the principles of natural justice.

Interim Injunction is sought to restrain the Transport Control Board and/or its servants and agents from enforcing and/or implementing the decisions to stop operation of the bus indefinitely because such decision is unlawful, wrong contrary to Section 68 of the Traffic Act, and contrary to principles of natural justice, and balance of convenience favours grant of interim relief because there are serious questions for determination, and damages are not adequate remedy.

STAY

The Board has required the applicant to appear on 27th July, 1994. The applicants could not appear because their Lawyer had very firm prior commitment elsewhere. It has adjourned it to 10th August, 1994. The applicants have not received the full details of charge or complaint, and in view of the Board's decisions so far which were made contrary to the provisions of the Traffic Act, contrary to the principles of natural justice, and it having unlawfully suspended the licence indefinitely it has no powers to deal with the matter, and it has prejudged and predetermined to revoke the licence, the required appearance is just a lip service.

The applicants also seek costs."

Background

The Application for Judicial Review was made on 8 August 1994 when it came before Pain J who granted leave on 15 September 1994. There was no opposition to the Application. On the same date it was ordered that "the decisions of the Transport Control Board made on the 25th day of May 1994 in respect of the Road Service Licence 12/10/94 are stayed until further order of the Court".

On 2 February 1996 Pain J expressed concern that Mr.Semisi (now Magistrate) for the respondent failed to appear as required thus causing unwarranted delay. He said that "application for lifting stay to be on notice supported by affidavit". Final submissions after hearing were made on 11 March 1998.

Applicants' submission

In this case there were two applications. One was Application for Transfer of Road Service Licence (the "RSL") under section 71 of the Act where Form No. 17 was used (application 'A') which was consented to by the first Applicant. The other was Application by the first Applicant for minor amendment of Road Service Licence under section 64 of the Act (application 'B'). The Road Service Licence No. 12/10/94 was granted by the Board to first Applicant under sections 65 and 66 of the Traffic Act (The "Act").

Mr. Shankar argues that s65(1)(a) deals with application for RSL and amendment. The Board could only summarily dismiss it if the needs of the area are adequately met. In other words it can only dismiss application devoid of merit and there is no need for more and additional service. The said Application 'A' does not fall under sec 65(1)(a) and (b) because it is an application for transfer of RSL. The transfer is dealt with by s71 of the Act and under s71 there is no provision to summarily dismiss without hearing.

Section 65 (in so for as it is relevant) which deals with grant and refusal of road service licences states:

65.*-(1) On receipt of an application for a road service licence or for the renewal, transfer or amendment of a road service licence, being an application complying with the provisions of section 64 and which in the opinion of the Board is not frivolous, scandalous or vexatious, the Board shall give notice in a newspaper published and circulating in Fiji specifying the details of the application and stating that within the next 10 days following the date of the notice, it will receive representations in writing for or against the application and, if the applications for a road service licence or for the renewal thereof, stating also that, within the next 10 days following the date of the notice, it will receive other applications in respect of the proposed service:

Provided that -

(a) where the application is for a road service licence or for an amendment thereof which, in the opinion of the Board, should not be granted because the needs of the area of the proposed service are already adequately served or because the route proposed is unsuitable for the regular passage of a public service vehicle or for other good cause, the Board may refuse the application without giving any public notice of the application; and

(b) the provisions of this subsection shall not apply to any amendment or road service licence which, in the opinion of the Board is not substantial and does not seriously affect the public or any other holder of a road service licence.

And sec. 71 which deals with transfer of licences provides:

71.*-(1) Subject to the provisions of this section, any road service licence may be transferred to any person.

(2) Application for the transfer of a road service licence shall be made in the prescribed form and forwarded to the Board accompanied by the prescribed fee.

(3) Subject to the provisions of section 65, the Board may refuse the transfer of the licence or may grant the transfer of the licence either unconditionally or upon or subject to such conditions as it thinks fit but it shall not in any case grant a transfer unless it is satisfied that the proposed transferee is financially able to carry out the service and is likely to carry it on satisfactorily.

(4) Any licensee aggrieved by the refusal of the Board to transfer a licence under the provisions of this section may appeal to the Minister against such refusal and, in this respect, the provisions of subsection (4) of section 68 shall apply to such an appeal. (Amended by Legal Notice 112 of 1970)

Mr. Shankar submits that the other application was for "minor amendment" and it is not caught by s 65(1)(a) because the amendment does not seek additional "trips" and "bus service" but to add on the RSL buses. Therefore application 'B' falls under s 65(b) and the Board has no powers to dismiss it.

Mr. Shankar argues that when a person's rights are affected by any order or decision of a statutory body there should be a proper hearing and opportunity to be heard. He then goes on to cite a number of authorities to which I shall refer a little later in my judgment. He says that there has been a denial of natural justice. He concludes by saying that the Board acted "illegally, contrary to fair procedure and irrationally quite apart from most unreasonably under Wednesbury principles".

Respondent's submission

Mr. Tuberi for the Board in his written submission says to the affect that the Board acted within the powers vested in it under the sections of the Act to which I have already made reference to hereabove. He maintains that there was no need for a hearing of the application. He submits that the First Applicant was summoned to appear before the Board on Wednesday 29 June 1994 "to show cause as to why the Board should not revoke or cancel the said RSL ("Road Service Licence") and in this regard it acted under s.68 of the Act. In response to this the First Applicant says that the alleged summons was never received and it was up to the Board to prove that it was.

Mr. Tuberi further submits that under s 71(3) subject to the provisions of s65 the Board may refuse the transfer of the licence and under s 71(4) (supra) the applicants could have appealed to the Minister which they failed to do. He says that they should have exhausted "avenues available" before applying for judicial review.

He further submitted that the power to revoke and to suspend licence is provided under s68 of the Act but I notice that under s 68(3) it states that "the Board shall, before revoking varying or suspending any road service licence, give the licensee a due opportunity to be heard".

As for the contention that reasons should have been given for the refusal Mr. Tuberi says that the Applicants were well aware of them.

Consideration of the issues

For my consideration I have before me very comprehensive and lengthy written submissions from both counsel and I have given them due weight.

In a judicial review application as is well-known the Court is "not as much concerned with the merits of the decision as with the way in which it was reached" (CHIEF CONSTABLE OF THE NORTH WALES POLICE v EVANS [1982] UKHL 10; 1982 1 W.L.R. 1155 at 1174; PACIFIC TRANSPORT COMPANY LTD v MOHAMMED JALIL KHAN and TRANSPORT CONTROL BOARD, FCA 21 of 1996S - judgment 12.2.97). Also, as stated by LORD TEMPLEMAN in REG. v INLAND REVENUE COMMISSIONERS Ex parte PRESTON [1984] UKHL 5; (1985) A.C. 835 at 862 that:

"Judicial review is available where a decision-making authority exceeds its powers, commits an error of law, commits a breach of natural justice, reaches a decision which no reasonable tribunal could have reached, or abuses its powers"

In this case, in a nutshell, what the applicants are saying is that the applications should not have been summarily dismissed without hearing them and without giving any reasons for the decisions and which action is contrary to sections 65 and 66 of the Traffic Act Cap. 176, as a consequence whereof there has been a denial of natural justice and the decisions were ultra vires and Wednesbury unreasonable.

Here so many grounds of relief have been thrown in when in fact one or two grounds would have sufficed on the facts of the case. The Fiji Court of Appeal has in the case of VICTOR JAN KAISIEPO and THE MINISTER FOR IMMIGRATION (Civ. App. No. 54/96) at p.3 commented adversely on this growing practice of legal practitioners having the strong tendency to throw in almost every ground available in a judicial review without substantiating all the grounds. The Appeal Court said:

"The grounds of the application were numerous and included a denial of natural justice, on the grounds of not giving a fair hearing and bias, taking into consideration irrelevant matters, failing to take into account relevant matters, acting unreasonably, not giving regard to or taking into account the legitimate expectations of this applicant and failing to give reasons for the decision. In effect, the appellant raised almost all imaginable grounds available in administrative law to challenge the decision but did not make clear what matters were relied upon to support the individual grounds. This is an unacceptable procedure when seeking judicial review. We add, that adopting this scatter-gun approach is inimical to the applicants prospects of success for the Court is left unclear as to what are the important issues in the case."

In a judicial review court's ensure that administrative actions are intra vires and keep within the bounds of their authority. These actions will be ultra vires if they fail to comply with the requirements of certain statutes and by common law. It is important that administrative actions take into account all relevant considerations and ignore any irrelevant considerations. The decisions must be reasonable; they must not be biased or pre-determined; they must be exercised with the rights of natural justice in mind, unless a statute, expressly or by clear implication provides a contrary intention.

This case involves the interpretation of the various statutory provisions referred to hereabove. The Court is required to consider whether the "process" by which the decisions were reached are authorised or valid. The basic question is whether has the decision-maker has acted intra vires or within the discretion conferred reasonably and fairly.

Now to the consideration of the grounds of relief.

I find that there was unfairness in the manner in which the decision was reached. This is an important head of challenge. The applicants had not been given a fair opportunity to make representation so that the decision-maker may become fully acquainted with all the relevant considerations before reaching a decision. The applicants should also know the case they have to answer. Hence there is a duty to act fairly.

On the aspect of 'fairness' I find the following passage from the judgment of LORD MUSTILL in DODDY v SECRETARY OF STATE FOR THE HOME DEPARTMENT (1995) 3 All E R 92 at 106 pertinent:

"What does fairness require in the present case? My Lords, I think it unnecessary to refer by name or to quote from, any of the often-cited authorities in which the courts have explained what is essentially an intuitive judgment. They are far too well known. From them, I derive the following:

(1) Where an Act of Parliament confers an administrative power there is a presumption that it will be exercised in a manner which is fair in all the circumstances.

(2) The standards of fairness are not immutable. They may change with the passage of time, both in the general and in their application to decisions of a particular type.

(3) The principles of fairness are not to be applied by rote identically in every situation. What fairness demands is dependent on the context of the decision, and this is to be taken into account in all its aspects.

(4) As essential feature of the context is the statute which creates the discretion, as regards both its language and the shape of the legal and administrative system within which the decision is taken.

(5) Fairness will very often require that a person who may be adversely affected by the decision will have an opportunity to make representations on his own behalf either before the decision is taken with a view to producing a favourable result, or after it is taken, with a view to procuring its modification, or both.

(6) Since the person affected usually cannot make worthwhile representations without knowing what factors may-weigh against his interests fairness will very often require that he is informed of the gist of the case which he has to answer."

In the case before me, I am of the view, in the light of the authorities I refer to hereunder, that the applicants should have been given the opportunity of being heard.

In R v BURTON-upon-TRENT JUSTICES ex parte HUSSAIN (April 1996 ADM.L.R. p.233) it was held that when "local authorities revoke, or refuse to review, private hire drivers' and operator's licences, and when the justices are dealing with appeals against those revocations and refusals, the proper construction of ss61 and 62 of the Local Government (Miscellaneous Provisions) Act 1976 and the requirements of natural justice require that both the findings of fact on which the decisions are made, and the reasons for the decisions, shall be given."

There POTTS, J at p.237 said that "the justices made no findings of fact and gave no reasons for their decision. In my judgment they ought to have done both". He said that had they done this "the applicant would have been informed of the basis upon which the court reached its decision. In my judgment, the applicant was entitled to be so informed". There it was held that because of the failure to make findings of fact and to give reasons there was a denial of natural justice.

Also in REX v TORQUAY LICENSING JUSTICES Ex parte BROCKMAN (1951), 2 KB. 784 at 785 C.A. it was held that the justices in that case "were nevertheless bound to hear each application and to decide whether on its individual facts there was enough to take it out of the general rule which they laid down".

In the case before me if the Board had decided on a policy to guide them in considering applications, it would have been only fair that it should be made public so that the applicants may know what to expect. Here there is nothing in the evidence to show that the Board followed any published 'guidelines' or laid down policy.

The following passage from the judgment of LORD GODDARD C.J. is pertinent to the matter before me which shows that the applicants were entitled to be heard:

That there is no objection to justices deciding among themselves the general lines upon which they will exercise their judicial discretion has been recognized in a number of cases, and the first to which we will refer is Reg. v Walsall Justices (8), decided as long ago as 1854. There the justices had made it known that they would not hear applications for any new licenses, and, when an application was made to them at the annual licensing meeting, they refused to hear what was to be urged on behalf of the applicant. The court held that the justices were not entitled to take up that position - that as the applicant wished to be heard he was entitled to be heard; but it is quite clear that the court considered that there was nothing wrong in the justices prescribing a policy for themselves, although they were bound to hear any application which a person was entitled to make and it would be for them to decide whether the general policy was to be applied in that particular case. Lord Campbell, C.J., said (9): "The justices cannot exercise the discretion reposed in them unless they hear the facts and arguments which the applicant is prepared to adduce". Erle,J., said (9): "There may have been good reason why a general resolution, otherwise proper, ought not to be applied in the case of this individual". The observation of that judge seems to contain the kernel of the matter: the justices cannot make a rule to be applied in every case without hearing it. They may lay down for themselves a general rule but are bound to consider whether it is applicable to any particular case (emphasis mine).

Also in REX v HOLBORN LICENSING JUSTICES, Ex parte STRATFORD CATERING LD (42 T.L.R.728) which was an application for the transfer of a licence SALTER J ibid 789 said:

".....it is impossible to prevent [justices], in the privacy of their own room, from adopting any standard or practice which seems to them right, and, if they do, I think it is both right and convenient that they should state their practice publicly for the information of all concerned. They must, of course, apply their minds properly to the circumstances of each particular case, "which again shows that there is nothing wrong in justices' laying down a line of policy for themselves, provided that they consider whether a particular case before them calls for the application of that policy."

The right to be heard has been accepted by the Court in a number of authorities and as stated earlier the learned counsel for the applicants referred to them on page 3 of his submissions as follows and I find them apt.

BARWICK CJ said in TWIST v RANDWICK MUNICIPAL COUNCIL [1976] HCA 58; 136 CLR 106 at 109 -

"The common law rule that a statutory authority having power to affect the rights of a person is bound to hear him before exercising the power is both fundamental and universal..."

The learned Chief Justice went on to say that -

"Legislature may in unambiguous, clear and cogent language preclude it but if there is any doubt the Court would supplement the legislative provision and require proper hearing."

In Annetts v. McCann 170 CLR 596 at 598 The High Court of Australia has said:-

"It can now be taken as settled that, when a statute confers power upon a public official to destroy, defeat or prejudice a person's rights, interest and legitimate expectations the rules of natural justice regulate the exercise of that power unless they are excluded by plain words of necessary intendment."

This involves having an opportunity to be heard and Dixon CJ in The Commissioner of Police v. Tanos [1958] HCA 6; 98 CLR 383 at 395 said -

"For it is deep rooted principle of the law that before anyone can be punished and prejudiced in his person or property by any judicial or quasi judicial proceedings he must be afforded an adequate opportunity of being heard."

Mr. Tuberi referred the Court to various sections of the Act. He said that s 71(3) governs transfer of licence in that under it the Board "may refuse the transfer of the licence ........" and s71(4) allows an aggrieved licensee to appeal to the Minister.

He said that s65 deals with grant and refusal of road service licences, s66 deals with matters to be considered before determining application for licence, s67 contains provisions relating to conditions of road service licence, s68 covers power to revoke, vary or suspend licences, s 72 covers amendment of licences and s 73 provides for temporary amendment of licence.

I reject Mr. Tuberi's argument and find that s 71(4) regarding appeal to Minister does not arise here, as to start off with, the applications for transfer and amendment were not even heard or heard on the merits but were summarily dismissed. There was a denial of natural justice. The applicants could only have appealed to the Minister upon the suspension of the licence if the first two applications which relate to the said RSL were dealt with in accordance with the requirements of the law. Therefore the suspension of the RSL which followed the refusal of the two applications without a hearing was void and of no effect. The applicants should also have been given the opportunity of being heard before the RSL was suspended.

Reasons for decisions

Mr. Shankar submitted that in this case not only the applications were summarily dismissed, but no reasons were given by the Board for the decision for the Applicants to know on what basis the decisions were reached. He says that because there has been no decision on merits nor reason given, to appal to the Minister would be an exercise in futility and that Judicial Review is the proper remedy.

I agree with Mr. Shankar and reject Mr. Tuberi's argument that the reasons "were well known and given to the First Applicant". What was given to the Applicant in the third application was insufficient. In a similar situation such as this in EX PARTE HUSSAIN (supra) at p.237 it was stated by POTTS J that "the decision letter did not sufficiently inform the applicant of the ground or grounds on which the licensing Authority had concluded that revocation was appropriate". There the licensing authority "simply informed the applicant that his driver's licence was revoked under s 62(1)(a), (b), (c) and (d), but failed to specify what the applicant had done or tried to do in order to justify revocation" and the Court upheld the submission requiring the Authority to give reasons.

To give or not to give reasons in Transport Control Board cases, have been fully discussed by the Court of Appeal in PACIFIC TRANSPORT COMPANY LTD and MOHAMMED JALIL KHAN f/n Rahmat Ali v TRANSPORT CONTROL BOARD (Civil App. No. ABU0021 of 1966S - judgment 12.2.97). There at p.2 it states:

"The Act does not impose any express obligation on the TCB to give reasons for its decisions, nor does any other statute; however, when a decision is inconsistent with policy which has previously been applied, the absence of any statement of reasons for departing from that policy can raise a doubt whether the tribunal gave proper consideration to relevant matters before reaching its decision."

The Court goes on to discuss this matter and referred to its own earlier decision in AKBAR BUSES LTD v TRANSPORT CONTROL BOARD (unreported 27 July 1984 Civ. App. No. 9 of 1984) where it recommended to the TCB that it should always give brief reasons for its decisions. It goes on to state:

"The basis for this recommendation can be found in the various authorities which had been collected in another unreported decision of the Court given at the same sessions (Rajendra Nath v. Madhur Lata (13th July 1984, Civil Appeal No. 11 of 1984). In Nath's case there had been a right of appeal from the decision for which no reasons had been provided, a fact which made the provision of reasons even more desirable."

The Court of Appeal had gleaned from certain High Court decisions that TCB had not been following the recommendations of the Appeal Court in AKBAR BUSES (supra) nor its own guidelines.

In the case before me it was important for the Applicants to know the reasons for the decisions, apart from anything else for the purpose of appealing to the Minister for which provision is made in the Traffic Act.

Conclusion

For the reasons I have given particularly because the applicants have not been given the opportunity of being heard in regard to the basis upon which the applications were summarily dismissed which the Board had no right to do the Board acted ultra vires resulting in a denial of natural justice.

The Board was required to exercise a statutory power and to make decisions affecting the rights of the Applicants, this gave rise to the imposition on it the duty to act fairly. This the Board failed to do.

The principles which should be applied in a case such as the one before me has been summed up very well by the Court of Appeal in the following passage from the judgment at page 10 in THE PERMANENT SECRETARY FOR PUBLIC SERVICE COMMISSION and THE PERMANENT SECRETARY FOR EDUCATION, WOMEN AND CULTURE v LEPANI MATEA (Civ. App. No. ABU0016 of 1998S - judgment 29.5.98 FCA):

"The requirement that a person be given a fair opportunity to be heard before a body determines a matter that affects him adversely is so fundamental to any civilised legal system that it is to be presumed that the legislative body intended that a failure to observe it would render the decision null and void. If there are no words in the instrument setting up the deciding body requiring that such a person be heard the common law will supply the omission. It will imply the right to be given a fair opportunity to be heard. While the legislative body may exclude, limit or displace the rule it must be done clearly and expressly by words of plain intendment. The intention must be made unambiguously clear. Finally we add that what is a fair hearing will depend upon the circumstances of each case; it does not mean that in every case a right of personal appearance must be given."

In the result, for these reasons, I will grant judicial review of the decisions of the Transport Control Board of 31 May 1994 and 1 June 1994 summarily dismissing the applications to amend the Road Service Licence No. 12/10/94 and for its transfer respectively and the suspension of the licence indefinitely.

It is ordered that certiorari go to quash the said decisions of the Board and make an order of Mandamus directing the Board to consider the applications according to law bearing in mind the principles of natural justice.

I reserve the question of costs until I hear both counsel on it.

D. Pathik
Judge

At Suva
21 August 1998

HBJ0017J.94S