Regina v Butland [2010] CKHC 58; CRI 2008-044-07390 (17 August 2010)

IN THE HIGH COURT OF NEW ZEALAND
AUCKLAND REGISTRY
CRI-2008-044-07390

REGINA

V

MATHEW JOHN BUTLAND
WAYNE JOHN CLARKEE
KATHLEEN ROBYN GARRITY
WANZHE GUI
MICHAEL ANTHONY LUAMANU
FRASER SAMUEL MILHAM
GLENDA JOY PHILLPS
ULAIASI PULETE
TAI BONG RHEE
MATTEW VAVE SCHWENKE
ARTHUR WILLIAM TAYLOR
ERNST TOFAEONO

"OPERATION SPIDER WEB"

Hearing:17 August 2010

Counsel: David Johnstone for Crown (on contempt application)
Bruce Northwood for Crown (on all other applications)
Mr. Taylor in person
No appearance by or behalf of other accused

Judgment: -

RESERVED JUDGMENT OF HUGH WILLIAMS J.

This judgment was delivered by
The Hon. Justice Hugh Williams
On
.............................................................
pursuant to Rule 11.5 of the High Court Rules

.....................................................
Registrar/Deputy Registrar

1. Mr Taylor’s contempt of Court application is dismissed.
2. Mr Taylor’s application concerning Mr Andrews is dismissed.

100. Mr Taylor’s application for additional disclosure is adjourned part-heard.

4. The Crown is granted leave to file an amended indictment in the form attached to its application.
5. The Crown is to file its Application for Severance within 7 days of delivery of this judgment.
   

Introduction

[1] This fixture was convened to consider the following outstanding interlocutory applications in relation to the “Operation Spider Web” trial or trials:

1. Mr Taylor’s application for an order holding Mr Northwood and the Crown Solicitor at Auckland in contempt for failing timeously to comply with a timetable order made by Andrews J on 17 December 2010.
   
2. Mr Taylor’s application for a direction to the Department of Corrections to enable him to interview and call a possible witness at his trial, a Mr Andrews.
   

100. Mr Taylor’s application for further disclosure in relation to “Operations Spider and Web”.
     

4. The Crown’s application for leave to file an amended indictment under s 345D of the Crimes Act 1961.
   

Contempt Application

[2] As is to be expected in a prosecution involving as many accused as this - especially a prosecution based largely on intercepted conversations - the management of the prosecution has involved a considerable amount of effort on the part of the Crown and the Court (and, of course, the accused and their counsel).

[3] In any prosecution such as this, a large number of pre-trial applications almost inevitably need to be determined, and this, as inevitably, results in delays in readying the prosecution for trial.

[4] As far as the Court is concerned, oversight and management of a prosecution such as this requires considerable judicial input, often from different Judges.

[5] As part of that input, on 17 December 2009 Andrews J held a Special Callover concerning this prosecution to identify pre-trial matters that required hearing, set timetables and allocate fixtures. Throughout this matter Mr Taylor has acted for himself and, so far as he was concerned, the Judge observed:

[9] Mr Taylor raised the matter of his compliance with the timetable directions set out earlier. He advised the Court that the outcome of his application heard recently before White J may have an impact on his ability to prepare submissions. He also advised that the content of an affidavit to be filed and served by the Crown by 5pm on 18 December 2009 (relating to the disclosure of information in the possession or control of the Police, relevant to the four charges against him) may also have an impact.

[10] Mr Taylor was advised that, if necessary, that matter can be dealt with before the allocated hearing date for pre-trial applications.

[11] Mr Taylor also advised that he has experienced difficulties in having material sent to him by way of service. Mr Northwood has advised the Court that material that can be faxed to Mr Taylor will be faxed, but bulkier material will be sent by courier. Mr Northwood has said that he will ensure that a telephone call is made to the Prison authorities, to alert them to material being couriered for delivery to Mr Taylor. I ask that the Prison authorities ensure that material that is sent to Mr Taylor, whether by fax or courier or by any other means, is delivered to him at the earliest available opportunity.

[6] At that point, the indictment contained a charge alleging that 11 of the accused, including Mr Taylor, conspired to manufacture methamphetamine between 16 May 2007 and 3 September 2008 and, in the usual way, the accused was seeking particulars of the acts on which the Crown was intending to rely to prove the conspiracy, together with particulars of the other counts as well. In her Minute of 17 December 2009, Andrews J derected Mr Northwood – who has had the principal carriage of this prosecution from the outset – to provide particulars of any counts by 15 January 2nd to use his “best endeavours to do so earlier”#8221;. The Judge directed that any outstanding pre-trial defence applications by Mr Taylor and others were to be filed and served by 29 January 2010 with normal timetable orders consequent on that leading up to those applications being heard. Mr Taylor said that, before Andrews J set the timetables, she inquired of Mr Nort and was assured as to s to his capacity to comply with them.

[7] The Crown did not comply with the timetable by providhe directed particulars by 15 January 2010. They were not provided until 25 January 2010.
[8] Its default in that regard led immediately to Mr Taylor preparing a contempt application dated 25 January 2010 (date-stamped by the Court 28 January 2010) together with a memorandum in support. The memorandum said Mr Taylor had been seeking particulars of the charges against him since 21 September 2009, a request he had repeated at least twice before Andrews J’s Minute, and had complained to the Court on 20 January 2010 of the Crown’s default in compliance. The memorandum submitted Mr Taylor was compromised in his ability to prepare his defence, including pre-trial applications, by reason of that delay, a submission he repeated at this fixture. The Memorandum continued:

7. The failure to comply with the direction of Justice Andrews is a disregard of this Honourable Court’s authority.

8. There is a significant public interest in ensuring that the impression that orders of the Court can be ignored with impunity and disobedience of them carries little or no consequence does not gain ground.

9. If litigants lose confidence that the Court is able and willing to ensure its directions and orders are adhered to, public confidence in the administration of justice will be undermined. It must be even more concerning when it is the Crown that is in breach of the order.

10. The Applicant has consulted legal counsel in relation to this application and applies for the costs incurred in relation to that to be ordered against the Crown Solicitor.

[9] It must immediately be said there seems to be nothing before the Court to support paragraph 10 of the memorandum.

[10] Unfortunately, Mr Taylor’s contempt application does not seem to have been handled administratively in the optimum fashion by the Registry. No hearing date was allocated and Mr Taylor, justifiably, complained on a number of occasions.

[11] It was only when superintendence of the file was taken over by Hugh Williams J in May 2010 that the contempt application was resurrected and a fixture made.

[12] Mr Taylor’s submissions at the fixture essentially reflected the terms of his earlier memorandum and, although he acknowledged that the Christmas vacation 2009/2010 might reasonably be expected to have impacted on the Crown’s ability to comply with Andrews J’s timetable, he again said it compromised his ability to prepare his pre-trial applications and his substantive defence for a hearing. He submitted contempt matters of this sort should be matters of strict liability.

[13] For obvious reasons, Mr Northwood did not argue the contempt application at this hearing. For the Crown, Mr Johnstone submitted that the admitted facts disclosed no evidence of intentional wrongdoing and fell well short of the tests for contempt.

[14] The Court agrees with Mr Johnstone’s submissions. Whilst it is, of course, undeniable that timetables, directions and other orders of the Court should be strictly complied with, compliance is by no means universal whether in civil or criminal matters – and it would be unstic to e to expect universal compliance. Breaches, especially of timetables, often occur and, unless repeated or extreme or placontemptuous, seldom attract significant sanctions, certainly not the sanction of a findingnding of contempt of Court.

[15] As mentioned, this is a complex prosecution involving large numbers of documents, witnesses, evidential transcripts, pre-trial applications and possible complex questions of law. Whilst full compliance with timetables and other directions would be desirable, to expect such would lack reality, ignore the pressure on litigants and their counsel of other business – not just in this, but in most civil and criminal cases – and would pay no attention to the fact that, in virtually every instance, lack of compliance with timetables occasions no, or no significant, prejudice to others or the Court’s process.

[16] Indeed, as the extract from Andrews J’s Minute makes plain, while Mr Taylor is remarkgood about bout complying with timetables and directions given his position as a maximum security prisoner in Auckland Prison, total compliance sometimes eludesand the Crown (both in a prosecutorial and in a civil sensesense) makes allowances, as does the Court.

[17] Further, it is somewhat difficult to accept Mr Taylor’s submission that his ability to prepare for pre-trial applications and the trial itself was severely compromised by the Crown’s 10 day delay in complying with Andrews J’s directions given, first, that he has been involved in at least two pre-trial fixtures and a number of callovers since January 2010 and, secondly, that the trial or trials of “Operation Spider and Web” are so complex and lengthy that no hearing is possible before 2011.

[18] For all those reasons, the Court concludes that the Crown’s 10 day default in compliance with Andrews J’s orders of 17 December 2009, whilst regrettable, comes nowhere near being a contempt of Court.

[19] Mr Taylor’s contempt application is accordingly dismissed.

Access to Witness

[20] On 17 February 2010 Mr Taylor sought an order from the Court requiring the Crown to give an undertaking that adequate facilities would be made available to enable him to interview a Mr Andrews and to ensure the interview took place in a manner which would protect the privilege in s 56 of the Evidence Act 2006.

[21] Mr Andrews was originally a co-accused with Mr Taylor in this matter but was discharged at the preliminary hearing stage. Mr Taylor believes Mr Andrews has evidence which might assist the former and wishes to interview him with a view to calling him as a defence witness. He said Mr Andrews has no objection to being interviewed, and has so advised the Department of Corrections, but the Department is refusing to facilitate the interview claiming that Mr Andrews must register as a “private visitor” - a category designed for families, friends and associates of prisoners - before he will be permitted to speak with Mr Taylor. Mr Taylor’s memorandum said Mr Andrews is reluctant to follow this course because it would mean the disclosure of personal information by him to the Department. Mr Taylor also does not want Mr Andrews to have to register as a “private visitor”, He also said the Department was refusing to register Mr Andrews as a “special visitor”.

[22] Mr Taylor repeated those submissions at this hearing and added that Judge Treston had issued a similar order concerning four serving prisoners in another criminal prosecution in which Mr Taylor is involved.

[23] Since this hearing Mr Taylor, on 26 August 2010, filed a memorandum attaching Judge Treston’s memorandum of 30 June 2010 in the summary prosecution against Mr Taylor in the North Shore District Court.[1] That memorandum has been read. It applies to different circumstances than those which apply to “Operation Spider” – not least that it deals with serving prisoners, not a member of the public – and it is apparent that the issue of jurisdiction was not addressed when Judge Treston directed the Department of Corrections to facilitate Mr Taylor’s access to the witnesses he sought to interview. With respect, Judge Treston’s order does not therefore address the same issues as arise in this case and, even if it did, this Court’s view is that it provides no precedent for Mr Taylor’s application in “Operations Spider and Web”.

[24] Mr Northwood said he had no instructions to appear on behalf of the Department of Corrections.

[25] That being the case, the opportunity was taken the following day to ask Ms Caseyding counsel for the Dthe Department of Corrections in judicial review proceedings Mr Taylor has brought,[2] what Corrections&#82ttitude was likely to be to this application. She referred rred to an affidavit sworn by Mr Puohotaua in those proceedings, paragraphs 19 and 20 of which deal with the conditions attaching to visits to prisoners at Auckland Prison.

[26] Putting a régime in place – whether by Court order or otherwise – to enable one serving prisoner to interview other serving prisoners for the purpose of a separate criminal proceeding is plainly different in degree and quality from putting a régime in place – again whether by Court order or otherwise – to enable a serving prisoner to interview a member of the public concerning a different criminal prosecution. For that reason alone, Mr Taylor’s present application appears to be misconceived.

[27] In the context of the present prosecution, it also appears to be misdirected since, if granted, it would be directing an organ of State which has no part to play in this criminal prosecution to undertake certain actions when it has had no opportunity to express a view as to the practicality of the course proposed.

[28] Thirdly, though Mr Taylor relied on s 25(f) of the New Zealand Bill of Rights Act 1990 (“NZBoRA”) – the right to “... obtain the attendance and examination of witnesses for the defence” under the same conditions as the prosecution - the Court’s jurisdiction to make the orders sought by Mr Taylor is by nos clear-cut.-cut. The two leading New Zealand texts on NZBoRA point to no authority to make an order such as Mr Taylor seeks.[3]

[29] An accused at tri “entitled to call sull such witnesses as he thinks fit”[4] but that right is not untrammelled.[5] As is commonplace, the interests of justice appear to be the overriding criterion.

[30] It is important to keep in mind that what Mr Taylor is seeking at this stage is not to call Mr Andrews as a witness at trial – though he may do that in due course – but to interview Mr Andrews in order to prepare for trial. It is also clear that, provided Mr Taylor and Mr Andrews are prepared to comply with the restrictions necessarily imposed by Mr Taylor’s circumstances, Mr Taylor can interview Mr Andrews for trpose he seeksseeks.

[31] Mr Taylor is a maximum security serving prisoner in New Zealand’s highest security prison and is determined – as is his right – to represemself at trial. Those factsfacts must be recognised. Mr Andrews may be disinclined to comply with the obligations with which all other visitors to Paremoremo Prison are required to comply (other than family) but, if he does, it is not for this Court – especially without direct input from Corrections – to create a special régime so that Mr Taylor can interview Mr Andrews. The only statutory addition to the conditions pursuant to which Mr Taylor may interview Mr Andrews is that Mr Taylor is entitled to the circumstances of any such interview not infringing Mr Taylor’s privilege as a party to this prosecution which applies to communications between Mr Andrews and himself.

[32] Having said that, it would appear the appropriate course at this stage is to dismiss Mr Taylor’s application, leaving it to him to bring such further proceedings or make a fresh application as seems appropriate in the future.

[33] Mr Taylor’s application concerning Mr Andrews is accordingly dismissed.

Application for further disclosure in relation to “Operations Spider and Web”.

[34] Currently, Mr Taylor and his co-accused face an indictment charging them in various combinations with one count each of manufacturing methamphetamine, conspiring to manufacture methamphetamine and conspiring to supply methamphetamine plus two counts each of supplying methamphetamine and possession of methamphetamine for supply, and 15 counts of importing pseudoephedrine.

[35] On 29 April 2010 the Court dismissed the Crown’s applications under s 340(3) and 345D(1) to sever Messrs Taylor and Clarke from the existing indictment and for leave to file an amended indictment against them. In its Reasons for Judgment delivered on 3 May 2010 the Court directed the Crown to reconsider its position, particularly as far as Messrs Taylor and Clarke were concerned, in the interests if more efficient trial management if that could be achieved without prejudice to the accused.

[36] In the result, the Crown now seeks leave to file an amended indictment (see next application) charging the accused with three counts of offering to supply methamphetamine, six of conspiring to supply methamphetamine, one of manufacture, two of conspiring to manufacture methamphetamine, five of possessing methamphetamine for supply and 33 counts of supplying methamphetamine. More particularly, it proposes to divide the indictment temporally into four counts against Messrs Taylor, Pulete and Clarke relating to the May/June 2007 period of the first set of interception warrants and the rest of the charges, which only involves Mr Pulete of the first trnd whnd which relate to the May/September 2008 interception warrants period. The May/July 2007 warrants were code-named “Operation Spider” an May/September 2008 warrants code-named “Operationation Web”.

[37] Though seeking leave to file the new combined indictment – an application discussed in the next section of this judgment – the Crown has not yet, unaccountably, filed an application for severance.

[38] As far as disclosure is concerned, Mr Taylor said the Police had disclosed to him what would appear to be all the disclosable material relating to “Operation Web” but, sinces e is not charged with any offences arising out of that Operation, the material is of little if any relevance. But he said thatdate, he has received no disclosure bar the evidential transcripts, the interception warranarrants, redacted supporting affidavit and a CD-ROM in relation to “Operation Spider”. He particularly seeks Police job sheets, notebooks, and the like.

[39] Mr Northwood said that, so far as he is aware, all disclosable material relating to “Operation Spider” had been sent to Mr Taylor, but he would do a further check. He made the point that in this Court’s Minute of 29 June 2010[6] Mr Taylor was asked to advise the Crown of, amongst other things, the nature of the material which he submitted was disclosable and which he had not received. Mr Northwood pointed to the résumé of Mr Taylor’s various applications concerning disclosure appearing in this Court’s Minute of 30 July 2010.

[40] Mr Northwood also made the point that it was as a result the grant of the interception warrants in Rotorua in May/July 2007 that the Police came to suspect there was drug-dealing in and from Auckland Prison involving Mr Taylor and others, and began investigating that possibility.

[41] At the present time – stressing that aspect of this prosecution – Mr Taylor, as a co-accused in a combined indictment containing all the charges arising out of both “Operations Spider and Web” is entitled to disclosure of all the material relating to all the charges. In that respect, his position is no different from the other accused.

[42] But if leave is granted to amend the indictment, and if the Crown then successfully applies to sever the May/July 2007 charges from the balance of the indictment, Mr Taylol only be entitled to d to disclosure of the relevant “Operation Spider” material. In his memorandum supporting his opposition to the s 345D cation, Mr Taylor also produced a chronology which bears onrs on the disclosure question, particularly relating to a Mr Ashby who faced charges of murder and possessing and manufacturing methamphetamine arising out of “Operation Spider” but with the drug dealing offences dismissed at the preliminary hearing. Mr Taylor complains he has no disclosable material relating to why that happened.

[43] In light of the above observations, the preferable course is to adjourn this application part-heard, first, to await the results of Mr Northwood’s check with Police; secondly, to await the result of the Crown’s application for leave to amend the indictment; and, more importantly, the outcome of its forecast severance application as they obviously have the potential to impact significantly on disclosure issues.

[44] That is not an indication that the Court necessarily accepts Mr Taylor’s criticism of the “Operation Spider” disclosure he has received to date. The material earlier discussed makes clear that he may well believe he is entitled to disclosure of a significant volume of material which the prosecution is under no legal duty to disclose to him – but that can await the future.

[45] In formal terms, Mr Taylor’s application for additional disclosure is adjourned part-heard.

[46] The above was drafted prior to receiving the Crown’s memorandum dated 24 August 2010 regarding the briefs of evidence in this case, and Mr Taylor’s memorandum of 26 August 2010.

[47] The former advised that Mr Taylor was supplied with all briefsvidence relevant at the deposition hearing and, since that that time, has been supplied with 16 further briefs which were not available at the time of the depositions hearing, plus 1290 documents including various disks containing information. The Crown tahe view that it has, at least currently, complied with its disclosure obligations.


[48] Mr Taylor, however, said that he cannot rely on the depositions briefs as being those of witnesses on whom the Crown intends relying at trial and says that he –

“should have been supplied with copies of briefs of evidence and a list of exhibits that the Crown intends relying on in relation to me, so I know exactly what case I have to meet. That has not been done.”

[49] The answer to all of that is that the disclosure position will need to be reviewed following determination of the Crown’s forecast severance application. If that application is unsuccessful, then Mr Taylor (and all other accused) will be entitled to disclosure of all material relevant to both “Operation Spider” and “Operation Web” whereas, if the severance application is granted, Mr Taylor will only be entitled to disclosure of relevant material concerning “Operation Spider”.

[50] The Court accordingly confirms its earlier determination that Mr Taylor’s application for additional disclosure should be adjourned part-heard.

Application for leave to amend indictment under s 345D

[51] As mentioned, the Crown applied for leave under s 345D to file the amended indictment earlier described. If that application is granted, it proposes to apply for severance of the four “Operation Spider” counts covering from May-June 2007 from the balance of the indictment, those covering January-September 2008 and arising from “Operation Web”. Given that time has been provisionally set aside for the hearing of those two trials at the beginning of 2011, no reason springs automatically to mind why the severance application could not have been brought and dealt with, if appropriate, at this hearing.

[52] Mr Taylor opposed the granting of leave, partly because he submitted what the Crown proposed was more than an amendment under s 345D, but principally because he submitted that to grant the application would deprive him of his right to seek a discharge under s 347 and because of delays on the Crown’s part in bringing the charges it now proposes he face. The cases on which Mr Taylor relies are discussed later in this judgment.

[53] The power conferred by s 345D to grant leave for the prosecution to file an amended indictment can only be granted if a Judge considers that the filing of such an indictment would be “conducive to the ends of justice”.[7]

[54] The approach to applications such as the present is as set out in Adams on Criminal Law[8] where the following appears:

CA345D.02 Considerations relevant to granting of consent
The principal consideration in determining applications to file an amended indictment under this section is whether the ends of justice require it: R v G 7/7/03, CA65/03. The court has to take into account the interests of all parties and balance the public interests as well as the rights of the accused to a fair and speedy trial: R v Martin 23/11/00, CA214/00; compare R v Rapatini (19998) 16 CRNZ 311 and R v E (1999) 17 CRNZ 40. ... The Court should consider the prior course of the proceedings (R v Cumming (2002) 20 CRNZ 30 (CA). The principles relevant to an application to amend an indictment under s 335 are also relevant to s 345D applications: R v Martin and v Rapatiniatini. In R v Martin, it was said that:

“The crucial consideration in both situations is prejudice to the accused person.fact that an accused person may have conducted his case on e on one basis and be unable to recast it to meet charges that are amended during trial is determinative.”

However, the fact that a defendant may find it more difficult to meet the charges in the new indictment is not of itself sufficient to show “prejudice”” R v C (CA329/00) (above).

If an adjournment would remedy any prejudice, there may be no objection to the change, but where such an adjournment would result in considerable delay it may be more appropriate to refuse the application, particularly if the accused is in custody: Rapatini, at p 314. Any prejudicial consequences of delay may be minimised by consent under the section being conditional on the indictment being served by a specified date, as was done in R v E. In that case Hansen J held, drawing a parallel with Jones v Police [1998] 1 NZLR 447; (1997) NZ 384 (CA4 (CA), that where the protection given to the defendant by s 335(5) is preserved, the Court is adequately securing the rights of the defendant under ss 24(a) and 25(b) New Zealand Bf Rights Act 1990 (right toht to be informed promptly and fully of the charges being brought, and right to a speedy trial).

[55] In opposing the Crown’s s 345D application Mr Taylor relied on Police v Paraha and Williams,[9] Crown Solicitor at Hamilton v Fatu & Ors[10]and R v Gray.[11]
[56] However, while paying regard to Mr Taylor’s diligence in discovering those cases and putting them before the Court, it must be said that his reliance on them was misplaced since all dealt with applications by the Crown pursuant to s 345(3), not s 34r>
[57] In Parahaaraha and Gray both accused had been discharged at depositions by Justices of the Peace and the Crown brought applications us 345(3) for consent of a Judge to the filing of an indictmdictment notwithstanding the result of the deposition hearing.

[58] Fatu was similarly an application under s 345(3) where the accused had been committed to the wrong Court following a preliminary hearing. True it is that, after analysing the terms of ss 345 and 347(1) Heath d an a an accused’s power to apply for discharge under the latter could only arise after a trial had begun on an indictment to which consent had been giveer s 345(3), but that is not the case in this prosecution. ion. Mr Taylor accepts that he was committed following a preliminary hearing and although he jibs at the reconfiguration of the charges in the amended indictment and asserts there is no evidence to support them, there is nothing in Fatu which suggests that he is prevented from bringing an application under s 347.

[59] For all those reasons, the Court concludes that in terms of the authorities in the passage from Adams cited, there is no basis not to grant the Crown leave to file the amended indictment in the form attached to its application and that Mr Taylor’s fears that proving such a course will deprive him of his right to apply to dismiss the charges under s 347 is unfounded.

[60] The application is granted accordingly.

Severance

[61] If the Crown now wishes to act on its forecast application for severance of the “Operation Spider” charges from the “Operation Web” charges, it is plainly important that it do so quickly having regard to the fact that time has provisionally been allocated in which the two trials could be held.

[62] The Crown is accordingly directed to file any application for severance within seven days of delivery of this judgment and the Registrar is then to arrange an early callover to make the necessary timetabling arrangements.

[63] While any such application will need to be assessed on its merits, the attention of the parties and whichever Judge will hear the application is drawn to the security concerns outlined in this Court’s Reasons for Judgment delivered on 3 May 2010.[12]

HUGH WILLIAMS J.

Editorial Note: Derived from the Court’s electronic records and believed to be correct and final.

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^[1] District Court North Shore, CRI-2009-044-9954, 30 June 2010, Treston DCJ.
^[2] Taylor v Chief Executive of Department of Corrections High Court Auckland CIV-2009-404-7339.
^[3] Rishworth et al “New Zealand Bill of Rights” 2003 ch 24 Pt 6, pp 705-706: Butler and Butler “The New Zealand Bill of Rights Act: A Commentary” 2005 ch 23.8.4.
^[4] Crimes Act 1961 s 367(1).
^[5] Robertson et al Adams on Criminal Law Vol.2 ch 5.12.04 p 5-143.
^[6] At para [7].
^[7] Mr Taylor’s concerns about the extent of the new indictment are answered by the terms of s 345D(2).
^[8] Adams on Criminal Law Vol.1 para CA345D.02 p 1-1979.
^[9] Police v Paraha and Williams High Court Wellington CRI-2004-485-60, 3 June 2004, Ronald Young J
^[10] Crown Solicitor at Hamilton v Fatu & Ors, High Court Hamilton CRI-2006-019-326, 26 July 2006, Heath J.
^[11] R v Gray High Court Wellington CRI-2006-485-50, 6 September 2006, Ronald Young J.
^[12] R v Butland Taylor & Ors High Court Auckland CRI-2008-044-7390 Paras [16]-[17], [20](c)-(e).