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Waqabaca v Fiji Institute of Technology Council [1996] FJHC 67; Hbj0018d.1996s (30 October 1996)

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Fiji Islands - Waqabaca v Fiji Institute of Technology Council - Pacific Law Materials

IN THE HIGH COURT OF FIJI

(AT SUVA)

JUDICIAL REVIEW

ACTION NO. HBJ0018 OF 1996

of an Application by KALIOPATI WAQABACA
and FIJIAN TEACHERS ASSOCIATION
for a Judicial Review under Order 53 of the High Court Rules 1988

AND:

IN THE MATTERn> of DECISION of the
FIJI INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY (F.I.T.) COUNCIL
Not to Appoint Mr. KALIOPATI WAQABACA to the position of Manager Ba Campus

AND IN THE MATTER OF F.I.T. COUNCIL acting in breach of the appointment procedures for F.I.T. staff, agreed to between the F.I.T., the 2nd Plaintiff and the Fiji Teachers Union dated the 1st of November 1995.

BETWEEN:n>

KALIOPATI WAQABACA
Lecturer and Manager of F.I.T. Ba Campus, Ba
1st Applicant

ass=MsoNormal alal align=center style="text-align: center; margin-top: 1; margin-bottom: 1"> FIJIAN TEACHERS ASSOCIATION

a registered Trade Union of Knolly Street, Suva

2nd Applicant

AND:

FIJI INSTITUTE OF TECHNOLOGY COUNCIL

a body corporate, pursuant to the F.I.T. Decree of 1992

1st Respondent

YUGESHWAR PRAKASH

of F.I.T., Ba

2nd Respondent

I. Gago for the Applicants

S. Kumar for the Respondents

Dates of Hearing: 18th and 25th September 1996

: 1"> Date of Interlocutory Judgment: 30th October 1996

INTERLOCUTORY JUDGMENT

The Applicant who is a Lecturer and employee of the Fiji Institute ohnology, held the position tion of Acting Manager Fiji Institute of Technology (F.I.T.) Ba Campus until the 8th of July 1996.

He has bn employee of the Fiji Institute of Technology since 1975 when he began as an Assistant Lect Lecturer. In 1989 he was promoted to the position of Lecturer. In 1993 a vacancy for the position of Senior Lecturer arose in Ba and he was subsequently posted to act in this position. In 1994 he was confirmed in the position of Senior Lecturer and in the same year was promoted to act as Head of Centre which post he held until the 8th of July 1996.

p class=MsoNormal stal style="margin-top: 1; margin-bottom: 1"> On or about the 25th of November 1995 the First Respondent amongst other pons advertised the positionition of Manager Ba Campus.

The Applicant along with others applied for the position. It was then given to iranjan Singh by the First irst Respondent as the successful applicant for the post.

The appointment of Mr. Singh did not meet with unal approval and as a result the appointment was challenged.nged.

Subsequent to this challenge the First Respondent withdrew Mr. Singh'ointment on or about 26th J6th January 1996 in a Communication from the Director dated 24th January 1996 addressed to the Applicant. A photocopy of this communication is annexed to the first affidavit of the Applicant sworn on the 12th of July 1996 and filed for the purpose of these proceedings.

It is appropriate to quote the relevant parts of this communication which is headed:

ass=MsoNormal stal style="margin-left: 72.0pt; margin-top: 1; margin-bottom: 1"> "SUBJECT: MANAGER BA CAMPUS

I have to inform yat the procedures utilised in making the appointment of Nirf Niranjan Singh as Manager of Ba Campus have been challenged I have acknowledged that the agreed procedures were not fully followed.

In these circumstanc is necessary that I request the Council Staffing Committeeittee to review the decision made by the Executive.

I have asked the Council committee to meet as a matter of urgency and and will inform you as soon as the decision has been reviewed. In the context of the review your application will be re-considered.

I would advise that you should not finalise any arrangements for taking up your positposition in Suva until this matter has been resolved.

I regret this delay, but I think you will agree that it is important that proper procedures are followed.

p class=MsoN=MsoNormal style="text-indent: 72.0pt; margin-top: 1; margin-bottom: 1"> Vinaka.

Pursuant to its withdrawal of Mr. Niranjan Singh's appointment the First Respondent on or about the 3rd of February 1996 re-advertised the position of Manager Ba Campus. The advertisement appeared in The Fiji Times of that date. Three paragraphs appear relevant in this application for leave to apply for Judicial Review. They read:

"Responsible to the Director for the management of the Ba Campus and the co-e co-ordination of teaching services offered at the Campus.

The successful appointee will have extenexperience in a management ment position and should possess thorough knowledge of tertiary teaching.

The position is being re-advertised. Applicants who have have had already expressed an interest need not re-apply as their original applications would stand."

On or about 3rd of May 1996 the Applicant learned that thst Respondent had appointed one Yugeshwar Prakash the SeconSecond Respondent to the position of Ba Campus Manager.

On the 8th of May 1e received a faxed personal communication from the Director with copies to Managers Corporarporate Services and Financial Services regarding his position at F.I.T.

Again I quote the relevant parts of this communication as they bear on the present application.

"You will have now been informed of the decision of the Council on the athe appointment of the Manager of the Ba Campus. I know you will be disappointed with the outcome and I am sympathetic to your feelings. I can only assure you that all aspects of your position were fully considered and the Council committee made its judgement objectively on the basis of the facts before it.

The successful applicant was Yugeshwar Prakash who has recently been Regional Telecom Training Co-ordinator at the South Pacific Forum and was formerly A/Chief Training Officer at FNTC.

Yugeshwar will be involved in planning meetings at Samabula next week and will come across to Ba with the Heads of Schools on Friday 17 May to familiarise himself with things at that end.

I expect him to take up his duties on Monday 20 June on which day you should arrange for for formal hand-over proceedings.

I have had a discussion with Santu Prasad concerning your return to the School of Building and Civil Engineering and there will be a position here at Samabula as a Senior Lecturer, with your duties to be discussed in detail with Santu. As a Senior Lecturer your substantive salary is currently $19,000, however I am instructing the Manager (Financial Services) to increase this by two steps to $20,000 in recognition of your service to the Institute.

I am aware that your return to Suva involves you in domestic changes as w as well as professional, and I would like to make this as easy as possible for you. You will not be under any pressure to relinquish your Ba accommodation immediately. However the sooner the Manager's accommodation can be made available the better, so would you please inform the Manager (Corporate Services) of your plans for moving and negotiate a date with her.

Council and r management of F.I.T. appreciate your work you have done ione in "holding the fort" during this time of transition and thank you sincerely for your contribution.

Dr. John Harré, Director"

The Apnt claims to be aggrieved by the appointment of Yugeshwar Prakash to the position of Manageanager Ba Campus on the alleged grounds that Mr. Prakash is not duly qualified to hold the position and that he has far less academic qualifications and experience than the Applicant.

He alleges that Mr. Prakash's appointment is not based on merit but rather on criteria only known to the First Respondent. He alleges that the First Respondent has shown bias against the Applicant.

The Second Applicant has also filed an affidavit swy Ted Young the General Secretary of the Second Applicant aant and sworn on the 5th of August 1996. Mr. Young states that the Second Applicant is a Trade Union registered under the Trade Unions Act and has amongst its members almost all Fijian teachers in schools throughout Fiji. The First Applicant is a member of the Second Applicant.

By virtue of its functions the Second Applicant is twful representative of its members concerning their rights ghts and grievances and the terms and conditions of their employment with their employer.

Mr. Young states that in 1992 the Government of Fiji passed the Fiji Institute Technology Decree whereby the F.I.T. Council was established as a body corporate which would take over the management and running of the F.I.T. By virtue of this decree members of the F.I.T. Staff were given choices of continuing in the civil service and be re-deployed elsewhere or continue with F.I.T. and be an employee of the F.I.T. Council. Because of his seniority at F.I.T. the First Applicant chose to continue employment at F.I.T. under the F.I.T. Council.

Since the enactment of the decree it was envisaged that the changeover by the F.I.T. Cl would be from the 1st of t of January 1996 and that prior to the changeover amongst other things the terms and conditions of F.I.T. employees were to be finalised.

Pursuant to the above, the First Respondent, the Second Applicant and the Fiji Teachers Union, astered trade union represenresentative of mainly non-Fijian teachers on the 1st of November 1995 executed an agreement with the First Respondent on behalf of their respective members concerning the terms and conditions of employment of their members with the First Respondent. This agreement was effective from 1st January 1996 and a copy of it is annexed to Mr. Young's affidavit.

For presurposes Section 16.2.2 a paragraph under the heading of Section 16 "Appointment and Prnd Probation" and Section 26 are relevant. Section 16.2.2 is headed "Procedures" and reads:

"Procedurethe making of appointments, including part time appointmenttments will be determined by Council from time to time after consultation with representatives of Institute staff nominated by the relevant union or unions."

Section 26 is headed "Procefor the Settlement of Personal Grievances" and contains eight sub-clauses. They are alre all important to the question I have to decide and I now set them out:

"26.1 Settlement of Personal Grievances/p>

A personal grievance of any staff member to whom these terms and conditions apply shall be settled in accordance with the procedure set out in sections 26.2 to 26.6 below.

26.2 Submission of Grievances to the Council

Any staff member who considers that she ohas grounds for a personal onal grievance may submit the grievance to the Council or a designated representative of the Council.

26.3 Representation of Complainant

When a grievance has been submitted, the staff member who has submitted the grievance is entitled to be represented by a nominee of the relevant union.

ass=MsoN=MsoNormal style="margin-left: 35.45pt; margin-right: 72.0pt; margin-top: 1; margin-bottom: 1"> 26.4 Time within which the Personal Grievance must be Submitted

The grievance shall be submitted wit period of forty-two days bays beginning with the date on which the action alleged to amount to a personal grievance has occurred or has come to the notice of the staff member, whichever is later, so as to enable the Council to remedy the grievance rapidly and as near as possible to the point of origin.

26.5 Written Statement

If the gnce is not settled in discussion between the staff member aber and the Council or the representative of the Council, the staff member shall promptly give the Council a written statement setting out:

(a) &nnbsp; &nsp; thu natf e o gthe grievancevance; and

(b)  p;&nbbsp;&nsp; tsp; the facts giving to t to the grievance; and

man">

(c) &nbbsp;& &nsp; tsp; the remedy sought.

26.6 Council's Response

If the Council is not prepared to grant the remedy sought and the parties have not otherwise settled the grievance, the Council shall as soon as possible, but in any event not later than the fourteenth day after the day on which the Council receives the staff members's written statement, give to the staff member a written response setting out:

/p>

ass=MsoN=MsoNormal style="text-indent: -34.35pt; margin-left: 106.35pt; margin-right: 108.0pt; margin-top: 1; margin-bottom: 1">i>(b) &nbssp; &nsp;&nbp; the reasons whyCouncil is l is not prepared to grant the remedy sought.

&nn">

26.7 Referral trievance Committee

/b>

Where the staff r who has lodged a personalsonal grievance is not satisfied with the outcome after the procedures laid out in sections 26.2 to 26.6 he or she may refer the grievance to a Grievance Committee consisting of two members nominated by the staff member and two members nominated by the Council and chaired by a person mutually agreed up by the individual and the Council.

26.8 Decisions of the Grievance Committee

A decision reached by a majority of the memberembers of Committee (not including the person chairing the Committee) shall be the decision of the Committee; but if the members are equally divided in opinion the matter shall be referred to the Permanent Secretary of Labour and Industrial Relations."

According to Mr. Young, the Seconlicant, the Fiji Teachers Union and the First Respondent commenced consultations to determitermine the appointment procedures in accordance with Section 16.2.2. He alleges that prior to completion of the consultative process the First Respondent proceeded to make appointments to positions within F.I.T. Such appointments were allegedly based as stated by the First Respondent on interim appointment procedures.

p class=MsoNormal stal style="margin-top: 1; margin-bottom: 1"> Mr. Young deposes that the Consultative Process between the relative Teachers Unions and the First Respondent dates back to about 1973 and continues today in the civil service. The process is designed to primarily ensure that all relevant considerations are taken into account before an appointment to a leading position is made and at all times ensures fairness and transparency of any appointment being made.

Mr. Young says it was the intention of the parties to the agreement of the 1st of Jan1996 that this Consultativeative Process would continue at F.I.T. upon the establishment of the F.I.T. Council as the new employers.

Mr. Young then alleges that in breach of the express provision of the Agreement the First Respondent proceeded to make appointments to the positions at the Fiji Institute of Technology without consultation. He claims that the interim appointment procedures which the First Respondent has adopted are a deliberate breach of the Agreement and says that the appointment of the Second Respondent by the First Respondent is a breach of the Consultative Process.

He also claims that the First Applicant has been the Acting Ma of Ba Campus since 1994 and is the most appropriate candidandidate for appointment to the substantive position.

I say immediately thas Court is not concerned with the merits of the respective Applicants for the position but but is concerned only with the appointment-making process, that is to see whether the Respondent followed proper procedures in that among other things it gave the Applicant an opportunity to present his case to the Council adequately; that the Respondent did not display bias in failing to appoint the Applicant and that it only took into account relevant considerations before making its decision.

The Applicant filed notice s application for leave to judicially review the First Respondent's decision not to appointpoint him as Manager Ba Campus on the 7th of August 1996.

The First Respondent through his Director John Harré has filed an Affidavit in Reply sworn on the 27th of August 1996 and the Applicant has filed a further Affidavit in Reply to Dr. Harré's on the 12th of September 1996.

I shall now mention relevarts of Dr. Harré's affidavit.

First Dr. Harré denies that the Second Respondent is less qualified for the position than the Appli He annexes to his affidaviidavit a summary of the relative qualifications and experience of both the Applicant and the Second Respondent. I note that the Second Respondent has had total management experience of 7 years (1 year acting) whereas the Applicant has had total management experience of 2 years, all acting.

Dr. Harré denies that the procedures of Clause 16.2.2 were not adhered tthe Council. First he says says that the First Respondent, through its Director, duly consulted with the representative of the Institute staff nominated by the Union on 15th February 1996 and offered an opportunity for further consultation with the full Council on 21st February 1996. Secondly he alleges the First Respondent then determined the appointment procedure in a quorum meeting held on 21st February 1996 according to Clause 16.2.2.

Dr. Harré states that there is no provision, either in the Terms and Conditof Employment or in the Appe Appointment Procedure determined by the Fiji Institute of Technology Council in terms of that agreement which requires that there be consultation between the Council and the Union in the making of any particular appointment. He then says that the Applicant was given a fair hearing in so far as

(i)  p;&nssp; he was ed to submit his Cuis Curriculum Vitae and other documentary eviy evidence of his suitability for the position and this material was copieall ms of ntervommit/span>

(ii) & &nsp; he was formally interd by d by the members of the committee established to make appointments;

man">&nbsp

(iii) &nhsp; s waitenvat t e inte interview to provide the committee with any other information he considered relevant.

&nn"> He says that the First Applicant has not exhausted the grievance procedure available in the Terms and Conditions of Employment Clause 26.

Finally he claimed that the Applicants have failed to provide any evidence that:

(i) &nbssp;&nnbsp;;&bsp; bsp; the decision was il;

(ii) &nnbsp;;&nspp; tsp; the dece decision was unreasonable;

(iii) &nnbsp;;&nbsere here was pras procedural impropriety.

That as such Dr. Harré claims the decision is not susceptible to challenge.

Ted Young swore aidavit in Reply to Dr. Harré's on the 11th of September 1996.

In essence he denies Dr. Harré's claims that the procedures of Clau.2.2 were complied with. He alleges that at the material tial time of the First Respondent's decision, negotiations were taking place as to who would be the representative or representatives of the Institute Staff to be nominated by the relevant Unions.

Mr. Younerts that the First Respondent refused to accept the Unions' nomination of their representasentatives of the Institute Staff and insisted that any representation to be nominated by the Union must be made from, and within, the Fiji Institute of Technology working Staff, whereas the Unions represented to the First Respondent that the prerogative of such nomination lay with the Unions and could not be dictated by the First Respondent, thus leading to a deadlock in the Consultation Process prior to the determination of the procedures for the making of appointments.

ass=MsoNormal stal style="margin-top: 1; margin-bottom: 1"> The grounds on which the Applicants seek leave to apply for Judicial Review arse already stated namely thly that the First Respondent failed to comply with Clause 16.2.2 and did not give the First Applicant a fair hearing and was biased against him and that it failed to give him any or any proper reasons for its decision.

They make the usllegation of failing to consider relevant matters or of taking into consideration irrelevanlevant matters and lastly that it acted unreasonably and in breach of the doctrine of Legitimate Expectations.

On the 21st of August the Respondents issued a Summons to stout the Applicants' Motion on the grounds that it disclosedlosed no reasonable cause of action, that it is scandalous, frivolous or vexatious and that it is otherwise an abuse of the process of the Court.

In their written submissions filed on the 18th of Septembe Respondents repeat their claim that this application is a is an abuse of Court process on the ground that the Applicants have not exhausted the grievance procedure in the Terms and Conditions of Employment applying to the First Applicant.

Although this submisappears towards the end of their submissions it is convenient to deal with it immediately. ely. They referred me to my recent decision in Fiji Bank Employees Union v. The Minister and Permanent Secretary for Labour and Industrial Relations and Another HBJ0013 of 1996.

On the 5th of August last I delivered an ex tempore judgment in that case which I have not found necessary to commit to writing. As the litigation in question attracted much public interest it is unnecessary to state the facts in any detail. Briefly they were that the Fiji Bank Employees Union had gone on strike and had sought Judicial Review of a decision of the Minister authorising the Permanent Secretary to refer the dispute between the Union and the National Bank of Fiji to an Arbitration Tribunal. I held that the application for Judicial Review was premature in that under the Trade Disputes Act I considered the Permanent Arbitrator was the person best suited to deal with the matter at that stage, the hearing having already begun before him and he having indicated that he could resume it almost immediately. In the end the Union agreed with my suggestion that the matter continue before the Permanent Arbitrator and it was eventually resolved.

The facts of that case however are different from those e instant and what I said there in my opinion does not appl apply here. It is important to remember the exact words of Order 53 Rule 3(6) of the High Court Rules. Sub-rule (6) reads:

"Where leave is sought toy for an order of certiorariorari to remove for the purpose of its being quashed any judgment, order, conviction or other proceedings which is subject to appeal and a time is limited for the bringing of the appeal, the Court may adjourn the application for leave until the appeal is determined or the time for appealing has expired."

In this case there is no appeal to any Courthe Applicants from any judgment, order, conviction or othe other proceedings.

In Action No. HBJ0014 of 1994 Charan and Another v. and Others in my unreported judgment of the 17th of Augf August 1994 I refused to entertain an application for leave to judicially review a decision of the Suva Magistrate's Court constituted by Mr. S.M. Shah on the ground that the Applicants had not exhausted their rights of appeal to this Court from the decision of the Magistrate's Court. That case clearly fell within Sub-rule (6) whereas it must be obvious that the instant case does not. I therefore reject the submission that the present application is an abuse of the Court process.

On an application for leave to judicially review a decision of some administrative tribunal or Minister of State Order 53 Rule 3(5) provides that the Applicant must have a sufficient interest in the matter to which the application relates before the Court will grant leave. The evidence before me satisfies me that both Applicants have a sufficient interest in this matter to enable them to apply for leave for Judicial Review.

In the case of the First Applicant this is his very natural int in obtaining appointment to a position which would give hive him a higher salary than he is at present earning.

The interest of the d Applicant is that the First Applicant belongs to it and the Union is charged with the rese responsibility of representing the First Applicant and ensuring that his rights under the Terms and Conditions of Employment of the 1st November 1995 are not breached or contravened.

Clause 1 of Part I Memorandum of Agreement between the parties stipulates:

Clause 1.4 states:

"Representation of Staff

y matter where representation is made on behalf of the staf staff of the Institute the Council will deal with the union or unions recognised as representing the staff concerned."

The next requirement before leave can be granted is that the Applicantt show they have an arguablguable case but nothing more at this stage.

In IRC v. National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Bus Ltd. [1981] UKHL 2; (1982) A.C. 617 at pp643 and 644 Lord Diplock saik said:

"The whole pu of requiring that leave should first be obtained to make take the application for judicial review would be defeated if the Court were to go into the matter in any depth at that stage. If, on a quick perusal of the material then available, the court thinks that it discloses what might on further consideration turn out to be an arguable case in favour of granting to the applicant the relief claimed, it ought, in the exercise of a judicial discretion, to give him leave to apply for that relief. The discretion that the Court is exercising at this stage is not the same as that which it is called upon to exercise when all the evidence is in and the matter has been fully argued at the hearing of the application." (emphasis mine)

In The National Fa Union v. Sugar Industry Tribunal and Two Others Civil Appeal No. 8 of 1990 the Fiji Coji Court of Appeal approved this dictum.

In my judgment the Applicants have shown they at least have an arguable case at this time. There is a clear conflict of evidence as to whether the First Respondent complied with Clause 16.2.2 of the Terms and Conditions of Employment, the Applicants saying it did not and the First Respondent maintaining that it did. This conflict can only be resolved by cross-examination of the deponents on this question at a substantive hearing. It would therefore be wrong for this Court to deny the Applicants an opportunity of testing the First Respondent's allegations in an open hearing.

In my judgment the Applicants should also be given a chance to per the Court that the First Respondent should have given reas reasons for rejecting the First Applicant's application. I know no authority requiring any body in the position of the First Respondent to give reasons for rejecting an application for employment or promotion but I am open to persuasion notwithstanding my present serious doubts to the contrary.

The Respondent makes what seems tot best a very hesitant submission that the Applicants are out of time in applying for leaveleave for an order of certiorari. I can reject this submission immediately. Even assuming that the decision in question was made on the 3rd of May 1996 the present applications were filed in this Court on the 7th of August barely 4 days at the most out of time.

In the exercise of my discretion I hoat the application was made in time and that the First Resp Respondent has not suffered any disadvantage by the lapse of the extra 4 days. The fact is that pending the final determination of these proceedings the Ba Campus is administered from Suva and whilst this may cause some inconvenience clearly it is something which the First Respondent is able to administer.

The final comment I wi make on this application is about the claim by the First Respondent that the First Applicaplicant failed to exhaust the grievance procedure in the Terms and Conditions of Employment.

ass=MsoNormal stal style="margin-top: 1; margin-bottom: 1"> According to the second affidavit sworn by the First Applicant on the 12th of mber 1996, immediately he l he learned of the appointment of Yugeshwar Prakash he sent a memorandum to the Director of F.I.T. Suva appealing against the appointment of Mr. Prakash and giving reasons why the Applicant considered he should have been appointed.

The Director replied to this memorandum on the 14th of May to the effect that there is no provision for appeal against appointment decisions and under the current Terms and Conditions of Employment no Appointment Appeals Board which could consider such a matter.

In my judgment this response is arguably unsatisfactory. It is true that under Clause 18.4 of the Terms and Conditions provision is made for the establishment by the Council of a promotions appeals procedure to be developed in consultation with representatives of Institute Staff nominated by the relevant union or unions and I accept that no such appeals system has yet been established.

Nevertheless in my view, knowing this the Director should arguably have realised that the Applicant had employed the wrong terminology and that actually he was seeking to activate the grievance procedure provided by Section 26 of the Terms and Conditions of Employment.

Therefore in my judgment it is arguable by the Applicant that he did not fail to exhaust his rights under the grievance procedure and that his attempt to use this procedure

was peremptorily rejected by the First Respondent.

In my judgment this is also a matterh the Applicants should be given leave to argue on a substaubstantive hearing.

For these reasons I grant the Applicants leave to applyJudicial Review and as the First Respondent has issued a Su a Summons seeking to dismiss the application at this stage I order that that Summons be dismissed and the First Respondent pay the Applicants their costs of such dismissal to be taxed if not agreed.

JOHN E. BYRNE

JUDGE

Authorities referred to in judgment:

High Court Rules Order 53 Rule 3(6).

HBJ0014 of 1994 Charan and Another v. Shah and Others - unreported judgment of Byrne J. of 17th August 1994.

Fiji Bank Employees Union v. The Minister and Permanent Secretary for Labour and Industrial Relations and Another HBJ0013 of 1996 - unreported oral ruling of Byrne J. of 5th August 1996.

IRC v. National Federation of Self-Employed and Small Business Ltd. [1981] UKHL 2; (1982) A.C. 617.

The National Farmers Union v. Sugar Industry Tribunal and Two Others FCA Civil Appeal No. 8 of 1990.

The following additional cases were cited in argument:

Pereru Dewa v. USP Judicial Rial Review No. 7 of 1994.

Charan and Another v. Shah and Others Civil Appeal No. 29 of 1994.

Korovulavula v. PSC FCA Civil Appeal No. 6/94.

Caswell & Caswell v. Dairy Produce Quota Tribunal for England and Wales (1990) Admin L.R. 765.

Dharam Lingam Reddy v. Veliamma and State Civil Action Appeal No. 19 of 1992.

R.H. v. Lancashire County Council Ex-parte Huddleston (1986) 2 ALL E.R. 941.

R. v. Social Security Commissioner & Another, Ex-parte Pattni (1993) Admin L.R. 219.

State v. Transport Control Board and Another Ex-parte Mohammed Jalil Khan Judicial Review No. HBJ0027 of 1994 - unreported judgment of Byrne J.

Chief Constable of North Wales Police v. Evans [1982] UKHL 10; (1982) 1 WLR 1155.

CCSU v. Minister for Civil Service (1985) AC 374.

R. v. Inland Revenue Commissioners and Another Ex-parte T.C. Coombs (1991) 2 WLR 682.

Sunbeam Transport Limited v. Transport Control Board and Another Judicial Review No. 4 of (1993) - unreported interlocutory judgment of Byrne J. of 3rd September 1993.

R. v. Legal Aid Board Ex-parte Bateman (1992) Admin. L.R. 692.

R. v. Forest Health District Council Ex-parte West and Another (1991) Admin. L.R. 349.

R. v. Monopolies and Mergers Commission and Another Ex-parte Argyll Group plc (1986) 2 ALL E.R. 257.

Hbj00018d.96s


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