PacLII Home | Databases | WorldLII | Search | Feedback

High Court of the Cook Islands - Land Division

You are here:  PacLII >> Databases >> High Court of the Cook Islands - Land Division >> 2019 >> [2019] CKLC 11

Database Search | Name Search | Recent Decisions | Noteup | LawCite | Download | Help

  Download original PDF


Ariki, In re [2019] CKLC 11; Application 104 of 2018 (20 May 2019)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF THE COOK ISLANDS
HELD AT RAROTONGA
(LAND DIVISION)

APPLICATION NO. 104/18


IN THE MATTER of the Declaratory Judgments Act 1994


AND
IN THE MATTER of the land known as ARERENGA SECTION 7, ARORANGI


AND

IN THE MATTER of an Order on Investigation of Title made by the Court on 6 August 1907
BY TINOMANA ARIKI of Rarotonga, Landowner (Atu Enua)
Applicant


Hearing: 19 April 2018


Appearances: Mr T Moore for the Applicant
Mrs T Browne for the Objector


Decision: 20 May 2019

___________________________________________________________________________


DECISION OF JUSTICE W W ISAAC
___________________________________________________________________________


Introduction

[1] This decision relates to an application by Tinomana Ariki for declaratory orders. The applicant seeks to interpret an order of investigation of title made on 6 August 1907 in respect to Allotment 7, Arerenga.
[2] That order stated:
[3] The applicant seeks the following orders:
[4] If the orders are made as sought, the applicant will then seek to challenge succession orders of 1942 and 1965 under s 390A of the Cook Islands Act, as well as the succession order to Arerenga 7 as atu enua. It should be noted that these applications under s 390A had already been filed at the time of hearing.

The Law

[5] Section 3(1) Declaratory Judgments Act 1994 provides:
[6] Section 4 Declaratory Judgments Act 1994 provides:
[7] Section 9 Declaratory Judgments Act 1994 provides:
[8] Section 10 Declaratory Judgments Act 1994 provides:

The Issues

[9] Both counsel have raised a number of issues in the submissions filed.
[10] In my view the two issues which must be considered before all others include:

Jurisdiction

The Applicant’s submissions

[11] The applicant submitted that they seek nothing more than an interpretation of the order of investigation of title made on 6 August 1907. The application does not challenge the validity of that order.
[12] They argue the lack of definition of the Court order in s 3 gives the Court latitude as a matter of policy to consider whether a Court order might be a document of title.
[13] It was also submitted that s 3 uses the word ‘instrument’ and, in the alternative, the order of investigation of title might fit in this definition.
[14] Mr Moore submitted that this case can be distinguished from Tavioni[1] in that the purpose and effect of the declarations is not to challenge the order of investigation of title but interpret it.
[15] Finally, it was submitted that unlike Tavioni no facts in this case are in dispute. The questions here are purely legal with factual matters left to the s 390A applications.

The Respondent’s submissions

[16] In response, Mrs Browne firstly submitted that it was not clear that any of the declarations sought properly relate to the list of documents subject to s 3(1) Declaratory Judgments Act. It is not an instrument prescribing the powers of a body corporate and it is not a document of title. Mrs Browne referred to the statement in Tavioni that a Court order does not fit any of the categories set out in s 3(1) Declaratory Judgments Act.[2]
[17] She submitted that the facts of this application cannot be distinguished from Tavoini. The purpose for which an application under the Declaratory Judgments Act is sought does not and cannot change the meaning of any definition in the Declaratory Judgments Act.
[18] Further Mrs Browne disputes Mr Moore’s submission and states that the facts are in dispute. These facts include the circumstances in which the 1907 order was made; the circumstances of the 1942 and 1965 succession orders; the relationship of Upokoina Nena to Rangi Ati; and whether the applicant is a successor of the Tinomana recorded in the 1907 order.

Discussion

[19] Section 3 of the Declaratory Judgments Act provides that a declaratory judgment can only be made in relation to the following instruments:
[20] I found in Tavioni that “a Court order did not fit any of these categories”.[3]
[21] Mr Moore for the applicant submitted that Tavioni could be distinguished because in Tavioni the declaratory orders were sought to invalidate a Court order. In the present case the declaratory orders are instead sought to interpret a Court order.
[22] Mrs Browne submitted that Tavioni could not be distinguished as the purpose of the declaratory order does not change the categories set out in s 3(1) Declaratory Judgments Act.
[23] S 3(1) of the Declaratory Judgments Act sets out clearly the instruments to which a declaratory order can be made.
[24] Mr Moore has looked to various definitions of instruments and submitted that in terms of those definitions, an order on investigation of title may fit a document of title or an instrument prescribing the powers of a body corporate. Mrs Browne disagrees and simply states a Court order is neither an instrument prescribing the powers of a body corporate or a document of title.
[25] I cannot agree with Mr Moore. An order on investigation of title, and therefore the order subject to this application, is plainly an order of the Court. Section 2(1) of the Cook Islands Act 1915 defines a Court order as “in respect of the Island Court, any order, judgment, decision, or determination of that Court”
[26] By the above, a Court order is clearly not one of the categories set out in s 3(1)aratory Judgments Act aAct and whether the purpose of the declaratory order is to invalidate the order or interpret it, the answer is the same. To decide otherwise would be to look past the pmeaning of the words in than that section and the intention of Parliament in omitting orders from the list of matters subject to declaratory judgment. My decision in Tavioni stands, a Court order is not subject to s 3eclaratory Judgments Act. [27] On this basis I conclude that I do not have jurisdiction in the terms of s 3(1) Declaratory Judgments Act to interpret rder on investigation of title of 1907.

S>Should the Court exercise its jurisdiction to make the declaratory orders sought?

[28] Notwithstanding that I have found I have no jurisdiction in this matter, for completeness I consider this second issue.
[29] Section 10 of the Declaratory Judgments Act provides the Court with a wide discretion to exercise its jurisdiction in terms of the Act and the Court may “on any grounds which it deems sufficient, refuse to give or make any such judgement or order.”

Submissions

[30] Mrs Browne has submitted that the orders sought under the Declaratory Judgments Act are unnecessary because these are the legal issues the s 390A application will address. She further questioned the effect of any such orders on the ability of the Chief Justice to exercise his discretion in considering those issues.
[31] Mr Moore has confirmed that should the Chief Justice dismiss his application under s 390A, the declaratory judgment he now seeks would be meaningless. The current application is sought in order to clarify the applicant’s standing should the 390A application succeed and result in the cancellation of succession orders. He conceded it is possible the applications are being heard in the wrong order.
[32] Mr Moore also confirmed in the proceedings under s 390A he would seek to clarify who is entitled to the land according to the succession orders of 1942 and 1965.

Discussion

[33] As I indicated at the hearing on 19 April 2018, I considered the issues in the present applications and the s 390A application are intertwined.
[34] The issues in the present application will include issues canvassed by the s 390A application. As Mr Moore has stated the answers he seeks in the declaratory applications will be used to support the s 390A applications.
[35] In terms of s 4 of the Declaratory Judgments Act a declaratory order is binding on the parties. That being said, I must question whether it is appropriate to consider this application before the s 390A. I am of the view that to fetter or otherwise divert the decision of the Chief Justice in these circumstances would fit poorly with the proper exercise of his jurisdiction.
[36] The jurisdiction to make declaratory orders is wide and having regard to the above I do not consider it is appropriate to make declarations as to the meaning of an order on investigation of title which may be considered at a later time by the Chief Justice.
[37] Accordingly, I decline to exercise any jurisdiction in this matter.

Conclusion

[38] For the reasons set out I make the following determinations:

Pronounced in Gisborne on this 20th day of May 2019.


W W Isaac
JUSTICE


[1] Tavioni v Cook Islands Christian Church Incorporated of Avarua [2016] CKLC 2; Application 196.2014 (24 November 2016).
[2] Above n 1 at [23].
[3] Above n 1 at [23].


PacLII: Copyright Policy | Disclaimers | Privacy Policy | Feedback
URL: http://www.paclii.org/ck/cases/CKLC/2019/11.html