Rokotuitavuki v Methodist Church in Fiji [1996] FJHC 23; Hbc0018d.96s (7 June 1996)

Fiji Islands - Rokotuitavuki v Methodist Church in Fiji - Pacific Law Materials

IN THE HIGH COURT OF FIJI

(AT SUVA)

CIVIL JURISDICTION

ACTION NO. HBC0018 OF 1996

BETWEEN:

AKARIVA VULA ROKOTUITAVUKI
Plaintiff

AND:

METHODIST CHURCH IN FIJI
First Defendant

AND:

ATTORNEY-GENERAL
Second Defendant

Plaintiff in Person
No appearance for the First Defendant
D. Singh for the Second Defendant

Date of Hearing: 24th May 1996
Date of Ruling: 7th June 1996

RULING

The genesis of this action lies in the Poverty Alleviation Fund setup by the Government in 1992 for the purpose of assisting the poor and needy people of Fiji in improving their standard of living and particularly by providing funds for new housing.

By an amended Statement of Claim annexed to his Writ which was issued on the 6th of February this year the Plaintiff makes various claims against the First-Defendant, the general gist of which is that since 1976 he has been a resident of Jittu Estate Suva formerly as a tenant of one Alfred Raman.

The Plaintiff alleges that under the Poverty Alleviation Fund the First Defendant was granted $310,000.00 by the Ministry of Finance for the acquisition of Jittu Estate land and that the First Defendant has notified the Plaintiff by a letter dated 9th January 1996 that he must vacate the land occupied by him. To date no Defence has been delivered either to the original or the amended Statement of Claim and this may or may not give the Plaintiff certain rights against the First Defendant if he wishes to explore them.

Presently before me is a Summons issued by the Attorney-General to strike out the Statement of Claim in so far as it relates to him. The Statement of Claim consists of some 29 paragraphs, paragraph 7 of which states that the Second Defendant is sued under the State Proceedings Act Cap.24.

Commencing in paragraph 19 the Plaintiff makes certain allegations against the Second Defendant and the Summons now before me seeks to have these struck out on the grounds that they disclose no reasonable cause of action against the Second Defendant and they are scandalous, frivolous or vexatious and as such constitute an abuse of the process of the Court.

The Statement of Claim was drawn by a layman with, so I am informed by the Plaintiff, some knowledge of the law. Perhaps it is therefore not surprising that in my view there is room for improvement in it.

Before me and with the consent of counsel for the Second Defendant the Plaintiff was represented by a spokesman Ratu Mosese Banuve Tuisawau and from certain answers Ratu Mosese gave to questions I put to him it appears that the burden of the Plaintiff's claim against the Second Defendant is that he failed to supervise the allocation of the money paid to the Methodist Church by the Ministry of Finance. This appears from paragraphs 19, 20, 25, 26, 27 and 29(b).

Paragraph 19 alleges that the Second Defendant has failed to invoke the law and maintain law and order or bring those responsible to justice in respect of some Methodist officials.

Paragraph 20 claims that the Second Defendant should repossess the Jittu Estate from the First Defendant and transfer to the Plaintiff and other sitting tenants of the Estate the land for development.

Paragraph 25 seeks an order that the Second Defendant do provide a full and complete account of all moneys paid to various organisations in connection with the work carried out in the development of the Jittu Estate.

Paragraph 26 seeks an order that the Second Defendant demand and obtain the refund of all moneys from such organisations which failed to carry out the work for which it had been paid in advance.

Paragraph 29(b) seeks an order that the Second Defendant repossess and takeover from the First Defendant all that land known as Jittu Estate and transfer the land to the Plaintiff and other tenants who are in the process of registering a Trust which the Plaintiff calls the Jittu Estate Tenants Trust.

As to the various paragraphs counsel for the Second Defendant alleges simply that they show no cause of action against the Second Defendant. For example counsel submits that at least in its present form paragraph 19 shows no cause of action against the Second Defendant on the ground that it fails to disclose any duty in law owed by the Second Defendant to the Plaintiff.

As to paragraph 20 counsel submits, and I agree, that this is a plea for repossession but as presently framed it shows no cause of action. Similar claims are made in respect of paragraphs 25 and 26 in that they do not plead any material facts but rather seek orders without disclosing the basis on which such orders are sought.

Paragraph 27 is a repetition of paragraph 20.

As to paragraph 29(b) counsel argues that there is no nexus between the relief sought and any duty owed by the Second Defendant to the Plaintiff. Similar claims are made in respect of sub-paragraphs (d) and (e) of paragraph 29.

The Second Defendant's submission is in short that because of the inadequacies I have mentioned no amount of amendment can salvage the Statement of Claim in any way in so far as it concerns his client.

The law governing applications such as this is well settled. Lindley M.R. in Hubbuck v. Wilkinson (1889) 1 Q.B. 86 at p.91 said that it is only in plain and obvious cases that recourse should be had to the summary process under O.18 R.18(1) of the Rules of the High Court. This was affirmed in Kemsley v. Foot and Ors (1952) A.C. 345.

In Attorney-General of Duchy of Lancaster v. L.N.W. Ry Co. [1892] UKLawRpCh 134; (1892) 3 Ch. 274 it was said that R.18 can only be invoked when the claim is on the face of it "obviously unsustainable".

Ratu Mosese Tuisawau in a submission on behalf of the Plaintiff referred me to the judgment of Scott J. in Civil Action No. HBC0278 of 1994 in which Ratu Mosese sued the Suva City Council and the Attorney-General in an action seeking to close the Lami rubbish dump. Scott J. dismissed the action against the Attorney-General on the ground that the Plaintiff was not seeking any actual relief against the Attorney-General, whereas here the Plaintiff does seek such relief. Ratu Mosese also referred me to some remarks of Lord Lowry in Roy v. Kensington and Chelsea FPC [1992] UKHL 11; (1992) 2 WLR 229 cited with approval by Scott J. on p.13 of his Judgment in part where Lord Lowry said there was much to be said in favour of the proposition that a Court having jurisdiction ought to let the case be heard rather than entertain a debate concerning the form of proceedings.

With that proposition like Scott J. I wholeheartedly agree but the problem for the Plaintiff here is that as they are presently framed I am not satisfied that the pleadings in so far as they concern the Attorney-General disclose any cause of action against him. In my view the Plaintiff would be well advised to obtain legal advice before pursuing this matter further against the Attorney-General; I can say no more.

I accordingly grant the order sought in the Summons and order that the Statement of Claim herein against the Second Defendant be struck out on the ground that it discloses no reasonable cause of action. I make no order for costs.

JOHN E. BYRNE
JUDGE

Legislation and authorities referred to in Ruling:

State Proceedings Act Cap.24.

RHC O.18 R.18

Attorney-General of Duchy of Lancaster v. L.N.W. Ry Co. [1892] UKLawRpCh 134; (1892) 3 Ch. 274.

Hubbuck v. Wilkinson (1889) 1 Q.B. 86.

Roy v. Kensington and Chelsea FPC 2 WLR 229.

Civil Action No. HBC0278/94S - Ratu Mosese Banuve Tuisawau v. Suva City Council and Another - unreported judgment of Scott J. dated 13th March 1995.

Authority not referred to in Ruling:

RHC O.15 R.6(2)

Hbc0018d.96s