Deo v State [2003] FJCA 66; AAU0015.2000S & AAU0016.2000S (27 November 2003)

IN THE COURT OF APPEAL, FIJI ISLANDS
ON APPEAL FROM THE HIGH COURT OF FIJI

CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. AAU0015 OF 2000S
CRIMINAL APPEAL NO. AAU0016 OF 2000S
(High Court Criminal Action No. 4 of 1999L)

BETWEEN:

BARAM DEO
Appellant

AND:

THE STATE
Respondent

AND

BETWEEN:

SHIU CHAND
Appellant

AND:

THE STATE
Respondent

Coram: Barker, JA
Tompkins, JA
Pathik, JA

Hearing: 20 November 2003, Suva

Counsel: Appellants in Person
Mr. J. M. Rabuku for the Respondent

Date of Judgment: Thursday 27th November, 2003

JUDGMENT OF THE COURT

[1] The appellants have applied for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court against the judgment of this court delivered on 16 May 2003 dismissing their appeal against their conviction in the High Court at Labasa of murder.

[2] In the Court of Appeal the appellants were represented by counsel. The grounds of their appeal to that court were summarised in its decision:

“First that the appellant Chand was wrongfully arrested and that this vitiates what followed; second the police officers failed to explain their Constitutional rights to each appellant at the caution interviews and so the statements are inadmissible; third the police brutalized the appellants at interview and so the statements were inadmissible; fourth the appellant Chand was not allowed to call a witness; and finally the summing up was inadequate.”

[3] In its decision, the court dealt expressly with each of these grounds. It held that the first ground was made out. The arrest was illegal. However that did not render evidence subsequently obtained inadmissible. The court concluded that none of the other grounds of appeal were made out. The result was that leave to appeal was granted but the appeals were dismissed.

[4] In the letters containing their application for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court, each applicant has set out the grounds they wish to advance in support of their appeals. We have considered these grounds carefully. They are for all practical purposes identical to the grounds advanced in support of their appeal to this court.

[5] At the hearing of the application for leave, we invited each applicant to advance any issues of significant public importance that they considered arose out of their appeals. They were unable to do so. Rather they again repeated the same grounds as those advanced on their appeal to this court and those set out in their applications for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court.

[6] Section 122 (2) (a) of the Constitution provides that this Court may give leave to appeal on a question certified by it to be of significant public importance. The clear intention of the section is that there is not to be a general right of appeal to the Supreme Court. To justify this court issuing a certificate, this court must be satisfied that one or more questions to be considered on the appeal are not only of public importance but are of significant public importance.

[7] No such question arises on the present applications. The applicants are seeking to re-argue the same issues that were before this court, all of which concern the factual situation of their particular cases and none of which can be said to be of significant public importance.

[8] The applicants have asked this court to grant them legal aid. That is beyond the jurisdiction of this court. Any application for legal aid must be made to the Legal Aid Commission. Each applicant did apply to that Commission for legal aid. Their applications were declined by letter dated 24 September 2003. There is a right of appeal against that decision, but that appeal is not to this court.

[9] The application by each applicant for leave to appeal to the Supreme Court is dismissed.

Barker, JA
Tompkins, JA
Pathik, JA

Solicitors
Appellants In Person
Office of the Director of Public Prosecution office Suva for the Respondent