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Sharma v Sharma [2015] FJCAT 1; CAT Appeal 6.2012 (9 December 2015)

IN THE CENTRAL AGRICULTURAL TRIBUNAL
AT SUVA


CAT APPEAL NO. 6 OF 2012


IN THE MATTER OF AN APPEAL FROM THE DECISION OF THE AGRICULTURAL TRIBUNAL AT SUVA


(REFERENCE NO. C & ED 3 OF 2008)


BETWEEN:


JAGDISH CHAND SHARMA and
PRAVIN CHAND SHARMA
APPELLANTS


AND:


HEMENDRA KUMAR SHARMA
FIRST RESPONDENT


AND:


DIRECTOR OF LANDS
SECOND RESPONDENT


Mr A Rayawa of Rayawa Law for the Appellants
Mr S Kumar of Sunil Kumar Esq.for the First Respondent
Mr N Chand of Attorney-General's Chambers for the Second Respondent


JUDGMENT


Background


[1] Before I deal with this Appeal against the Ruling of the Learned Agricultural Tribunal, I must state at the outset that leave has not been granted by this Tribunal to amend or to change the order of the names of the parties and the names of the parties before the Agricultural Tribunal shall remain. For ease of reference, I will refer to the Appellants as "the Interested Parties", the First Respondent as "the original Applicant" and the Second Respondent as "the Director of Lands".


[2] The Appellants/Interested parties have appealed against the Ruling of the learned Agricultural Tribunal dated 6th November 2011 dismissing their application seeking leave to appeal out of time the Decision dated 24th November, 2010.


[3] In its Decision dated 24th November, 2010 on the substantive application, the learned Agricultural Tribunal held that the original Applicant Hemendra Kumar Sharma qualifies for a declaration of tenancy and an Instrument of Tenancy has been granted against the landlord, the Director of Lands.


[4] The agricultural land which is the subject of the appeal is currently vested in the State and held by the Director of Lands. It is described as Crown Lease 9707 Lot 1 R. 1960 known as Koroqaqa, Province and District of Naitasiri (LD: 4/14/1490) containing an area of 2.9137 hectares or 10 acres.


[5] The land was previously leased by the Director of Lands to the First Interested Party, Jagdish Chand Sharma for a term of 14 years 8 months 21 days commencing on the 10th June, 1985. The lease expired on 31st December, 2000 and the land reverts to the State. The lease has not been renewed. The Second Interested Party, Pravin Chand Sharma is the son of the First Interested Party, Jagdish Chand Sharma.


[6] The Notice of Motion before the Agricultural Tribunal seeking leave to appeal out of time and stay was filed on the 4th February, 2011. In support of the Motion, the First Interested Party filed an Affidavit in Support on the 4th February, 2011 and the Second Interested Party had later filed a Supplementary Affidavit in Support on the 9th March, 2011.


[7] During the hearing of the Motion before the Agricultural Tribunal, the Interested Parties had only pursued the application for leave to appeal out of time and the application for stay was abandoned.


[8] The Motion was dismissed by the Learned Agricultural Tribunal and the Appellants/Interested Parties have appealed the Ruling of the Agricultural Tribunal.


Amended Grounds of Appeal


[9] The Appellants/Interested Parties initially filed Notice and 4 Grounds of Appeal on the 27th June, 2011 but that was subsequently amended and 13 Grounds of Appeal were filed on the 2nd April, 2013 as follows:


  1. The Learned Agricultural Tribunal erred in law in failing to give the Appellants an opportunity to be heard.
  2. The Learned Agricultural Tribunal erred in law in accepting the allegations of criminal conduct levelled at the Appellants by the Respondents without giving the appellants a fair opportunity to answer to those allegations and a fair opportunity to provide evidence that negates such allegations.
  3. The Learned Agricultural Tribunal erred in law in basing his ruling and reasoning entirely on the untested allegations of criminal conduct by the Respondent against the Appellants resulting in the deprivation of equitable and legal proprietary interest of the Appellants.
  4. That the learned Agricultural Tribunal erred in law in categorizing the Interested Party as a "Landlord: instead of a competing Tenant.
  5. That the Learned Agricultural Tribunal erred in law in refusing leave to appeal out of time and that it failed to consider the absence of contradictory evidence adduced by way of affidavits from opposing parties on the cause of delay which renders the Appellant/Interested Party reasons in the affidavit as unchallenged and his reliance on letters and records in the Court file to rebut the affidavit without giving the applicant an opportunity to respond is grossly unfair.
  6. The Learned Agricultural Tribunal erred in law in ruling that the letter attached as "PC6" in the Appellant/Interested Parties affidavit is irrelevant and further erred in concluding that the "PC6" was a private dealing between the Appellant/Interested Party and the 1st Respondent/Applicant as the letter was addressed to the Director of Lands who is the 2nd Respondent.
  7. The Learned Agricultural Tribunal erred in law in failing to apply and or wrongly applying the test for an application for leave to appeal out of time.
  8. That the Learned Agricultural Tribunal erred in law in finding the 1st Respondent will be prejudiced if leave to appeal out of time is granted.
  9. That the learned Agricultural Tribunal erred in failing to notify the 1st and 2nd Appellant/Interested Parties of the date of the Ruling delivered on the 24th day of November 2012 as no such Notice is recorded on the Court Records nor attached as annexure in the Court Records.
  10. That the Learned Agricultural Tribunal erred in law in failing to keep proper records of proceedings as the Court Records are illegible and contains ambiguous and incoherent facts.
  11. That the Learned Agricultural Tribunal erred in law in the failure to keep property Recordings of Proceedings which has resulted in great prejudice to the 1st and 2nd Appellants in that they are unable to rely on the accuracy and integrity of the Court Records.
  12. That the Learned Agricultural Tribunal erred in concluding that the Counsel for the Appellants was misleading the Tribunal when submitting that the Tribunal Ruling dated 24th November 2010 did not consider "PC-6" or Exhibit 3".
  13. That the Learned Agricultural Tribunal erred in law in concluding that pleadings in the Proceedings before the Agricultural Tribunal should be strictly adhered to when the Agricultural Landlord and Tenants Act itself provides that the Tribunal has powers to regulate its own proceedings.

Jurisdiction


[10] The preliminary issue of Jurisdiction was raised in Submissions by Counsel for the Appellants/Interested Parties that his clients the Interested Parties have standing in the appeal.


[11] The issue of locus is whether a person who has no contract of tenancy under ALTA and who is not a landlord can invoke the jurisdiction of this Tribunal on appeal.


[12] As this submission is based on an of error law which is relevant to the appeal, I had allowed the Appellants' Counsel to address this issue despite the fact that it is not a ground of appeal.


[13] In response, Counsel for the original applicant submits that the appeal provision does not create any appeal by any interested party. If there is no mention of any interested party, only two people are supposed to appeal the decision of the Agricultural Tribunal and that is the landlord and the tenant.


[14] Section 48 of the Agricultural Landlord and Tenant Act (Cap. 270) provides:


48.(1) Where a landlord or a tenant is aggrieved by an award, order or certificate of a tribunal made or issued under the provisions of this Act, the landlord or tenant may appeal against such award, order or certificate to a central agricultural tribunal ....


(2) Within twenty—one days after the making of any final award, order or certificate, the appellant shall –


(a) pay such fee as may be prescribed to the secretary of the tribunal;

(b) lodge with the tribunal written notice of the appeal......;

© serve a copy of the written notice of appeal upon the opposite party.


[15] In the substantive matter, the original applicant Hemendra Kumar Sharma had filed an application against the Director of Lands for a declaration of tenancy of the whole land. He has no contract and no rights arising therefrom and was therefore residing on the land as an illegal tenant.


[16] After an inspection of the land, it was discovered that the interested parties were also residing on the land. They were residing on the land as illegal tenants when the lease of the first interested party expired on the 31st December, 2000.


[17] Upon discovering the interested parties on the land, the Agricultural Tribunal on his own Motion had granted leave to join the interested parties in the Reference. The interested parties were given the opportunity to respond to the original applicant's application for a declaration of tenancy.


[18] Counsel for the interested parties, Mr G P Lala had filed a Statement of Defence. The Agricultural Tribunal held that "there was no counterclaim hence there was no need for the Applicant to file a defence to counter claim" (page 1 Decision).


[19] There was no counterclaim or a cross claim by the interested parties for a declaration of tenancy against the Director of Lands.


[20] A declaration of tenancy has been granted to the original applicant Hemendra Kumar Sharma and the landlord, the Director of Lands has not appealed against the Decision of the Agricultural Tribunal.


[21] In the written submissions in reply by the Interested Parties, they submit that the definition of "Interested Parties" was discussed fully in the Full Bench of the Court of Appeal of Fiji in the case of Re Azmat Ali [1986] FJCA 8; [1986] FLR 30 (23 July 1986):


"That would be a pure formality. Construction of these provisions as a whole indicate a contract capable of sustaining a claim unless declared invalid at the application of an interested party which may include the landlord, "the tenant" under the contract, or "any tenant". Among the possible situations it certainly envisages one where more than one tenant may have a claim over the whole or part of the subject land, for instance where the whole land is claimed by "the tenant" under the agreement produced, whole or part of it is claimed by someone claiming tenancy under some other agreement or whole or part of it is claimed by a person claiming a declaration of tenancy under section 4."


[22] The decision in Re Azmat Ali established the relationship between the Native Land Trust Act and ALTA. The Court of Appeal held that the provisions under ALTA are to prevail over section 12 of the Native Land Trust Act with the consequence that the declaration of a tenancy by a tribunal under the Act is not subject to the consent of the Native Land Trust Board. It was also held that where Tribunals act beyond their power, the High Court can exercise its supervisory power to control them.


[23] In the case of Re Azmat Ali, the appellant had sought a declaration of tenancy against the landlord who is a lessee of the Native Land Trust Board. The Agricultural Tribunal granted a declaration of tenancy and ordered an assignment of part of the agricultural land being leased by NLTB to the landlord. The Central Agricultural Tribunal upheld the decision of the Agricultural Tribunal but the Hon. Justice Dyke of the High Court in his supervisory jurisdiction declared null and void an award made by the Agricultural Tribunal and the Central Agricultural Tribunal.


[24] On appeal to the Court of Appeal, the Hon. Justice Mishra at page 37 stated:


"It is not for this court to consider whether correct orders were made under the appropriate provisions of ALTA, the sole issue here being whether it was within the powers of tribunals to make the orders that they made without specifically making them subject to NLTB's consent that is to say, did they exceed their jurisdiction by making those orders outside the powers conferred upon them by ALTA?"


[25] The Court of Appeal upheld the decisions of the Agricultural Tribunal and the Central Agricultural Tribunal granting a declaration of tenancy and assignment of part of the landlord's land and the appellant was made a sub-lessee of the land.


[26] The case of Re Azmat Ali is therefore distinguished on its facts.


[27] In this case, the interested parties are claiming to be existing tenants of the Director of Lands in his administrative capacity. The Director of Lands has not issued any lease either to the interested parties or to the original applicant. The interested parties and the original applicant are claiming payment of rent to the Director of lands. However, payment of rent on its own does not create a tenancy under ALTA.


[28] The decision of ALTA Tribunal prevails over any administrative decision of the Director of Lands whether to grant a lease to any of the parties.


[29] The parties to any appeal before this Tribunal are the landlord who is the Director of Lands and the tenant.


[30] The Interested Parties are not tenants of the subject land and they do not have the locus to appeal the Ruling of the Agricultural Tribunal.


Determination of Grounds of Appeal


[31] In the event that I am wrong on the issue of Jurisdiction, I will consider the other grounds of appeal.


[32] This is an appeal against the Ruling of the Agricultural Tribunal for dismissing the Motion seeking enlargement of time to appeal the Decision on the substantive matter dated 24th November, 2010.


[33] The issue for determination on this appeal is whether the learned Agricultural Tribunal had exercised his discretion correctly in dismissing the application for leave to appeal out of time.


[34] In Avery v No. 2 Public Service Appeal Board & Others [1973] 2 NZLR 86, Richmond J stated at p.91:


"When once an appellant allows the time for appealling to go by then his position suffers a radical change. Whereas previously he was in a position to appeal as of right, he now becomes an applicant for a grant of indulgence by the Court.


The onus rests upon him to satisfy the Court that in all the circumstances the justice of the case requires that he be given an opportunity to attack the judgment from which he wishes to appeal."


[35] In Gatti v Shoosmith [1939] 3 ALL ER 916, the Court of Appeal when considering an application for leave to appeal out of time stated at 919G-920A:


"...what I venture to think is the proper rule which this court must follow is: that there is nothing in the nature of such a mistake to exclude it from being a proper ground for allowing the appeal to be effective though out of time; and whether the matter shall be so treated must depend upon the facts of each individual case. There may be facts in a case which would make it unjust to allow the appellant to succeed upon that argument.


The discretion of the court being, as I conceive it, a perfectly free one, the only question is whether, upon the facts of this particular case, that discretion should be exercised."


[36] The decision on whether to allow the interested parties time to appeal the Decision on the substantive matter is a discretionary matter based on the facts of this case.


[37] I will consider Ground 7 of the appeal which basically covers the other grounds of appeal.


7. The Learned Agricultural Tribunal erred in law in failing to apply and or wrongly applying the test for an application for leave to appeal out of time.


[38] When considering the relevant principles for an application for leave to appeal out of time, I will also consider the other grounds of appeal raised by the Interested Parties.


[39] The relevant principles governing extension of time to file an appeal is aptly discussed in the Court of Appeal Case of Bahadur Ali and Ors. v Ilaitia Boila and Chirk Yam and Ors., FCA Civil Appeal No. ABU 0030 of 2002, Reddy P. then President of the Court of Appeal stated at p.7:


"The power to extend the time for appeal is discretionary and has to be exercised judicially, having regard to established principles (see Hart v Air Pacific Limited, Civil Appeal No. 23 of 1983). The onus is on the Appellants to satisfy the Court, that in the circumstances, justice of the case requires that they be given the opportunity to attack the Order ....... and the judgment....... The following factors are normally taken into account in deciding whether to grant an extension of time:


  1. The length of the delay.
  2. The reasons for delay.
  3. The chances of the appeal succeeding if time is extended.
  4. Prejudice to the respondent."

Length of the Delay


[40] The delay relates to the time the Decision dated 24th November, 2010 was delivered or in this case received by the interested parties' Solicitor, Mr G P Lala and the filing of the Motion on the 4th February, 2011 for enlargement of time.


[41] In Attorney General of Fiji v Paul Praveen Sharma, Civil Appeal No. ABU004 of 1993, the Court held:


"It is not always necessary to deal with each of these factors willynilly. For it is said in Palata Investment v Burt Sinfield [Supra], where the delay is slight, it is generally unnecessary to go into the merits of the case. By the same token if the delay is substantial and the Appellants are unable to give a reasonable explanation for the delay and there are no questions requiring serious consideration by the highest judicial tribunal in the land, the Court is not obliged to deal with every factor."


[42] The interested parties submit that the circumstances in which the Decision was delivered and served on their Solicitor Mr Lala is unfair but has not stated the time within which the Decision was received by their Solicitor.


[43] Counsel for the original applicant, Mr Kumar submits that the only person who can say that he did not receive the Decision in time and to clarify this issue is the gentleman Mr G P Lala himself.


[44] It is for certain that the Decision was received by the interested parties' Solicitor, Mr Lala before they filed the Motion seeking leave to appeal out of time. The Affidavit contained proposed grounds of appeal against the Decision. According to the affidavit of the interested party, the First Interested Party arrived in the country on the 24th January, 2011. The Motion was filed on the 4th February, 2011.


[45] During the hearing of the Motion, the current solicitor Mr Rayawa had appeared on instructions of Mr G P Lala. Mr Lala was then still on record as the Solicitor representing the interested parties on the Motion. However, the Affidavits in support filed by the First Interested Parties have not disclosed the date when the Decision was received by their Solicitor, Mr Lala.


[46] Counsel for the Interested Parties, Mr Rayawa submits that the time has not even started to run as the Decision was not delivered in open Court. They further submit that the Decision was resent by the Office of the Agricultural Tribunal but there is no evidence when the Decision was resent and when Mr Lala finally received the Decision.


[47] Although the Decision was not delivered in open Court, the Decision was nevertheless received by the interested parties' Solicitor, Mr Lala to enable them to file the Motion.


[48] On appeal, that evidence of the date when the Decision was received by their Solicitor would have assisted this Tribunal on the computation of time for the delay. As the Interested Parties have not disclosed the time when the Decision was received by their Solicitor, this Tribunal is not able to determine independently the length of the delay in filing of the application for enlargement of time.


[49] The original applicant submits that in the Magistrates' Court and other Inferior Courts, the computation of time starts from the day after the decision is given. In this case the decision is given on the 24th November, 2010 and 21 days to appeal will expire on the 15th day of December, 2010. The application was filed well out of time on the 4th February, 2011 which amounts to 1 month and 2 ½ weeks out of time.


[50] The Agricultural Tribunal in his Ruling held that the interested parties were late by 1 month and 2 ½ weeks.

[51] In Pacific Agencies (Fiji) Ltd. v Spurling, Civil Appeal N. Misc. 10 of 2008, Hickie, JA held:


In addition, Counsel must be aware that the Full Court of Appeal as an appellate court, has taken the view (as set out in a number of recent cases) that it will not normally interfere with the findings of a trial judge. For example, in the recent case of Bebe v Telecom Fiji Limited (Unreported, Fiji Court of Appeal Civil Appeal No. ABU 0065 of 2007 (9 July, 2008) Byrne, Powell and Hickie JJA), the Court held at para. 14:


'... the Trial Judge made comprehensive findings of fact and the Court of Appeal will not normally interfere with such findings. Indeed, the Court strongly endorses, Benmax v Austin Motor Co. Ltd [1955] 1 All ER 326 where it was said that:


'An appellate court, on an appeal from a case tried before a judge alone, should not lightly differ from a finding of the trial judge on a question of fact ....' "


[52] The calculation of time is a matter of fact and as there is non-disclosure of evidence by the Appellants/Interested Parties on this issue, this Tribunal will concur with the calculation of time by the Learned Agricultural Tribunal which is 1 month 2 ½ weeks.


[53] A delay of 1 month 2 ½ weeks is a substantial delay.


Reasons for the Delay


[54] In ground 9 of the grounds of appeal, the interested parties submit that the Tribunal erred in failing to notify the interested parties of the date of Ruling delivered on 24th November, 2012. The date of the Decision on the substantive matter is 24th November, 2010 and affidavit containing the proposed grounds of appeal against that Decision was filed by the second interested party on the 9th March, 2011.


[55] The Decision of the Agricultural Tribunal dated 24th November, 2010 was sent by mail by the Lautoka Office to all the parties. It was received by the other parties but the Interested Parties submit that it was not received by their solicitor, Mr G P Lala in time to file the appeal.


[56] In Revici v Prentice Hall Incorporated and Others (1969) 1 All ER 272, the Court of Appeal held that "... if there was non-compliance with the rules, it must be explained; and prima facie if no excuse was offered, no indulgence should be granted."


[57] The following passage from the Judgment of the Privy Council in In Ratnam v Cumarasamy and another ( 1964) 3 All ER 933 at 935 demonstrates the Court's reluctance to grant leave to appeal in the absence of substantial reasons.


The rules of court must, prima facie, be obeyed, and, in order to justify a court in extending the time during which some step in procedure requires to be taken, there must be some material on which the court can exercise its discretion. If the law were otherwise, a party in breach would have an unqualified right to extension of time which would defeat the purpose of the rules which is to provide a time table for the conduct of litigation.


[58] The Interested Parties submit that the Decision was not received by their solicitors' office in time and the Office of the Agricultural Tribunal had resent the Decision by mail. They were informed that the 21 day period for lodging an appeal had lapsed. They have laid the blame on the door of the Office of the Agricultural Tribunal for failing to send the Decision to their solicitor Mr G P Lala on time and for not delivering the Decision in open Court.


[59] In his Ruling, the Agricultural Tribunal had referred to the practice and procedure adopted by the Tribunal to send by post its Ruling or Decision to the parties to proceedings. The Tribunal had set out the times when previous documents were regularly sent by post by their solicitor Mr Lala to the Tribunal and documents were also received by their solicitor from the Tribunal in time.


[60] The other solicitors had received the Decision in this case on time but the interested parties had not received the Decision in time to file their appeal.


[61] The Fiji Court of Appeal in Vimal Construction and Joinery Works Ltd v Vinod Patel and Company Ltd., FCA Civil Appeal No. ABU0093 of 2006, at paragraph 15 held that:


"...[L]itigants should not assume that leave will be given to bring or maintain appeals or other applications where those appeals or applications are out of time unless there are clear and cogent reasons for doing so. "


[62] In Fa v Tradewinds Marine Ltd and Another (Unreported Fiji Court of Appeal, Civil Appeal No. ABU0040 of 1994 when considering an application for leave and stay, the Court of Appeal held:


"That is a very short period but time limits are set with the intention that they should be observed and even lateness of only a four days requires a satisfactory explanation before an extension of time can be granted. In this case ... the applicant has given no explanation at all." (My underlining)


[63] When the period for filing of appeal has expired, the Court will not exercise its powers unless there is some good and reasonable excuse for the applicant having failed to act within the prescribed period.


[64] I consider that there was a substantial delay and no reasonable explanation was provided for the delay in filing the application for leave to appeal out of time.


Whether there is an arguable case on appeal


[65] In grounds 1,2,3 and 5 of the appeal, the interested parties submit that they were not given the opportunity to be heard by the Tribunal.


[66] However, as referred to above, when considering the original applicant's application for a declaration of tenancy, the Tribunal had carried out an inspection of the farm and noted the presence of the interested parties on the farm.


[67] On his own motion, the Tribunal had joined the interested parties to the proceedings and the interested parties were given the opportunity to respond to the original applicant's application. The interested parties were represented by Counsel Mr G P Lala during the hearing of the substantive matter as well as during the hearing of the application for leave to appeal out of time.


[68] Mr G P Lala had filed a Statement of Defence but there is no counterclaim or a cross-claim filed by the Interested Parties for a declaration of tenancy against the Director of Lands. The interested parties are therefore not competing tenants under ALTA.


[69] The issue before the Agricultural Tribunal on the substantive matter was whether the original applicant had fulfilled the requirements of section 4 ALTA.


[70] The Supreme Court of Fiji in Ponsami v Dharam Lingam, Civil appeal No. ABU0023 of 95S held at page 12:


"...[A]n applicant who seeks a declaration of tenancy under ss.5 and 23(3) relies on his occupation and the presumption for which s.4 provides, not on his contract of tenancy...


[71] Also at page 13 inPonsami, the Supreme Court held:


"...[A] person who occupies and cultivates land under an unlawful agreement may qualify for a declaration of tenancy if he satisfies the requirements of section 4 of the Act."


[72] In this case, the Tribunal finds that the original applicant was occupying and cultivating the land and his interest as a tenant was settled when he made an application for a declaration of tenancy.


[73] Having heard the interested parties on the substantive application, the Tribunal held that the original applicant qualifies for a declaration of tenancy and granted the Instrument of Tenancy.


[74] In ground 3 of the appeal, the interested parties are claiming equitable and proprietary interests in the land. When the first interested party's lease expired, there was no renewal of the lease. The interested parties have referred to recommendations by an Inspector of the Director of Lands for the lease to be renewed in the names of the Interested parties and the original applicant.


[75] There is no lease issued to the interested parties or to the original applicant by the Director of Lands in his administrative capacity. In any event, the decision of ALTA Tribunal prevails over any administrative decisions of the Director of Lands.


[76] In grounds 6 and 12, the interested parties had referred to PC6 in the interested parties' affidavit. At page 9 of its Ruling, the Agricultural Tribunal states:


The attached submissions to the aforesaid letters were not legal submissions but a documented chronology of events transpiring up to the dispute between the applicant and the Interested Parties. In the respectful opinion of this Tribunal, this purported submission by G P Lala & Associates would have been better addressed as List of Bundle of Documents, which by procedure, ought to be discovered first to Counsel for the Applicant and Respondent.


[77] This Tribunal notes that PC6 which is a bundle of documents is an annexure to the Affidavit of the interested party and is not an exhibit in the Court Record. I concur with the decision of the Tribunal on the issue of discovery before tendering of the Bundle of Documents in Court.


[78] The Agricultural Tribunal had considered the original applicant's application for a declaration of tenancy and in doing so, the Tribunal had also heard Counsel for the Interested Parties as well as the Director of Lands and also considered the documents filed by them.


[79] Although the original applicant was occupying and cultivating the farm, he was not a tenant and the onus of rebutting the presumption of tenancy was placed on the Director of Lands.


[80] The Agricultural Tribunal had correctly held that no steps having been taken by the Director of Lands to evict the original applicant within 3 years of the applicant's occupation and cultivation of the subject land, the original applicant's entitlement arose under section 4 of ALTA and the declaration of tenancy was granted.


[81] There is no appeal by the landlord, the Director of Lands.


[82] The other grounds of appeal are grounds 4, 10 and 13. In ground 4 of the appeal, the interested parties submit that the Tribunal erred in law in categorizing the interested party as a landlord instead of a tenant.


[83] The Tribunal at paragraph 1 of the Ruling stated that the interested parties who are the applicants in the application for leave to appeal out of time are referred to as the interested party. Reference to the Interested Party in the Decision is contained in page 4 in which the Tribunal stated that the Landlord, in as far as this application is concerned, will be the Respondent Director of Lands and not the 1st named Interested Party.


[84] Furthermore, in ground 10 of the appeal, the interested parties submit that the Tribunal erred in law in failing to keep proper records of proceedings as the Court Records are illegible and contains ambiguous and incoherent facts. This Tribunal notes the typing errors in the Court Record but that did not appear to affect the ability of the parties in the preparation and filing of their documents or in their submissions in Court.


[85] In ground 13 of the appeal, the interested parties further submit that the Tribunal erred in law in concluding that pleadings in proceedings before the Agricultural Tribunal should be strictly adhered to when the Agricultural Landlord and Tenants Act itself provides that the Tribunal has powers to regulate its own proceedings.


[86] The Tribunal is authorized under section 19 (1) ALTA to regulate its own proceedings. In this case, the Tribunal had excised its discretion and proceeded to the site inspection and upon finding the interested parties on the land had joined them as interested parties to the proceedings.


[87] The above grounds of appeal have no basis and are dismissed. I do not consider that the interested parties have an arguable case on appeal.


Prejudice to the Respondent if time is extended


[88] In ground 8 of the appeal, the interested parties submit that the Tribunal erred in law in finding the 1st Respondent or original applicant will be prejudiced if leave to appeal out of time is granted.


"Any delay to a successful party receiving the fruits of a Judgment is, of course, prejudicial" per Justice J F Sheppard in The Official Receiver v Petrie Limited, FCA Civil Appeal No. ABU 0049 of 1997 (28 November, 1997).


[89] The Director of Lands submits that the delay from the date of the allowable time of appeal (15th December, 2010) to the present circumstances is approximately 2 and ½ years and the delay in obtaining the fruits of judgment of the Tribunal is in itself prejudicial.


[90] Counsel for the original applicant submits that any leave to appeal would deprive the original applicant of the fruits of Judgment.


[91] This matter has been pending since 2008 and the proposed appeal has little chance of success and the original applicant will be prejudiced if time to appeal is allowed.


[92] During submissions, Counsel for the Interested Parties raised the issue of compensation as an additional ground of appeal. The issue of compensation was not in the amended grounds of appeal.


[93] Counsel for the original applicant submits that this was an application under sections 4 and 5 of ALTA and there was no cross-application made for compensation under section 18.


[94] The right to relief arises from an entitlement to a declaration of tenancy under ALTA and as there was no cross-application by the interested parties for a declaration of tenancy or for compensation under section 18 ALTA, I consider that this ground has no merit.


Conclusion


[95] In the circumstances, I do not consider that the Learned Agricultural Tribunal had exercised his discretion wrongly.


[96] The appeal by the interested parties is accordingly dismissed. The interested parties are ordered to pay costs summarily assessed in the sum of $1,000.00 each in favour of the Respondent/Original Applicant and the Respondent/Director of Lands. The total cost of $2,000.00 to be paid within 21 days.


30 Days to Appeal


Sgd. Makereta Hiagi Mua
CENTRAL AGRICULTURAL TRIBUNAL


AT SUVA
9th December, 2015


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