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Court of Appeal of Fiji |
IN THE COURT OF APPEAL, FIJI
[On Appeal from the High Court]
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO.AAU 007 of 2019
[In the High Court at Suva Case No. HAC 142 of 2018]
MAIKELI FREYER NAWAITABU
Appellant
AND:
THE STATE
Respondent
Coram : Prematilaka, JA
Counsel : Mr. Fesaitu for the Appellant
: Mr. S. Tivao for the Respondent
Date of Hearing : 12 May 2020
Date of Ruling : 15 May 2020
RULING
[1] The appellant had been indicted in the High Court of Suva on three counts of rape, one count of attempted rape and 04 counts of sexual assault under the Crimes Decree, 2009 committed between the 01 January, 2015 and 31 December, 2015 at Nasinu in the Central Division.
[2] The information consisted of the following counts.
COUNT ONE
Statement of Offence
RAPE: Contrary to section 207(1) and (2) (b) of the Crimes Act of 2009.
Particulars of Offence
MAIKELI FREYER NABUb>> betweentween the 1sp>dsup>day of January, 2014 and 31st day of December, at Nasinu sinu in the Central Division penetrate vagi G with your fingers without her cher consenonsent.
COCOUNT TWO
>RAPE: Contrary to section 207(1) and (2) (c) of the Crimes Act of 2009.
Particulars of Offence
MAIKELI FREYER NAWAITABU between st day of January, ary, 2015 and 31st day of December, 2015 at Nasinu in the Central Division penetrated the mouth of MN with your penisout hnsent
ign="center">COUNT THRE THREEE<Statement of Offence
RAPE: Contrary to section 207(1) and (2) (c) and (3) of the Crimes Act of 2009.
Particulars of Offence
MAIKELI FREYER  ITABU > between thed1st f January, ary, 2015 and 31st day of December, 2015 at Nasinu in the Central Division penetrated the mouth of JR, a child under 13 years of age with your penis.
COUNT FOUR
Statement of Offence
ATTEMPTED RAPE: Contrary to section 208 of the Crimes Act 2009.
Particulars of Offence
MAIKELI FREYER NAWAITAB0; betweentween the 1st day of January, 2015 and 31st day of December, 2015 at Nasinu in the Central Division attemptedave c knowledge of GN without her consent.
COUN>COUNT FIVT FIVE
Statement of Offence
SEXUAL ASSAULT: Contrary to section 210(1)(b)(ii) of the Crimes Act 2009.
Particulars of Offence
MAIKELI FREYER &NAWAITABU > between1st day of January, ary, 2015 and 31st day of December, 2015 at Nasinu in the Central Division procured GN to witness an act of gross indecency by displayiur peo the GNGN.
b>COUNTCOUNT SIX
Statement of Offence
SEXUAL ASSAULT: Contrary to section 210(1)(b)(ii) of the Crimes Act 2009.
Particulars of Offence
MAIKELI FREYER NAWAITABU  eentwhe 1st day ofay of January, 2015 and 31st day of December, 2015 at Nasinu in the Central Division procured MN to witness an act of gross indecency by displaying your penis to the saiMN
lign="cgn="centerenter">">COUNT SEVENStatement of Offence
SEXUAL ASSAULT: Contrary to section 210(1)(b)(i) of the Crimes Act 2009.
Particulars of Offence
MAIKELI FREYER NAWAITABU& betweentween the 1st day of January, 2015 and 31st day of December, 2015 at Nasinu in the Central Division procured MN to commit an act of gross indecency by forcing the said MN to hold your penis
Statement of Offence
SEXUAL ASSAULT: Contrary to section 210(1)(b)(ii) of the Crimes Act 2009.
Particulars of Offence
MAIKELI FREYER NAWAITA60;6> betweentween the 1st day of January, 2015 and 31st day of December, 2015 at Nasinu in the Central Division procuredo witan act of gross indecency by displaying your penis to the said JR.
>[3] The victim in the first count of digital rape had been one GN, the victim in the second count of penile rape (an act of fellatio) had been one MN and the victim in the third count of penile rape (an act of fellatio) had been a child (under 13 years of age) named JR. The actual names of the victims had been suppressed.
[4] Attempted rape had been committed against GN while sexual assaults had been carried out against GN, MN and JR.
[5] After full trial, the assessors had expressed an opinion of guilty against the appellant on all counts on 28 November 2018. The learned High Court judge had agreed with the assessors and convicted the appellant of all charges in his judgment on 29 November 2018. He was sentenced on 13 December 2018 to 11 years and 09 months and 15 days of imprisonment with a non-parole period of 07 years, 09 months and 15 days.
[6] The appellant being dissatisfied with the conviction imposed had filed a timely notice of appeal on 09 January 2019 containing eight grounds of appeal. Subsequently, the Legal Aid Commission had filed an amended notice of appeal on 20 April 2020 seeking leave to appeal on 04 grounds of appeal along with written submissions. The respondent’s submissions had been filed on 11 May 2020.
[7] In terms of section 21(1)( b) of the Court of Appeal Act, the appellant could appeal against conviction only with leave of court. The test for leave to appeal is ‘reasonable prospect of success’ (see Caucau v State AAU0029 of 2016: 4 October 2018 [2018] FJCA 171, Navuki v State AAU0038 of 2016: 4 October 2018 [2018] FJCA 172 and State v Vakarau AAU0052 of 2017:4 October 2018 [2018] FJCA 173 and Sadrugu v The State Criminal Appeal No. AAU 0057 of 2015: 06 June 2019 [2019] FJCA87. This threshold is the same with timely leave to appeal applications against sentence as well.
[8] Grounds of appeal urged on behalf of the appellant are as follows
Ground 1
The Learned Trial Judge erred in law and in facts when convicting the Appellant on counts 1 and 2 of rape, when the totality of evidence does not support the charges that the Appellant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Ground 2
The Learned Trial Judge erred in law and in facts when convicting the Appellant on count 4 of attempted rape, when the evidence does not support the charge that the Appellant is guilty beyond a reasonable doubt.
Ground 3
The Learned Trial Judge erred in law by misdirecting the assessors and himself on the elements relating to the offence of sexual assault to which the Appellant is indicted for and that the totality of the evidence does not support the charges of sexual assault for counts 5, 6 and 7.
Ground 4
The Appellant is prejudiced by the learned Trial Judge directing himself and the assessors at paragraph 26 of the summing up that the Court being satisfied that prosecution has adduced sufficient evidence to call for a defence.
[9] The learned High Court judge had summarized the evidence of JR, GN and MN in the summing-up as follows.
‘20. The 1st witness for theecution was was JR. A summary of his evidence is that;
21. The 2nd witness was >. The summasummary of her evidence is that;
22. The PW3 was MN. The summary of his evidence is that;
01 ground of appeal
[10] Under the first ground of appeal the appellant argues that the prosecution had not adduced evidence from GN and MN that the appellant
had committed the acts complained of by force, threats, intimidation or bodily harm to cause fear in them. In other words according
to the appellant there was no evidence to say that the consent was not given freely and voluntarily due to the absence of the factors
outlined in section 206(2) of the Crimes Act.
[11] This argument presupposes that there is a burden on the prosecution to prove the absence of all factors set out under section
206(2) to prove lack of consent or to negate the element of consent required in the offence of rape. In my view, this is a wrong
construction of the law. All what the prosecution has to prove is absence of consent on the part of the victim. This is denoted by
the phrase ‘without the other person’s consent’ in section 207(2)(a) of the Crimes Act.
‘In this Part —
(1) The term "consent" means consent freely and voluntarily given by a person with the necessary mental capacity to give the consent, and the submission without physical resistance by a person to an act of another person shall not alone constitute consent.’
(2) Without limiting sub-section (1), a person’s consent to an act is not freely and voluntarily given if it is obtained —
(a) ................
[13] Thus ‘without consent’ could be either patent lack of consent or consent (even if present outwardly) not given freely
and voluntarily by a person, with the necessary mental capacity to give the consent. The prosecution may prove either of them or
both. For example there can be initial physical resistance and subsequent submission in the same transaction due to any of the reasons
set out in section 206(2) or some other reason inconsistent with the consent.
[14] However, the prosecution does not have to rule out one or more or all instances outlined under section 206(2) to prove the element
of ‘without consent’ in a charge of rape. Sub-section (2) only elaborates without limiting sub-section (1) instances
where consent is not regarded as freely and voluntarily given. Neither does sub-section (2) override sub-section (1). This is the
same with submission without physical resistance which alone would not amount to consent.
[15] The evidence clearly shows that the appellant had committed the acts of rape without the consent of GN and MN. There is no ambiguity
in that regard.
02nd ground of appeal
[16] The appellant’s complaint is that it was not open to safely arrive at a verdict of attempted rape on GN on the evidence
available. In Bulimaiwai v The State [2005] FJHC 261; HAA0068J.2005S (2 September 2005) the elements of attempted rape was set out as follows in the light of section 380 of the Penal Code [there does not seem to be a similar provision in the Crimes Act, 2009 except section 44(2) excluding a mere preparatory act] and
ruled out a mere indecent assault on the evidence led.
‘The elements of the offence of attempted rape are first that the accused intended to have carnal knowledge without consent, and second that he did some overt act to put his intention into execution. Often the intent to rape is implied from the nature of the overt act. A touching of the breasts may only constitute an indecent assault. An attempt to take off underclothes together with a touching of the breasts may constitute a sufficient overt act. A great deal depends on the circumstances of each case.
The “overt acts” in this case were the holding of the complainant’s hand, the pulling of the complainant towards the porch, the holding of the complainant against the wall, the pulling up of her skirt, the touching of her private parts, the pushing of the complainant to the floor, and the Appellant’s act of bending down and unbuttoning of his trousers. Together with these acts, he told her to keep her mouth shut and “to come here” and to shut her mouth or he would punch her. He only desisted when she threatened to tell the father of her daughter, a fellow police officer. All that was left for the Appellant to do, was to attempt a penetration. His aggressive conduct makes it clear that he was doing what he was doing despite her lack of consent to that conduct.
In Harnd v. State Crim. A3 of 2005LAB, I foun found that where the Appellant pushed the victim onto a bed, lifted up her dress, pulled down his own trousers and put his hand over her mouth when she struggled, accompany a request for sexual inte intercourse, there was sufficient evidence to prove both the overt acts and the intention to rape. It is essentially a question of fact whether the offender’s acts are sufficiently overt or proximate (R v. Patnaik [2000] 3 Arc News 2)./i>
[17] In Raj v State [2009] FJHC 31; HAA108J.2008 (6 February 2009) the evidence that "He pushed me to the ground. He lay on top of me. He took his penis and tried to
insert it into my vagina. I tried to shout. He closed my mouth, by putting his hand on my mouth.", was held to prove attempted rape.
In Epironi Levukaiciwa & Alifereti Tokona v. State [2002] HAA 087/01S (28 March 2002) , an act of lying on top of the victim with the intention of having sexualrcourse was held to be an o an overt
act sufficient to prove an attempt. In Tiare Bobo v. The St160;[1999] HAA 0049/99B (23 August 1999), Fatiaheld that where the accused undressed himself, the only irry irresistible conclusion to be reached was
that he intended to have sexual intercourse with the victim who was struggling.
[18] The evidence of GN is that when she was picking Cassava, the accused had pushed her down and pulling his pants down had tried
to pull her Sulu down. When she had fallen on the ground the accused knelt down and tried to lie down on top of her. At that moment,
the victim had screamed and ran home pushing the accused away. There is clearly an attempt to commit rape. Her evidence on attempted
rape should be considered also in the light of her own evidence on the appellant’s act of rape earlier committed. He could
not have intended to do anything other than committing an act of rape on GN.
03 ground of appeal
[19] The appellant challenges the convictions on charges 5, 6 and 7 relating to sexual assault on the basis that the trial judge had
misdirected the assessors in paragraph 19 of the summing-up to the extent that the directions were on section 210(1)(a) whereas the
information laid the charges under section 219(1)(b)(ii) of the Crimes Act, on the elements of the offence of sexual assault and
the evidence did not support the convictions on those charges.
[20] It is true that the directions had been on the elements of sexual assault as described section 210(1)(a) of the Crimes Act. While
recognizing the error, the crucial question would be whether there was evidence to sustain the charges under section 219(1)(b)(ii)
of the Crimes Act, for otherwise the misdirection cannot be said to have caused a miscarriage of justice. The evidence was clearly
enough to uphold the charge under section 219(1)(b)(ii) of the Crimes Act.
[21] The counsel for the appellant seems to admit in his written submissions that there is evidence to support the charges in counts
8, 5 and 7 and I agree with his position. However, he argues that the evidence does not prove count 07 which is based on the evidence
of MN which was as follows
‘The accused has called him and when gone, the accused has taken the hand of the witness and put it inside his underwear. The
hand of the witness has touched the penis of the accused and the witness has pulled his hand out. The witness further testifies that
he has not been agreeable to such an act and the accused knew it’
[22] The counsel’s argument appears to be that there is no witnessing an act of gross decency by MN. Instead, MN had been subjected
to an act of gross decency by the appellant which is clearly an indecent assault on MN by the appellant contrary to section 210(1)(a)
of the crimes Decree.
[23] Thus, the appellant could have been convicted for sexual assault under section 210(1)(a) of the Crimes Decree, where consent
of the victim is immaterial, and section 210(1)(a) also carries the same sentence as for an offence under section 219(1)(b)(ii) of
the Crimes Act. Therefore, the learned trial judge’s error has not caused a miscarriage of justice and there is no reasonable
prospect of success of his appeal on this ground before the Full Court.
4th ground of appeal
[24] The appellant challenges the learned High Court judge’s direction in paragraph 26 of the summing-up on the premise that
the trial judge ought to have refrained from such a direction.
‘26.With the leading of the above evidence prosecution closed their case and the Court being satisfied that the prosecution
has adduced sufficient evidence to call for a defense, acting under the virtue of section 231(2), of the Criminal Procedure Decree,
called for a defense explaining the rights of the accused’.
[25] I agree with the appellant’s counsel’s submission that the trial judge would have desirably refrained from using
the phrase ‘the Court being satisfied that the prosecution has adduced sufficient evidence’ lest it might be construed
by the assessors that the trial judge had been already satisfied with the prosecution evidence and therefore they would have to
follow suit or at least there might be a risk that the assessors may do so. Judges should always be mindful to avoid similar expressions
in the summing-up. Yet, it cannot per se vitiate the validity of the verdict of guilty or the legitimacy of the trial as held in
Raqio v State [2020] FJCA 6; AAU61 of 2015 (27 February 2020).
[26] Further, the assessors are not deciders of fact in Fiji and their role is that of rendering assistance to the trial judge on facts. In Rokopeta v Stu>&#/b> [2016] FJSC 33; CAV0009, 0016, 0018, 0019.2016 (26 August 2016 Suprourt held on the role of assessors and the judge udge as follows.
‘58.R.‘In Noa Maya v. The State <[2015] FJSC 30; CAV 009. 2015 (23 Octob15] his Lordship Sir Keith, J said at paragraph 21:
“...in Fiji..iji...the opinion of the equivalent of the jurors – the assessors – is not decisive. In Fiji, although the judge will obviously want to take into account the considered view of the assessors, it is the judge who ultimately decides whether the defendant is guilty or not”.
[27] Therefore, when the judge has independently considered the cases against the appellant and agreed with assessors and viewed
in the light of the above legal position the complaint of the appellant pales into insignificance.
[28] Therefore, there is no reasonable prospect of success in the appellant’s appeal against conviction.
Order
Hon. Mr. Justice C. Prematilaka
JUSTICE OF APPEAL
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